In January 1941, more than 80,000 troops of the Kuomintang Third Theater ambushed the Headquarters of the New Fourth Army and more than 9,000 subordinate units in the Maolin area south of Jing County, Anhui Province, creating an incident in southern Anhui that shocked China and foreign countries.
After the incident, the Kuomintang did everything in its power to slander and impose various charges on the New Fourth Army, one of which was that the New Fourth Army violated the orders of the Third Theater and was not dispatched and refused to go north. Even, to this day, there is still a "God Answer" on the Internet of "Why did the Anhui Southern Incident happen":
"The commission asked the New Fourth Army to go north to resist Japan, but the New Fourth Army did not leave, but only stayed in the south to pull the troops, so the commission suppressed it."
In fact, did the New Fourth Army violate the orders of the Third Theater and not be dispatched north to resist japan? As early as January 19, 1941, the CCP published the "Truth About the Tragic Encirclement and Annihilation of the New Fourth Army's Southern Anhui Troops" to explain and refute this.
The article first pointed out: "Facts have fully proved that the New Fourth Army resolutely carried out the orders of its superiors and gloriously fulfilled the orders of its superiors in the War of Resistance behind enemy lines. Even in this transfer to Jiangbei, there was no violation of the orders of the superiors. ”
In fact, this is also true.
Why? Specific facts are:
First, Ye Ting, commander of the New Fourth Army, and Xiang Ying, deputy commander of the New Fourth Army, in reply to the Kuomintang's Telegrams of He Yingqin and Bai Chongxi, had publicly stated that all the troops of the New Fourth Army that remained in Jiangnan could cross the river and move north.
Second, in order for the New Fourth Army to move north, Ye Ting personally went to the headquarters of the commander of the Third Theater to handle the formalities for moving, and Gu Zhutong, deputy commander of the prisoner of war, personally planned with him the marching route and time of the crossing of the river north through southern Jiangsu.
Third, Shangguan Yunxiang, commander-in-chief of the Kuomintang 32nd Group Army, also allowed the New Fourth Army to cross the river in southern Jiangsu on false roads.
Fourth, most of the Jiangnan troops of the New Fourth Army began to move on December 5, and successively crossed the river north through southern Jiangsu.
V. On the 17th, the Japanese broadcast said that the first part of the New Fourth Army: "From the vicinity of Xuancheng to the Jintan and Jurong sides of the area occupied by our (enemy self-proclaimed) were defeated, and our troops took advantage of this good opportunity to capture the enemy everywhere since the 14th and annihilate him." This also proves that the New Fourth Army in southern Anhui province still rushed to southern Jiangsu from the continuous bloody battles after being surrounded and annihilated by the Kuomintang army.
In fact, in the absence of any replenishment of the cost of expulsion, the cost of resettlement of wounded and sick pensions, and the ammunition, all the troops of the New Fourth Army remaining in southern Anhui were dispatched on January 4 and began to move north.
It was precisely because the New Fourth Army resolutely carried out the order of the Third Theater to go north, and unreservedly informed Gu Zhutong, commander-in-chief of the Third Theater, and Shangguan Yunxiang, commander-in-chief of the Group Army, that Gu Zhutong was able to send heavy troops to ambush on the road through which the New Fourth Army had to pass, resulting in such heavy losses suffered by the New Fourth Army in the Maolin area.
The ironclad facts show that the New Fourth Army resolutely carried out the order of the Third Theater to cross the river and go north, and there was no violation of the order and was not dispatched.