Author: Hu Xianda
In the second year after the founding of New China, the united forces led by the United States brazenly launched the Korean War, and the flames of the war once burned to the yalu River.
According to the Yalta Agreement between Stalin and Roosevelt, the peninsula was divided by the 38th Parallel, with North Korea on one side and South Korea on the other.
The United States invaded the peninsula in the name of the coalition forces, which not only violated the Yalta Agreement, but also seriously threatened the security of the northeast region of New China.
For New China, this is an external problem that must be carefully dealt with. Under the frequent emergencies of General Jin, it is imperative to send troops to aid the DPRK.
The most important task in sending troops to aid the DPRK and protecting the national territory is to form an army and select a good general. At the meeting on the planning and formation of the Northeast Border Defense Army, Lin Biao made a suggestion to the chairman, meaning that Deng Hua, commander of the 15th Corps, should be transferred to Huang Yongsheng, commander of the 13th Corps.
Chief of Shino Linluo
According to the emergency plan, the 13th Corps will be the main force of the first batch of troops to enter the DPRK. Lin Biao's suggestion was tantamount to replacing Huang Yongsheng and letting Deng Hua go. According to the convention, such a temporary change would be a big taboo for soldiers. The cadres attending the meeting had a lot of discussion about this, and there was no consensus on what was going on.
At this time, Luo Ronghuan, the old political commissar of Siye, agreed with Lin Biao's suggestion, which led to a consensus among everyone and supported Lin Biao's change of generals.
In fact, many of the Four Wild Troops were old units that Lin Biao had brought in the past, and Deng Hua and Huang Yongsheng were also Lin Biao's old subordinates. In the selection of troops, Lin Biao, who knows the roots and the bottom, has the right to speak. Why did he commit this taboo? How exactly did he think about it?
At the beginning of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, Lin Biao was injured by mistake and went to the Soviet Union for medical treatment. He had a certain understanding of the weapons, equipment and combat capabilities of the Soviet Red Army. It was based on this understanding that he felt that it was more appropriate for the 13th Corps to enter the Korean War and hand it over to Deng Hua.
Deng Hua
From a worldwide perspective, in terms of "data hard power" such as military equipment, the only one who could compete with the US army was the Soviet Red Army. The Volunteer Army was to confront the American Army, and the Red Army was a good frame of reference.
As a warrior he relied on, Lin Biao knew Deng Hua's combat style very well. He held that Deng Hua was more suitable to serve as a military commander for the main force sending troops to aid the DPRK. Because Deng Hua has a sense of the overall situation, he is good at flexibly handling all unexpected problems from the overall perspective. Compared with Deng Hua, Huang Yongsheng dared to fight a hard battle and was able to carry out the orders of his superiors to the end, but he was strong and flexible.
Fighting with the U.S. military, it is inevitable to encounter many unprecedented emergencies. As a front-line commander, you must be able to face the complex situation of the battlefield independently, have an opinion at a critical moment, and be able to consider the response plan from the overall perspective.
From this point of view, Lin Biao's recommendation of Deng Hua as the commander of the 13th Corps is indeed reasonable, and Deng Hua is also a very suitable candidate.
These talents of Deng Hua were vividly displayed as early as 1947 when Lin Biao waved his division to fight and draw four draws, and Lin Biao never forgot them.
In the fourth battle, Lin Biao's main opponent was Chen Mingren, a concubine of the Chiang clan. At that time, after analyzing and judging Chen Mingren's previous combat style, Deng Hua believed that Siping's defenders were about 30,000 people, and suggested that Lin Zong send a column of troops to storm Siping, and then wait for work to meet the enemy who came from Shenyang to reinforce.
In the study and judgment of the strength of the Siping defenders, Lin Biao did not take Deng Hua's analysis data for granted at the time, and still adhered to his original judgment that there were about 20,000 enemy troops in Siping City, and there was no need to send additional troops to strengthen the siege force.
Lin Biao did not take Deng Hua's advice, and fought with Chen Mingren in Siping in the dark and deadlocked. When the reinforcements from Shenyang came, our siege troops were caught between the front and back, losing more than 8,000 people, and had to withdraw and find another fighter.
Unable to attack Siping for a long time, our army suffered a heavy loss of insufficient troops. Afterwards, Lin Biao learned that the strength of the defenders in Siping City was roughly in line with Deng Hua's judgment. If Deng Hua's plan to increase the number of troops to attack the city could be adopted, the outcome of the duel with Chen Mingren was likely to be a different situation. Our army first took Siping with superior troops, and then relied on the defense of Siping City and the surrounding fortresses to meet the enemy reinforcements who came from Shenyang all the way to the wind and dust. In this way, it is possible to avoid the situation of being trapped under the fortified city, being attacked by the enemy back and forth, and having to withdraw. In this battle, lin Biao, while reviewing the lack of siege troops and losing, was also deeply impressed by Deng Hua's talent in analyzing and judging the combat opponent and the overall situation of the war.
In addition, Deng Hua, as one of the most capable generals under Lin Biao's command, in the spring of 1947, when Lin Biao led the entire army to retreat to Harbin and Du Yuming's five armies were in hot pursuit, he cleverly designed a pocket array and ate the reorganized 25th Division, which was once known as Zhao Zilong's division, and Du Yuming was so shocked that he no longer dared to swing his division north.
When Lin Biao recommended military commanders who sent troops to aid the DPRK, Deng Hua's talents played an important role.
For geographical reasons, the premier suggested at the meeting that it is best for the troops who send troops to aid the DPRK to use the old troops of the four fields nearby, who have been fighting in the northeast for a long time and can quickly adapt to the geographical climate and combat environment of the battlefield.
Lin Biao strongly agreed with this consideration, and other participants at the meeting also believed that it was more appropriate for the Four Fields Unit to enter the DPRK to fight.
The meeting decided to dispatch four field troops from the Central and Southern Military Regions to form the Northeast Border Defense Army, and the 13th Corps took the lead in rushing to the northeast to carry out defenses in order to cope with the unexpected situation of the US invasion of Korea.
With the approval of the chairman, the 38th, 39th, and 40th armies of the 13th Corps rushed to Andong, Fengcheng, Liaoyang, liaoning, and other places in Liaoning, and assembled on standby.
The 13th Corps belonged to the most effective corps in the sequence of the Four Fields, and the commander of the corps was Huang Yongsheng. When Liang Xingchu of the 38th Army, Wu Xinquan of the 39th Army, and Wen Yucheng of the 40th Army were ordered to lead their troops to the northeast, they were very surprised, and their commander Huang Yongsheng did not go with them.
Of course, Liang Xingchu, Wu Xinquan, Wen Yucheng, and other military-level cadres of the 13 corps also admired the talents of Deng Hua, commander of the 15 corps. Deng Hua was appointed as their superior, and it did not take much running-in.
Later, Deng Hua, as the first deputy commander in charge of the operational command of the Zhi Division, went to the battlefield to keep the overall situation in mind and did not fail in his mission. He personally went to the front line to survey the terrain, find out the enemy's situation, and provide plans to assist General Peng in commanding the volunteer army to fight against the enemy.
In the Battle of Shangganling, which the US army could not look back on, Deng Hua, through the comparative analysis of the situation and strength of the enemy and us, believed that the volunteer army must carry out position defense through tunnel tactics in order to continuously deplete the strength and firepower superiority of the US army, and then gradually turn defeat into victory through the resilience of this position defense.
In terms of fire suppression, THE US aircraft, tanks, and artillery can take turns to fight, or they can continue to suppress the volunteer infantry charge and fire counterattack in the form of extended firepower and orderly docking. However, the volunteers relied on the defensive positions held by the tunnels, and with their ingenious anti-slope peak waist design, the American shells swept over their heads and hit in vain. The US military was driven hysterical and mad by Deng Hua's tactics, and poured countless fire on Xiangganling. In this battle, 40,000 volunteer soldiers and 60,000 American troops fought bloodily for 43 days, at the cost of nearly 10,000 casualties, annihilating 25,000 enemies.
The U.S. military squandered more than 1.9 million shells and more than 5,000 aerial bombs in the land of projectiles, and finally collapsed and fled. Shangganling has become a veritable "sadness ridge" in the hearts of Americans.
With his outstanding military ability, Deng Hua assisted General Peng in commanding the volunteer army and defeated the invincible MacArthur, Ridgway, Clarke, and other US generals, showing with actual achievements that the original "change of generals" was correct.
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