In the early days of the Jinggangshan base area, the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army was surrounded on all sides by the white regime, often fighting against the Kuomintang troops far more powerful than themselves. It is particularly important to develop a set of correct strategies and tactics that can defeat a strong enemy. In the course of one year, Chairman Mao led his troops to break the enemy's four "attacks" and two "attacks" on Jinggangshan, which fully demonstrated his military genius beyond ordinary people.
After the Nanchang Uprising, the Autumn Harvest Uprising, and the Guangzhou Uprising were defeated one after another, the Kuomintang once mistakenly believed that the armed forces of the Communist Party had been almost wiped out, and that only a few insignificant small detachments remained.
At the end of 1927, when the Wan'an Uprising broke out and the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army successively captured Chaling and Suichuan County, the Kuomintang Jiangxi authorities were shocked and launched the first "offensive and suppression" of the Jinggangshan revolutionary base area. At the beginning of 1928, Yang Ruxuan's unit of the 27th Division of the Gansu Army attacked Wan'an with 1 regiment and 1 battalion, and then entered the new city of Beidamen in Jinggangshan with 1 battalion, posing a serious threat to the base area.
Chairman Mao has just put forward the guerrilla warfare principle of "the enemy comes and I leave, the enemy garrisons us to disturb, and the enemy retreats and we pursue" in Suichuan, and the opportunity for actual combat testing has been ushered in. He carefully analyzed the battle situation and made careful arrangements. He instructed the Red Guards of Ninggang County to attack the enemy troops occupying the new city day and night, causing them to be shocked and restless for a day. Later, when the enemy army found out that the attacker was the local Red Guards, they did not think so, and their pride relaxed.
Seeing that the time was ripe, Chairman Mao concentrated his superior forces to annihilate the enemy, surrounded the new city from the south, north, and east, deliberately left a gap in the west, and preset an ambush. On February 18, the Red Army took advantage of the thick morning fog to launch an attack, and the enemy thought that it was the Red Guards attacking, but they did not care, and when the Red Army entered the city from three sides, the enemy panicked and broke through from the west, and was entering Chairman Mao's pocket.
No matter what, people could not believe how these Red Army soldiers with rifles and spears in their hands could clean up Yang Ruxuan's 1 regular battalion and the county Jingwei regiment in less than half a day. Chairman Mao completed the first annihilation campaign against the regular army formed by the Kuomintang with a plan that was difficult to distinguish between true and false. Chen Shiyu, who took part in the battle, later said:
Whenever I recall the battle in the new city, my heart is always excited. War is originally cruel and merciless, but the command of war is a science and art, and it is simply a pleasure to be able to participate in a just battle under the command of Chairman Mao.
In April 1928, Zhu Mao joined the Division at Jinggangshan to form the Fourth Army of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, which greatly alarmed the Kuomintang. Chiang Kai-shek vainly attempted to strangle the Red Army in its cradle and mobilized the army to once again "attack and suppress" the Jinggangshan base area. The 1st Division of the Eighth Army of the Xiang Army, which received the order, occupied Chaling and Shuxian County, and the 27th Division of the Gan Army occupied Yongxin, Ji'an, Suichuan and other places successively, and the troops attacked Ninggang in two ways.
At the moment of the great enemy, Chairman Mao calmly and calmly told the vast number of commanders and fighters the story of "Zhu Deaf Son, the Great King of the Mountains." From the end of the Qing Dynasty to the establishment of the revolutionary base area, Jinggangshan was once a place where bandits roamed and where green forests lived.
In December 1921, Zhu Kongyang (nicknamed "Zhu DeafZi"), a company commander of the Cantonese Army stationed in Hunan, was dissatisfied with his superiors' deduction of military salaries and led his troops to Jinggangshan to become the "King of the Mountains". In order to deal with the advance and suppression of the officers and troops, Zhu Kongyang took advantage of his familiarity with the terrain and environment and other favorable conditions to maneuver and flexibly with the officers and troops in the mangy mountains, so that the officers and troops were exhausted and could not help him. He has a famous saying to deal with encirclement and suppression: You don't need to be able to fight, as long as you can play circles. A few words contain an extremely simple guerrilla tactical principle.
At that time, most of the military commanders in the Red Army were students from the Whampoa Military Academy. They have studied a set of command and management methods of the old army, but how to fight a war and how to effectively destroy the enemy and how to save and develop themselves when the enemy is strong and we are weak cannot be found in textbooks. Many commanders are often at a loss in practice.
Chairman Mao said with a smile: It is a good experience to play circles, but he is passive in playing circles, not to destroy the enemy and expand the base areas. We must change Zhu Deaf's words, that is, we must be able to fight wars and play circles. The purpose of playing circles is to avoid reality, and to fight a war is to fight a falsehood. When the strong enemy came, he first led him around in a few circles, told him to eat and sleep restlessly, made the enemy tired, and concentrated his superior forces to clean him up when he could not open his eyes. Moreover, the blow was beaten cleanly and neatly, and it was better to injure his ten fingers than to cut off one finger and eat the enemy bite by bite. Finally, Chairman Mao humorously summed it up: Our position is not fixed, and if we win a war, we will fight, if we can't win a war, we will leave, if we make money, we will not do anything. Now, when the enemy comes to "attack and suppress," we must go around in circles with him well, and then seize his weakness, surprise him, attack him unprepared, and hit him fiercely.
Therefore, Chairman Mao decided to "concentrate his forces and annihilate the enemy all the way" to strike at the Gansu army, which had weak combat effectiveness. At the end of the month, in accordance with his deployment and under the command of Zhu De, the Red Army adopted the tactics of avoiding the enemy's front and attacking the flanks, first defeating 1 regiment of the Gan Army at the Wudou River in Suichuan, and then taking advantage of the victory to pursue and capture the county town of Yongxin in one fell swoop, successfully smashing this "advance and suppression."
A few days later, on the basis of summing up their experiences, Chairman Mao and Zhu De formally developed the flexible and mobile strategy and tactics of "being able to fight wars and at the same time being able to fight in circles" into guerrilla warfare "sixteen-character tips" of guerrilla warfare in which "the enemy advances and retreats, the enemy garrisons us to disturb, the enemy wears us out to fight, and the enemy retreats and we pursue."
The armed struggle under the leadership of the Communist Party of China was waged for a long time under the condition that the enemy was strong and we were weak. This requires that when fighting a war, we must focus on fighting wisdom, rather than relying on fighting force alone. Chairman Mao called this "sixteen-character recipe" "the basic principle of guerrilla warfare of a simple nature adapted to the conditions of the time."
It is precisely from the characteristics of the enemy's strength and our weakness that it seeks advantages and avoids disadvantages, avoids real attacks and attacks, and flexibly moves to achieve the purpose of preserving itself and destroying the enemy, thus gradually changing the balance of forces between the enemy and us. It was from it that the people's army's later strategies and tactics were developed. Since then, the "Sixteen-Character Recipe" has become a magic weapon for the Red Army to overcome the strong with the weak, and the Red Army has used it to achieve one victory after another.
The Red Army captured the county seat of Yongxin, and Yang Ruxuan was so angry that he scolded his subordinates for being incompetent. In late May, he personally led 4 regiments of troops from Ji'an to Yongxin. Chairman Mao instructed the Red Army to take the initiative to withdraw from Yongxin and return to Ninggang. Yang Ruxuan got an empty city and triumphantly sent a report to Jie. He also moved the division headquarters to Yongxin in a vain attempt to capture the Jinggangshan base area at once.
When Chairman Mao returned to Ninggang, he consulted with Zhu De, Chen Yi, and other comrades to prepare to strike at the enemy by attacking the enemy with the method of attacking the east and the west with sound. He first sent the 1st Battalion of the 31st Regiment to attack Gaolong in Chaling County, and then sent 28 regiments to reinforce, completely annihilating 1 company of the enemy and capturing more than 100 guns.
The Red Army fought another victorious battle at Gaolong. Yang Ruxuan received the news, and sure enough, thinking that the main force of the Red Army had turned to Hunan, he sent 2 regiments directly to Ninggang, leaving only 1 regiment at Yongxin to defend the division headquarters. Chairman Mao heard that the enemy's forwards had reached Longyuankou, knew that Yang Ruxuan had fallen into the trap again, and immediately sent a letter to Gaolong to ask the Red Army to quickly return to Yongxin.
Zhu De received Chairman Mao's letter and immediately led the Red Army to Yongxin City, marching 120 miles in one night. The enemy who remained behind in Yongxin just left the city to search west. Zhu De ordered his troops to occupy favorable terrain and lay an ambush. When the enemy entered the ambush circle, the Red Army fighters suddenly attacked, beating the enemy to the point of dizziness, and after more than 1 hour of fierce fighting, they annihilated all 1 regiment of the enemy and killed the enemy regiment leader "Liu Beard".
The Red Army came to Yongxin City with lightning speed, and Yang Ruxuan was still in the dark and was playing mahjong. Someone told him that he heard gunshots outside the city, and he said indifferently: "The main force of the Red Army has gone to Hunan." This sporadic gunshot is nothing more than a small group of guerrilla harassment, and there is no need to make a fuss. I've sent 'Liu Beard' to search, and if there's any situation, he'll report it! ”
In the evening, the Red Army launched an onslaught on the city, and bullets rained down into the city. Yang Ruxuan learned that he had been surrounded by the Red Army, and hurriedly jumped the city wall to escape, only to be injured by the Red Army and flee back to Ji'an. The enemy who came to Longyuankou heard that Yongxin had fallen and the division headquarters had been annihilated, and hurriedly fled to Ji'an. The enemy's "advance and suppression" this time all failed, and the Red Army occupied Yongxin for the second time.
Yongxin was occupied by the Red Army twice, and Chiang Kai-shek became angry and launched the fourth "attack" on Jinggangshan in June 1928. The Hunan warlord Wu Shang led 5 regiments to force Ninggang from the west, and the Jiangxi warlords Yang Chisheng and Yang Ruxuan also led 5 regiments to attack Yongxin from the east. The two enemy forces attacked separately and together, and there was a great possibility of stepping on Jinggang Mountain.
Chairman Mao once again ordered the Red Army to take the initiative to withdraw from Yongxin and rest in the area around Ninggang New City. When Yang Chisheng and Yang Ruxuan arrived at Yongxin, they shrank in the city and did not dare to push forward. Wu Shang did not move when he arrived at Chaling, wanting to see the situation in Jiangxi. In order to mobilize the enemy, Chairman Mao ordered the three regiments of the Red Army to attack in two directions to the southwest, where the enemy's defensive strength was weak. The two Red Army attacked fiercely, annihilating 1 regiment of the enemy along the way and defeating the landlords' armed forces along the way.
Wu Shang received the news and hurriedly divided his troops to the south to block, which relieved the pressure on the western side of the base area. Yang Chisheng and Yang Ruxuan thought that the Red Army had fled to southern Hunan, and quickly mobilized troops to prepare for a large-scale attack. Where did they know that the main force of the Red Army had already rushed back to Ninggang in accordance with Chairman Mao's original plan.
On the basis of the reconnaissance situation, Chairman Mao made specific combat arrangements: Zhu De and Chen Yi led the 29th Regiment and the 1st Battalion of the 31st Regiment to snipe Yang Chisheng at New Qixiling; the 28th Regiment led by Wang Erzhuo sniped at Yang Ruxuan's 2 regiments at Old Qixiling; and Yuan Wencai led a 32nd Regiment and rushed around the path overnight to the vicinity of the enemy's front-line headquarters. As soon as the enemy at Qixiling collapsed, the Red Army immediately encircled them, cut off the enemy's retreat, and tried to eliminate them all at Longyuankou.
At dawn on June 23, the 28th Regiment led by Wang Erzhuo took the lead in launching a charge against the enemy at Laoqixiling, and after an hour of fierce fighting, captured the top of the mountain, and the enemy was confused and fled down the mountain. Wang Erzhu immediately led the team and directly attacked the Mouth of Longyuan.
The team led by Zhu De and Chen Yi also rushed to the New Qixi Ridge before dawn, immediately arranged a hidden position, and seized the commanding heights of the Wangyue Pavilion. The enemy came to the front of the position and launched a continuous charge, and the battle was very fierce. Zhu De raised his machine gun, jumped up to the Moon Pavilion, and fired fiercely at the enemy. The soldiers saw the front-line commanders personally enter the battle, and one by one they bravely rushed down the mountain. The enemy could not resist and turned around and fled. Red Army soldiers chased after them.
Yuan Wencai heard the gunshots of Qixiling and immediately launched an attack, scattering the enemy's front-line headquarters in one fell swoop. Yang Ruxuan was injured in his right arm again and fled into the wilderness.
The two enemy troops fled to Longyuankou, with 28 regiments in front of them blocking, 29 regiments and 1st battalion of 31 regiments pursuing them in the back, and the surrounding mountains were full of Red Guards armed with large knives, and they fell into the net of heaven and earth, and it was difficult to fly with their wings, so they had to surrender their guns. Under the personal deployment and command of Chairman Mao, the Red Army annihilated 1 regiment of the enemy, captured more than 1,000 guns, tens of thousands of rounds of ammunition, and won the biggest victory since the establishment of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army------ the "Great Victory at Longyuankou."
In order to celebrate this great victory, Zhu De, who was in a good mood, made up a song:
Commissar Mao led the troops in Jinggang, and the Strength of the Red Army was strong and strong, and it did not cost the Red Army three points of strength to crush the "two sheep (Yang)" in Jiangxi!
Later, he also said: "Three dozen Yongxin eliminated Zhu Peide's main force. Zhu Peide's main force was crushed, and the other Kuomintang troops did not dare to cooperate. The three strikes of yongxin are a key, the key to the development of the base areas and the development of the Red Army, and are related to the later victory of the Red Army. ”
After several successive victories, the Jinggangshan base area was expanded to the entire territory of Ninggang, Yongxin, and Lianhua counties, a small part of Ji'an and Anfu counties, the northern part of Suichuan County, and the southeastern part of Suichuan County, with a total area of more than 7,200 square kilometers and a total of more than 500,000 people, and the Jinggangshan base area ushered in its heyday.
After that, Chairman Mao continued to interpret the divine power of the "Sixteen Character Recipe" in a fascinating way, led the Jinggangshan army and people to victory in the famous Huangyang Boundary Defense War, and captured Yongxin for the fourth time, smashing the two "meetings and suppressions" of the Kuomintang troops in Xianggan and Gansu provinces against the jinggangshan revolutionary base area twice in succession.
Chairman Mao's command ability impressed the soldiers and civilians on Jinggang Mountain, and people often compared Chairman Mao to "Kong Ming.", and the Xiucai Long Pulin in the army also compiled a paragraph modeled on the "Empty Mountain Plan" that Chairman Mao had laid down in the Defense of the Huangyang Boundary, which was copied from the singing voice of the Peking Opera "Empty City Plan", which was widely sung for a time and became a good story. A passage by Shaw Ke spoke to the hearts of many people at that time:
In the early stage of the Jinggangshan struggle, many of our comrades did not understand the characteristics of China's revolutionary war and were not accustomed to guerrilla tactics in the new form of warfare. Chairman Mao taught us that the lifeblood of Jia Baoyu in the Grand View Garden is the stone on his neck, and the lifeblood of the Kuomintang is its army. Only by destroying the enemy, surrendering his gun, and capturing the prisoners can he dig out his lifeblood.
During the jinggangshan struggle, in the anti-"encirclement and suppression" struggle in the Central Soviet Region and in the long-term struggle that followed, we fought many battles. For many years, every time I thought of those victorious battles, I had a sentence in my heart: "Chairman Mao uses soldiers like gods!" ”
On November 7, 1928, Chiang Kai-shek, who regarded the Jinggangshan base area as a problem for his confidants, appointed He Jian as the acting commander-in-chief and Jin Handing as the deputy commander-in-chief, and concentrated more than 30,000 people in 6 brigades from the two provinces of Xianggan and Gansu. Under the circumstance that the heavy troops were under pressure and economic difficulties, and the third "meeting and suppression" could not be quickly broken, in order to avoid the enemy's sharp edge, the troops took the initiative to withdraw from Jinggangshan and advance toward the Gannan region to open up new base areas------ the revolutionary base areas in gannan and western Fujian.
During the Jinggangshan struggle for more than a year, Chairman Mao and his comrades-in-arms persisted in their tenacious exploration in practice in an extremely complicated and arduous environment, leaving valuable wealth for the CPC, the people's army under its leadership, and the Chinese revolution, and becoming a new starting point for the Chinese Communists to continue to advance. General Jiang Hua, who was awarded the rank of general in 1955, made a very pertinent review and evaluation of this process:
In the practice of struggle, I have gradually come to understand and understand the jinggangshan road opened up by Comrade Chairman Mao, that is, the road of establishing rural base areas, encircling the cities with the countryside, and finally seizing national power. This is the correct path that will lead the Chinese revolution to victory. And our Party has paid a blood price for finding this path.
In 1927, after the defeat of the Great Revolution, the Chinese revolution was at a low ebb, and in the face of the brutal massacre of the Kuomintang reactionaries, many Communists realized the importance of mastering the barrel of a gun. The Eighty-Seventh Congress of the Party established the general policy of opposing armed counter-revolution with armed revolution, and began a new period in which the Party independently led the armed struggle and seized power by revolutionary war.
But how is armed struggle? Where is the center of gravity of the Chinese revolution? That is to say, what road does the Chinese revolution take? What power do you rely on? These problems are grimly placed before the whole Party. At that time, in the history of the world proletarian revolution, there was only a successful precedent for the seizure of power by the urban insurrection of the October Revolution in Russia.
Thus, the armed struggle led by our Party, at the outset, was still modelled on the experience of the October Revolution and the holding of an armed uprising in the cities. For example, in the Nanchang Uprising, it was decided that the rebel army would go south to Guangdong, first taking Chaozhou and Shantou, taking Guangdong as the base, and then going north. The Guangzhou uprising planned to hold on to Guangzhou and seize power in the province. The Autumn Harvest Uprising was also aimed at capturing Changsha. The guiding ideology of these armed uprisings was to take the city as the center and take the revolutionary road of taking the city first and then the countryside, but the results were unsuccessful.
This is not only a lack of experience among anyone, but also a lack of experience in this armed struggle by the whole Party. Comrade Chairman Mao led the troops of the Autumn Harvest Uprising, marched toward Jinggangshan, created the Jinggangshan revolutionary base area, established the workers' and peasants' main power in the base areas, carried out the agrarian revolution, and carried out the armed division of workers and peasants, thus providing a brilliant example for the whole Party... Therefore, people are right to say that the Jinggangshan revolutionary base area is the cradle of the Chinese revolution.