On August 4, 1949, Cheng Qian and Chen Mingren led more than 77,000 people from the Changsha Appeasement Office, the 1st Corps Headquarters, 3 corps and 3 security divisions to solemnly declare an uprising in Changsha. Changsha was then peacefully liberated.
Chairman Mao Zedong attached great importance to the uprising led by Cheng Qian and Chen Mingren. As early as before the uprising, in view of chen Mingren's extremely fierce and cruel fight with Lin Biao's Northeast Democratic Coalition Army in three wars and four peacetimes, and whether the Communist Party could fully understand and forgive him, he was not at the bottom of his heart, Chairman Mao Zedong specially entrusted Zhang Shizhao to relay a message to Chen Mingren: "At that time, Chen Mingren was sitting on their boat, rowing each boat, and wanted to win. Just stand up and we'll have to reuse him!" ”
For the famous generals of the Kuomintang army who revolted, Chairman Mao Zedong often had amazing great strokes in his treatment and use. In particular, chairman Mao Zedong treated Cheng Qian and Chen Mingren's rebel troops even more unusually.
Although when Cheng Qian and Chen Mingren first announced the uprising, there were still 70,000 or 80,000 troops in the army, but after Bai Chongxi's rebellion, the rebel troops ran away quite a few people, and there were still 30,000 or 40,000 people left. For these rebel troops, Chairman Mao Zedong gave a formal corps name, the 21st Corps. The entire corps has jurisdiction over 2 corps and 6 divisions.
It should be said that for Chen Mingren's 30,000 or 40,000 rebel troops, Chairman Mao Zedong was able to give a complete corps structure number and still appoint Chen Mingren as the commander of the corps, which is unimaginable in common sense. It fully reflects Chairman Mao Zedong's great importance and trust in Chen Mingren and the rebel forces.
Not only that, Chairman Mao Zedong also gave a special explanation to Lin Biao, commander of the Four Fields: "When the corps has made some achievements in reorganization and discipline, give them a batch of guns," and "After about a year, if the corps performs well and our local units, such as independent divisions and regiments, can concentrate, we can consider forming an army to join the corps, so that Chen Mingren has 3 corps."
Sincerely, the golden stone is open. Chen Mingren was deeply touched by Chairman Mao Zedong's open-mindedness, arrogance, and trust. During his participation in the Cppcc Political Consultative Conference in Beijing before the founding of the People's Republic of China, he repeatedly expressed to Chairman Mao Zedong the idea of "going to the front line to fight and make meritorious contributions."
It is said that as a senior general of the Kuomintang army who had just revolted, Chen Mingren was able to put forward the idea of going to the front line to fight and make meritorious contributions, which was very remarkable, and it was not something that ordinary people could do. We see that there are not many generals who have revolted in the Kuomintang throughout the War of Liberation, but when the uprising comes, they can lead a whole regiment to immediately turn around and fight the Kuomintang army, which has no precedent, and it is difficult for ordinary people to do it.
Although Chairman Mao Zedong expressed his appreciation for Chen Mingren's idea, he did not agree. The reason was that the Chair had a deeper consideration.
First, the troops are not neat. Chen Mingren's troops were originally under the control of Bai Chongxi, commander of the "Suppression General" in central China. After the uprising of the troops, Bai Chongxi came to draw a salary from the bottom of the pot, and after his reactionary propaganda and vigorous rebellion, the troops fled a lot, tens of thousands of people. This made Chen Mingren's rebel troops, although at this time known as an organized corps, have a full count of 30,000 or 40,000 people, which is neither full nor neat. At this time, it is obviously not a wise move for such an untidy corps to go to the front to fight.
Second, there is no unity of thought. Although Chen Mingren led the uprising, it does not mean that all these troops have turned a corner in their thinking. In fact, it is impractical to have so many people turning the corner at once. The fact that many people who had been counter-escaped by Bai Chongxi before was proof of this. Some people had to revolt under the great offensive of the Communist army to destroy the decay, some people still had a certain wait-and-see element in their hearts, and it is not even excluded that there were a very few reactionaries in the insurrectionary troops. In view of this, in the absence of unity of thought, it is not very supportive to let them go to the front line to fight. In particular, the problem of escaping again should not be underestimated.
Third, the troops have not been reorganized. Judging from the practice of transforming the Kuomintang insurrectionary troops in the War of Liberation, after the uprising came, it was necessary to carry out a comprehensive transformation and rectification training. Including the dispatch of a large number of political workers, including carrying out a large amount of ideological and political work, including the transmission and assistance of our army's strategy and tactics, these are all indispensable links and actions. That is to say, the complete transformation of a Kuomintang insurrectionary force into a Communist army requires extensive rectification and training, and a time process.
Obviously, Chairman Mao Zedong's considerations are objective, comprehensive and correct.
But despite this, Chairman Mao Zedong did not say that Chen Mingren went to the front to fight. In his instructions to Lin Biao, he further clarified that Chen Mingren's troops "After the initial reorganization, if there is a combat opportunity, it is good to go to the front line and fight a few battles." I would also like to draw your attention to the fact that, if possible, they shall be allowed to participate in one or two battles."
Through Chairman Mao Zedong's treatment of Chen Mingren's desire to go to the front to fight, we have also appreciated the side of the great man who combines principle and flexibility, the side of knowing people and using people's hands, and the side that makes many Kuomintang army uprising generals happy and convinced.
Main References: Mao Zedong's Military Manuscripts Since the Founding of the People's Republic of China