Wen | Hu Bo
Xu Yongchang (1887-1959), a native of Chengxian County, Shanxi (now part of Yuanping City), was a chinese poet. He graduated from the Wuwei Left Army Camp Academy, the Beijing Army General Research Institute, and the Fourth Phase of the Army University. During the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, Xu Yongchang held the post of director of the Military Command Department for a long time and was one of the five ministers of the central command body of the Chinese army at that time. With its high status and special status, the diaries written have naturally become indispensable precious historical materials for the study of the history of the War of Resistance.
The author has selected some of the contents in "Xu Yongchang's Diary" to introduce Xu Yongchang's experience in some of the events during the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression from one side.
Xu Yongchang
In order to open up the communication line in Chinese mainland, the Japanese base camp decided to launch a "No. 1 Operation" through the north and south of China in 1944, the first of which was the attack on Henan and Hubei. In this regard, the Chinese military and political high-level has become aware of the frequent movement and transportation of the Japanese army.
Xu Yongchang recorded his judgment in his diary on April 6, and he believed that the Japanese army's move was "to first open the Yue-Han Line and prepare for the enemy in the Indochina Peninsula in the future, to use this road to withdraw into China; to obstruct the airport east of our Guangdong-Han Line, to facilitate the disturbance of the southwest airport... and now to open up the Pinghan Yunyun ... it seems to be in the north and attack the south, but it also takes the seventh and eighth divisions to open up the Guangdong and Han Dynasties, and to see how the enemy draws troops."
It can be seen that Xu Yongchang and many military and political leaders at that time (including the commander of the 1st Theater commander in the Henan Battlefield) generally believed that the Japanese army would launch a large-scale operation, but not in the northern battlefield, but in the southern battlefield.
On April 12, Xu Yongchang, based on the information provided by the 2nd Department of the Military Command, further believed that "the current increase in the enemy's strength in the middle battlefield is not enough to judge as the basis for opening the Guangdong-Han line, nor is it possible." By this time, Xu Yongchang felt that the Japanese army might launch a battle in the Hunan battlefield, but it seemed that it still needed to be prepared in the short term. However, a day later, after telephone contact with the headquarters of the commander of the 1st Theater, I felt that "the Second Department yesterday did not see an increase in the clouds and clouds." At this time, Xu Yongchang sensed that the intelligence of the 2nd Hall seemed to be inaccurate, and then asked the 1st Theater of Operations in the Henan Battlefield to pay close attention to the movements of the Japanese army, but he still thought that the main battlefield of the Japanese army was in the south, but he did not expect that the Japanese army did launch an attack in Henan.
Xu Yongchang and Chiang Kai-shek
On April 20, Xu Yongchang received a phone call from Tang Enbo, deputy commander of the 1st Theater, arguing that the Japanese army "does not seem to be able to restore the clouds as rumored on the Pinghan Line, and the most noteworthy person is still in the middle battlefield, and if the situation of the increase in the area around Linyue is observed, if there is no change of troops going north for several days, there is no doubt that it will be disturbed." At the same time, he endorsed Tombaugh's idea of "preparing for a counteroffensive."
Three days later, on April 23, Xu Yongchang, in another telephone communication with Tang Enbo, learned that the Japanese army had "transferred five divisions of the Kwantung Army to kaifeng and Xinxiang along the river, preparing to attack Luoyang Yunyun." However, Xu Yongchang believed that this was a "deceptive trick" of the Japanese army to "solve the puppet army on the one hand, and on the other hand to disturb and defend me". In fact, at this time, the Battle of Yuzhong was already very fierce, but Xu Yongchang and the top brass of the commander's headquarters of the 1st Theater still believed that the Japanese army was only pretending to attack, and they still focused on central China.
On April 29, Xu Yongchang finally realized that the Japanese attack in Henan was not a feint, and he began to plan "our troops ... to gather the situation of Yu, Lin, and Deng, and wait for the enemy to penetrate deeply and attack it as a benefit, and the terrain is both favorable and fortified, which Mr. Jiang thought so." Although Xu Yongchang was sure that the Japanese army was not pretending to attack, he was very puzzled by the Japanese army's attack on the Henan battlefield, and after a day's consideration, he believed that the Japanese army "opened the Pinghan Railway, there is no reason", so he came to the conclusion that the Japanese army's move was to "attack the Tang clique or grab wheat".
In the following month, the Chinese army continued to retreat in the Yuzhong battlefield until Luoyang was besieged, and Xu Yongchang and other military and political leaders finally understood that the real intention of the Japanese army was to open up the entire mainland communication line, but it was too late. During this month, Xu Yongchang was inconceivable about tea and dinner, and even refused the banquet of the American staff. Although the armies of the 1st Theater of Operations were defeated and retreated one after another, Xu Yongchang still believed that the Japanese army "has become the end of the crossbow, I have turned into the troops of each army that are mostly weak against the enemy, the army's heart has changed, the enemy has gone deep into the favorable place with us, if the supervision is reasonable, it is quite possible to turn defeat into merit, and in this way, it is reasonable to fight with the enemy, and do whatever it takes to deal with it in order to strike at the next attempt." Unfortunately, Jiang Dingwen, commander of the 1st Theater, and Tang Enbo, deputy commander of the 1st Theater, disappointed him...
At the end of the Battle of Yuzhong, Xu Yongchang made a summary of the reasons for his misjudgment, and he wrote in his diary on May 29: "Yu every suspected that the enemy could not restore the Pinghan Road, and the main feeling was that it was difficult for the enemy to build the Yellow River Bridge, and if there was no bridge, the road was difficult to pass, and the heavy goods could not be crossed, it was still only half through, and he did not expect to build a wooden bridge to lay light rail, although I tried to destroy it in an effort, the enemy was still between being able to use it and not being able to use it." ”
At the military meeting that afternoon, Xu Yongchang wanted to regroup and block the Japanese attack on the battlefield in central China, he believed that "in the xiang'e war situation, the people recognized that the Guangdong-Han line was in a position and lost, and most of them advocated preparing for the Xianggui line, and took the counterattack on the northern battlefield as impossible, and instead of making sacrifices in vain, if they withdrew and sorted out, Yu could not be silent, and said that the terrain between Xianggui and Guizhou was difficult to defend and benefit the enemy, and he had to first deploy a bitter struggle in Guangdong and Han, do not mess with the steps, until the Yushan army dispatched two or three armies to open the rear to sort out, it was necessary, but it was still necessary to actively counterattack. Although the enemy is victorious, he is also extremely tired, and if I straighten out, the enemy will also be given the opportunity to rest, and the conditions of the canal are available, and it will be easy to rest and rectify, and even if it reaches a considerable period, it will continue its attack and turn to the enemy with great benefits." Subsequently, he also advocated punishing those responsible for commanding the failure of the operation, so as to boost morale with strict military discipline.
Xu Yongchang always pinned his hopes on being able to stop the Japanese attack in the Hunan battlefield, and he further judged that the Japanese army would "enter the middle battlefield to the mouth of the river or stop immediately, even if it is close to Hengyang, but it will never go west into the southern battlefield of Guilin, and the enemy may not move after the end of the middle battlefield... and the enemy in Guangzhou has not moved for nearly twenty days, then he knows that the enemy has no deep intentions at all, but he is bent on attacking our counter-offensive forces and the chaotic time to cope with the war, until Yun opens up the Cantonese and Han Xianggui to prepare for a retreat, the labor cost is large, the occupation is also large, and the exposure is declining. If the clouds recede, most of the ships may be used at this time."
According to this, Xu Yongchang believed in his diary on June 18 that the Japanese army "is insufficient, as long as I have the ability to fight, I will not try to enter Guizhou." Now I should start from Changsha, still make a protracted resistance plan on the front, the two wings will organically fight a decisive battle with it, the enemy has no intention of going deeper, and according to the observations of the previous days (the fourteenth), I should consume the enemy at this stage and strike at his luck." However, unfortunately, changsha and Hengyang were not defended, and the Successive Battles of Changheng and Guiliu that followed the Battle of Yuzhong were also defeated one after another, becoming the most miserable battle for the Chinese army during the War of Resistance Against Japan.
Although the Chinese army was defeated in Henan, Hubei, Hunan, and Guangxi, Xu Yongchang was not discouraged, but seriously summed up the experience, and finally achieved success in the Battle of Xiangxi in 1945.
Japan surrendered, and Xu Yongchang signed the instrument of surrender on behalf of the government of the Republic of China
On August 15, 1945, the Emperor of Japan announced the unconditional surrender to the Allied countries, and the War of Resistance Against Japan was finally won. Two days later, Xu Yongchang flew to Manila as a representative of the victorious power, China, to meet with MacArthur, commander-in-chief of the Allied Southwest Pacific Theater, and then took a boat to Tokyo, Japan, to prepare for the surrender ceremony.
On the sea trip to Japan, Xu Yongchang confessed in his diary on August 22 that he was finally able to sleep for six hours during the trip, the first time since he left the house. Perhaps at this time, Xu Yongchang can finally relax himself. However, when the reporter on the ship interviewed Xu Yongchang on August 31 and asked him how he felt about the war and his surrender, he still thought that "this is an experience that should be repented of."
On September 2, 1945, Xu Yongchang signed his name on behalf of China on behalf of the Japanese government on a Missouri warship in Tokyo Bay. Finally, let's take a look at what Xu Yongchang wrote down in his diary on this day:
"Today is the period for the signing of the surrender, and at 7:30 a.m. on a destroyer, I met with the representatives of the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union, Australia, and the Netherlands on board the ship. Arriving at the Missouri at eight o'clock, the commander-in-chief of the US Third Fleet Halsey's flagship also. According to the regulations, the Chinese delegation boarded first, the military music masterpiece, the British, Soviet, Australian and other representatives followed, and at nine o'clock the Japanese representatives also arrived, and MacArthur briefly narrated.
At the beginning of the ceremony, Mai was already in place according to the regulations at this time, the Japanese deputies stood on the opposite side of the case, and the representatives were successively arranged as the nine countries of the United States, China, Britain, the Soviet Union, Australia, Canada, France, the Netherlands, and New Zealand (New Zealand), and major general Wainwright, a former U.S. naval and army officer who was captured in the Philippines, also participated.
At nine o'clock the ceremony was completed, The delegates of The Mai were allowed to enter the living room, Yu and Mai and Ha had a brief greeting (they had met with Nimitz before the ceremony), and Halsey flew in a dense formation of nine hundred air forces over the upper left side of the ship, saying that Yu knew that these were the air forces of the Third Fleet, and there were already hundreds of other protective aircraft circling above. After talking to Mai, everything was found to disembark the ship according to the prescribed ceremony, board the destroyer and return. ”