【文/田士臣】
中國外交部發言人汪文斌在6月13日例行記者會上表示，國際法上根本沒有“國際水域”一說，并拒絕将台灣海峽定性為“國際水域”，這引起了美國和台灣當局的關注和抗議。美國國務院堅稱台灣海峽為“國際水域”，包括航行與飛越在内的公海航行自由在這一水域受到國際法的保障，台外事部門發言人歐江安亦反對北京的說法，堅定附和美國的主張。
除了外交層面的争端外，還有媒體報道引用汪文斌的發言，将中國的立場描述為對整個台灣海峽的主權主張。使問題更加複雜的是，中國大陸的一些社交媒體賬戶無知地鼓吹将整個海峽視為内海，這一觀點并沒有在任何中國官方政策中得到承認。
1982年《聯合國海洋法公約》(UNCLOS)被公認為管理所有海洋活動的“海洋憲章”，它是否有關于“國際水域”的規定呢？如果沒有，為什麼美國不僅在台灣海峽，還在其領海以外的其他海域都堅持使用這個術語？台灣海峽的法律地位又該被如何定義？這些都是需要解決的問題，以便我們充分了解争議各方對海洋法的不同解釋和适用。
在《聯合國海洋法公約》全文中搜尋，你會發現沒有關于“國際水域”的法律定義或相關規定，但這個詞對于美國海軍或海事律師而言卻并不陌生。美國海軍于1900年首次出版、經多次更新後于2022年3月再版的《美國海上行動法指揮官手冊》明确規定：“出于作戰目的，國際水域包括不屬于任何沿海國家主權管轄範圍的所有海洋區域”。
很明顯，“國際水域”更是一個軍事行動術語而非法律術語。既非法律術語，在《聯合國海洋法公約》中沒有任何相關規定也就不足為奇了。這一事實亦為汪文斌的發言提供了支援，即“‘國際水域'在國際海洋法中沒有法律依據”。這就引出了一個問題，為什麼美國要使用這個術語，而不是與《聯合國海洋法公約》保持一緻？
這并不僅僅因為美國不是《聯合國海洋法公約》的締約國，上述美國海軍指揮官手冊給出了答案：“領海以外的所有水域都是國際水域，在這些水域中國際社會享有公海航行和飛越自由。國際水域具體包括毗連區、專屬經濟區和公海”。出于作戰目的，美國将毗連區和專屬經濟區重新劃分歸類為等同于公海的區域，宣稱享有航行和飛越自由而可以不被該區域所要求的法律義務所束縛。更關鍵的一點是，這些自由在美國看來包括了從正常過航到軍事演習的各種活動。
這樣一來，美國就可以在沿海國家的毗連區和專屬經濟區自由開展軍事活動而不承擔任何法律義務。由此，“國際水域”一詞，而這種霸權在很大程度上依賴于其軍艦在世界各大洋上的機動性。
另一個謬論是，美國軍艦過航台灣海峽是執行航行自由計劃行動（FONOPs），以挑戰中國在台灣海峽的“過度海洋主張”。美國的航行自由計劃始于1979年卡特政府時期，其年度報告可在美國國防部的網站上免費查閱。但梳理一下這些檔案，你就會發現找不到任何具體記錄可以佐證“中國在台灣海峽有過度海洋主張”。
最後，台灣海峽的法律地位到底是什麼？它到底是允許國際航行的海峽還是内海（正如一些社交媒體使用者所錯誤主張的那樣）？同樣，我們還是要回到《聯合國海洋法公約》，它對用于國際航行的海峽的法律制度做了具體規定。
根據《聯合國海洋法公約》規定，有兩類“用于國際航行的海峽”。第一類是與一個或多個沿海國家的領海完全重疊的海峽，這些海峽受過境通行制度的管轄，霍爾木茲海峽、馬六甲海峽、直布羅陀海峽、曼德海峽等都術語這一類。第二類是與沿岸國領海沒有完全重疊的海峽，在海峽當中有一條穿越公海或專屬經濟區的友善國際航行的航道，這些海峽也适用公海航行和飛越自由規定的限制，比如台灣海峽和宮古海峽。
不過，《聯合國海洋法公約》也規定，行使這種自由和權利需要遵守相關義務，包括沿海國根據國際法制定的适用的法律和法規。以台灣海峽為例，海峽當中有一條穿越專屬經濟區的通道，海峽水域被劃分為幾個區域，包括内水、領海和毗連區。這種情況下，在台灣海峽的領海部分适用無害通過制度，而在專屬經濟區通道内類比适用公海航行與飛越自由。
這也是為什麼汪文斌指出“中國對台灣海峽享有主權、主權權利和管轄權”。他實際上是表示，中國對台灣海峽兩側的中國内水和領海享有主權，對當中的專屬經濟區部分享有主權權利和管轄權。然而，一些媒體錯誤地或故意地，把中方的聲明報道為中國對整個台灣海峽的主權要求。
作者：田士臣，經士智庫總裁兼國際軍事行動法研究中心主任，中國論壇特約專家；
翻譯：易吳霜，英國國王學院博士候選人，經士智庫研究助理。
【原文連結：https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/world/article/3182228/taiwan-strait-dispute-international-waters-merely-us】
Taiwan Strait dispute: ‘international waters’ is merely a US concoction to maintain its maritime hegemony
By reclassifying all waters seaward of territorial seas as international waters, the US can claim all the high seas freedoms while avoiding any of the obligations due to coastal states
In this sense, the term serves as a panacea for Washington, allowing it to maintain the mobility of its warships in the world’s oceans
Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin’s assertion that there is no such thing as “international waters” in international law and rejection of the Taiwan Strait as international waters have raised concerns and led to an outcry in both the United States and Taiwan.
The US State Department insists the Taiwan Strait is international waters where high seas freedoms, including of navigation and overflight, are guaranteed under international law. Taiwanese foreign ministry spokeswoman Joanne Ou also rejected Beijing’s claim, to stand firmly with the US.
Beyond the official disputes, there are media reports that cite Wang’s statement as describing China’s position as claiming sovereignty over the entire Taiwan Strait. Social media accounts in mainland China also ignorantly advocate treating the entire strait as an internal sea, which is not acknowledged in any official Chinese policy.
The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is considered the “constitution of the oceans” governing all maritime activity. Does it have any regulations on “international waters”?
If not, why does the US persist in using this term, not only with regard to the Taiwan Strait but also in other areas beyond territorial seas? And, what is the legal status of the Taiwan Strait? These are questions that need to be addressed to understand the different interpretations and applications of the law of the sea between the disputing parties.
Search the full text of UNCLOS and you will find no provision for “international waters”. However, this term is not new to the US navy or marine lawyers.
The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, published by the US Navy, states: “For operational purposes, international waters include all ocean areas not subject to the sovereignty of a coastal state.”
Clearly, “international waters” is an operational, rather than legal, term. Since it is not a legal term, it’s not surprising that there are no provisions for it in UNCLOS.
This supports Wang’s statement that: “There is no legal basis of ‘international waters’ in the international law of the sea.” And it invites the question of why the US started using the term instead of keeping in line with UNCLOS.
It is not simply because the US is not a party to UNCLOS. The answer lies in the same US Navy handbook, which asserts that: “All waters seaward of the territorial sea are international waters in which the high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight are preserved to the international community. International waters include contiguous zones, EEZs [exclusive economic zones] and high seas.”
By reclassifying contiguous zones and EEZs alike as equivalent to the high seas for operational purposes, the US claims freedom of navigation and overflight without being tied down by the obligations demanded.
The key point is that these freedoms, in the eyes of the US, include activities ranging from normal passage to military exercises.
So the US will carry out military activities in the contiguous zones and EEZs of coastal states without paying attention to its obligations. It is in this sense that the term “international waters” serves as a panacea for Washington, allowing it to maintain its maritime hegemony, which relies heavily on the mobility of its warships in the world’s oceans.
Another incorrect view is to regard the US sailing of its warships through the Taiwan Strait as carrying out freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) to challenge “excessive maritime claims” by China.
The US freedom of navigation programme started in 1979 under the Carter administration and its annual reports are freely available on the US defence department’s website. Comb through these and you will find no specific record of challenging excessive Chinese maritime claims in the Taiwan Strait.
Finally, what exactly is the legal status of the Taiwan Strait? Is it a strait used for international navigation or an internal sea (as wrongly advocated by some social media users)? Again, we have to come back to UNCLOS, where the legal regime of straits used for international navigation is specifically regulated.
Accordingly, there are two types of strait used for international navigation between one part of the high seas or an EEZ and another part of the high seas or an EEZ.
The first type are straits that are completely overlapped by the territorial seas of a coastal state or states and which are subject to the legal regime of transit passage. The Strait of Malacca is one example of this.
The second type are straits not completely overlapped by territorial seas, with a route through the high seas or an EEZ suitable for international navigation, and which are subject to high seas freedom of navigation and overflight. The Taiwan Strait and Miyako Strait are two examples.
Still, UNCLOS stipulates that the exercise of such freedom and rights is subject to obligations, including under the applicable laws and regulations of the coastal states. Take the Taiwan Strait, for example. There is an EEZ corridor through it, and the waters are divided into several zones including internal waters, territorial sea and contiguous zones.
The principle of innocent passage applies to the designated territorial sea in the Taiwan Strait, while the high seas freedoms, of navigation and overflight, apply to the EEZ. That is why Wang said that, “China has sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the Taiwan Strait.”
He meant that China has sovereignty over the internal waters and territorial seas in the strait, and sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the EEZ part. However, some media mistakenly or deliberately cited his statement as saying that China claims sovereignty over the entire Taiwan Strait.
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