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Gestapo - A History of Horror (50)

author:Apartment 39

《the gestapo:a history of horror》by jacques delarue

Himmler Shaping the Team (2)

At the specified time, the attack began. According to the arrangement, heydrich's information was read in Polish on an emergency transmitter, which took only three or four minutes in total. Naujoux and his men then retreated, leaving only the "canned food" on the spot.

The next day, September 1, as German troops began to advance into Polish territory from dawn, Hitler gave a speech in front of the Reichstag building, listing some of the Poles' transboundary aggression (since August 23, the Germans' provocations have gradually increased) and mentioning the "attack on Polish regular troops" on Radio Grewitz. Ribbentrop informed German embassies abroad in a communiqué that the Wehrmacht had been forced to take action to "respond" to the Polish offensive, and the same remark was reiterated in the communiqué of the Wehrmacht High Command. German and some foreign newspapers published details of the attack on the radio station, the truth of which was revealed six years later. As for the SS security officers involved in the operation, Senior SS Commando leader Bakr insisted that everyone but Naujoks had been "cleaned up".

The Nazis often used the same tactics, using enemy uniforms and materiel to carry out actions in violation of international law. The last and most famous one was Operation Griffin, in December 1944, special forces led by the Waffen-SS Skolzner were sent to the Ardennes, where they were tasked with supporting von Lundstedt's desperate attack. Operation Griffin used more than three thousand soldiers, dressed in U.S. uniforms and armed with Sherman tanks, American trucks and jeeps. Their plan was to create chaos behind the Allied lines, to try to penetrate deep behind enemy lines and to carry out sabotage operations.

Gestapo - A History of Horror (50)

Otto Skorzner, commander of special forces in Nazi Germany.

In any case, Operation Himmler in Grewitz shows the cooperative relationship between the SS and the Wehrmacht during this period. In fact, the SS Security Service, the Gestapo and Abwehr all took part in the operation on the orders of the Wehrmacht High Command.

On the third day of the war, German troops had occupied large areas of Polish territory. The panzer corps entered Warsaw on the 8th, and Hitler decided to move his headquarters closer to the front. Three special trains crossed the Polish border from the Katowice region, not far from Grewice, and stopped all the way north at Sopot. This small port, formerly of the free city of Danzig, was officially recommitted to the German Reich in a decree of 1 September, where Hitler remained until the end of September. As for the three special trains, the first belonged to Hitler, the second belonged to Goering, and Himmler sat in the third.

Himmler was one of the first to enter Poland, as in Austria and Czechoslovakia. His loyal aide-de-camp – Wolff, the leader of the superior group of the SS – was always close behind him. He participated in all important staff meetings and supervised and directed related work in the occupied territories. Each department was represented, and Walter Schulenburg was one of those celebrities. This choice was not accidental, as Schulenburg had earlier been entrusted by Heydrich to consult with the army and to draw up an action plan for Himmler's forces in the rear of the front. The Gestapo's Special Assault Squad and SS Security Service entered Poland after the first wave of offensive forces in order to "ensure the security of the rear", but above all began to implement the measures against the Poles that Himmler had long arranged.

Gestapo - A History of Horror (50)

In December 1944, the German 150 Panzer Panther tank G-camouflaged M10 tank destroyed in Operation Griffin, Belgium, was destroyed in Malmedy, Belgium.

The security police, with members of the Gestapo and SS Security Service, formed the Einsatzgruppen, which was subordinate to the Einsatzgruppen Commando. The soldiers were shocked to learn more about Hitler's measures to eliminate Poland. Hitler decided to bomb Warsaw, although it was completely unnecessary militarily - because only ordinary people would suffer. At the same time he ordered a political "cleansing" of Poland, and the generals knew exactly what the consequences would be. Finally the Germans also drew up various provocative plans, in particular Ribbentrop had informed Kanaris that the Ukrainian minority was organizing a fake uprising against the Poles, which would cause all the farms and houses in those areas to burn to ashes.

Canaris had warned Keitel that these activities would pose a risk to the military. Some generals agreed with Canaris, lamenting that "the world will one day hold the Wehrmacht accountable, because these things happened with the connivance of the latter." Under pressure from these generals, Keitel and Brauchitsch personally informed Hitler that they opposed the use of Himmler's commandos in the rear of the troops. They insist that their security is adequately guaranteed.

To the generals' surprise, Hitler agreed with them at first, but later changed his decision, ordering Keitel to accept the presence of Himmler's men. Keitel acquiesced as usual and told the generals that he could not do anything to influence the course of events, as this was the Fuehrer's order. Thus, the bombing of Warsaw and the mass executions of certain groups of people – intellectuals, nobles, clergy and, of course, Jews – were accepted. Himmler and Heydrich argue that the first three categories of people are very dangerous because they are the only ones able to organize internal resistance – and organizing such actions is much more difficult for ordinary people who have lost their intellectual and moral strength. As for the Jews, the extermination of them in Poland was the beginning of a "final solution".

At a conference held by Hitler's special train, General Johannes von Braskowitz, who had drawn up plans for an attack on Poland and personally commanded the battle, strongly opposed the atrocities committed by the SS and Einsatz commandos against Jews and the Polish elite in Poland and gave a detailed report on them. He gave the report directly to Hitler, but had no effect other than succeeding in making the latter furious. Subsequently, the Wehrmacht High Command and Himmler reached a written agreement, in which the two sides agreed to use the Einsatzgruppen in the war against the Soviet Union. In doing so, these forces have acted beyond all previous levels of terror.

Gestapo - A History of Horror (50)

Johannes von Braskovits, General of the Wehrmacht.

In September 1939, few generals dared to protest. It took Kanaris, Braskovits and the slightly inferior Brausic to successfully manipulate Keitel, but the attempt ultimately failed.

In general, the army favored and supported Hitler. The generals wanted an "easy victory", and the actions in Austria and Czechoslovakia, and the subsequent blitzkrieg in Poland, seemed to prove them right. They feared a battle against the French and British armies, but Hitler insisted that the French campaign was just as easy. In the autumn of 1939, the generals occupied prominent positions in the Nazi state. They have won honors in the East and are preparing to face the democracies of the West. Domestically, many of them held key positions in the wartime economy. The remoteness of the occupied territories, and the duties they had to perform there, should have given them an independent environment and freed them from party surveillance and the control of the Gestapo and SS security services.

What was the attitude of Himmler and the Gestapo in the face of this situation? At first they took some precautions to limit the autonomy of the army. For example, most of the army's transport tasks were entrusted to the party's mobile unit, the National Socialist Automobile Corps. Without means of transport and drivers, the military will not be able to ensure adequate supplies on its own. In this way the Party retained an easy way to control the soldiers.

On the other hand, at Hitler's request, soldiers were not given police powers, either in Czechoslovakia or in Poland, which was against the usual practice. These powers were taken over from the outset by Himmler's institutions in Czechoslovakia and Austria. In Poland, as soon as the actual fighting ceased and the country was occupied, they were immediately taken away.

The Einsatzgruppen commandos of SS security and Gestapo agents followed closely behind the combat troops, which was a novelty and a "bold innovation" for Himmler. This creation allows his two major institutions to work together and reflects the important changes under way.

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