Huang Dan: The Imagination of Historiography: Between Events and Narratives

Because of the interest in the history of the press, in recent years, even with a little bit of Chinese historiography, it is not a dime, let alone what to enter the room. Fortunately, the history of newspapers and periodicals and Chinese history belong to the same family, and from this and that, some feelings arise, which can also be regarded as a little reflection on their own history in the process of historical study, of course, mainly for the history of newspapers and periodicals. Not necessarily to the point, but hopefully not too outrageous.

The clear-eyed person knows at a glance that the title is not original, and it is copied from Mills's "Sociological Imagination". Of course, this topic has to do with my feelings, or more importantly, Mills's "imagination" stimulates me. So, let's start with what Mills calls "imagination":

What they need, and what they feel they need, is a quality of mind that helps them to use information to enhance their rationality, so that they can see the world clearly, and perhaps what is happening between them. It's exactly this quality I want to describe... It can be called the sociological imagination (Wright Mills, translated by Chen Qiang and Zhang Yongqiang: The Sociological Imagination, Triptych Bookstore, 2001, p. 3).

I especially like the words "mental quality", which means that "imagination" is a person's inner cultivation, a kind of temperament that cares about people and the world, is a kind of "being in this mountain", and can identify its "face" in "different heights and heights near and far" from this to that, and is not the technology, strategy or method that people are keen on now. Mills tries to use this "imagination" to connect the individual with the times, so he goes on to say that this "mental quality" actually refers to a transformative ability: "to cover the most impersonal and indirect aspects of social change to the most personal aspects of the human self, and to observe the connection between the two." (Ibid., p. 4) Regarding historical research, traditionally called "narration without doing", the "narrative" behind the popular Western school, the discourse system and context behind it are different, and even in the historical view, it is difficult to pinch together, but it involves two foundations of relying on historiography: matter and narrative or narrative [In postmodern historiography, this "narrative" is far from the "narrative" in "narration but not doing" can be regarded as the same (for narratives, see robertf.berkhofer, jr., Xing Lijun translation: Beyond the Great Story: A History as Text and Discourse, Chapter 2, Beijing Normal University Press, 2008), while Topolski distinguishes between "variable narratives" and "structural narratives" (Li Jianming: The Cultivation and Skills of Historians, Shanghai Sanlian Bookstore, 2007, p. 344). Thus, the discussion of Millsian imagination in historiography ——— the ability of the individual to transform society, naturally lies between the matter and the narrative/narrative.

Xu is related to the matter, and the historical materials can be described as "three thousand pets in one" in historiography. Although historiography is the theory of historical materials, in the end it is too extreme and few people should respond to it today, the exclusive status of historical materials in historiography is not affected by this. In my impression, it is almost the instinctive reaction of the historian. This fully reflects the basic requirements and training of historiography, and at the same time it is also a unique feature of historiography, and it is still the meaning of its title to carry forward and expand.

The point is that the historical material, as the name suggests, should be a material related to history, in other words, it is always related to the problem that the researcher himself needs to solve——— that is, the "history" that the researcher wants to tell or narrate, without the latter, naturally there is no historical material. Based on this, the narrator or narrator must make an indispensable assessment and examination of his or her own problems, from the inextricable threads of individuals, societies, events, scenes, etc. Documentary materials and events themselves do not constitute history, "they are or will be histories only for those who have concentrated or will concentrate on them" (Croce: History and Chronicles, in Toynbee et al., Zhang Wenjie, ed., Discourses on History: A Collection of Translations of Modern Western Philosophy of History, Guangxi Normal University Press, 2002, pp. 398-410, cited at 400). Mr. Wang Ermin said very much: "Historical materials do not exist intentionally, they are being active for various people in the world, and no one has the intention to provide their activities as historical materials." In other words, the lives of people are so varied that they are not intended to prepare for history, and they can never know exactly what kind of history they are playing. Those who are called historical materials as seen by later generations are actually due to the unintentional legacy of the ancestors, and the descendants have only imposed the meaning of fate..." "There is no so-called naturally existing historical material in the world, and all the materials must have historical significance and function through the historian's awareness and destiny." (Wang Ermin: Methods of Historiography, Guangxi Normal University Press, 2005, pp. 123, 134) This is true of historical sources, and the same is true of the facts that historians revere. From the perspective of epistemology, according to Mr. Jin Yuelin, "nature" and "facts" are not the same thing. "Nature does not have to be natural in 'fact' for us to experience, and facts must be 'in fact' experienced for us in order to become facts. The material of fact is a natural or natural project, but if the project is not really in experience, it is only material, and we cannot admit it as fact. We require natural projects to be experienced before we recognize them as facts. (Jin Yuelin: "TheOry of Knowledge", The Commercial Press, 1996 edition, pp. 769-770) When historiography is like news, and it is said to "speak with facts", the facts must have experienced the immersion of the narrator's imagination, otherwise there are no facts, just like there is no historical material.

In this way, whether it is true or false, sufficient or not, it is only to touch the surface of the use of historical materials, and more importantly, it is necessary to examine the relevance of historical materials to the problems to be studied. That is to say, when the scholar is ready to seek out and collect historical materials, he should first have the "mental qualities" ——— imagination that Mills demanded, "should include a clear concern for a series of public discourses and private troubles", and "should open the search for causality between the environment and the social structure" (The Sociological Imagination, p. 139). Therefore, the American scholar Fisher believes that "historiography is a discipline that solves problems." A person (or anyone) is a historian if he asks a question about past events without a predetermined answer, and arranges the selected facts in the form of an explanatory paradigm to answer the question" (quoted from Li Jianming, The Cultivation and Skill of Historians, p. 249). However, in terms of some of the situations or the results I have seen so far, it seems that there are not many people who can understand this, and what is most lacking is precisely this ability to transform from problems to materials from materials to history. When it comes to studying history, the first reaction is to go around the library of the reference room, or take pictures, or copy, or copy, and be very busy, as if only in this way can it be like a "history", but in the end it is not clear what it intends to do. So the so-called article, basically is to look at the dish under the meal, what information to write what article, is the data to determine the article. The most important basis for measuring the selection of a topic, if not the only one, is whether someone has written it or not, and it is also a beautiful name to fill in the blanks. In such a so-called study, there can be no other ending except for "things" that have nothing to say. Researchers or masters who can't cut but only step on the line will casually connect the pieces of cloth together; or like the stall owner, the colorful layers are stacked, "drying" a bunch of "unhindered materials". "Piling up evidence from all sides, the middle clearing is a major discovery, which is really a lament for the miraculous power of historians." (Wang Ermin: Methods of Historiography, p. 137)

Of course, such and such a "cloud to the moon" is waiting for it in historiography, and most people can also be conscious. Quite blinding and even tempting is another kind, that is, to say "things" as the key. Many articles or studies, from the beginning to the end, are trying to make something clear. Telling things has become the highest goal pursued by research. Leaving aside the so-called "construction" for the time being, in a general sense, it should be admitted that many articles do explain one thing clearly; at the same time, it should be admitted that it is not easy to make a clear outline of an event that has already passed through the collection of materials and display it in front of everyone, and it is impossible to do it without spending a certain amount of effort. On the surface, this kind of case-based research is also very historical, with both facts and narratives/narratives, which conforms to the norms of historiography. Perhaps because of this, many people, including the younger generation of graduate students, are quite comfortable with this, thinking that they have entered the right path. In fact, in essence, such things still belong to what Zhang Xuecheng calls "history usurpation of history" (quoted from Yu Yingshi: "Historiography, Historians and Times", Guangxi Normal University Press, 2004 edition, p. 90), not historiography. Because we do not know why we are talking about this matter, nor why the speaker is saying this, it is not clear what this matter has to do with "history." Mills was very unabashed, arguing that this approach to research was "foolish" in itself, for "there is good reason to believe that a small-scale study of detail, whatever results, will help us to solve or clarify problems of structural significance" (The Sociological Imagination, p. 71). From the postmodern context, Mills's "structural meaning" seems to be structural determinism, but in any case, it is required that before studying, for individuals and times, events and meanings, historical materials and history must have "imagination", there is a connection, is completely correct, as far as methodology is concerned, it is also the "contextualism" that is difficult to avoid or even indispensable in historical narratives (Robert F. Berkhofer, Jr., Xing Lijun translation: Beyond the Great Story: History as Text and Discourse, pp. 52-61) Strategy. To say things in isolation for the sake of saying things is, if not "stupid," at least blind. At a large level, its highest value is only to provide a little sorted material for future related research. It is worth noting that this tendency towards concrete events seems to have spread, especially out of the reversal of the grand narrative of revolutionary historiography, coupled with the influence of modern historiography after that, so that the focus is on the concrete and the microscopic, and the meaning of research is replaced by the novelty of subtle details. Baraclau once criticized that "just as the old positivists believed that the 'facts of history', once collected for historians, they would be invisibly embedded in the view that they were generally accepted by the correct model, and finally proved to be an illusion", there is another danger, and the historians' "hard work will be wasted in a large number of fragmented studies, and no general or final result can be achieved" (quoted from Lin Tongqi: "China-Centric View:Characteristics, Ideological Trends, and Internal Tensions", coving, Lynn translation: History of Discovery in China", Zhonghua Bookstore, 2002, translator's order, p. 13).

If it is because of "historicism" and "factualism" that they believe that history is the "collection" of facts, so that they "always work hard to drill the horns" (Wang Ermin: Methods of Historiography, pp. 134, 140), and only know the so-called "historical materials" or "facts", then the use of so-called postmodern historiography to deconstruct is really a bit of a cattle knife. Leaving aside Sima Qian's "Changes in the Past and the Present", this kind of research has not even been done to "know people and discuss the world", which shows that we are far from our own traditions. Zhang Xuecheng said: "Learning has the most affection... There is more than enough skill but insufficient temperament, and it cannot be said to be learned. (Ibid., p. 136) This statement can be called the Chinese version of "mental quality", which is somewhat close to Mills's "imagination", but these seem to have become antiques, and most of them, if not abandoned, are gradually drifting away. Jiang Tingdian once regarded this research attitude of sticking to small things as more mature than reading every word in the Book of Han, but did not understand the history of the Han Dynasty (ibid., p. 135). In this way, it is a great paradox to say that the study of history in name is actually ignorance of history.

Lack of "imagination", end up as a history without knowing history, from the root can naturally be traced back to the historical view. Because there is a lot of reflection and discussion like this, there is no need to fry cold rice. From the relationship between "things" and "narratives," I would like to say a few words about "on the emergence of history."

Chinese historical papers or monographs are basically "causes, processes, results, and meanings (or evaluations)" (Luo Zhitian, "The Qianjia Tradition and the Mainstream of Chinese Historiography in the 1990s", Open Era, No. 1, 2000, p. 104). Such a four-part formula is also "on the emergence of history." Because it is shallow, I do not know where this phrase first came from, and from the perspective of historical norms, this is undoubtedly of great significance for preventing the idea from taking the lead, casting historical materials and rape historical facts with one's own opinion. However, this phrase may also cause some people to misunderstand that "theory" is a natural outflow of historical or historical arrangements, forming the strange idea of "building a wall of bricks" (The Sociological Imagination, p. 69). Of course, if this "theory" refers only to the generalization of facts, and not to the generalization of meaning at the level of scholarship or theory, that is, at the "historical" level, then it is another matter.

Whether objectivity is outdated and becomes a "noble dream" (Peter Novick, translated by Yang Yu: "That Noble Dream: The Problem of Objectivity" and the American Historical Circles", Life, Reading, and New Knowledge Triptych Bookstore, 2009 edition), it is still possible to see each other, and history needs to be explained, and there is no objection. If it is a narrative or a statement, it cannot be without the logical structure of the narrative or statement, so in the study of historiography, the facts can be generally determined, and the meaning of the facts varies from person to person. There are subjective elements in historiography, and there is never a way to write a final version (Yu Yingshi: Historiography, Historians and Times, p. 91). The historical changes in different epochs are due not only to the introduction of new facts and information, "but also to changes in the points of interest of the people and the framework within which people now establish records" (The Sociological Imagination, p. 156), i.e., the narrative structure. By summarizing the three dominant paradigms in the study of China, Ke Wen proves that "historians of each generation must rewrite the history written by historians of the previous generation", because "the orientation followed in the study and the basic questions raised are still mainly determined by the social and cultural environment of the historians" (Ke Wen, lin Tongqi translation: Foreword to Discovering History in China, pp. 41, 48). Any historian's study of a person, an event, or even a certain period of history is always associated with "how much the past can be understood and how they understand history in general" (robert f. berkhofer, jr., Xing Lijun translation: Beyond the Great Story: A History as Texts and Discourses, p. 52), so the historian must have his own idea or preset starting point from the beginning of the study, otherwise, he would not be able to write at all. Traditional Chinese scholarship requires that "examination evidence" and "righteousness" be applied equally, and replaced by the current expression, "that is, on the premise of mastering detailed and reliable historical materials, reference is made to certain theories and concepts to explain the meaning of historical facts, so as to obtain historical knowledge" (Li Jianming: "The Cultivation and Skills of Historians", p. 138). Therefore, history needs theory, and even the development and adoption of historical materials are inseparable from the observation of theory. If there are no new theories and changes in the historical view, how can the "revolution of historical materials" in the West come from (Xu Shanwei: "Contemporary Western New Historiography and the Revolution of Historical Materials", Studies in Historical Theory, No. 2, 2010, pp. 84-97)? Mills is not without reason for calling historiography "the most theoretical profession in the humanities" (The Sociological Imagination, p. 156). "Theory emerges from history" is not a natural formation of "theory" by the accumulation of "historical facts" or "historical materials", still less is it that there must be a "theory" after "history", and the fact is closely related to the theoretical vision of historians themselves and their application in research. "Problems" and "isms" are inherently intimate and inseparable, and there is certainly no problem without "isms" without them. I once made an analogy, like a colorblind person who can't see the rich colors, a historian without theory and its ability to apply, trying to be able to "argue from history", which is pure fantasy. I have no say in the state of Chinese historians. In the field of news communication, it is true that the theory of the researcher who studies the history of journalism is the weakest. Since this is the case, only "things" have no "narratives", and it is inevitable to pile up "materials without history". "They may be able to provide material for writing history, but they cannot write history themselves, and although they can entertain themselves, they cannot record it truthfully." (Ibid.)

Of course, we need to pay attention to another phenomenon. Leaving aside for a moment the "revolutionary" or "modern" narrative paradigm of Chinese historiography, beginning with the annals school of the 1960s, historiography has been challenged by the social sciences and has gradually moved closer to the social sciences (Georg Eagles, translated by He Zhaowu: History in the Twentieth Century: From Scientific Objectivity to postmodern Challenges, Shandong University Press, 2006 edition), seems to have more and more echoes in China in recent years, and social science theories or frameworks have been increasingly used in historical research. Mr. Yang Nianqun's observation that "compared with more than a decade ago, it seems that everyone in the current Chinese historical circles will speak two words of Habermas or Foucault" (Yang Nianqun: Introduction: Chinese Historiography Needs a Kind of "Feelingism", edited by Yang Nianqun: New Historiography, Volume 1, Zhonghua Bookstore, 2007 Edition), may illustrate this from one side. Of course, historiography itself cannot grow too many theories and concepts that can be used for analysis, and learning and borrowing theories of other social sciences is not only the only way for historians to cultivate their theories, but also an indispensable path for historical research.

Judging from the relationship between "narrative" and "things", the consciousness of theoretical application actually means the consciousness of "narrative". This is not a bad thing, and the pluralistic theoretical orientation is bound to bring a rich and diverse atmosphere to the problems, studies and interpretations of meaning established by historiography, and the research status of historiography in recent years has fully proved this. However, just as materialism is often conceptualized in "revolutionary" historiography, in the current theoretical application of historical research, it falls into what Mills calls "abstract empiricism" (The Sociological Imagination, p. 61), namely: it is not the problem that requires theory and method, but the method or theory that determines the problem. Therefore, it is not uncommon to cut enough to corroborate the theory with historical materials and standardize evidence with frameworks, so as to "become a handmaiden of social science" (Lu Jianrong: Introduction: History of Sleeping with Literature, edited by Lin Hunte, translated by Jiang Zhengkuan: "New Cultural History", Maitian Publishing House, 2002 edition, pp. 13-14). When "it is increasingly accustomed to using the 'norms' constructed by modern social theory to cultivate our 'problems'", the price is that the presentation of "historical richness" fades at a "high rate"; when "problem consciousness" is forcibly summarized and combined into theoretical contexts or disciplinary categories, the dynamic sense of history is crushed and rearranged, "and finally shrunk into a string of dry historical dogmas" (Yang Nianqun: Introduction: Chinese Historiography Needs a Kind of "Feelingism", edited by Yang Nianqun: New Historiography, Vol. 1).

Dilthey's rejection of sociology is certainly not advisable, but he thinks that the humanities such as science and history are different, the former is interpreted from the outside, the latter is understood from the inside; scholars engaged in natural science research use causality vocabulary, while humanities scholars speak with "experience" (Peter Burke, Yao Peng, Zhou Yupeng, Hu Qiuhong, Wu Xiushen, Liu Beicheng Revised: History and Social Theory, Shanghai People's Publishing House, 2010 edition, p. 7), is justified. It is not that the social sciences do not need experience, but they use experience as an argument to make theoretical explanations and generalizations of laws and characteristics. The "experience" in history is a part of "history", which is the feeling and experience of the researcher for the object of his study. If theory is used instead of empirical experience, and "narrative" is substituted for "things", this is not history. Mr. Yang Nianqun proposed "sensoryism" to confirm a dynamic world with "feeling" rather than "concept" (Yang Nianqun: Introduction: Chinese Historiography Needs a Kind of "Feelingism", Edited by Yang Nianqun: New Historiography, Vol. 1).

There is another problem in the application of theory, that is, the contempt and arbitrariness of the theory, the main manifestation of which is that there is no need to know the ins and outs of the theory, and the trick is to come and go. Theory is basically a shadow, without any analysis or interpretation, and even more so, it is not self-aware of misuse and misuse. In recent years, when "news professionalism" is used to study some newspapers or newspaper people in history as an example, most of them do not first study the origin of this concept, the different meaning dimensions it contains, and the degree of compatibility with the practice of Chinese newspapers and periodicals, the only thing that is done is to use this concept to classify, and then according to the established logic, prove that so-and-so is "news professionalism" or not. If this is only a problem in the field of journalistic historiography, then "newspaper and periodical public opinion" has almost become an indispensable term for historians to discuss newspapers and periodicals. Curiously, almost no one has discussed or defined the term beforehand: does it refer to "public opinion" in Chinese, or public opinion in the sense of "public/opinion——— public opinion? Does newspaper opinion refer to reports or opinions? How can newspapers and periodicals have "public opinion"? Is the expression of opinion in the press public opinion? Why? If so, to whom is the public opinion? To further, there are not a few people who use communication theory to study and write historical papers or monographs. But most people only know a little fur, and even this bit of fur is in name only. For example, using Laswell's "five Ws" to build the idea and framework of research is not only unnecessary in my opinion, it is simply superfluous, at best, it is another way of saying it. As for the causes and consequences of these "five W's", the context in which they arise, the main purpose and the possibility of research related to them, etc., it can be seen that very little is known. In recent years, some doctors with doctoral backgrounds in history have successively joined the field of news and communication, engaged in the teaching and research of newspaper history. So far, at least, as far as I can see, they are still very new to news or newspapers. Of course, they are doing the history of newspapers and periodicals, but they are doing "historical newspapers" rather than "history of newspapers and periodicals" (Huang Dan: The History of Newspapers and Periodicals and Historical Newspapers, University of Journalism, Spring 2007, pp. 51-55), because they do not understand the theory of news communication, and therefore do not know how to raise the question of news communication or the press itself. Interlacing is like a mountain, which may be used as a justification. The problem is that what they don't understand is not only the theory of news communication, but it seems that they know very little about all the theories, and to be sure, they have not read a few theoretical books. I don't understand but can't use it, so I can only rely on the "imaginary style", with my own impression, see the meaning of the words, follow the clouds, and press it randomly, that is, I am unwilling to do a little in-depth understanding of the meaning of a certain theory, the context of the production, the problems targeted, the limits of interpretation, and so on.

In discussing the application of "civil society" to Chinese history as an analytical concept, Duzanchi cautioned against the multi-layered narrative structure of the concept, rather than merely as an objectivist term. The first question to be asked is not whether it can be used, but to discuss "the relevance of European historical categories such as civil society derived from the liberation narrative structure of the Enlightenment to China", and then to relate to the narrative structure of civil society used by historical figures to promote development in a certain direction, and finally why civil society has not grown in China, and why it is (Du Zanqi, Wang Xianming, Gao Jimei, Li Haiyan, Li Dian translation: "Saving History from the Nation-State", Jiangsu People's Publishing House, 2009 edition, pp. 142-143). Only through such continuous questioning can it be possible to grasp the history of this concept and the history of China, and to reveal its face more accurately. How many of our historians have such awareness, or have asked similar questions before using a certain theory? How many people don't use theory as an unhistory"? In this respect, historians are far inferior to social science researchers. Historians have an excessive sense of narcissism and superiority over historical materials, and lack the least enthusiasm and reverence for theory. The ignorance and contempt in the application of theory form a great contrast with the attention and care of historical data selection. "When historians adopt concepts to examine past societies, their usage is often non-historical or de-historic, so they often make anachronistic mistakes." (Bourdieu and Hua Kangde, translated by Li Meng and Li Kang, Deng Zhenglai, "Practice and Reflection: A Guide to Reflecting on Sociology", Central Compilation Publishing House, 2004 edition, p. 131) It is a bit too much to compare historians and sociologists to a "dialogue between deaf people", but because they are disciplined by their different professions, they develop "their own languages, values, mentalities, and ways of thinking", and this "subculture" is reinforced by "training" (Peter Burke, Yao Peng, Zhou Yupeng, Hu Qiuhong, Translated by Wu Xiushen and revised by Liu Beicheng: History and Social Theory, Shanghai People's Publishing House, 2010 edition, pp. 2-3), but it is not bad. When "the social scientist is too busy to read history" (Sociological Imagination, p. 155), historians, on the contrary, are too busy to read theories and can only adapt to ready-made concepts, as if they were ready-made "historical materials" at hand to assemble articles. Isn't it also a great paradox that historians pay the most attention to and have become the place where they can settle down, but in terms of theoretical use, they are almost gone?

The mission, value, and significance of historiography have caused wave after wave of controversy in the 20th century, and they are still a variety of opinions and fascinating flowers. Palercleff was confident that "the time has come to solve the problems encountered in historiography and to deal with historical data with new research methods and attitudes." This understanding transcends ideological and environmental differences" (Jeffrey Baleklaugh, translated by Yang Yu: Major Trends in Contemporary Historiography, Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 1987, p. 5). I cannot judge this optimism, and out of foundation and knowledge, I am not able to intervene in the discussion between the new and the old and put forward any of my own views, but can only start from the phenomenon to talk about a little superficial feeling, and what "new research methods and attitudes" have nothing to do with it. From an abstract level, behind the events and narratives, it is natural that there can be no historical view, just as any technology is dominated by ideas. However, I would rather go down a little from above, because the problems mentioned above do not correspond to what kind of historical outlook is held, and in my opinion, whether it is new or nostalgic for the old, it is necessary to consciously pay attention to and consciously improve, otherwise any historical view will not be implemented. Because of this, it is not shallow and ugly, and re-fry the "cold rice" that many Fang family seems to have said. At this point, I think of Heidegger's definition of "statement": "A statement is a statement of communication and a provision. Thus, "the statement is presented in terms of what has already been unfolded in comprehension and what is revealed by the search" (Heidegger, co-translated by Chen Jiaying and Wang Qingjie, Xiong Weixue: Existence and Time, Life, Reading, and New Knowledge Triptych Bookstore, 1987 edition, p. 191). If this existential expression does not hinder our use in historiography, then the ruler of history examines his "mental qualities" from the outside in, so as to sort out his position between events and narratives, and give birth to a Millsian "imagination", which should be of much help to chinese historiography today, especially the history of Chinese newspapers and periodicals, if you do not want to be the ant-type empiricism described by Bacon or the theoretician who cocoons himself. As for taking this as a convenient way to think at the level of historical philosophy, it can only be based on their own understanding, and it has far exceeded the expectations of this article.