Heidegger on the origin of the concept of truth

Author: Wang Lu (Professor, School of Philosophy, Zhengzhou University, Professor, Department of Philosophy, School of Humanities, Tsinghua University)

Summary: Heidegger is famous for his discussion of "is" (Sein), and in related discussions he also talks about "true" (Wahrheit): the title of section 44 of his famous book "Yes and Time" is "This is, Unfolding State and Truth". Heidegger was dissatisfied with traditional views and interpretations of truth, and tried to dig out more meanings from the ancient Greek word aletheia, such as revealing and expanding. However, his discussion of the meaning of the Greek word aletheia is problematic, and there is some ambiguity in the way in which he addresses the issue. From Heidegger's discussion, it can be seen that his discussion of truth is not mainly to explore truth, but to use this concept to explore "this is", and the ultimate purpose is to explore "yes". This also shows that in philosophical research, the concept of "truth" is crucial. Clarifying Heidegger's relevant discourse is not only beneficial to understanding his ideas, but also meaningful for the study of Western philosophy.

"What (?) "It is the basic way in which people ask questions and express their knowledge, and thus become the basic question of philosophical study. "Is it true (?) Further assertions and inquiries about knowledge have also become questions of philosophical reflection. Philosophers even asked, "What is 'yes'?" "What is 'true'?" ”。 Therefore, "yes" and "truth" are fundamental questions of philosophical study and are closely related.

Heidegger is well known for his discussion of "yes", which also involves "true". In particular, his treatise on the origins of the concept of truth is well known, and the qualities he proposes, such as presentation and revealing, have attracted attention and discussion, with mixed reviews (1). Simply put, Heidegger is consistent with traditional knowledge in the basic sense of "true.". But he also argues that the German word Wahrheit does not translate part of the meaning of the ancient Greek word aletheia, and that he wants to reveal this part of the meaning, and from this point of view, to speak of truth with the help of this part of the meaning. In this way, his exposition of truth differs significantly from traditional knowledge.

An intuitive question is that if Heidegger's knowledge is correct, it means that the philosophers of antiquity and later would have been problematic about what is true, for they have missed a part of the crucial meaning of the word aletheia; if not, then why did Heidegger dig out that part of the meaning of aletheia? It seems to me that this is mainly because it is true, a very important concept in philosophy, and two concepts that are closely related. Heidegger's main work is to explore the is, and therefore must explore the truth. However, his main purpose in exploring the truth is to explore the true. In his view, in the explanation of yes, it is not enough to explain "true" in the ordinary sense of "true"; he needs more understanding. So he drew resources from the analysis of the ancient Greek word aletheia in order to come up with his own new interpretation and apply such an explanation to his discussion of yes.

This article will take As an example verse 44 of Heidegger's book Yes and Time, and illustrate these points by analyzing his related arguments. The title of this section is: "This is, Unfolding State and Truth", which shows that Heidegger not only explicitly regards truth as the object of discussion, but also associates truth with truth. We focus on this section to avoid taking it out of context. My discussion focuses on two aspects, one is to illustrate Heidegger's statement about truth, and the other is to illustrate Heidegger's way of speaking. It seems to me that a clear and full knowledge of his way of discourse is very useful for a better understanding of his discourse.

I. Discussion on origins

The first sentence of verse 44 of Yes and Time is: "Philosophy has since ancient times equated the truth with the sein" (2), and at once brings the truth to the core. It is worth noting that the title of the section says "This is" (Dasein), so this section is discussed around the truth and this is. This is easy to understand: the book raises the question of "yes", in the course of the discussion it raises "this is", and goes on to refer to "in-world-in-is", so the book actually explores yes around this and in the world. Now juxtaposing truth with this is but a continuation of the book's discussion. But the first sentence of this verse makes it clear that truth and what is raised are juxtaposed. That is to say, this is a question derived from the yes, and it is discussed in order to explore and ultimately explain yes. In the process of discussing this is, it is now necessary to take into account "truth", which in turn is directly related to it, so that the discussion of truth is not only related to this here, but fundamentally, directly related to is. This also shows that in the process of discussing yes, it is very important to explore the question of truth, because it is related to yes from the very beginning. The connection between truth and truth is not only close, but also has a long history.

In the opening section, Heidegger also makes specific reference to two of what Aristotle said: philosophical research "is itself" and refers to philosophy as the science of "truth" (p. 245). In this way, he not only links his discussion to Aristotle's, but also shows that his connection between truth and truth is historically justified. He then questioned the understanding of the concept of truth by his predecessors, asking directly what the science associated with it meant, and from these questions the section was divided into three parts related to truth, namely, the view of tradition, the view of origin, and the view of the way of being. These three parts embody the three levels and ideas of Heidegger's discussion of this issue. We will focus on the second part, starting with a brief explanation of the first part.

The first part, entitled "The Traditional Concept of Truth and Its Ontological Basis," begins with the traditional view of truth: "The 'place' of truth is a proposition [judgment]" and "The essence of truth lies in the fact that judgment 'corresponds' to its object." Then proceed from "conformity" and think: conformity represents a relationship, "truth is also a relationship." But not all relations are in conformity" (p. 248), and in further analysis of truth and conformity, the "structure of truth" and its "relation whole" are spoken of, and thus the "connection of yes" (p. 249), thus transitioning from the discussion of truth to the discussion of yes, so that all previous discussions of yes and the results that have been produced can be drawn upon. For example, he spoke of the subject-object-relation (p. 249) and of "what is really knowledge." Cognition is judgment", and to judgment "it can be said that it is 'true'" (p. 249). Because of the content of the judgment, the types or ways of yes are spoken of (Seinsart, Seinsweise) and, by way of illustration, it is finally spoken of "the proposition is true, which means that it reveals the being in the being itself"; "the 'true' of the proposition must be understood as revealing - is" and "in the - world - is" (pp. 251-252). These statements show that Heidegger proceeded from traditional theories and understandings, questioned them, and then discussed them in his own terms and concepts. Therefore, it is necessary to approach it in the way of "in-world-in-is", so that the discussion of truth seems to be naturally connected to the world (3). Based on these explanations, he moved on to the discussion of the second part, "The Phenomenon of the Origin of Truth and the Dependent Arising of the Traditional Concept of Truth."

The second part begins by saying, "'True' is equivalent to saying 'yes- revealed' (p. 252). Two points can be seen from this statement itself. First, the literal meaning of the word true is mainly "true." Second, the so-called "true" means that it is revealed. Obviously, this statement differs from the traditional definition of truth, except that it eliminates the notion of "conformity." True and true are nothing new, but the expression "yes-revealed" expresses something new and is therefore different from something common sense. Heidegger believes that this is something that has long been felt and understood in ancient Greek philosophy, and the above statement is to expound this understanding in ancient Greek philosophy. He then quotes Aristotle and other ancient Greek philosophers, quoting the Greek words logos and aletheia, to illustrate the above statement and its related concepts, and to speak of truth as meaning "the thing itself," that is, what it appears in itself, "the state of revelation" (p. 252), as it is revealed, so that he finds from the ancient Greek philosopher the source of his statement about what truth offers, "revealing" and "obscurity." "To hide" and so on became the term he was going to use. Moreover, the terms appear to be derived from ancient Greece and are therefore well-founded. This also seems to show that Heidegger's statement of truth is not a subversion of tradition, but a trace of the origins of ancient Greece.

For example, Heidegger said: "The 'definition' of truth as revealing and revealing - is, and not simply a literal interpretation, but comes from the analysis of certain conditions of this is, which we are accustomed to calling 'true'." (p. 253) Here the definition is spoken of, the use of the word "true" is introduced, which is clearly illustrated by the aid of "revelation". With this in mind, Heidegger says, "Really, as revealing - yes, is a way of being." What makes this revealing activity possible in itself must necessarily be called 'true' in a more primordial sense. The ontological basis that reveals the existence of the activity itself points first and foremost to the phenomenon of truth at its very beginning. (Ibid.) The "way of being", "existential", "ontological", etc., which are spoken here, are obviously the language used in the discussion of yes and this, but here it is associated with "revelation", with truth, and is called the "most fundamental" phenomenon. So Heidegger said explicitly:

[Citation 1] Revealing that activity is a way of being in the world and being. The toil of looking, or even the toil of staying on the sidelines, reveals the yes in the world. What is in the world becomes what is revealed. It is "real" in the second sense. The first "true," i.e., what is revealed, is this and this. Truth in the second sense speaks not of revealing - is (revealing), but is revealed - is (revealed state). (page 253)

Here we clearly speak of the two meanings of truth, one is primary and revealed, and the other is secondary, it is revealed. It can be seen that in the discussion of the "real", starting from the revelation of - is, the two concepts of this is and in - the world - are introduced, and it seems that they are introduced naturally. In this way, all previous discussions of this being and being in the world-in-the-world can be used in related discussions, such as the unfolding state of the world. Of course, the reverse can also be said that truth is not only a concept, a problem, but also related to all those previous discussions, that is, with yes, with this, with being in the world. In this way, Heidegger found a basis for his argument from the resources of ancient Greece. In this way, he seems to have not only justified his argument, but also expanded his approach. For example, he can talk about "the phenomenon of the most primordial truth can only be attained through this state of unfolding" (p. 253), he can talk about "this is essentially its unfolding state, unfolding and revealing as unfolding things, then it is essentially 'true'" (p. 253), and he even explicitly says: "This is 'in truth'" (p. 253).

It should be admitted that there has been a great change from "'true' (true) is equivalent to saying 'is - revealing'", and now "this is 'in the truth'". Contrast these two propositions: the "yes-revealed" of the former is missing, and the "this is" of the latter is also absent from the original proposition. But we can still see that the two propositions still have two literal terms that are the same: one is "true" and the other is "is." That is, the other terms have changed, except for these two terms. This shows that what is really crucial is these two concepts, truth and yes. A closer look reveals that, although the two terms have not changed, the order of the explanations has changed. In the original proposition, it is the "truth" that is explained, and the "is" appears only in the description and plays an explanatory role. But in the conclusion, what is stated is "this is", and what appears in the process of explanation is "true". This reversal of the order seems to indicate that what is important still seems to be "yes", since "this is" literally means "is", and is therefore directly related to yes.

Heidegger then makes four statements about the latter proposition and considers them to be "prescribed" the "whole meaning of existence" of the sentence "This is in truth" (p. 255). Although truth is also spoken of, such as "the truth of existence", "the untruth", and "this is in the unreal" (p. 255), there are very few explanations related to truth, and they all appear in the process of explaining this is true. It also shows that Heidegger's talk about truth is not the end, and that he talks about Allah if it is to talk about yes. Because in his place, it is the most important and important thing he wants to explore. Due to space limitations, we will not expand on these explanations, but only look at the concluding summary of Heidegger's explanation of truth:

[Citation 2] The ontological interpretation of the existence of the phenomenon of truth leads to the following proposition: 1. In the most original sense, truth is the unfolding state of this is, and the state of revelation of the person in the world belongs to this unfolding state. 2. This is the same origin in the truth and the unreal.

Within the horizon of the traditional interpretation of the phenomenon of truth, if the above propositions are to be fully understood, it is necessary to first indicate: 1. the truth that is understood as conforming comes from the unfolding state through some specific correction; 2. the unfolding state itself is in such a way that the change of the unfolding state at the source comes into view first and guides the theoretical interpretation of the structure of the truth. (pp. 256-257)

This quotation has two characteristics, one is to accommodate the language that Heidegger used before, such as existential-ontological, revealing, in the world is, is, is, is, not true, these are terms he uses in the process of discussing yes, and now all of them are used in the discussion of truth. This is very well represented in the first small paragraph. This brief description alone contains the terms "this is" and "expandability" (state), while further supplementary explanations contain terms such as "is", "revealing" (state) and "in the world". A closer analysis shows that 1 is a statement about the truth and 2 is a statement about what it is. Perhaps because the word "this is" is used in the description of the truth, it needs to be explained. Maybe it's just to show that this is related to the truth. So, in any case, the connection between truth and yes is still very clear.

Another peculiarity is that Heidegger associates his own unique account of truth with the general description of tradition. This is very clear from the second subparagraph: here again it is mentioned that it is understood as conforming to the truth. It is particularly clear that he is clearly asking people to understand in the way of yes, and to use this understanding or related understanding to lead to an explanation of truth. Whether Heidegger's argument makes sense or not is aside, it is clear that he is indicating that his interpretation of truth is correct, that it is consistent with the word "wahrheit" or with the original Greek usage of aletheia, and that it helps to better illustrate the meaning of the word.

It is interesting to note that the term "unfolded state" appears here many times, seemingly replacing the term "revealing". A few points need to be explained here. First, we have briefly mentioned that Heidegger made four points of "this is 'in the truth'", where the word "expandable" (state) appears frequently, such as "this is the state of being inherently contains a general state of expansion" (p. 254), "the state of unfolding is the basic way of this, and this is the way it is" (p. 254). Second, the expression "expanded state" appears many times before verse 44, such as "the unfolded state of yes" (p. 45), "the unfolded state of this is" (p. 188), "the expression 'this' implies the unfolding state of this essence" (p. 154), "this is its unfolded state" (p. 155), and so on. Therefore, the use of the display state as a self-evident concept in Citation 2 cannot be said to be incomprehensible. The so-called "expandability" (state) is an indication of what this is. It means that this general unfoldability belongs to this state of yes and no. But it seems to me that the most important thing is that whether or not this state of unfolding is clear or not, it can be seen at least that it is primarily related to this, and since it is related to it, it is ultimately relevant to the state of display.

Heidegger has since made some explanations, including a criticism of Aristotle's views, which are limited to the purposes of this article and will not be discussed again. It is very obvious that from truth to revealing - is, or revealing, and then to presentation, or to presentation, so that the question of truth is connected to yes. Although it seems that this is the way in which it is said, the discussion of the way of being is shown that what is considered here is still, although it is to talk about yes through this and yes through truth. So at the end of this section, Heidegger asks directly about "the way it is related to truth," about the necessity of the premise of "truth."

2. Presentation

In summary, Heidegger's talk about truth is different from the traditional way of talking, and his way of talking can be said to be very unique. First, Heidegger proceeded from the traditional view. Secondly, he proceeded from the ancient Greek concept of aletheia, third, he incorporated the explanation of truth into his own discourse system, using his own set of unique terms to discuss, and fourth, his related discussion was not to discuss the concept of truth itself, but to better illustrate what is and is related, which is what he really wants to explore.

This seems to be a basic way of approaching the problem from the traditional point of view: he did just that on the question (4), and he did the same when it came to the question of truth. He classifies the traditional view into two categories: the truth is judgment, and the essence of truth lies in the conformity of judgment with the object; and aristotle holds these two views. He then pointed out that it is problematic to use conformity to explain the truth. This way of exploring his is good, so that he can continue the tradition of his discussion and remain on the main line of philosophical research and development. It seems to me that it is possible to criticize traditional knowledge, and it is also possible to discuss it on the basis of criticism of the problems that exist in traditional understanding. Moreover, this contains the study, induction, analysis and summary of traditional understanding, which is appropriate and necessary in research.

It is also possible to start with the ancient Greek word aletheia and discover the meaning of the word, thus talking about the German Wahrheit. The latter is a translation of the former, so the word Wahrheit is a substitute for the word aletheia in German, which should have meant the same. If we recognize that there are some problems with the word and its application, we can go back to the source and start with its corresponding Greek. But in my opinion, Heidegger's specific way of operating is not without problems.

Suppose that Heidegger's analytical work on the word aletheia makes sense, i.e., that the word originally had literally the meaning he said. It seems to me that even so, Heidegger's argument is problematic.

In the case of ancient Greek literature, Heidegger relied mainly on the statements of Aristotle and Heraclitus, quoting a few sentences from the former and not even quoting from the latter. On the basis of these quotations alone, Heidegger says: "Aristotle compares aletheia with (things), with this (true) means 'the thing itself', the thing that appears in itself, the one who is in its revealing nature." (p. 265) Even without a quotation, Heidegger explains, according to Heraclitus, that "what we call the phenomenon of truth always arises in the sense of being revealed[ to be obscured]" (p. 265). It is based on such citations and interpretations of the literature that Heidegger argues:

[Cit. 3] The use of the word "true" to translate aletheia, especially in theory, obscures the meaning of what the Greeks understood before philosophy, on which the Greeks "self-evidently" based the term aletheia. (pp. 252-253)

This passage indicates two meanings, one is to criticize the inappropriateness of translating the word aletheia in terms of "true": there are some meanings that it has not translated; the other is to expound the nature and characteristics of these meanings that are not translated: these meanings are understood before philosophy (vorphilosophisches Verstaendnis), and are fundamental and self-understandable (selbstverstaendlich). A closer analysis shows that these two properties and characteristics are in fact only one, i.e., that the so-called untranslated meaning is relevant to understanding and is self-explanatory. In layman's terms, the meaning of the word aletheia is self-evident, as it was before philosophy.

These statements seem to have two meanings. One is obvious: the word aletheia was used long before philosophy arose, and its meaning is self-explanatory. The other, less obviously, seems to say that "truth" is a philosophical understanding. There seems to be an implication in this way: the word aletheia also has some meanings in non-philosophical senses, and these meanings are more basic. It seems to me that this latter meaning is not justified or not, but can be discussed, such as what it is, whether it is revealing as Heidegger said. The question is how the word aletheia was used in ancient Greek philosophers, such as Aristotle, and whether their use carried the meaning of this so-called pre-philosophical understanding.

I think that this question actually seems to be very difficult to say clearly: since the meaning of aletheia is self-explanatory, people will not explain and explain it when they use it, and posterity will only be able to understand the word and understand its meaning from the specific use of the predecessor. Recognizing this, we will find that Heidegger's statement is undoubtedly very problematic. First of all, there is very little literature on which he cites it, but we can see a great deal of it in the writings of Plato and Aristotle, of which the word aletheia is clearly spoken of in the true sense. One could argue that these documents don't seem to tell the story, as they have translated the word aletheia as "truth" (or Wahrheit). I don't think that's the crux of the matter. The key is what Heidegger himself calls "self-understandability." Since the word aletheia means self-evident, we have to consider whether the word "truth" (truth or Wahrheit) means self-evident. If so, then at least in terms of self-evidentness, the translated name corresponds. If it is assumed that although the word "true" means self-evident, it does not cover the full meaning of the word aletheia, then we have to consider, what is the meaning of the missing part?

From Heidegger's argument, he seems to think that the missing part of the meaning is roughly as follows: to be revealed - is, to unfold the state, to cover, and so on. Regardless of whether these expressions and their meanings themselves are self-explanatory, they are at best descriptions of the meaning of aletheia, not translations of them. So how can such a meaning be translated, that is, how should it be expressed in the form of a word? Heidegger himself undoubtedly did not provide such a translation, and his discussion of the meaning of the word provided not so much an understanding of "truth" as it merely helped to expand the scope of his discussion of yes.

Since Heidegger cites the ancient Greeks as a basis, let us concentrate on their statements, such as those of Aristotle. I do not want to discuss here whether Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotle's quotation is justified, but I would like to point out that we should at least consider how the word aletheia is used in many of Aristotle's relevant discourses. Since the meaning of the word is self-evident, as Heidegger puts it, the existing translation, for example, the person who said yes, is true, does not satisfy this feature. Since truth and are related, does Aristotle's argument satisfy this feature? In fact, Aristotle has many related statements, such as his famous statement that propositions are statements that contain truth and falsehood. This sentence speaks of truth without mentioning yes, but the proposition contains the word "yes.". Thus Aristotle's discourse shows that truth and right are related and closely related. Or let's take a step back, if Aristotle's aletheia is not translated as "true", then why can it be translated? We can admit that the meaning of the word is self-explanatory, but the question is, in natural language, how can this self-intelligible meaning of it be understood? Could it be that just because Aristotle was a logician and philosopher, he changed the meaning of the word? Even if Aristotle is so, what about Plato? In his case, logic has not yet arisen, philosophy has not been as disciplined as Aristotle's metaphysics, and has the aletheia he is talking about lost the meaning that people understood before philosophy came into being? Doesn't his statement that "the true proposition speaks of the yes as it is" (5) not relate the truth to the yes? Isn't what he means here by aletheia self-explanatory? It seems to me that Heidegger's interpretation of the word aletheia is presupposed and therefore lacks objectivity. Because of this, the way he cites and the interpretation of the citations are problematic.

It should be noted that two points of Heidegger's description of the correlation with truth are clear. One point is that his summary of the traditional view is clear, and his summary shows that the traditional view of truth itself is clear, or at least clear in it, such as truth is related to judgment, truth means that knowledge is consistent with the object, and so on. And his understanding of these views is also clear. Another point is that Heidegger's two statements about truth are clear, one is that the word aletheia had some meaning in the ancient Greeks as "self-understandable", and the other is that people "are accustomed" to calling certain situations "true". The former seems to indicate that the meaning of the word "true" does not need to be understood by means of anything else and is therefore self-explanatory. The latter seems to say that the word "true" means, or at least its main meaning comes from its adjective "true", and that the word has a conventional meaning, and that it is in this sense and the way in which it is understood. The two statements seem to be different, but in fact they have the same point, which is that the meaning of the word "true" is self-evident. If these two clear understandings are added together, doesn't aletheia mean "true"?

The main meaning of the German word Wahrheit (true) comes of course from wahr (true). The meaning of the word also seems self-explanatory, and people use it without thinking, and in some cases people will say "(yes) true". Heidegger acknowledges this, but has a different view. For example, he thinks that the meaning of the word "conforms" is not clear and does not seem to explain the truth; some of the original self-evident meanings of the word aletheia are not expressed as "true"; truth is certainly related to the proposition, but there are deeper problems between the two that need to be considered, and so on. So his job is to explore these questions further. Such a consideration and explanation is not in itself to blame; the problem is that his further exposition is problematic.

As mentioned above, he thinks that there is a problem with using conformity to define truth, so he defines truth in terms of revealingness, for example, he says that truth is "a way of being this." When he criticizes traditional philosophy for losing some of the original meaning of the word aletheia, he uses the term "unfolding state" to refer to it, for example, when he says, "True is the unfolding state of this.". When it comes to further questioning the relation between truth and proposition, he speaks of the premise of truth as the "meaning of the ontological basis of activity in itself." All of this suggests that the term "this is" is involved in the discussion of truth. If we were to use a sentence from the previous quotation to express Heidegger's work on truth, I think it would be to show that truth is the unfolding state of this (Quote 2). That is, he needs to explain the truth by this is. Therefore, the concept of "this is" is crucial to illustrating truth.

(Original information: Journal of Peking University. Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition, No. 20212)

Source: Journal of Peking University. Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition