In "Bright Sword", Li Yunlong fought the most beautiful battle and his luckiest one, that is, he accidentally ambushed the Japanese officer's field observation group at Baijiafeng, killing a major general, six major generals, and more than a hundred comfort officers at once. So what is the prototype of this battle? What tactics were the Japanese troops observing in reality?
In fact, the prototype of this battle is that in 1943, Wang Jinshan, a famous general of the Eighth Route Army, nicknamed "Wang Madman", led the Sixteenth Regiment of the 386th Brigade of the Eighth Route Army to annihilate the Japanese "Officer Field Observation Group" in Hanluo Village. In this battle, the Eighth Route Army eliminated a total of 9 major general officers, 99 major, middle, and minor officers, 60 cadets, and 15 car drivers, which greatly shocked the Japanese base camp.
General Wang Jinshan
<h1 class="pgc-h-decimal" data-index="01" > a new tactic of Okamura's iron-style three-tier position</h1>
On October 1, 1943, the Japanese army mobilized about 30,000 troops, personally organized and commanded by the commander of the North China Dispatch Army, Okamura Ningji, with Lieutenant General Shimizu, commander of the Sixty-ninth Division stationed in Linfen, as the commander of the former enemy commander and the chief of staff of the Taiyuan First Army as the supervisor, to carry out a large-scale "sweep" of the Anti-Japanese base area of the Eighth Route Army in southeastern Jin.
The purpose of this "sweep" is to use the so-called "new tactics for three-tiered positions of the iron brick style" to comprehensively implement and thoroughly realize its plan of "suppressing the communist experimental zone in the mountains." The enemy's "iron sweep" is aimed at crushing our army to the north bank of the Yellow River and annihilating them in one fell swoop, so as to create a model "experimental zone for suppressing the Communist Party" and set an example for other regions to "suppress the Communist Party."
This time, the Japanese army dispatched a total of about 30,000 people from the Sixty-ninth Division, the Sixty-second Division, and the Thirty-seventh Division, and about 30,000 people from the puppet army's "Suppression of the Communists" First Division, the Second Division, and the local puppet army.
The japanese army's battle plan was to use two brigades to place on the east side of the Tongpu Line (Huoshan West), and form columns to spread out in a section of 70 or 80 miles from north to south, forming a blockade and blocking line on the west side, and coordinating with the hinterland to "sweep" the troops to the south. Three brigades were placed on the west side of the Baijin Line in Guxian County, Songjiao, and Liangma in columns to form columns in the 80 or 90-mile lot, forming a blockade and blocking line on the east side, and coordinating with the hinterland to "sweep" the troops to the south. Nine brigades were each formed into three-story horizontal formations (echelons), each with a distance of 10 to 15 huali, spread between Jiexiu on the Tongpu Line and Nanguan Town on the Baijin Line, forming a "铗磙", rolling into twenty or thirty huali every day or every other day. The blockade forces on both sides advanced in tandem with the hinterland "sweeping" forces.
The first ladder was dominated by japanese troops, and the main task was to capture the main force of the Combined Eighth Route Army. The second echelon was a mixture of Japanese and puppet armies, and its main tasks were to capture prisoners, loot property, and transport enemy areas later. The third echelon is mainly based on the Japanese army, and its main task is to continue to "clear and suppress" and expand the results of the battle. This is the so-called "new method of operation of the three-layer iron-shaped formation," the purpose of which is to eliminate the main forces of the Eighth Route Army, destroy the base areas, and comprehensively realize the "mountain suppression of the communist experimental zone." However, in actual battles, our army fought bravely, flexibly and maneuvered, and jumped out of the Combined Strike Points of the Japanese Army respectively, so that the Japanese Army did not succeed in a single combined attack.
Okamura Ninji
<h1 class="pgc-h-decimal" data-index="02" > Wang Jinshan annihilated the Japanese officer field watch group</h1>
On 17 October, the Taiyue Military Region of the Eighth Route Army received a report from the Linfen Spy Station, saying that the General Staff Headquarters of the Japanese Army in Tokyo had drawn more than 180 brigade commanders, wing commanders, and juniors from all over North China, as well as cadets from the officer school, to form an "officer field viewing group." Led by brigade commander Major General Hattori Naotomo, he had arrived in Linfen and would enter the Taiyue District by car along the Lintun Highway to "watch the battle in the battlefield" and learn the new tactics of Okamura Ningji's masterpiece,--the new tactics of the iron-style three-tier position.
After receiving the information, Commander Chen Geng immediately made a decision and, using a 100,000-hot telegram, ordered Wang Jinshan to lead the Sixteenth Regiment to secretly turn into an ambush at the western end of the Lintun Highway, and must completely and completely annihilate this "officer viewing regiment" and not let him run away. At that time, Wang Jinshan was the commander of the Taiyue Second Military Subdistrict, and before the Japanese army "swept up", he led the 16th Regiment to the hidden village of Gangtou in the southeast of Linfen.
General Chen Geng
After receiving Commander Chen Geng's order of 100,000 fire and lightning, Wang Jinshan immediately mobilized politically to the troops, saying that the Japanese army's "officer field watch regiment" totaled more than 180 people, most of whom were general-level officers, one-third of whom were cadets of the officer school, and even lieutenant officers, who could eliminate so many Japanese officers at once and eliminate 50,000 Japanese troops at the top, and we must make up our minds to completely eliminate it at all costs, and we must fight a war of annihilation, not a collapse war.
On the night of October 22, Wang Jinshan and his troops secretly moved into the northeast of Linfen, southeast of Hongdong, and southwest of HanLuo Village on the west side of the Lindian Highway, blocking the news, hiding, and actively preparing for battle. Wang Jinshan personally led the cadres of the regimental battalion and company to reconnoiter the terrain in disguise on the 23rd, formulate an ambush plan on the spot, and assign the ambush points and combat tasks of each battalion company.
After returning to the residence, he received a chicken feather letter from the Eighth Route Army's Tongpu Intelligence Station, saying that the "Japanese Army Field Spectator Group" in Linfen City had set up a convoy, 3 small jeeps, 10 caravan trucks, no troop cover, and only cadets from the officer school with rifle machine guns. On the morning of the 24th, it set off and drove along the Lintun Highway towards the base area. After receiving the information, Wang Jinshan immediately ordered the troops to eat before midnight, leave on time at 12 o'clock, and enter the ambush area lightly. After entering the ambush area at 2 a.m. on the 24th, each battalion company occupied its position according to the predetermined battle plan, disguised itself, loaded itself, and quietly waited for the enemy.
<h1 class="pgc-h-decimal" data-index="03" > the battle of Hanluo Village</h1>
At 8:00 a.m., the convoy of the Japanese "Spectator Regiment" drove along the Lintun Highway, and at 8:20 a.m. it entered the ambush circle of the Eighth Route Army, with three small jeeps in front and ten caravan trucks following close behind, and the speed of the vehicles was also quite fast. The ninth company of the three battalions of the sixteenth regiment first jumped on the road as planned, blocking the enemy's way, and the sixth company of the second battalion blocked the enemy's retreat, while the ambush units on both sides rushed to kill them together. Grenades were thrown into the enemy convoy one by one, and light machine guns, rifles, and grenadiers were constantly thrown at the enemy. The battle was very fierce, the enemy's bullets were finished, the combat knife was fought, the cadets raised their rifles, the soldiers of the Eighth Route Army shot one by one, and finally the Hattori Naoto who led the team saw that there was no hope of escape, took the lead in committing suicide by caesarean section, and other Japanese troops also raised their knives to commit suicide.
In this battle, except for the Japanese officer cadets who slipped through the wolf's den hole under the road, the remaining 180 or so people were all killed. A total of more than 60 pistols, more than 60 rifles, 3 light machine guns, more than 100 combat knives were captured, and 13 cars were burned. 9 major general officers were killed, 99 officers were killed, 99 officers were senior, middle and junior, 60 cadets, and 15 car drivers.
After the Japanese army's "officer field watch group" was annihilated, Okamura Ningji was very shocked and angry, and sent planes to the villages near Hanluo to indiscriminately bomb them, and also dispatched troops to surround and loot the villages, and the people were brutally killed. In anger, Okamura dismissed the commander of the Shimizu Division and beheaded the Japanese squad leader of Han Luo's stronghold, and the puppet army stationed in Linfen Province was dismissed. And his iron sweep plan must not end 20 days earlier.
On January 3, 1944, Yan'an's "Liberation Daily" published a special newsletter entitled "Ambush at Hanluo Village on the Lintun Highway, We Killed All "Officers' Present Battle Regiments" Below the Commander of the Enemy Brigade, Resulting in a Brilliant Example of Ambush warfare in Enemy-Occupied Areas."