The 103rd of the 700 famous works translated into Chinese
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Fichte's philosophy of history is an important stage in the development of the german classical philosophical view of history.
Like Kant's The Concept of Universal History from the Point of View of the Citizens of the World (1784) and Hegel's Lectures on the Philosophy of History (1822-1831), "The Fundamental Characteristics of the Present Age" examines the logic of the historical development of mankind from the perspective of the globalization of advanced civilizations.
In this book, the author points out that the history of each people has both its inevitable development trends and its occasional forms of change, so that the members of each nation should see and participate in the course of history with both the consciousness of a citizen of the world and the attitude of patriotism. In this way, the book not only inherits the tradition of Kant, but also sets a precedent for Hegel.
In German classical philosophy, Fichte's Fundamental Characteristics of the Present Era (1806), like Kant's The Concept of Universal History from the Point of View of the Citizens of the World (1784) and Hegel's Lectures on the Philosophy of History (1822-1831), examines the logic of the historical development of mankind from the perspective of the globalization of advanced civilizations. Regarding the unique contribution of this expedition, we can comment on it from the following nine aspects.
Fichte
(i) Fichte's philosophy of history begins first and foremost with the origin of time. This is because time is the process itself of any real thing, and whatever philosophy of history should explain how possible history is as a process itself, without making such an explanation is to uncritically affirm the object of study of the philosophy of history.
Fichte saw this flaw in the philosophy of history in the past, and so in his early epistemology he deduced time: the extra-temporal self, through the impediment of the non-self set by himself, presents an infinite time series in which various objects are set, thus overcoming Kant's shortcoming of not deducing time as a pure form of perceptual intuition from the self. In late epistemology, he went on to study the origin of time. But at this time time time time time is no longer considered to be rooted in the set-up activity of the self, but as a constant unfolding link in the manifestation of the absolute; he at this time believes that the absolute existence of time, the only, real and absolutely self-existent thing, is what is called God in all languages; it must be manifested absolutely, that is, God must appear, and this manifestation is the activity of knowledge, the manifestation and manifestation of divine power This intellectual activity, which has the divine power to create all things, sets its own object, and by this object constantly develops itself, and thus time arises. Thus, Fichte has recognized that time is the process of absolute manifestation of itself, or conversely, that the change in time is an absolute manifestation.
This view of the process of development of time in which the existence of time is created, no matter how obscure it may be, and no matter how much theological overtones it may be, is easy to understand if we compare it with the hypothesis proposed by modern cosmology as the highest principle, and it does have its legitimacy. Modern cosmology holds that the universe is based on the initial singularity, split into an infinite process of development of matter in time, and after a variety of brilliant developments, it collapses to this singularity. This hypothesis may be seen as an empirical scientific expression of Fichte's theory of the origin of time, or conversely, his theory is a speculative prediction of modern cosmology. However, Fichte, like many philosophers of his time, believed that the object set by intellectual activity was the natural world, which did not develop and change in time, and that only a society that was constantly developing and changing in time was a historical process in which the existence of time existed beyond time and on which this object developed its inner power.
(ii) In Fichte's view, this process of development, composed of extra-temporal existence, is the history of human civilization, where European, Arab, Chinese and Indian civilizations are all at a common origin and will return to this common origin in the future.
Although in his philosophy of history he examines the history of European civilization entirely, and does not examine the other branches of human civilization, he analyzes the internal structure of human history on the basis of his epistemology. He argues that human history consists of two closely interrelated parts, namely the transcendental part and the empirical part. The former is an inevitable existence, which shows the cosmic blueprint as a historical goal and the process of its realization, and is the logic of the development of human history; the latter is the accidental reality of existence, which shows an infinite number of historical facts and the process of their emergence, and is the experience of the development of human history. These two aspects constitute the object of the study of the philosophy of history and the object of the study of history, respectively. Fichte thus defined the tasks of the philosophy of history and historiography.
(iii) With regard to that a priori part of human history, Kant called it the hidden plan of nature and divided it into three stages: instinctive domination, a state of freedom, and a perfect civil society. Fichte inherited and developed this idea, describing the transcendental part as the cosmic blueprint followed in the development of man's secular life, describing its realization as the process of reason's transition from blind domination to conscious domination, as the process of society from uncivilized to civilized, with the implication that "the purpose of the secular life of man is that in this life man man freely and rationally establishes all his relations."
The realization of this purpose has gone through many twists and turns, and with immovable inevitability, five insurmountable epochs or basic periods are depicted: first, there is no need for coercion, no need for hard work, and the relationship between people is arranged only by reasonable instinct; this is the period in which reason directly rules by instinct, called the state of human innocence. Secondly, the rational instinct has become weaker, manifested only in a few illustrious figures, by whom they are transformed into a period of external authority which has a coercive effect on everyone; this is the period when the systems of doctrine and life adopt arbitrary attitudes, called the state in which evil begins. Third, the period of direct freedom from arbitrary external authority, indirect freedom from rational instinct and the domination of reason in any form; this is a period of absolute indifference to any truth, without any guidance and late indulgence, called a state of fullness of evil. Fourth, the period when reason in its scientific form spreads universally to mankind, when reason and its laws are grasped in clear consciousness; this is the period when truth is recognized and most loved as the supreme thing, the state in which reason begins. Fifth, through the perfection of the technique, according to the laws of reason, the period in which all human relations are adjusted and arranged; this is the period when man possesses a reliable and infallible means to mold himself into an accurate facsimile of reason, called the state of rational perfection and holy perfection. Fichte predicted that in this period the state, as an institution governing the proper art, would consciously and systematically devote itself to the tasks set forth by reason; in this way mankind would establish an ideal society by free and rational action—a society in which reason was the highest criterion, in which all men were equal and free, and everyone was for me and for me. Fichte's blueprint of social history certainly belongs to the optimism of the Modern Western European Enlightenment, and although it has been abandoned by modern real life, the truth content it contains is still enlightening to us.
(iv) According to this blueprint drawn up by Fichte, although many peoples have had their glorious periods in human history, not any such period in human history can be counted as an era, but only the period which can cover all mankind in its principles qualifies as an era.
This criterion for defining epochs is important not only for us to examine more distant history, but also for our closer history. A principle that has been naturally realized since the Renaissance, after enduring the shocks of economic crises, world wars and violent revolutions, has been perfected and has entered a stage of rapid globalization, because this period on which it is based also shows itself as an epoch in the development of human secular life. Conversely, a principle which, from the beginning of the 20th century, proceeded from the peculiar convictions of the individual and was carried out by artificial means, destroyed itself because it could not provide higher productivity of labour and higher democracy, and thus this period based on it merely showed itself as a brief episode in human history. Although the realization of the former principle inevitably carries many evil consequences, so it is not our ideal and not the ultimate goal of history, but as a principle of an important era that must be passed, it has not yet fulfilled its mission of encompassing and spreading throughout mankind.
(v) In the realization of the blueprint drawn up by Fichte, time as the historical process itself is divided into two kinds: one that marks the unfolding of the a priori part, which is the time in the concept of uneven passage; and the other marks the progress of the empirical part, which is the time of the chronicle that flows evenly.
Since the progress of these two parts is in contrast, time in the same chronicle always converges in a number of different concepts; Fichte writes, "For the purpose of uniting all nations as one family, it is possible for the time of conception to remain in the same place through a considerable amount of chronicle time, as if it were possible to force the river of time to pause." This means that there are always some different individuals in the same chronicle time, who are at different stages of civilization development at different times. Thus there are always different individuals in the same chronicle, and Fichte divides them into three categories: one is "those who are indeed the products of their own time, who express this age most clearly"; the other "lags behind their own time, for they have never had any contact with the broad range of individuals representing the general level of development during their development, and the narrow circle in which they developed themselves is still the legacy of the old age"; the third is "already ahead of their own time, They have in their hearts the germ of a new era, but around them is still this present age that they regard as old, but in fact truly realistic." This analysis of Fichte reminds us that just as in the mid-19th century the Germans were contemporaries in comparison with the French only in terms of chronicle time, not in conceptual time, and the same is true of the underdeveloped countries today compared to the developed countries. But unfortunately, there are still some people around us who think they are beyond the principles of the present era, but they have not yet reached this principle.
(vi) In the realization of the blueprint drawn up by Fichte, nations and nations are constantly evolving as independent and organic wholes and are at different stages of social evolution. Thus, in this unbalanced development, the developed organism becomes the prototype of the underdeveloped organism, and the nation and the state, which have entered the advanced stage of world history, are the yardstick by which the nations and states that have not yet entered this stage are judged. In view of this fact, Fichte, speaking succinctly and succinctly of the third basic period of secular life, writes that "it is possible to judge and know the epoch only by those nations that have leapt to the top of the civilization of their epoch", and he goes on to point out that the only valid criterion for judging is those "the basic criterion of those who are at the pinnacle of the present epoch, that is, the principles of the present epoch itself". However brief this statement may be, it also shows that when Marx, in his Introduction to the Economic Manuscripts of 1857-1858, spoke of "bourgeois economy providing the key to the ancient economy, etc.", his inheritance to the German classical philosopher was very obvious. We can fully assert from their point of view of social evolution that no nation or individual lagging behind the times will be qualified to make a correct judgment of the present era, and in today's international community, from the conceptual point of view of time, the developed countries are far more advanced than the underdeveloped countries, so their judgment of the present era is much more correct than the judgment of the underdeveloped countries on the present era, and the national rules formulated according to the former judgment should of course gradually spread throughout the world. In such cases, the underdeveloped countries should undoubtedly actively create conditions for compliance with those rules, but the developed countries should not impose them on any country that did not yet have such conditions. Fichte once wrote in response to a similar problem that arose at that time, "The epoch advances at its firm and always established pace, and nothing in the long course of the epoch can be accelerated or demanded by the strength of a single horse." This means that the times are advancing inexorably, and the people of the underdeveloped countries can never be separated from the glorious path of world civilization for a long time, but will embark on this path through a difficult and tortuous process, and the single-handed force that wants to force such a country to obey its will is acting as a kind of world policeman.
(vii) In elucidating the course of the development of European civilization, Fichte divides the contradictions that run through them with ups and downs into two categories: one is the contradiction between the standard peoples representing advanced cultures and the ignorant peoples who have not yet been civilized, or between civilization and barbarism;
With regard to the former category of contradictions, Fichte argues that educated nations should rule and barbarians should serve; that it is only in this conflict between civilization and barbarism that all ideas and all science, as the forces and means to lead barbarism to civilization, begin to sprout and develop; and that the natural war of civilization against the barbarism around it is of great significance in promoting the development of world history. With regard to the second type of contradiction, Fichte pointed out that the Christian national community, as an advanced stage in the development of human civilization, implemented the principle of the equality of all human beings not only in the field of citizenship law, but also in international law, although this principle did not prevail in the surrounding non-Christian countries at that time. If we look at the present state of mankind, we may say that the first type of contradiction has now disappeared and that the barbarians have entered the stage of civilization, although their civilization is still in one stage of underdevelopment of one kind or another; therefore, Fichte's argument no longer has any practical significance. But what he said about the second type of contradiction is a different matter. The progress of civilization in all mankind today has made great strides, so that whether the norms of citizenship and state law, which have been established on the basis of the achievements of European civilization, can be implemented within non-Christian countries and between such countries and Christian countries, respectively, has been called the biggest historical problem facing the present era, and it is also the biggest practical problem for all mankind to solve. Here, resisting the introduction of the former norm is perverse, and ignoring the promotion of the latter is an act of aggression. Just as it is ridiculous to demand equality in international relations and create inequality in domestic relations, it is absurd to insist on equality in internal relations and not to speak of equality in international relations.
(viii) Fichte, in The Fundamental Characteristics of the Present Epoch, has pointed out succinctly that the history of each people has both its inevitable development trend and its contingent forms of change, and that the members of each nation should therefore see and participate in the course of history with the consciousness of a citizen of the world and with an attitude of patriotism.
In his subsequent book Patriotism and Its Opposites (1806-1807), he further elaborated on this theme. In his view, cosmopolitanism is the belief that the purpose of human life will certainly be fulfilled, while patriotism is the belief that this purpose will first be realized in the peoples of which we are members, and then the achievements of the attainments will be transmitted throughout mankind. The purpose of human life, which he speaks of, is that man freely and rationally establishes all his relations, or, in other words, the kingdom of reason; this is the universal principle of human civilization, and it will be concretely embodied. Thus, Fichte argues, there is no abstract cosmopolitanism in the world, and on the contrary, cosmopolitanism is bound to become in reality a kind of patriotism aimed at establishing a rational kingdom. This is so because cosmopolitanism does not do nothing anywhere, but inevitably manifests itself, working and functioning in its own direction, but it can only influence the state in which it lives directly as a living force, which constantly guides its influencing activities by its own means, in accordance with its own laws, within its own limits.
(ix) The philosophy of history expounded by Fichte in The Fundamental Characteristics of the Present Age is full of dialectical content. In the basic period of the development of the five contradictions between rationality and anti-rationality that he spoke of, reason experienced a tortuous process from prosperity to decline and from decline to prosperity. We can summarize the first two periods as the stage in which reason first rules directly through instinct and then indirectly through authority as instinct, as the stage of the increasing decline of the blind rule of reason, and the latter two basic periods as the stage in which reason first enters knowledge and then enters life with the help of skill, as the stage of discerning rational rule, and the third basic period between these two stages is the stage of combining the dark world with the light world, the world of coercion and the free world, It is the stage at which the instinctive form of reason is destroyed and the conceptual form of reason begins to be born; thus the development of reason, in the period when it is hit hard by something against reason, enters a period in which the extremes of things must be reversed and the extremes of the negative are supreme. Fichte wrote of this:
The whole journey that man has traveled through this series of periods in the earthly world is nothing more than a return to the stage in which it was originally located, nothing more than a return to its original state. But man must walk out of this path with his own feet, and he must, with his own strength, make himself what he once became without any action of his own, and that is why he must first lose his original state.
Fichte's philosophy of history was an important stage in the development of the historical view of German classical philosophy. His "Fundamental Characteristics of the Present Age" not only inherits the tradition of Kant, but also sets a precedent for Hegel. If we compare Hegel's views with Fichte's philosophy of history, it is easy to conclude that Hegel's philosophy of history is the inheritance and development of Fichte in its basic views.
【Preface to the Translator of "The Fundamental Characteristics of the Present Era"】