Author: Unsentimental
As early as early 1938, Xu Xiangqian, deputy commander of the 129th Division of the Eighth Route Army, was ordered to lead the eastward detachment to open up the base area in southern Hebei and rely on the Taihang base area. The troops also quickly grew from more than 500 people to about 10,000 people.
After the End of the Battle of Wuhan, the Japanese army adopted the policy of "taking abduction as the mainstay and military strikes as a supplement" to Chiang Kai-shek, and gradually drew troops back to North China. Among them, the 114th Division and the independent mixed 3rd Brigade regiment each had a total of more than 3,400 people, and in mid-November 1938, the soldiers launched the first large-scale "sweep" of Ji'nan in four routes. Its first road was more than 1,200 Japanese puppet troops attacked by Shijiazhuang, and they took more than 40 cars and attacked the Ningjin and Zaoqiang areas. The second road was composed of more than a thousand Japanese puppet troops dispatched by Xingtai and Gaoyi, and with the cooperation of nearly 100 cars, they attacked nangong through Ren County and Julu. The third route was more than 500 enemies dispatched from Dezhou to attack the Linqing area through Wucheng. About 600 enemies dispatched by Handan were the fourth road, responsible for attacking the Yongnian and Guangping areas.
In fact, as early as October, Xu Xiangqian judged in advance from a series of indications that tomorrow's puppet army would have a "major operation" against our Base Area in Southern Hebei, so he launched early mobilization of the military and civilians in the base areas to clear the fields, learn from the experience of Jizhong, dig more road ditches, and set up more roadblocks. In terms of the anti-"sweeping" operational ideology, Xu Xiangqian stressed the need to rely on the vast countryside, disperse and maneuver with the enemy, see the opportunity, and if you do not fight, you will already be victorious. At the same time, it is also necessary to resolutely suppress the traitors and guard against the recalcitrant army from taking advantage of the opportunity to create friction.
According to this guiding ideology, after the enemy from Xingtai and Shijiazhuang occupied Nangong on November 17, the young anti-Japanese guerrilla column of the Eighth Route Army took advantage of the enemy's unstable foothold and repeatedly attacked and harassed the enemy to exhaust the Japanese puppet army. On the night of the 22nd, under the cover of nightfall, the 5th Company of our 771st Regiment broke into Nangong County in one fell swoop with a swift and concealed movement, took down an artillery position of the Japanese army, and killed more than ten enemy people.
On the 23rd, the enemy of nangong continued to attack the south in two ways, with more than 60 cavalry and 20 cars on the one road. Our young anti-Japanese guerrilla column ambushed in Shangjia Village in advance and blocked the exit with trees. After the Japanese cavalry entered the village, they dismounted and removed the barricades, and I ambushed the troops to attack the situation. Only 6 of the enemies who entered the village escaped. After the follow-up troops of the Japanese army arrived, 1 battalion of the Eighth Route Army also rushed to reinforcements. After 2 hours of fierce fighting, the invading enemy dropped 3 military vehicles destroyed by me, hurriedly loaded dozens of corpses into the remaining cars, and fled back to the Nangong.
When the enemy who attacked the other way invaded the ancient city village, he was also ambushed by our young anti-Japanese guerrilla column. When the enemy approached the edge of the village, one grenade of our army had grown like an eye, impartial, and landed in the carriage of a Japanese car, blowing up the enemy's flesh and blood, and the ghost cried wolf. After several hours of fierce fighting, the Japanese army made no progress and had to retreat back to the city. The walls of the Nangong Palace were completely demolished before our army withdrew, so it was particularly conducive to our army's day and night raids. The enemy in the city was so miserable that they barely held out until the 25th, and then they had to abandon the city and flee north.
The fleeing enemy had intended to cross the Fuyang River at The Village of Houkou in Ningjin, but the bridge here had long been demolished by our army and blocked by fire on the other side of the river. Unable to cross the river, the Japanese army fled to the county seat of Xinhe instead. Taking advantage of the enemy's unstable foothold, our pursuing troops invaded the city in one fell swoop and fought fiercely with the enemy for one night. The enemy fled to Ningjin in a hurry, and when passing through the mainland village, he was ambushed by the 2nd Regiment of our Dongjin Detachment and the Jiyu Detachment that were ambushed here. The two sides repeatedly charged and killed for 8 times, and we killed and wounded about 200 enemy people.
The Japanese army suffered repeated blows and had to withdraw from the central area of our southern Base Area on the 30th. In this anti-"sweeping" operation that lasted half a month, although our army finally won, it also exposed the problem that the Ji'nan Plain was extremely favorable to the rampage of Japanese cars and cavalry, and our army could only rely on villages, graves, and mounds to strike at the enemy. Because of the unfavorable terrain, the troops of southern Hebei and northwestern Lu suffered hundreds of casualties. However, when summing up the lessons learned from the operation, Xu Xiangqian also found that some troops and the masses used natural ditches and pits to greatly avoid losses. So he pondered that if all the avenues were dug into ditches to conceal themselves, to delay and block the rapid forces of the Japanese army, we would be able to greatly preserve our living forces and provide our army with a favorable battlefield against the enemy.
After careful consideration, Xu Xiangqian believed that this was a good way to persist in guerrilla warfare in the plains, but the amount of work was quite huge, and the troops alone could not complete it in a short period of time, and it was necessary to mobilize the masses in the broadest possible way and rely on the masses. Therefore, the Ji'nan Bureau issued a directive and launched an unprecedented-scale mass campaign to transform the terrain of the plains. Not only that, the Ji'nan Bureau also stipulated that all the roads should be dug into ditches 3 feet deep and 5 feet wide with large trucks as the standard. Pile the excavated earth on both sides of the ditch and build a side wall 1 and a half feet high and 2 feet wide as a sidewalk. And every few dozen cubic meters, it is also necessary to dig a compound road of about 4 to 5 zhang, so that the big cars that have touched their heads can be staggered.
It was the middle of winter, and the land in southern Hebei was frozen as hard as a stone. However, the broad masses of the people are not afraid of the cold and hardships, and the road is full of people. Some took off their cotton coats, sweated and picked up their picks, and raised shovels to dig the ground. In order to speed up, some villages hang lanterns on the side of the road in the dark night, hold torches, and work in shifts day and night.
The people of Southern Hebei, who threw themselves into this movement, formed a powerful army of roadbreakers. For the victory of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, they really did not care about remuneration, but really had money to contribute money, made a strong contribution, and supported the great cause of the War of Resistance with practical actions. According to statistics, a total of more than 50,000 road ditches were dug in the base areas of southern Hebei, which is equivalent to about twice the long march itinerary of the Red Army. These crisscrossing and cobweb-like ditches played a positive role in the protracted struggle of guerrilla warfare in the plains. When our army attacks, it can use this to conceal the enemy, and when it is transferred, it can quickly conceal and disperse, and get out of the enemy's fire control. The Armored Vehicles, Cars and Heavy Weapons of the Japanese Army could only sigh.
Therefore, at that time, some people called this great project the "Maginot Line" on the Ji'nan Plain. Xu Xiangqian put forward the famous "human mountain" theory, and in his memoirs, he wrote a strong stroke about it.
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