Wen | Chunfeng smiled
The Tashan Blockade Battle was a turning point in the Liaoshen Campaign and even the entire Liberation War, and its significance was extraordinary.
The stubborn resistance of the four columns at Tashan for five days (10.11-10.15) not only prevented the superior main forces of the Kuomintang as many as four armies from breaking the siege of Jinzhou, but also affected the layout of the decisive battle between the Kuomintang in north and east China.
However, having said that, tashan's gains and losses were so important, the Kuomintang army was not absent-minded in order to attack him, so why did it not bypass the four-column blocking position when tashan could not be attacked for a long time, detouring or going straight to reinforce Jinzhou?
Looking back at history, we will find that the Eastward Advance Corps of the Nationalist Army, which was responsible for breaking through Tashan to aid Jinzhou, considered the choice of detour more than once before and after encountering setbacks in attacking Tashan.
Let's take a closer look.
First, the first controversy over the plan to attack Tashan
Tashan is located between Jinxi and Jinzhou, the terrain is high at the east and west ends, the middle is low-lying and flat, the Bac Ninh Railway passes through, Tashan Village is in such a valley, the northwest direction is more than 200 meters above sea level Baitai Mountain and rolling hills, southeast is the Fishing Mountain, bordering the Bohai Sea.
Therefore, for the Kuomintang army, if they could capture Tashan, they could use the railway or road to quickly transport troops to Jinzhou.
The distance between Jinzhou and Tashan was twenty or thirty kilometers, and in less than half a day the Nationalist army would drive to Lin Biao's eyes. Therefore, Tashan seems to have become the only way for the Kuomintang army to aid Jin.
(Lin Biao and Luo Ronghuan in the film and television drama)
However, for the Kuomintang army, Tashan is the only way to go, and their main direction of attack must be placed on Tashan?
Just before dawn the day before the Tashan blockade officially began (October 10), the Nationalist army sneaked in with a division from the area of Tayushan, southeast of Tashan Mountain, and almost broke through the defensive position of the four columns at Tashan Mountain. Its failure was due to the fact that the follow-up reinforcements did not keep up, so that they did not return.
When some of the main forces of the Kuomintang army arrived at Huludao by boat, Chiang Kai-shek's "Minister of Chincha," Luo Qi, who was the head of the North China Field Inspectorate, and Que Hanqian, commander of the 54th Army, held a meeting to study how to march into and seize Tashan.
At the meeting, Zhang Boquan, chief of staff of the 17th Corps, insisted on attacking the defensive positions of the four columns on the front of Tashan with the main force, trying to break through it, so that it could be driven straight into Jinzhou by rail or road.
(The main force of the four columns on the Tashan position)
However, the chief of staff of the 54th Army, who had some experience because of his early participation in the battle, did not recommend such a seemingly clever approach, but advocated focusing the attack between Tashan and Baitai Mountain in its northwest direction, taking advantage of the relatively sparse fortifications of the Plaster and the open terrain here, making a breakthrough, and then detouring back to the rear of the Tashan defenders and annihilating the other side in one fell swoop.
From a military point of view, this proposal by the chief of staff of the 54th Army is not unreasonable, because at that time, the defensive focus of the commander of the fourth column, Wu Kehua, was in the area of Tashan Village, and the arrangement between Tashan and Baitaishan was indeed slightly insufficient.
Therefore, if the recommendations of the Chief of Staff of the 54th Army are put into practice. The Tashan defenders, even if they could hold their positions, could have suffered more casualties.
However, at the meeting, most of the Kuomintang generals, because they were from north China, lacked understanding of the strength and topographic characteristics of the Northeast People's Liberation Army, and were arrogant, so they categorically rejected the proposal of the chief of staff of the 54th Army, and generally supported Zhang Boquan's frontal breakthrough plan. Therefore, in the two days after the start of the Tashan Blockade Battle, the Nationalist army lost troops in the battle for the front of Tashan and made no progress.
Second, Roach's program is online
Seeing that the frontal attack had no effect, Roach, who was Chiang Kai-shek's minister of Chincha, was a little discouraged, and at the meeting, he and other senior Kuomintang generals discussed whether it was necessary to change the mode of attack.
This time, Que Hanqian, commander of the 54th Army, directly stood up and proposed to use his 54th Army to pretend to attack the front of Tashan Mountain, and then the 62nd Army of Lin Weili detoured from the left flank through the hilly area northwest of Tashan Mountain, and then occupied Hongluo Da Shan behind Tashan in one fell swoop.
In this way, the Defenders of Tashan saw that the backyard was on fire, and they would inevitably have to divide their troops to rescue, and the troops of the Nationalist army pretending to attack at this time could attack with full force and cooperate with the 62nd Army, which was responsible for the roundabout raid. In this way, Tower Hill can be easily conquered.
Objectively speaking, although Que Hanqian's proposal is somewhat risky, it is indeed much better than the original simple frontal attack plan. However, Que Hanqian had just forgotten that Roach was going against his ideas. On the one hand, Luo Qi still insisted on breaking through from the tashan front from his heart; on the other hand, Lin Weili, the commander of the 62nd Army responsible for the adventure, had a good relationship with Luo Qi himself, and he was an old classmate, and Que Hanqian's arrangement was obviously unfavorable to Lin Weili and his men, so Luo Qi, after thinking about it left and right, rejected Que Hanqian's suggestion and took the opportunity to question his disobedience to Chiang Kai-shek's orders.
(Que Han Qian)
At this point, Que Hanqian did not even dare to say a word, and could only agree with trepidation to any arrangement made by Luo Qi in order to clear his false accusations. But where did he know that after the liberation of Jinzhou, Luo Qi, in order to excuse himself, simply put the responsibility on Que Hanqian alone, and Chiang Kai-shek was so annoyed that he almost shot Que Hanqian.
It can be seen from this that in the process of attacking Tashan, the Kuomintang army did not consider the idea of bypassing the front of Tashan in a roundabout attack, but its internal factions were numerous, and they conspired with each other, so that smart people could not exert their talents, so they had to make way for fools.
Third, the roundabout offensive has finally been carried out, why is there still no progress?
The tug-of-war on the Tashan side lasted for more than two days, and in the early morning of October 15, a deputy commander of the Kuomintang army who ran out of the direction of Jinzhou informed Luo Qi and others of the news that Jinzhou had been breached. Now, the rapid capture of Tashan has lost its significance for the Nationalist army.
(The People's Liberation Army invaded Jinzhou)
After some time, Du Yuming was sent from Xuzhou to command the war, and on October 23, he organized an attack to continue the attack on Tashan, trying to break through and retake Jinzhou.
This time, the Kuomintang army did not insist on attacking the front of Tashan any longer, but shifted the focus of the attack to the Baitai Mountain area on the flank of Tashan, and the Kuomintang army and the People's Liberation Army repeatedly tugged around this hilly area, resulting in more than a day of fighting, and the Kuomintang 54th Army and the 62nd Army suffered huge casualties and had to rest for a day, while the situation on the front line still made no progress. Because at this time, the Tashan defenders had already strengthened the defense of the Tashan flank, and the People's Liberation Army also had mobile corps to reinforce, and the position was as solid as a rock.
In contrast, the top level of the Kuomintang regiment of the EastWard Advance Corps was lost because Jinzhou was lost, the whereabouts of Liao Yaoxiang's main corps were unknown, and they had no hope that their side could occupy Tashan, and the middle and lower-ranking officers and men of the Kuomintang army were also demoralized and perfunctory. At this time, even if the tactics of roundabout encirclement were implemented with du Yuming's intervention, it would not help.
By October 27, the Kuomintang army just wanted to continue to attack Tashan, but found that the People's Liberation Army around Tashan and Baitai Mountain had long been lost, and they wanted to find a common people who could not find it, and when they were still confused, the PLA garrison in Tashan had already thrown themselves into the battle of pursuing and annihilating the Liao Yaoxiang group in the Western Liaoning Corridor.
(Liao Yaoxiang in the film and television drama, the second person wearing a military hat on the left)
Incidentally, when Hou Jingru commanded the East Advance Corps to attack Tashan, he was not even willing to make a frontal breakthrough, because he still thought that Liao Yaoxiang of the WestWard Advance Corps could cut off Lin Biao's return route one step ahead of himself and relieve the siege of Jinzhou.
However, when Hou Jingru learned that Liao Yaoxiang's group was making slow progress in the area of Zhangwu and Xinlitun, and that there were still hundreds of miles away from Jinzhou, Hou Jingru was also a little dissatisfied, feeling that even if he rushed to the outskirts of Jinzhou, he would still be fighting alone, giving the other side a head in vain, and his own offensive speed did not feel slow. Therefore, the huge Kuomintang EastWard Advance Corps was not even so careless about the frontal attack, let alone any detour around Tashan to rescue Jinzhou.
bibliography:
The Literature, History and Study Committee of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, ed., General Du Yuming, China Literature and History Publishing House
Memoirs of Cheng Zihua, People's Liberation Army Publishing House
The Literature, History and Study Committee of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, ed., The Liaoshen Campaign: Battlefield Memories of Former Senior Kuomintang Generals, China Literature and History Publishing House
Liu Tong, Decisive Battle: Northeast Liberation War, Shanghai People's Publishing House