Lu Zhengxiang was a diplomat in the late Qing Dynasty and early Ming Dynasty, and he did two major things during his tenure as foreign minister, one was to sign the "Twenty-One Articles" proposed by Japan, and the other was to refuse to sign at the Paris Peace Conference. This "signature" and "non-signature" are crucial for both China and the world. It was only the "May Fourth Movement" in 1919 that focused people's attention on Cao Rulin, Zhang Zongxiang and Lu Zongyu, but Lu Zhengxiang gradually faded out of people's vision.
It was only recently, after reading the article "Lu Zhengxiang from the Chief of Foreign Affairs to the Priest of the Monastery" in Cai Dengdeng's "Love and The End of the Gap" (Beijing Publishing House, 2019), that I understood Lu Zhengxiang in a real historical context and raised a wave of respect.
Original text: "Lu Zhengxiang's Redemption"
Author | Qingdao Liu Shitong
Picture | network
The first half of his life was a mixed reputation
The article summarizes Lu Zhengxiang's life as follows: "His reputation in the first half of his life was mixed, and his merits in the second half of his life were complete." Lu Zhengxiang's "destruction" was destroyed by the fact that he had signed the "Twenty-One Articles" proposed in Japan, and his "reputation" was praised at the Paris Peace Conference, and he refused to sign. It is also this "signature" and "non-signature" that almost determines the first half of the foreign minister's life. The question is, should his signature on the Twenty-One Articles really be "ruined", and his refusal to sign at the Paris Peace Conference is really "honorable"? Are there any hidden and insider stories?
On January 18, 1915, Japan took advantage of the fact that during the First World War, European and American countries had no time to look east, disregarded diplomatic etiquette, and directly proposed the "Twenty-One Articles" to Yuan Shikai, and also warned Yuan Shikai to keep it absolutely secret, otherwise it would cause serious consequences. At this critical moment, Yuan Shikai "changed generals on the verge of battle" and ordered Lu Zhengxiang to succeed Sun Baoqi as foreign minister. From the beginning of negotiations on February 2 to the final amendment proposed by Japan on April 26, Lu Zhengxiang always "defended article by article with a stoic spirit and a roundabout strategy, and argued on the basis of reason", until May 9, when Japan proposed an ultimatum, Yuan Shikai and the Beiyang government were forced to accept most of the provisions of the "Twenty-one Articles". As the chief foreign minister, Lu Zhengxiang knew that "if I signed, I signed my death case", but because of the requirements of his position, he had to obey the government's decision. However, through his arduous negotiations, he still defended and fought for a great deal of rights and interests. Many remedial suggestions were also made after the signing. Scholar Chen Gonglu said: "As far as the international situation is concerned, the disparity between the strengths and weaknesses of China and Japan is very different, and the war is unfavorable to China... In the end, it is forced to endure humiliation and sign a treaty, how can it be wrong? Hu Shi, who studied in the United States, also wrote in his diary: "Because of this negotiation with Japan, I can be said to know myself and know the other, know both weight and perseverance, and can be soft and rigid." This is unprecedented in diplomatic history. The two scholars' assessments are very fair.
Then there's the Paris Peace Conference. China, as a victorious country headed by Lu Zhengxiang, led the Chinese delegation to the meeting, put forward two proposals for the peace conference: abolish the privileges of imperialism in China; abolish the "Twenty-one Articles" that Japan forced China to recognize, and recover its rights and interests in Shandong. But the proposal was rejected. Because as early as 1917, when he announced his participation in the war, Duan Qirui had signed a "military alliance" with Japan, and for the Japanese proposal of the Jiaoji Railway, Zhang Zongxiang, the minister in Japan, wrote the words "readily agree" in his reply. This undoubtedly tied the hands and feet of the delegation. At this time, Lu Zhengxiang seemed to be a little afraid, and even went to Beijing to suggest that the government "sign in secret and retain the Shandong clause." Fortunately, at this moment, a huge "May Fourth Movement" broke out in China, and the roars of "fighting for state power abroad, punishing national thieves at home" and "abolishing the Twenty-one Articles" spread throughout the country; on the day of signing, overseas Chinese and students in Paris surrounded the residence of the Chinese delegation and prevented Lu Zhengxiang's deputies from signing. Lu Zhengxiang could not go out of the door, and in the end he did not sign the peace treaty.
In summary, it can be seen that Lu Zhengxiang's "signature" and "no signature" before and after, of which the hidden situation is quite complicated. In 1915 he had to sign the Twenty-One Articles, which was undoubtedly his shame. After all, he did his best, and through reasoning, he defended and fought for great rights and interests. In this regard, it seems that it is not an exaggeration to say that he has certain merits. In 1919, he finally refused to sign, which was undoubtedly his glory; but if there was no huge pressure from public opinion, and without Gu Weijun's strong refusal to sign, he probably went to the opposite side of the matter. Here I can't help but say a few more words: In the past two decades, many people in the academic circles have used "reason" and "reflection" as the reason to believe that the "May Fourth Movement" opened up the precedent of modern radicalism in China, thus advocating "farewell to May Fourth" and thus negating the "May Fourth Movement". As far as Lu Zhengxiang's refusal to sign was concerned, if on May 4, 1919, the students in Beijing did not hold a huge rally and march, could it have caused so much public opinion to force Lu Zhengxiang to refuse to sign?
The second half of his life was full of merit
The reason why Lu Zhengxiang's "merits were perfect" in his later years was because he correctly understood the two major events related to the country and the nation that he had done during his tenure as foreign minister. In reflecting on both events, his Belgian wife, Peder Boffey, was crucial to his admonition.
Before leading a delegation to France to attend the Paris Peace Conference, he told Mrs. Peid that he would strive to abolish Japan's "Twenty-one Articles" and reclaim Japan's sovereignty over Shandong. In the end, he did it, did not sign, and was welcomed back home with patriotic heroism. However, later, When Mrs. Peide learned of her husband's failure to sign the "true reason", she felt a pain of being deceived and fooled, and decided to leave China with her husband and return to Paris to recuperate. Before dying, the daughter of the Belgian general left a suicide note to Lu Zhengxiang, saying: "Zi Xin, my illness is probably hopeless. Honey, everything in your life has been worthy of me, just one thing that I think is the most disgraceful (i.e., signing the "twenty-one articles"). You are sorry not only for me in this matter, but also sorry for your country, and sorry for God. After my death, you had better hurry to serve in the church of the college where I used to study in Belgium, and perhaps get God's forgiveness and hope to go to heaven. Farewell, Zi Xin! Your Pedder. In this way, on October 4, 1927, Lu Zhengxiang was officially ordained at the Monastery of St. Andrew in Bruges, Belgium, became a monk, and converted to Catholicism. He said: "I only pursued one thing at this time, and I begged for a chance to retreat. ”
Since then, he has been repenting for signing the "Twenty-One Articles", and in a letter to a friend in 1937, he said, "Sooner or later this great account of state affairs will always be settled." He only wanted to "dedicate himself to the Lord with his own body, so as to make up for it, and to alleviate the evil accounts of my life for the world, the motherland, and the people." In the monastery, he lived a life of poverty, refusing all financial support, no different from the poor old man on the street. However, he was not isolated from the world; after Japan brazenly launched an all-out war of aggression against China in 1937, he actively publicized China's War of Resistance to the outside world as a Christian; he also followed the suggestion of Yu Bin, bishop of Nanjing, and edited the "Yishi Bao Overseas Newsletter" to introduce the situation of China's War of Resistance and wrote an article calling on the people of all European countries to support China's War of Resistance. Lu Zhengxiang not only repented from the depths of his soul, but also practiced it. He was 74 years old until 1945, and told a Chinese reporter who had traveled to Belgium to interview him that he had expressed remorse for signing the "Twenty-One Articles" on Yuan Shikai's behalf to Chinese, and that "I have been deeply responsible for this for thirty years."
It can be seen that there is no exaggeration or untruth in saying that Lu Zhengxiang 's merits are perfect in the second half of his life", and he finally washed away the sins of that year with more than twenty years of hard practice and deep repentance, in order to complete his own salvation.
The article was originally published in the 8th edition of the 1694th issue of the Social Science Daily, and its reproduction without permission is prohibited, and the content in the article only represents the views of the author and does not represent the position of this newspaper.
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