<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="2" > defected</h1>
On December 22, 1961, a small, sturdy man wrapped in a thick coat braved the fierce snowstorm to walk to the U.S. Embassy in Helsinki, Finland. He told the American soldiers standing guard at the gate that my name was Anatoly Golitsyn, an official at the Soviet Embassy in Finland, and asked to see the intelligence officers of the American Embassy.
Post-mortem verification indicated that he was speaking by his real name.
The U.S. Embassy immediately initiated the defector disposal process. Golitsyn was taken to a separate small room at the embassy, where he was met by the head of the CIA Helsinki station. Golitsyn said he was a major in the KGB, and to show his identity and sincerity, he presented a stack of confidential files from the Soviet Embassy in Finland and then demanded that he and his wife and children be sent to the United States. In return, he could provide more intelligence on Soviet spy agencies.
According to routine procedures and practices, CIA officials first persuaded Golitsyn whether he could remain in the Soviet Union and act as an inside line for them to work secretly. Golitsyn rebuffed, saying that if he went back now he would be dead, and that the KGB would be able to discover the inside line that served the CIA.
They all ate this bowl of rice, and the CIA officials immediately understood the subtext in this sentence: the KGB had undercover inside the CIA.
At the same time, CIA headquarters launched a verification of The situation in Golitsyn. There is only one record in the CIA archives: In 1954, a KGB defection officer named Peter Deriabin mentioned Golitsyn as a KGB officer with the potential to defect.
Golitsyn said he was willing to expose KGB undercover agents hiding inside the CIA if he could get to the United States safely.
After a comprehensive assessment by the CIA, it was concluded that Golitzen was a valuable defector. On Christmas Day, the CIA sent a plane to pick up Golitsyn and his family. However, the plane did not go to the United States, but landed in Frankfurt, West Germany.
Golitsyn was sent to the U.S. Military Mutiny Review Center there and began routine censorship. Over the course of a week, the CIA conducted a full set of reviews of Golitzen, including a lie detector test, and finally believed in the reliability of Golitzen's defection, which arranged for the family to enter the United States.
After arriving in the United States, beginning in February 1962, in a heavily fortified courtyard in Maryland, the CIA began interrogating Golitzen to hear from him about the KGB.
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="345" > a defector unlike any other</h1>
Defectors are the weaker side. A man who changes his court and defects to the enemy is like a dog that has lost his family. On the one hand, there is a weak person, and on the other side is a professional intelligence agency, which is a powerful state apparatus. Moreover, for the rest of his life, the job bowl of the defectors was in the hands of others.
Man under the low eaves, had to bow his head.
Unexpectedly, this Golitsyn was an outlier among the defectors.
He was a KGB man, and the case was naturally under the responsibility of the CIA's Soviet Division. But Golitzen was arrogant and looked down on the CIA's Soviet officers interrogating him. He spoke wildly, believing that these officials were all boys and girls running errands and were not qualified to talk to him at all.
In total disregard of the CIA's rules, he demanded to bypass the soviet bureau officials and speak directly to more qualified officials. He unceremoniously and directly named: James Angleton.
Golitsyn said that in the entire CIA, only Angleton's shrewdness reached the point where he was asked questions.
Angleton is the head of the CIA Counterintelligence Division.
James Angleton
In the CIA, Angleton was a man with a story. Kim Philby, a well-known Soviet spy, was an old friend of Angleton's for many years before exposure. Philby secretly joined the Soviet intelligence service while studying at Cambridge University, entered MI6 after graduating from Cambridge, and was later sent to the United States as a liaison officer for MI6 in the CIA. Once a week, the two men must have dinner to exchange information and discuss problems. Whether it is a public friendship or a personal relationship, the two can be called close friends.
As a counterintelligence expert, as the first person the CIA to catch a spy, Angleton did not know how many people he suspected in his career. But he never suspected the Soviet undercover agent around him, who had always regarded Philby as his best friend.
The exposure of Philby's identity as a Soviet spy had a great impact on Angleton's face and heart, and it can be imagined.
From then on, Angleton's vision became more gloomy and suspicious. Especially for the KGB, he developed a morbid vigilance, or admiration. He believed that the KGB had a very deep and complex conspiracy against the United States, that it had been playing a very big game of chess against the United States, and that the KGB was taking a completely unusual path, and that its logic was often the exact opposite of what was usually reasonable.
While naming Angleton by name, Golitzen also made a comment that the KGB was good at using false information and defection tactics to mislead the West. Based on this, he made a prediction that the KGB would spare no effort to slander him with false defection and false intelligence, and he expected that soon thereafter, KGB officials would defect to Western countries to seek contact with the CIA or FBI in order to destroy him.
Golitsyn's confession fits Angleton's judgment of the KGB conspiracy.
Golitsyn put a top hat on Angleton and took him into the ditch. The encounter with Goliczen brought Angleton's career to an inflection point.
Not only did Golitsyn name Angleton, he also named another person. The man's name was Robert F. Kennedy, who was then the U.S. Attorney General and the younger brother of U.S. President John F. Kennedy.
These demands of Golitsyn were met.
Not only did he meet with the Attorney General, but he also earned the Full Trust of the Attorney General. And the attitude of the attorney general also affected his brother who was president, and President Kennedy also praised Golitsyn's intelligence, and even wrote a letter to French President Charles de Gaulle in order to pass on his information.
Later, Golitzen's popularity made officials within the CIA who doubted Golitsyn's sincerity begin to realize that if they doubted Golitsyn again, they would risk their careers.
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="346" > burst out</h1>
The defectors took the initiative to turn to the provision of intelligence, and the accepting party was of course secretly happy about it. At the beginning of Golitsyn's intelligence, the CIA was such a mentality.
However, as Golitzen's revelations deepened, the mood of the CIA and other Western intelligence agencies slowly changed, and they gradually tasted some unusual flavors of this pie that fell from the world.
Golitsyn did provide a lot of extremely explosive heavyweight intelligence.
The CIA was shocked and encouraged by his first round of confessions, which included a large number of NATO classified documents and clues to more than a hundred Soviet spies lurking in NATO and member states. One CIA official who interrogated him said: "During the first 48 hours of our interrogation of Golitsyn, we received so much intelligence from him that most of us confirmed that he was genuine." We are quite familiar with the Soviet Embassy in Helsinki, and we can use what we know to check whether what he said is true. ”
Golitsyn said four senior French intelligence officials in key positions were repulsed by the KGB. All classified documents within NATO, passing through France, will be delivered to the KGB office building in Moscow within 24 hours.
However, the appetizing thing is that Golitzen said that he did not know the real names of the four people, nor did he know their specific positions and other specific information.
That is to say, according to Golitzen's intelligence, it is impossible to directly target specific suspects.
Because of the blowing of the attorney general's brother, US President Kennedy also highly praised Golitsyn's intelligence, and he specially sent a special envoy to Paris by special plane to carry a handwritten letter to President de Gaulle. A few weeks later, de Gaulle personally selected six French intelligence officers to travel to Washington to verify Golitsyn's intelligence.
Although Golitsyn could not name the four men, the confidential French materials he provided in his confession were all revealed to the KGB by the four men. The material apparently came from the highest levels of the French government and intelligence agencies. The list of investigators who had access to the confidential materials was shocking. After a close investigation of the list, the suspicions were concentrated on two people. One is the director of France's Foreign Intelligence and Counterintelligence Service, and the other is President charles de Gaulle's personal intelligence adviser.
Some of the senior French officials in charge of the investigation were also suspicious of Golitsyn's intelligence and discussed with Angleton: Could Golitsyn be a divisor sent by the KGB to sabotage U.S.-France relations?
The discussion did not reach a conclusion.
Both suspects were suspended, but they have not been prosecuted.
Golitsyn provided further intelligence, saying that one of the 4 Soviet spies hidden at the top of the French hierarchy was code-named "Sapphire." After receiving the CIA's briefing, France quickly identified a specific target, a high-ranking and powerful person who was one of the most promising officials in the French intelligence agency. The French authorities immediately issued an arrest warrant for the man. However, when the police went to carry out the arrest, they found that "Sapphire" had been killed next to the window of their home.
Investigators believe that the motive for killing "Sapphire" is self-evident, in order to cover other hidden spies.
However, the murder case has not been solved. The exact whereabouts of the other spies that Golitzen confessed to have never been identified.
Although the infidelity was discovered, it caused more disaster. Speculation about who the other spies really were plunged the entire French intelligence apparatus into a cloud of mutual suspicion, and for a long time the French intelligence system was almost paralyzed.
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="347" > refers to the chief of MI5</h1>
There is trouble not only in France.
Golitsyn also provided intelligence about Britain.
Golitsyn said his job at the KGB's First General Directorate was responsible for intelligence activities against Britain and other Nordic countries. In preparation for defection, he read and memorized a large number of british secret documents obtained by the KGB in advance. One document, he said, documented the process by which British intelligence deciphered Soviet codes. The document is from MI5 and is written by Peter Wright, a senior MI5 official. According to the trust list, only five senior MI5 officials in the entire MI5 can read the document. Obviously, the traitor who provided the documents to the KGB was among these 5 people.
Peter. Wright and his autobiographical novel The Spy Catcher,
In order to find out this infidelity, the British intelligence agencies set up a "fluency committee" to investigate. After careful investigation, the committee excluded four other people, and the final target of suspicion was surprising, it was actually the top michigan: The chief of the division, Lord Roger Hollis.
Further investigation added to The suspicious level of Hollis. It was discovered that he had traveled to China in the 30s. At the same time, an agent of the Comintern also arrived in China. From all indications, it's not like a coincidence that the two most likely had a secret meeting in China.
However, the evidence for the final determination that Hollis was a Soviet spy was insufficient. Within two years, Hollis retired safely.
Before Hollis retired, Peter Wright, who presided over the "Fluent Committee" investigation, had a conversation with Hollis. Hollis asked Wright, "Why do you think I'm a spy?" Recalling the conversation years later, Wright said: "I pointed out he was by far the best suspect. Hollis replied, "Peter, you've handcuffed me... All I can tell you is that I'm not a spy. ”
But Wright has stuck to his doubts. Nearly two decades later he added: "From an intelligence point of view, there is a ninety-nine percent certainty that Lord Rogue is a 'spy.'" Wright had an important reason: British intelligence agencies "failed in all anti-Russian operations, including double espionage or technical operations, shortly after they began." "There can only be one explanation for this, that is, there are high-level officials who sold these secrets to the Soviet Union."
However, there are also those who disagree with Wright's judgment. They believed that there might be a senior Soviet spy in British intelligence, but that did not mean that it was Hollis.
Eventually, the Cabinet Minister, Lord Trand, concluded that Hollis was not a Soviet spy.
Although the case was closed, the confusion caused to British intelligence agencies was a fact. The suspicion and confrontation within the intelligence agencies caused by the highest command's involvement in the Soviet espionage case was extremely deep and widespread, and many of the British agents involved in the investigation of the case were later inexplicably "persecuted", and their careers were completely ended in the following years.
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="348" > a very frightening confession</h1>
Britain's story doesn't stop there.
More than a year after Golitsyn defected, something happened in Britain that made the CIA interrogators recall a passage from Golitzen's original confession.
It was January 1963, when Hugh Getskill, a well-able right-wing leader of the British Labour Party, died suddenly, at the age of 56, in his prime. His cause of death was peculiar, a rare acute infection with lupus. The time and place of his illness is unusual. After using coffee and biscuits at the Soviet consulate in London, Geitzker suddenly developed severe symptoms and died soon after.
When the CIA officer heard the news, he remembered a statement from Golitzen's confession earlier. Golitsyn said the KGB was planning a special operation aimed at eliminating "opposition leaders" in certain European democracies in order to help parties and their leaders who were close to the Soviet Union and thus increase Soviet influence in those countries. Further details of the operation are not known, but Golitsyn said General Rodin, kgb's director of the 13th bureau, who was responsible for the assassination, was involved in the operation.
After reading and studying Golitsyn's confession, Angleton immediately set out to trace Rodin's recent whereabouts. The result was a chilling one: the day Gatesker had coffee at the Soviet consulate, Rodin was in London.
Later, it was revealed that Soviet scientists had experimented with this particular lupus virus with rats.
Angleton's investigation also found that Getskill had a strong political rival, namely British Labour Leader, Left Wing Leader of the Labour Party, and British Prime Minister Harold Wilson. Wilson, on the other hand, had two close associates who maintained close business dealings with the Soviet Union, traveled frequently to the Soviet Union, and had secret ties with the KGB.
Combining this with Golitsyn's confession that the KGB "wants to eliminate the 'opposition leaders' of certain European democracies in order to help the parties and their leaders close to the Soviet Union," He deduced that British Prime Minister Wilson was clearly a potential beneficiary of Getskill's death.
Angleton's conclusion meant that the gravity of the situation had escalated.
Angleton decided to pass on his investigative materials to MI5 and hoped that MI5 would investigate Wilson and his two cronies.
Angleton's request caused an uproar within MI5. On the challenging question of whether intelligence agencies can monitor its prime minister, MI5 has been divided into two factions, creating a fierce confrontation. In the end, MI5 rejected Angleton's proposal.
However, the truth about Getskill's sudden death is no longer followed.
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="349" > looking for "sasha"</h1>
France and Britain are important, but the CIA is more concerned about itself. Is Golitzen's statement at the outset that there were KGB spies hidden inside the CIA true or false?
Golitsyn said he had seen a large number of documents from the CIA at KGB headquarters, and that the sources of the documents were clearly more than one. He asserted that KGB spies were installed in key positions in the CIA's Soviet Division and the FBI's Counterintelligence Division. He also said that many of the CIA's intelligence officers in Eastern Europe had been conspired against by the Soviet Union and East Germany and had become double agents.
In order to verify Golitsyn's confession, Angleton decided to set up false intelligence to test it.
The CIA's Soviet Division sent a secret telegram to the CIA sub-station in Ottawa, requesting that intelligence officers be arranged to meet with diplomats from the Soviet Embassy in Canada, and that the time and location of the joint be specified.
Of course, this is a fake task.
At the same time that Angleton was directing the CIA's Soviet division to send the telegram, he secretly sent personnel from another line to Canada to secretly monitor the joint at the agreed time.
At the agreed time and place of the joint, of course, the fictitious joint scene did not appear, but the surveillance personnel sent by Angleton found the presence of disguised Soviet officials at the scene, who were obviously observing at the docking point.
Apparently, the contents of the connector telegram leaked to the KGB.
However, due to the excessive number of people at the CIA headquarters and the Ottawa station to handle the telegram, this one tentative operation alone still could not pinpoint specific suspect targets.
Golitsyn provided a specific clue: A CIA official who had worked in West Germany had actually been serving the Soviet Union. The KGB gave him the code name "Sasha," and he betrayed many American secrets.
In the years that followed, under the stubborn impetus of Angleton, the CIA went up and down to track down "Sasha."
Angleton's investigation of Sasha was all carried out in secret, and everyone knew that Angleton was looking for traitors, but no one knew who was on his list of suspects. Angleton does not discuss suspects with anyone other than to report the investigation to the CIA director.
At first, at least three CIA officers were suspected of possibly Sasha, and in the end, while there was no conclusive evidence to support that suspicion, all three had their career prospects affected.
Golitsyn later added that he remembered sasha's real name beginning with K. As a result, all the CIA officials whose names began with K and who also worked in West Germany were subjected to months of embarrassing scrutiny, with one officer choosing to resign in desperation and another fired for failing to prove his innocence.
Ingres pursues Sasha almost obsessively and reluctantly, but is unable to pinpoint the exact target, and gradually he falls into a state of near paranoia, and he is somewhat irrational in determining the target of doubt.
At one point, Angleton targeted his suspicions on a CIA official named Sasha. This is completely against common sense, and it is impossible for any intelligence agency to use the real name of a spy as a code name, and it is even less likely that a professional KGB will do so. However, Angleton actually left this little bit of common sense behind him. Later, it was because of the rigorous and formal arguments made by someone that Angleton withdrew his suspicions and investigations into the official.
Angleton saw the CIA's Soviet Division as the hardest hit area in need of consolidation. As a result, during the investigation of "Sasha", many very capable agents were either transferred to other departments or simply dismissed, and later, the entire Soviet Union was almost paralyzed, resulting in the entire CIA's intelligence work against the Soviet Union entering a frozen period.
William Colby, who later took over as CIA director, said: "Everything has come to a standstill, and we have become an intelligence organization that does not gather intelligence." ”
Before kolby became the director of the CIA, he was also the subject of Angelton's investigation, which made Colby intolerable to Angleton. As soon as he took office, he fired Angleton, sent him home from retirement, and let him devote his excess energy to fiddling with the wide variety of orchids he loved.
Until Angleton retired home, "Sasha" was still not found. Whether this traitor exists or does not exist is unknown.
The third episode of TNT's three-episode mini-Series,"The Company," produced in 2007, tells the story of the CIA's pursuit of "Sasha." In the play, the main characters such as Angleton and Philby appear in real names, which is extremely documentary.
Angleton in Cold War Doubts
Although in reality, Angleton did not find "Sasha" until his retirement, but the play fulfilled his dream on the screen, and "Sasha" was eventually dug up by Angleton.
Angleton didn't do it, and the TV series director did it for him. However, due to the show's strong documentary style, it is easy for viewers who do not know the truth to treat the fictional story as historical truth.
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="350" > causing civil unrest</h1>
The trouble caused by Golitzen was that some of his intelligence was accurate and clear, and a considerable part of it was vague and difficult to judge the truth.
Most of this vague intelligence is that many Soviet spies are hidden in the intelligence agencies of the United States and other Western countries, or that some Soviet intelligence officials who have defected are actually fake defectors in order to mislead the West.
He said the situation was widespread, but he couldn't say specific clues.
It was this vague intelligence that filled the Western intelligence agencies with an atmosphere of suspicion for a long time, leading to serious divisions.
Golitsyn said Pankowski was a fake defector.
Pankovsky, a colonel in the Soviet military intelligence agency GRU, provided the CIA with a series of secret documents on Soviet rockets between 1961 and 1963, providing an important basis for the United States to assess Soviet power during the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Golitsyn said that The information provided by Pankovsky in the early days was directed by the KGB, but Golitzen could not produce evidence of it. After his claim was questioned, he added that even if Pankovsky were genuinely willing to serve the United States, he might have been forced to engage in a deal he could not resist, in effect being manipulated by the KGB to deliver documents intended by the Soviet Union to the CIA.
According to Golitsyn, The important information that Pankovsky once relied on at the highest levels of U.S. decision-making became a fake by the Soviet Union to fool the United States.
It's also too magical!
Golitsyn also provided vague intelligence that he said the KGB had a scam of arranging for Soviet diplomats at the United Nations to defect to the United States, who had no access to, much less truthful intelligence. In the hands of the CIA and the FBI, there are some such fake spies.
If Golitzen's statement is true, then the U.S. intelligence officials responsible for plotting against these spies are making a joke, and their achievements have turned into scandals, even meaning that the reports submitted to the president by the U.S. intelligence agencies are false intelligence.
The FBI had two spies on hand, just in line with what Golitsyn had said. Both men, soviet diplomats at the United Nations, secretly approached the FBI and said that they were actualLY KGB officials who would be severely sanctioned by their superiors for their inability to complete intelligence missions, and made a proposal: they were willing to sell Soviet secrets in exchange for the opportunity to defect to the United States.
Although some doubted their motives, FBI Director Hoover approved their development, giving them code names: "Fedora Hat" and "Top Hat" respectively. After the two KGB officials defected, they made a condition that they must report some American intelligence back to the Soviet Union in order to win the trust of the KGB's superiors. So Hoover approved some U.S. intelligence. In turn, they provided some Soviet intelligence, much to Hoover's trust. Hoover selected classified information about the decision-making level of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and submitted it to President Johnson.
The CIA informed the FBI of Golitsyn's confession, and Hoover categorically rejected Golitsyn's claims. Of course, he can't approve of it, so where is that face?
Hoover thought that Golitsyn had obvious paranoia, and that Golitsyn himself was a fake. He even thought that Golitzen had been sent by the KGB to ruin the FBI's reputation. Hoover was dissatisfied with the CIA's approach and refused to continue working with the CIA on the Golitzen case. As golitzen's confession contained more and more unfavorable information about the FBI, Hoover completely broke off all working contacts with the CIA.
Golitsyn's alarmist intelligence has caused panic among the intelligence agencies of several major Western countries. The British intelligence agencies were in chaos for a long time because the top officials were suspected of being traitors.
Based on Golitzen's intelligence, the CIA classified West German, French, and Dutch intelligence agencies as "insecure," and contacted them with a suspicious eye.
At first, the CIA and Western intelligence agencies rejoiced at Golitsyn's defection and felt that they had caught a big fish.
However, later they increasingly felt that the taste was not quite right.
They realized that for the entire next ten years, because of the arrival of Golitsyn, the intelligence agencies of several Western powers had been restless, and everyone was endangering themselves and messing up their positions.
The CIA finally became suspicious, and for more than a decade the investigation into whether Golitzen was a "fake traitor" sent by the KGB to do things never stopped.
Some CIA counterintelligence agents insisted until retirement that Golitsyn was a "fake defector," and while some of the intelligence he provided was true, he brought more chaos and disaster to NATO's national intelligence agencies, with far more negative effects than the value of the intelligence he provided.
However, due to various entanglements of interests and relationship constraints within the CIA, the suspicion of Golitzen has always been only a suspicion, and it has never been possible to give a clear statement.
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="351" > Golitsyn's prediction</h1>
At the beginning of his defection, Golitzen gave Angelton a prophecy: the KGB, in order to slander his defection, would soon send a fake defector to defect and use false information to provoke the CIA's trust in him.
Curiously, Golitsyn's prophecy was quickly fulfilled.
More than a year later, a KGB defector really came running.
The man's name was Noshenko.
It is not known whether it was influenced by Golitzen's previous predictions, and the CIA initially expressed doubts about Noshenko's motives for defecting. One of the reasons for suspicion is: Noshenko was born into a family of Soviet elites, his father was the Minister of Shipbuilding Industry of the Soviet Union and a member of the Central Committee of the Cpustomol before his death, he entered the KGB with the aura of his father, successfully became deputy director, his life and career were smooth, and he suddenly wanted to betray the country, there was no reason at all! The second reason for suspicion was that Noshenko had defected during a visit with the regiment, and he said that something had gone wrong the night before the defection, and that a prostitute had stolen the dollar funds he had brought with him, which was the living expenses of all the members of the regiment, and he was unable to account to them, and he was very frightened. The reason for being a spy just because you lost a few dollars is too much of a stretch.
Noshenko claimed to be a KGB colonel, and Angleton gave him the documents he provided to Golitsyn for identification, and Golitzen took one look at them and concluded that they were fake.
During his review, Norshenko provided a lot of information against Golitsyn and said something that slandered Golitzen. These contents happen to be completely consistent with Golitzen's previous predictions.
The CIA was thus plunged into an unsolvable paradox. If you believe Noshenko's intelligence, you will conclude that Golitsyn is a fake defector. This, then, proves that Golitsyn's previous prophecies have been fulfilled, indicating that Noshenko is a fake who came to slander Golitsyn, and Golitsyn is the real defector.
This leads to a very evil logic: whether it is Believe or not Norshenko, Golitsyn is the winner.
In his confession, Noshenko also provided some information that proved to be true. However, after the CIA analysis, it was believed that the information was outdated, and even if the information content was leaked, it would not cause any damage to the KGB. To put it bluntly, it was entirely possible for the KGB to let Noshenko use this intelligence to deceive the Americans.
Angleton chose to believe Inlitsyn, believing that Norshenko was a liar sent by the KGB.
As a result, Noshenko went from being a guest of honor to a prisoner of the order, and one level was three years. The CIA, which had not received conclusive evidence that Noshenko was a liar for three years, released him again and assigned him to a job in charge of consulting on espionage activities in Reader's Digest magazine.
But Until his death in May 1987, Angleton insisted that Noshenko was a KGB-designed conspiracy and that Golitzen was the real and valuable defector.
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="352" > unsolved mystery</h1>
No matter how stubborn Angleton may be, there are indeed many mysteries in Golitsyn's body.
For example, was his defection a game of chess under the KGB, or a personal self-directed self-act?
If it is a KGB conspiracy, then Golitzen has betrayed so much real intelligence, this kind of loss is difficult for even the chairman of the KGB to bear, who dares to take this risk and take this responsibility?
If it was his personal defection, how could he have so much secret KGB intelligence, and how could he understand the rich and accurate internal situation of the intelligence agencies of Western countries? In the KGB's well-segregated and highly specialized system of secrecy, with Golitsyn's position and his own strength, he could never have mastered such a rich and span of intelligence information.
Also, after Golitzen gave the code name "Sapphire", "Sapphire" was immediately killed. So, who revealed the news? Is there still an internal response within the CIA and within the French intelligence agencies? Otherwise, how can it be so closely connected? It seems to be playing a double reed, who is cooperating and manipulating behind it?
Golitsyn confessed that the KGB was planning to eliminate the "leader of the opposition" in some European democracies, and the right-wing leader of the Labour Party in Britain had died mysteriously. According to common sense, the KGB should promptly stop or adjust the plan of action that Golitsyn knew about and was bound to betray after Golitsyn's defection. However, Golitsyn betrayed the plan of action, and the KGB went its own way, as if to cooperate with and corroborate Golitsyn's confession. This logic is also too strange.
And then there's the record in the CIA archives: As early as 1954, a KGB defector mentioned that Golitsyn was likely to defect. How could he have anticipated what would happen 7 years later? Could this also be the hands and feet of the KGB?
In particular, Norshenko's defection is almost like fulfilling Golitsyn's prediction. Moreover, although he said something unfavorable to Golitsyn after his defection, the final effect of all his derogatory remarks was to strengthen the CIA's trust in Golitzen. Was Noshenko's arrival an isolated accident?
The mystery is far more than that, it is really cut and cut, and the reason is still chaotic...
The CIA was miserable and very big.
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="353" > French film Snake</h1>
It's not too big to watch the hilarity. For Golitsyn's hilarity, French film writers and directors did not let go.
In 1973, the French film company LaBoetti filmed a spy blockbuster called "Snake". The film is based on the Golitzen incident, and the plot of the US president sending a special envoy to bring a letter to the French president is shown in the film.
The KGB spy Vlasov in the film is based on Golitsyn.
In the film, Vlasov is portrayed as a fake defector. The intelligence he began to provide made the CIA very excited, he exposed several Soviet spies hidden in the top of the Intelligence Agencies in West Germany, France, and Britain, and the strange thing was that the "Soviet spies" whose identities were exposed, one by one, either died mysteriously, or disappeared and fled... The intelligence agencies of Western countries have fallen into an atmosphere of suspicion and uneasiness.
Vlasov in the French film Snake
Vlasov, on the other hand, was vaguely proud.
As the plot progresses, the CIA feels that things are not quite right and gradually becomes suspicious. They launched an investigation into Vlasov, they sent false information to Vlasov's accomplices, forcing them to reveal their flaws, and then they found strong evidence that Vlasov had lied with his accomplices.
At this time, they realized that they had indeed been caught in the KGB's treacherous schemes, suffered a big loss, and were deceived. The lesson is too profound...
In the film, Vlasov seems to have a good ending and can be completely withdrawn. The KGB took him back in exchange for spies.
But what fate will he face when he returns, and the CIA director and the French intelligence chief in the film have a conversation after watching Vlasov leave:
The CIA director said: "He is finished, and he himself understands." He'll get his medallion, and then it'll slowly disappear... They wouldn't trust him. ”
The french intelligence chief said: "They had to do it. ”
The prospect of fate that these two men sketched for Vlasov may be a curse or a rumor.
What was the final fate of Golitsyn in reality, and there has been no public information since then.
Although Golitzen stirred up a very large chess game, he was only a pawn after all.
The conversation between the two intelligence chiefs at the end of the film about Vlasov's fate may be a metaphor for Golitsyn's fate.