This article was originally published in the Journal of Chinese Literature and History, No. 3, 2020
Thank you Teacher Chen Xifeng for the manuscript!
Please indicate the source when quoting
Chen Xifeng
Jiangsu Changshu people. Doctor of History of Peking University, Associate Researcher of Collaborative Innovation R&D Center of Culture and Science and Technology of Sichuan University. He is currently presiding over the Western Project of the National Social Science Foundation "Research on the Formation and Evolution of the Border Defense Pattern of the Southern Song Dynasty".
Summary: The death of the Shukou general Wu Xuan was a major political event in the early period of the Xiaozong Dynasty of the Southern Song Dynasty. This article examines the reaction of the imperial court and the Shu agents around Wu Xuan's illness at the time of Gao Xiao and the resulting Shukou conspiracy. On the issue of Xingshuai's successor, the imperial court hoped to abandon Wu's sons, while Wang Zhiwang, Wang Yingchen, Yu Yunwen and other Shu agents were interested in Wu Xuan's nephew Wu Gong. Before and after Wu Xuan's death, the military and political structure of Shukou briefly underwent drastic changes from Wu Ting, Wang Quan, and Ren Tianxi to Ren Tianxi, Wu Sheng, Wu Ting, and then to Yuanqi, Wu Gong, and Wang Xingzu. The crux of the slightly tortuous process of marshal planning lies neither in the strong resistance of the Wu warlords' forces, nor in the differences between the imperial court and the agents of the Shu Dynasty, but because when dealing with this issue, the imperial court has always wavered in the opposite line of thinking of "suppressing the Wu generals" and "protecting Sichuan".
Keywords: Southern Song Dynasty Gao Xiaoshi Sichuan Zhishu agent Xingzhou capital rule Wu Xuan Wu Gong
In the Southern Song Dynasty, because of the founding pattern of half of China's southern China, the strategic position of border defense in Sichuan was very prominent, and people at the time had the saying that "no Shu is no southeast". However, due to the spatial distance between Sichuan and the southeast core area, there were considerable difficulties in the imperial court's control of the area. [1] In response, the Song court had to adjust its ruling strategy, on the one hand, to moderately tolerate the existence of local forces in Sichuan, especially the local military generals; on the other hand, it sent envoys, envoys, emissaries, and general treasurers with civilian ministers as the main body to serve in Shu prefectures, giving them certain cheap powers, so that they could act as agents for the imperial court to govern Sichuan and coordinate relations between the central and local forces. [2] As a result, in different periods, around the central land, offensive and defensive, peace and war, civil and military, civilian and military and civilian contradictions, the military and political operations of Sichuan in the Southern Song Dynasty showed an extremely complex relationship between the imperial court, the agents of Shu and the forces of local military generals.
For the discussion of the military and politics of Sichuan in the Southern Song Dynasty, especially the topic of Wu's shogun is the most leading force, which has long attracted Chinese and foreign scholars to continue to explore. Chen Jiaxiu, Yi Yuanhong, Wang Zhiyong, Yang Qianshu, He Yuhong, etc. have all conducted in-depth research on this issue. [3] Recently, Wang Huayu wrote an article combing through Wu Ting's deeds, making up for the slightly thin research on Wu's second-generation leaders in the academic circles. [4] On this basis, this paper intends to further focus on a relatively short period from the thirty-first year of Shaoxing (1161) to the fifth year of the main road (1169), focusing on the reaction and measures of the imperial court and the Shu agents around the Shukou general Wu Xuan, who had been neglected in previous studies, and the shukou conspiracy caused by the Shukou conspiracy.
The reason why we can concentrate on sorting out this historical event mainly depends on the multi-dimensional nature of the historical materials. To deal with the problem of military and political operation in Sichuan in the Southern Song Dynasty, it is necessary to fully take into account the voices of the imperial court, the agents of shu and the forces of military generals. Basic historical texts such as the "Song Hui Zhi Manuscript", "Song Shi Benji", and "Jianyan Since the Year of the Year", etc. are more embodied in the measures of the imperial court, and the calligraphy materials of Wang Zhiwang, Wang Yingchen, and Yu Yunwen, which are stored in the "Hanbin Collection", "Wending Collection", and "Famous Ministers of the Past Dynasties", can partially glimpse the opinions of the agents who ruled Shu during this period. Generally speaking, the martial artists belong to a relatively "aphasia" group in the course of history, but the existence or excavation of epitaph inscription materials such as "Wu Xuan Shinto Stele", "Wu Ting Shinto Stele", "Yang Congyi Epitaph", "Ren Tianxi Tombstone" and so on provides a possibility for us to trace the deeds of the Sichuan military general at the time of Gao Xiaoxiao. The author believes that the historical outlook based on official historical documents, calligraphy and inscription materials may become an excellent case for us to observe the political game, power operation, information communication and other issues between the Southern Song Dynasty court and Sichuan.
I. Wu Gong and Yao Zhong: Wang Zhiwang's Worries
After the shaoxing peace agreement was signed, the peace between Song and Jin was maintained for twenty years. In May of the thirty-first year of Shaoxing (the sixth year of Jin Zhenglong, 1161), the Jin lord Yan Liang sent an envoy to ask the Song to "the land of Huai and Han and the generals who would be close to each other"[5], and his intention to go south was made public. The Song side immediately made a series of arrangements for the three major theaters of war in Jianghuai, Jinghu, and Sichuan. On the Sichuan side, Wu Xuan, the general of Su, the commander of Xingzhou, and the former military commander of the imperial army, was appointed as the envoy of Sichuan Xuanfu, responsible for unifying the combat strength of the three major capitals of Shukou (Xingzhou, Xingyuan, and Jinzhou), presiding over the front-line military affairs, and protecting Sichuan and Shu.
What needs to be explained is that after eleven years of Shaoxing, the Southern Song Dynasty government successively collected the military power of the four major Xuanfu divisions of Huaidong, Huaixi, Jinghu, and Sichuan, and divided the main regular forces of each theater under the seven major capitals of Zhenjiang, Jiankang, Chizhou, Ezhou, Jinzhou, Xingyuan, and Xingzhou, and were led by the military capitals of the imperial front (referred to as the capital system, also known as Rong Shuai). The three major capital commanders located in the Sichuan Theater of Operations are headed by Xingzhou. This is not only related to the military tradition formed since Wu Jiu defended Shu, but also out of the realistic consideration of border defense in the theater: Xingzhou controlled the two most important passages for the Northern Army into Shu, Chen Cang and Qishan, and the defensive pressure was extremely heavy. According to the number of troops stationed in Shukoutun established by Qiandao in the third year, the capital of Xingzhou was 60,000, Xingyuan was 17,000, and Jinzhou was 11,000. [6] The xingzhou capital commanded twice as many troops as the xingyuan and jinzhou divisions combined, which showed its pivotal position in the Sichuan theater. Shiren had the thesis that "the Sichuan army is prosperous by independence" [7]. After the Shaoxing Peace Conference, the xingzhou capital was under the control of Wu Xuan for a long time. Under his rule, "the soldiers of the West Road (according to the improvisational state) were the most important in the world".[8]
In fact, taking the opportunity of Wu Jiu's illness in the ninth year of Shaoxing (1139), the Song court had taken the lead in completing the "use of literature to control martial arts" in the Sichuan region. Although Wu Xuan commanded his brother's troops with the Right Protector, he had to obey the moderation of Hu Shizhong and Zheng Gangzhong, the deputy envoys of Sichuan and Shaanxi, and he himself stood shoulder to shoulder with yang zheng and Guo Hao, the other two generals of Shukou, and did not have a position of xuan. This time the Jin-Song war was rekindled, and the Song court did not appoint Wang Gangzhong as an envoy, but appointed Wu Xuan as the envoy of Sichuan Xuanfu, giving him full command of the Shukou army. This move is certainly an affirmation of Wu Xuan's military command ability and recognition of his status as a commander-in-chief, but it is also an adjustment made by the central authorities to the principle of "using culture to control force" in order to resist strong enemies and protect Sichuan.
However, at this time, Wu Xuan was already sixty years old and was deeply infected. According to the observation of Wang Zhiwang, the then governor-in-chief of Sichuan, Xuan was "usually sick" and addicted to Dan medicine, "dozens of pills of Dansha per day", and "relapsed when he relapsed". [9] His weak physical condition was bound to affect Wu Xuan's control over the war situation on the front line, laying hidden dangers for the paralysis of the highest military command system in the theater; however, as far as the relationship between the central and local military generals was concerned, Wu Xuan's illness provided an opportunity for the imperial court to break Wu's domination of the military and government of Shukou. Therefore, the issue of the choice of Wu Xun and his successor and the Xingzhou capital system became a major focus of attention in the following years that attracted the attention of the Southern Song Dynasty.
In early September of the 31st year of Shaoxing, the Jin army attacked Dashanguan and opened the curtain of the "Battle of Xin Wei". Upon hearing the news, Wu Xuan rushed north from xingzhou and sat down to kill Jinping to command the enemy. However, in his serious illness, he could not even ride, and could only "shoulder the public opinion" on the base. [10] After finding out that the Jin side was only a diversionary attack, Wu Xuan immediately dispatched his troops out of Qishan Dao to attack Longyou, while the whole army attacked Dashanguan and Shangyuan Fortress from Chen Cangdao. At first, Wu Xuanshang planned to personally lead a large army to detain the pass, but he was helpless to suffer from the disease of the internal organs, "the internal organs were slightly safe, and the disease of the kidneys and intestines was bitter", "when every disease was drama, it was also quite dangerous", and finally had to order Xingyuan to command Yao Zhong's army on his behalf, "suppressing the soldiers and horses", and he himself returned to Xingzhou in early November to suffer from a major nutritional disease. [11]
The military campaign of the Xingzhou Governor's surprise attack on the Long Right was quite smooth, and the Large Army of Jinzhou tun garrisons on the right wing of Shukou also recovered Shang, Yu, Hua, and Shaanxi under the leadership of the commander-in-chief Ren Tianxi, and the Guanzhong earthquake. [12] Contrary to the gradual defeat and retreat of the Jianghuai Battlefield, the Song army reported frequent successes in the Sichuan-Shaanxi Battlefield.
However, in November of that year, Wang Zhiwang, the governor of Sichuan, poured cold water on this excellent situation. He pointed out that there were two major hidden dangers in the Sichuan-Shaanxi battlefield: First, Yao Zhong, the commander of xingyuan who was mainly attacking Dashanguan and Shangyuan, was unable to open up the situation for a long time, so that the Song army could never pose a direct threat to the hinterland of Jinfangguan; the other was the physical condition of Wu Xuan, the commander of the theater, who was "quite dangerous and the people's hearts were worried." [13] To this end, Wang Zhiwang repeatedly reported Wu Xuan's illness to the imperial court and recommended that his nephew Wu Gong be transferred back to Sichuan. [14] In one of the recitals, Wang said:
The Shu people who were proud of this before them, with their Wu arches here, are slow and anxious. Wu Gong moved to Xiangyang, and Qu Was worried about the loss of help. If this is the case, how can we not foresee it? ...... Seeing the current situation in Shuzhong, it is not as if Wu Gong is urgently restored. If Wu Xuan has always been safe and healthy and has the help of Wu Gong, the more the military voice is louder, and it can quickly achieve great achievements. If the increase and loss of the disease is not unusual, then this army has no other worries. Wu Xuan was Xuanfu, and Shang Ling was in charge of the capital, if Wu Gong was the capital, and Wu Xuan was sentenced to Xingzhou by Xuanfu, Yu Ti was particularly smooth. ...... Human life is unknown, one party's safety is in danger, and the urgency is urgent, and it is hoped that the power of the imperial court will be of great importance and will be disposed of quickly. [15]
In the middle and late period of Shaoxing, Wu Gong successively served as the rear commander of the Xingzhou Capital, the Commandery of the Chinese Army, the Governor of JiechengXi and the Capital of Fengzhou, and for a long time presided over the defense of the four prefectures outside Guanwai, and was an important assistant to Wu Xuan.com. It is said that Wu Xuan relied heavily on him, "when he went out, he made him command, and Ju praised his conspiracy" [16]. On the eve of the Battle of Xin Wei, as part of the coordination of the battle interval, Wu Gong was ordered to move the town of Xiangyang and replace Tian Shizhong as the commander of the capital of Ezhou. In late October, due to the tight war in Jianghuai, the former Jinghu envoy and Ma Shuai Chengmin returned to the southeast to aid, and Wu Gong then took over the post of envoy of the Jinghu system with E Shuai and became the commander-in-chief of the central battlefield.
At that time, Wu Xuan was concurrently serving as an envoy to Sichuan Xuanfu as a minister in charge of the former military forces of Xingzhou and the imperial government. In Wang Zhiwang's conception, the imperial court could grant Wu Gongxing the governorship of the prefecture, return it to Shukou, and share part of Wu Xuan's duties as his arm. In this way, not only can Wu Xuan properly disperse the pressure and make Sichuan's "military voice more and more vigorous"; more importantly, "the increase in the disease situation is not constant" and "human life is unknown.", once Wu Xuan loses the command ability or even dies suddenly, Wu Gong, as the "reserve marshal," can take over the post of commander of the theater on the spot, "relies on urgency and urgency," and enables the smooth transfer of high-level military command in Shukou.
Judging from the Wang Zhiwang Shushu in the "Hanbin Collection" and "The Collection of The Treasures", the reason why he was so anxious to transfer back to Wu Gong was largely because he was worried that the command of the theater would fall into the hands of Yao Zhong, the ruler of Xingyuan Capital. In the early years of the Southern Song Dynasty, Wu Jiu protected Shukou, and in addition to Wu Xuan's assistance, there were eight more dependent generals, including Yang Zheng, Tian Sheng, Yao Zhong, Wang Yan, Wang Jun, Wang Xi, Li Shiyan, and Yang Congyi. [17] When the Battle of Xin Wei broke out, Yao Zhong, Wang Yan, Li Shiyan, and Yang Congyi were still in front of the Sichuan Army. Among them, Yao Zhong made Ren Xingyuandu take charge of the Capital of Xingyuan with the Baoning Army, Wang Yan made ren the capital of Jinzhou with the Baoning Army, and the two of them and Wu Xuan of Xingzhou formed the new shukou three generals; Yang Congyi and Li Shiyan were appointed to the left and right departments of the Xingzhou Capital. [18]
In terms of the order of the generals in the Sichuan Theater at this time, once Wu Xuan passed away, the highest rank and the largest number of soldiers were Yao Zhong. Due to the long distance of the road and the wartime situation, it is very likely that the Song court, which had not made personnel arrangements, would use Yao Zhong on the spot to replace Wu Xuan in charge of the army on the basis of the principle of "high rank and low rank, and the number of soldiers in the army". This is a situation that Wang Zhiwang categorically does not want to see. Since Shaoxing served as the judge of The Tongchuan FuLu in the twenty-fifth year (1155), Wang Zhiwang had served in Sichuan for six years and was well versed in Shu affairs. [19] According to his observation, Yao Zhong not only had "no strategy at all" and "was not a great general", but also ruled the army without a form, and during his tenure as Marshal xing, he "went to The Fork", using "the name of the army and Chang Ping", "occupying more officials and soldiers to fill their service, and the people did not have a good life", and the military and government of Xingyuan province were extremely corrupt. He even prophesied that "if this man succeeds, he will be in great trouble." [20]
Wang Zhiwang's request to transfer Wu Gong back to Shukou was undoubtedly put forward from the standpoint of the war zone. His many years of service to Shudi made him familiar with the situation of Yao and Wu's second generals. In his view, Yao Zhong had a vain name and could not be relied on, and only with Wu Gongji taking over the military power could he continue the good offensive posture on the Sichuan-Shaanxi battlefield. In the course of the ensuing war, Yao Zhong first attacked gongzhou and Deshun for a long time, and then suffered a disastrous defeat outside wonju, which completely confirmed Wang's judgment of his military ability.
However, the considerations of the highest decision-makers are very different from those of wang Zhiwang in the local area. The situation in which Wu shi held the Shukou military control was by no means welcomed by the imperial court. Yao Zhong is no longer lucky, and he will not lose the battlefield general. If Wu Gong is transferred back at this time, and when he establishes his merits in the Sichuan-Shaanxi battlefield and further accumulates popularity, it will be inevitable that he will succeed in taking charge of the Xingzhou army. In response to Wang Zhiwang's performance, the Privy Council examined the Zhufang text Hong Mai and pointed out that "Wu shi has held the Shu soldiers with merit for thirty years, and it is advisable to have a new people to watch and listen, so as not to make the tail big"[21], which can be described as a direct expression of the imperial court's "anti-malpractice" voice. Moreover, judging from the fact that Wang Yan, the capital of Jinzhou, did not obey Wu Xuan's orders,[22] there was also strong uncertainty about whether Wu Gong, as a latecomer, could effectively rule Yao Zhong, Wang Yan and other elder generals. Therefore, the imperial court did not respond to Wang Zhiwang's request for construction. We also do not see in the historical records that the Song court made personnel arrangements for Wu Xuan's illness, and perhaps Yao Zhong's succession as the governor of Xingzhou was exactly what the imperial court wanted.
With the continuous advancement of the war, thirty-two years after entering Shaoxing, the Longyou region with the Deshun Army as the core gradually became the focus of the left and right Sichuan-Shaanxi battlefields and even the entire Song and Jin war situation. However, the rumors of Wu Xuan's "heart disease" were rife in Lin'an City, which caused panic among the people in the government. [23] Whether Wu Xuan was healthy or not was not only deeply related to the Sichuan-Shaanxi war situation, but also had a leading role in the next step of the Song side and the implementation of the battle strategy. On February 1, Yu Yunwen, who had just made the merit of quarrying but being an enemy, was appointed as an envoy of the Military Department Shangshu and Chuan-Shaanxi Xuan, and rushed to Shukou. In addition to being responsible for "recruiting troops and buying horses" [24], the field investigation of Wu Xuan's condition was an important task of his trip. After arriving at Shukou, Yu Yunwen once made a pout in view of the personnel pattern in the war zone:
The subjects eavesdropped on Wu Xuan's army, except for Li Shiyan, who knew how to train military and political affairs and could rely on them. And Shi Yannian is already seventy-three, and he has not yet agreed to take the ministry of Lizhou East Road. ...... If as later expected, wang yan was sick, as Wang Yan was in Shangzhou, it was far away, Li Shiyan was already in decline, and Yao Zhong and Fu Zhongxin were not more than a big deal. The courtiers begged to return to the class to play things, just as Shu went to the imperial court far away, there are such things are different, the stakes are extremely important, the urgency is inextricable, and the commission is not the ratio of the remaining roads. ...... His Majesty desires to quickly discuss with the minister and give him an early punishment. [25]
In the recital, Yunwen stated to the imperial court that Li Shiyan was old and ill, and wu Xuan had no other "people who knew how to train military and government and could rely on", and at the same time asserted that Xingyuan was "not enough to take charge of major affairs" under Yao Zhong, and what he saw was no different from Wang Zhiwang's previous performances. However, unlike Wang Shi, who advocated the transfer back to Wu Gong, Yu Yunwen did not give direct advice on the selection of candidates.
As an agent newly sent to Shu Prefecture, Yu Yunwen's ascension forced the imperial court to consider transferring Wu Gong back to Sichuan, and the ensuing defeat of the Yuanzhou army completely shelved Yao Zhong's idea of taking over the post of governor of Xingzhou. At the time of the stalemate on the western front, both the Song and Jin sides threw heavy troops into Longyou. Once the commander Wu Xuan died of illness, if the successor was not available, not only the newly recovered Longyou region would change hands in an instant, but shukou would also be a problem. Compared with the imminent situation in Sichuan and Shaanxi, the tail of the Wu general is only a kind of "hidden worry" after all. In this regard, the imperial court can patiently wait for the opportunity and consider the long term. Therefore, in the second half of that year, Wu Gong, who had been promoted to the official of the Infantry Department of the Guards, was released back to the Sichuan-Shaanxi battlefield by the new emperor Xiaozong. [26] However, after Wu Gong returned to Shu, he did not hold the position of Xingzhou Commandery as Wang Zhiwang had expected, but the post of Jingluo envoy of Jiewen Longzhou and concurrently zhijie prefecture. Between the two orientations of "suppressing the Wu clan generals" and "guaranteeing Sichuan", although the imperial court chose the latter again, it still imposed a certain degree of restriction on the appointment of Wu Gong.
Second, the local and the central: the difference between the commander-in-chief
At the beginning of the first year of the Gandao Dynasty (1165), Wu Xuan (then serving as the envoy of Xuanfu in Sichuan, the commander of Xingzhou, and the military commandery before the imperial throne) disregarded his weak body and "resisted the Zhang Dynasty".[27] At that time, the Longxing Peace Agreement had just been reached, the border situation was not completely clear, and the Shukou Tun garrison, which had suffered heavy losses from deshun's retreat division, also urgently needed to calm the hearts of the army. At the age of sixty-four, Wu Xuan chose to go to Lin'an for a visit at this time for two purposes: First, to respond to the accusations of the military attendant Hu Quan and others with practical actions. In August of the second year of Longxing (1164), Hu Quan accused Wu Xuan of "insulting" The Sichuan envoy Shen Jie in his "Ying Zhao Zhi", and listed "the worries of Sichuan Shu" and "the troubles of ugliness" as "the urgent task of the day", and suggested that the imperial court send heavy ministers to suppress them. [28] Even more ministers bluntly said that Wu Xuan "held power exclusively, and was jealous of his heart" and "held the mouth of the soldiers, and he would be in trouble in the future". [29] On his way eastward, Wu Xuan first pleaded with Shangshu to resign from his post as a Sichuan xuanfu envoy, and then expressed his request to Shi Shi, in fact, showing the court a deferential gesture. [30] Second, he won the support of his son Wu Ting over the issue of the successor to the xingzhou capital, so that the new emperor Xiaozong could accept that Wu shimen would continue to lead the Xingzhou army. Before leaving, Wu Xuan deliberately used the cheap power to keep Wu Ting (then the commander of the Xingzhou Capital) to know Xingzhou and preside over the defense of Shukou. [31]
At the end of April, Wu Xuan and his party arrived in Lin'an. This was the second and final creation of the dynasty in Wu Xuan's life twelve years after Shaoxing. The imperial court gave him a series of supreme courtesies and graces, such as xu lijia temple, jinfeng county king, and crown prince entry. [32] During his accession to the imperial court, Emperor Xiaozong did ask for his opinion on the selection of xingshuai. Wu Xuan was blunt, and took "the fifth son of the subject, Ting Zhongzhi can be appointed", and strongly recommended Wu Ting to take over the command of the xingzhou capital. [33] In fact, unlike Wu Ting, who was too young (at the age of twenty-nine) and lacked the experience of being independent, Wu Gong, who was then the envoy of Jiewen Longzhou, the governor of Jielong Prefecture, and the state of Quan Zhicheng, should have been the most suitable candidate for Xingshuai. However, due to the earlier discord between Wu Xuan and Wu Gong's uncle and nephew, Wu Xuan was more interested in Wu Ting on the issue of succession. [34]
Considering that Li Shiyan, the governor of Xingyuan, had died of illness at the end of the second year of Longxing, on May 23, the imperial court ordered Wu Xuan to transfer the sentence of Xingyuan, still under the command of Sichuan Xuanfu envoy. [35] This personnel change is noteworthy. Since Wu Xuan had already played wu Tingquan zhixingzhou before leaving Sichuan and was in charge of military affairs, the Song court ordered Wu Xuan to change the sentence to Xingyuan at this time, which was actually a disguised recognition of Wu Ting's administration of Xingzhou. Sure enough, at the end of that year, Wu Ting was promoted to "the commander of the army"[36], surpassing Wu Gong to become the second most important person in the Sichuan Theater after Wu Xuan.
Therefore, we can see that the final situation formed by Wu Xuan's creation of the dynasty was that he himself was in charge of Xingyuan, his son Wu Ting was in charge of Xingzhou, and his nephew Wu Gong controlled the military horses of the four prefectures outside Guanwai. Wu's control over the military and government of Shukou was not ended or weakened by the conclusion of peace agreements and the criticism of courtiers, but became more and more powerful.
On the surface, Emperor Xiaozong was indistinguishable from Wu Xuan and acknowledged the situation in which his son Wu Ting succeeded him in charge of the Xingzhou army. Wu Xuan's two major goals for entering the DPRK can be said to have been successfully achieved. But under this beautiful picture, there is actually a dark tide. For a long time, Wu's control of shukou's military handle has been regarded as a hidden danger by the Song court. Before the outbreak of the "Battle of Xinwei", although Emperor Gaozong was forced to appoint Wu Xuan as an envoy to Sichuan in the war situation, in the course of the subsequent war, the imperial court was slow to agree to Wang Zhi's wish to transfer Wu Gong back to Shukou, because he did not want to see Wu too big. Now that Wu Xuan was old and sick and the Song and Jin wars were extinguished, it was the perfect time for the imperial court to break the Wu general's military and political domination over Shukou. It was only because Wu had been conservative in Shaanxi and Shu for more than thirty years, and the foundation was solid, Wu Xuan himself did not have excessive acts, and the abandoned heroes and generals were also inconsistent with the "recovery" temperament shaped by Emperor Xiaozong, so they did not bear it for a while. What the imperial court was waiting for was only the moment when Wu Xuan died.
After Wu Xuan left the dynasty, the Song court began to use a variety of channels to find candidates for Xingshuai. In the second year of the Gandao Dynasty (1166), through the consultation of Wei Qi, the governor of Sichuan, Emperor Xiaozong consulted the generals of Shuzhong with Wang Yingchen, then the envoy of Sichuan, and asked him to recommend a "military commander with a little prestige and a well-known reputation" in the Shukou army, and specifically pointed out that the recommended person "does not have to be able to declare it", "but can be the general Xingzhou army". After Wang Yingchen received the will, Gu Song recommended the following three candidates:
The subject Fushimi held the Tenshō Four Chambers of Command, an Envoy of the Anyuan Army, and Wu Gong of Zhijie Prefecture, who held a prudent and honest body, was strict and orderly, loyal to his family, and often regarded sacrificing his life to the country, and the detailed examination was calm, and things were not light, and he went in and out of the calendar, and his reputation was beneficial. His father, Wu Jie, died in a hundred battles to save Shu, and the Shu people cherished his kindness, where the temple was enshrined. And the arch can do this, not only the only soldier is happy to use it, but the people are also happy. For example, in the second year of Longxing, the Jin people entered, all the generals came out, and the victory of the battle of Qishan was won by the people. Or rather, cowardice (choice) (avoidance?). ] thing, it can also be seen that it is not. He also trained envoys of the Fushimi Guozhou regiment, jiecheng west and Fengzhou terracotta warriors and horses, commanded the army before and after the imperial court, restrained The Lizhou Tun garrison Ma Wusheng, Xiao Yong was loyal and simple, handled things peacefully, practiced military and government, and was good at picking up soldiers and pawns, which could be secondary than Wu Gong. Fushimi also gave Yao Zhong, the defensive envoy of Ying prefecture and the commander of the horse infantry army of Chongjing Lake North Road, a general of the world, and a person of Guanfu, who was convinced. Zhong made meritorious contributions before and after, mostly in Sichuan and Shaanxi. Thirty-one years after Shaoxing, the Battle of Wonju, Gai Yong was a light enemy, so that he lost, but the soldiers did not say anything at first, and still think about it. It offends idleness, and often has the desire to sigh and be angry, brush shame and self-effect. Even though Shen Jie was an envoy to the west of Hubei, he was accompanied by Qi Puzhong, and he could also be relieved of urgency. [37]
The three generals recommended by Wang Yingchen obviously have a primary and secondary order, the first recommendation is Wu Gong, the second recommendation is Wu Sheng, and the last recommendation is Yao Zhong. In terms of his written account of the three generals, the length used for Wu Gong is far more than that of Wu Sheng and Yao Zhong, reflecting Wang's strong tendency toward Wu Gong in the selection of Xingshuai. It is worth noting that in addition to emphasizing that Wu Gong has the commanding qualities of "strict and orderly imperial government, detailed examination and calmness", Wang Yingchen also specifically mentioned that the Shu people cherished Wu Jiu Ende, and Gong inherited his father's style, "the soldiers and soldiers are happy to use, and the people are also happy", which will surely stabilize the hearts of the soldiers and people in Sichuan after the war. The "Wu clan general", the most taboo factor of the imperial court, was made by Wang Yingchen as an important plus, once again showing the difference in position between the Song court and its agents on the issue of Shukou's conspiracy.
During the Southern Song Dynasty, most of the envoys of the Sichuan system were civil servants, who were mainly responsible for coordinating the relationship between the local forces in Sichuan (prominently local military generals) and the imperial court, and acting as the agent of the imperial court in the Sichuan region. In principle, the envoys and other agents of Shu administration must follow and uphold the will of the central authorities, and take the interests of the imperial court as the starting point in everything; however, because they have a closer and deeper understanding of the battlefield situation and local realities, they may not be consistent with the court's policy in everything. On the issue of Shukou's conspiracy to marshal, Wang Yingchen naturally understood the basic considerations of the imperial court at this time and the delicate relationship between the Wu clan and the imperial court, but he still directly stated that the Wu clan was deeply rooted in Sichuan and could not be abruptly abandoned, and the appointment of Wu Gong was conducive to condensing and stabilizing the opinions of the military and people in Sichuan. It is not difficult to imagine that after Wang Yingchen listened to this recital, Emperor Xiaozong would certainly not be satisfied.
Yu Yunwen, who had been an envoy to Sichuan and Shaanxi four years earlier, was also questioned by the imperial pen for "Shukou plotting a marshal" because he was familiar with the military situation in the west. However, Yu Yunwen, who was idle in the fengci temple, perhaps out of consideration for not seeking his own government, did not provide the exact candidate for Wu Xuan's successor, but only knocked down the kingship of Xingyuandu, emphasizing that this person was "greedy and cunning, and he will make mistakes one day". In addition, Yu Yunwen also suggested that Emperor Xiaozong change his thinking and try to use it from "the unevolutionable official position", so that the appointee "will be able to encourage himself deeply" and the imperial court will be easier to control. [38]
In addition to consulting the current and former agents of the Shu Dynasty, summoning recommended or alternative military generals to the line for in-person inspection was also an important way for the Southern Song Dynasty monarchs to find and select senior commanders in various theaters. During the time of Emperor Gaozong, the tradition of taking turns to summon upstream commanders to the court was formed. [39] According to the Song Huijiao, during the second and third years of the Qiandao Dynasty, Wang Gui, Zhang Ping, Yao Zhi, Wu Sheng, and many other high-ranking Shukou generals were instructed to go to Que. [40] Yu Yunwen also spoke of the fact that Emperor Xiaozong had "two surrenders" in succession, summoning Zhang Ping's five men to "give the right at different times, or have a choice". [41]
Unlike Sichuan Xuanfu, who made Wu Xuan subordinate to Wu Ting, and Wang Yingchen, who made him recommend Wu Gong, song court apparently preferred to bypass the Wu brothers and find another candidate among the Shukou generals. However, the results of the interview disappointed Emperor Xiaozong, lamenting that the summoned generals had "nothing to do". In fact, as far as the situation at that time was concerned, it was indeed not easy to forcibly break wu's control over the Shukou military at the personnel level of the army. This should start from the overall situation of the Wu brothers and other generals in the Shukou Tun garrison after the "Battle of Xin Wei".
As mentioned above, in the "Battle of Xin Wei", Wu Gong had already held important positions such as the governor of Ezhou and the envoy of the Jinghu system, and became the commander of the great war zone alongside the generals Wu Xuan and Liu Kun. In the "Thirteen Battle Merits Since Zhongxing" established by the Song court in August of the second year of Qiandao, three battle merits (Cihu, Qishan, and Caizhou) in the Jinghu battlefield under wu gong's command were selected. [43] Although there is some controversy over the criteria for the selection of battle merits, it is still difficult to hide their ability to dominate the enemy. At the end of the second year of Longxing, Wu Gong (then the envoy of Jiewen Longzhou, concurrently Zhijie Prefecture, and Quan Zhicheng Prefecture), who returned to Shukou, won another victory at the Battle of Qishanbao. [44]
During the "Battle of Xin Wei", Wu Ting's performance was equally eye-catching. He first led an army to conquer Jiancheng Zhipingzhai and Gongzhou, and then defeated the Jin army in Deshun and Wattingzhai in succession; after Yao Zhong's army defeated Yuanzhou, Wu Ting was ordered to temporarily restrain the xingyuan capital commander's army and horses, and successfully stabilized the decline. [45] It can be said that although Wu Ting, who was only twenty-four years old at the time, failed to serve as the commander of the front in the "Battle of Xin Wei", he was one of the few "general stars" that emerged in the Sichuan Theater and even in the entire Southern Song Military Circles at the time of Gao Xiaoxiao.
In sharp contrast to the high-light performance of the "Second Wu", in the early years of Emperor Xiaozong, there was a serious crisis of "breaking the file" in the ranks of the commanders of the Sichuan Theater. The first is that several old generals left over from the Wu Jie era have withdrawn from the historical stage after the war. Yao Zhong, the ruler of Xingyuan Capital, was reprimanded for the defeat of the Yuanzhou army and has since withdrawn from the ranks of front-line commanders;[46] Wang Yan, the commander of the Jinzhou capital, was transferred to the two Huai battlefields due to contradictions with Wu Xuan and served as the commander of Jiankang Capital, but was later abandoned due to the defeat of Zhaoguan;[47] Li Shiyan, a veteran general who succeeded Yao Zhong as the commander of Xingyuan Capital, died of illness at the end of the second year of Longxing; [48] in September of the second year of the gandao, the former commander of the xingzhou capital and the veteran general Yang Congyi was enshrined;[49] In the same year, the xingzhou capital commander who performed prominently in the "Battle of Xinwei", the commander of the Xingzhou capital, The veteran is thankful. [50]
The attrition of the ranks of middle-level commanders was equally severe. This was mainly due to the two major war defeats in Wonju and Deshun. In May of the 32nd year of Shaoxing, Yao Zhong led a large army to rescue Yuanzhou, and the soldiers were defeated at Beiling outside the city. The defeat of this battle led to the demise of the elite troops of the Xingyuan Commandery, and the destruction of the troops of the commanders, and the former army of Xingzhou and the commander Zheng Shilian under the command of "seven commanders, thirty generals, and seventy generals, and died in battle" [51]. A few months later, the defeat of the Deshun retreat division was the biggest catastrophe in the Sichuan Theater since the defeat of Fuping, and the elite western soldiers, the Xingzhou Capital Commandery, "more than 30,000 people in the main army", and finally "less than 7,000 people were received", and "there were very few people in command and generals". [52]
In short, on the one hand, the performance of the Wu brothers in the "Battle of Xin Wei" was convincing enough; on the other hand, due to the combined effect of internal and external factors such as normal intergenerational replacement and war defeat, in the early days of Emperor Xiaozong, the shukou army that had once been a fierce general withered away, and to a large extent, it had fallen into an embarrassing situation where there were no generals to use. It was not easy for the imperial court to abandon the Wu brothers and find another good general in the Sichuan Theater.
Third, from Ren Tianxi and Wu Sheng to Yuan qi and Wu Gong: the replacement of Rong Shuai
Just as the Song court was inquiring from many sources about the merits and demerits of the Shukou commanders, Wang Yingchen, the envoy of the system, sat in Chengdu, closely followed the movements of Shukou, and immediately conveyed information about the development of Wu Xuan's condition to the imperial court. In March of the third year of the main road, at the end of a letter with Chen Junqing, the secretary of the Tongzhi Privy Council, Wang Yingchen talked about Wu Xuan's recent situation, saying that on February 21, Wu Shi had been ill for a while, "urgently summoning his second son Zhili Prefecture and Mianzhou", and later the news came out that his condition was tending to ease, but the second son "has not yet returned to office". [53] In early April, Wang Yingchen sent a report to the imperial court, saying that Wu Xuan was once again critically ill and had summoned his eldest son, Wu Yuanchi of Zhili Prefecture, to Xingzhou. On May 6, Zai Zhi Jiang Fu and Yu Yunwen presented this recital, and the imperial meeting began to discuss the issue of the selection of Xingshuai. In this regard, the official gate of the "Song Hui To Compile Manuscripts" has the following account:
Shang: "In case Wu Xuan can't afford it, who can replace him?" It is also said that Yu Yunwen said: "Qing (before the words) [preface] Ren Tianxi can represent Wu Xuan, too." YunWen said, "No (post) [knowledge] Ren Tianxi." In front of the mountain, I heard that the generals were obedient. The courtier said, "The man who smells it is old is also a general." The Lord: "You may be summoned to walk and see who he is." ”[54]
Apparently, prior to this, Yu Yunwen, the privy councillor, had recommended to Emperor Xiaozong that Ren Tianxi, the ruler of the Golden State, take over the post of Xingshuai. [55] Yu Yunwen seemed to be more able to grasp Emperor Xiaozong's intention to abandon the Wu brothers than Wang Yingchen, who could not perceive the Sacred Heart. However, when Emperor Xiaozong mentioned this, Yunwen cautiously stated that he had not been in contact with Ren Tianxi, and that his source of information was only Ren's reputation among the Shukou generals. Moreover, as Jiang Fu, the Governor of the Senate, said, although Ren was a general and had a good performance in the "Battle of Xin Wei", after all, "his people were old"—he was sixty-seven years old at the time[56], and whether he could shoulder the heavy responsibility of commanding the Xingzhou army, Emperor Xiaozong was still undecided, so he decided to personally evaluate it by the old method of summoning him to Que.
On May 17, a famous general Wu Xuan died of illness in Xingyuan at the age of 66. [57] However, at this time, the Song court still did not select a candidate for Xingshuai. Earlier, Wang Yingchen had already reached the urgent information of Wu Xuan's illness. In response, the Imperial Council on 4 June again discussed the issue of successors. According to the official records of the "Song Hui Zhi Manuscript":
On June 4, the third year of Qiandao, Shang Xuanxuan said to Zai Chen: "Wu Xuan is in urgent need of illness, and there is no one to replace him." Yesterday summoned Tianxi, the outsider heard that he was old, in case he was overwhelmed, who could use it? Moreover, Wang Yingchen was ordered to transfer the system to Lizhou, and temporarily restrained the armies and horses, but the imperial court chose his people. Chen Junqing said, "The generals are extremely rare. And if you know that Yangzhou and all rule the royal power, you are not comfortable with the public opinion. Shang: "I also know it." But there was no one, and at that time, he was not at ease. Yu Yunwen said, "How can this person use the two defeats in Huaixi?" Sincerity is sincerity. "Therefore, there was a purpose, with Wu Sheng as the ruler of the Eastern Road of Lizhou, and the king summoned him to go to the line." [58]
This passage contains a lot of information. First, according to the plan, at that time, the imperial court had already announced that Ren Tianxi, the ruler of Jinzhou, would enter the dynasty. Judging from the expression "Outsiders are old, in case they are unbearable", Emperor Xiaozong does not seem to have much confidence in Ren Tianxi taking over the Xingzhou army. Second, because the successor of Xingshuai was delayed in choosing, the imperial court had to order Wang Yingchen to move north to Lizhou and temporarily control the situation; third, Emperor Xiaozong's feelings that "the generals have no substitutes" and Chen Junqing's "extremely rare generals" revealed the difficulties of the decision-making level in trying to shelve Erwu and find another good general in Shukou; fourth, Yu Yunwen once again exposed the old scars of the defeat of the Huaixi army under the control of the xingyuan capital, and the king's power not only had no chance to go further, but even the position of marshal of Xing was not guaranteed; fifth, wang Yingchen had previously recommended that Wu Sheng, the commander of the Xingzhou Capital Commandery who had been in the imperial court, was promoted to the position of Commander of the Xingyuan Capital. The imperial meeting, which was aimed at discussing the candidates for The Xing Marshal, ended with the replacement of the personnel of the Xing Marshal.
As for the attribution of the position of Xingshuai, the documents have not been recorded positively, and few modern scholars have discussed this matter. Fortunately, the Tombstone of Ren Tianxi, unearthed in the 1980s, provides us with key information:
Three years on the main road, recalled. Huixi Shuai Wu Xin Wang Xuan (璘薨) was renamed the commander of the various armies of Gongxing Prefecture (公興州) stationed in front of the imperial court, and was appointed as the defense envoy of Hezhou. [59]
Ren Tianxi, who was summoned to Que, finally passed the interview of Emperor Xiaozong and was honored with the post of Xingshuai. In just a few years after the "Battle of Xin Wei", the veteran general benefited from the special military and political structure of Shukou and actually completed the "triple jump" from the commander of the Jinzhou Tun garrison to the commander of the Jinzhou capital to the capital of Xingzhou.
During this period, the movement of Wu Ting, the son of Wu Xuan, is also worthy of attention. For the last two years of Wu Xuan's life, Wu Ting had been the de facto host of the Xingzhou army. According to the "Tombstone of Wu Ting", between April and May of the third year of Qiandao, Wu Xuan, who knew that his time was short, sent Wu Ting to the court to try to win the favor of Emperor Xiaozong through interviews, and then gain the approval of the imperial court for his successor Xingshuai. In the face of Wu Ting, who came to the dynasty, Emperor Xiaozong took a posture of glad acceptance, not only talking earnestly with him "to the end of more than ten moments", but also appointing him as "the commander of the guards and the army, and the control of the Xingzhou army and horses". [60] It can be said that wu ting only has a difference in name and score from the position of commander of Xingzhou. However, when he returned to Shukou full of joy, he was given the edict of Ren Tianxi to lead the Xingzhou army and to transfer himself to the capital of Jinzhou. [61] In the end, Wu Ting, who had lost his father's protection, had to accept the imperial court's arrangement to go to Jinzhou to take up his post.
In short, after Wu Xuan's death, Shukou temporarily formed a situation in which Ren Tianxi, the former governor of Jinzhou, was transferred to the governor of Xingzhou, and Wu Sheng, the former commander of the xingzhou capital, was promoted to the governor of Xingyuan. Wu Ting, the successor chosen by Wu Xuan and who had actually presided over the military affairs of Xingzhou, was only placed in the weakest Jinzhou capital, while another Wu leader, Wu Gong, did not even join the ranks of Rong Shuai. The control of the Xingzhou army by the Wu Jie and Wu Xuan brothers for more than thirty years was easily broken by Emperor Xiaozong.
However, judging from the selection process of Emperor Xiaozong's ministers at the Imperial Council contained in the "Draft compilation of the Song Hui", the use of Ren Tianxi and Wu Sheng to lead Xingzhou and Xingyuan Ersi was not so much a careful selection by the imperial court as an almost helpless expedient move. "Wu Xuan is very ill, and the generals have no one to replace" is the reality of Shukou's military and political affairs in Emperor Xiaozong's eyes. Sure enough, soon after, Emperor Xiaozong denied himself, calling Ren Tianxi "selfish" and Wu Sheng "foolish" and "common material", and could not take on heavy responsibilities at all;[62] Coupled with the turmoil that might be caused by forcibly blocking Wu Ting's leadership of Xingshuai, Wang Yingchen, who was temporarily serving as the envoy, had never been involved in the military, and it was difficult to control the situation. Therefore, on June 8, Yu Yunwen, who was known for his knowledge of military affairs, was appointed as a senior scholar of the Senior Government Hall as an envoy to Sichuan and rushed to Shukou. [63] According to Zhou Bida's "Rafting Tour of the Mountains", Yu Yunwen set off on June 20. [64] On Leap July 29, he had reached the Jinzhou border at the eastern tip of Shukou for only two months. [65] Looking back at the second year of Longxing, wang Yingchen took a full four months to take him from Raozhou in Jiangxi to Wanzhou on the road of Kuizhou. [66] Comparing the two, the imperial court's anxiety about the situation in Shukou at that time can be seen.
After arriving in Sichuan, Yu Yunwen immediately began to inspect the deeds of Ren Tianxi and Wu Sheng'er. Soon he discovered that Ren Tianxi was "cowardly in heaven and cowardly, and had no law in governing the army", "greedy and lustful", and Wu Sheng was "stupid and ignorant" and "not strict in military discipline, and more than human feelings", so he secretly played "the two people are not the talents of major generals, they cannot convince the public, and when they are in a hurry, they will mistake state affairs." [67] This accusation is consistent with Emperor Hyojong's previous judgment.
Based on the principle that "to go to a major general, you must first get a general", the imperial court did not immediately depose The Second General of Wu, but ordered Yu Yunwen to step up the search for a new candidate for the Commander-in-Chief. In the following year, the selection of marshals became the focus and difficulty of Yu Yunwen's work in Shu. According to his observation: "Shu Zhisu generals, or more practicing side affairs, or brave in battle, or have a long time to be called, such as Ji Fang, Sun Zheng, Liu Xing, Zhao Feng, Lu Hui, old and lazy; such as Mei Yan, Zhang Yan, Hui Feng, Li Yu, Liu Hai, Yao Zhi, sick and ruined." Secondly, although there are more than a dozen people, they are not convinced. [68] The negative impact of the defeat of the Yuanzhou army and the collapse of the Deshun Division on the Sichuan Theater was profound and long-lasting. It is a great irony that the Shukou army, which once dominated the world, was so useless that there were no generals available. To this end, Yu Yunwen played several times, bluntly saying that "the present Shu general is not elected"[69], "the western general has no outstanding material, and can be used by His Majesty"[70], trying to change the inherent line of thought of Emperor Xiaozong", who only wants to choose the commander of the Shu army. During this period, Emperor Xiaozong also paid the imperial pen and intended to use Yao Zhong as the commander of the Eastern Road army and regain control of the Xingyuan Capital, but yu Yunwen resisted. [71]
In view of the situation that "Shu Chengcheng was not elected", Yu Yunwen proposed two sets of plans for selecting a marshal. The first is to give priority to dispatching generals from the eastern or central battlefields who have no military positions to Sichuan. His specific recommendations are:
If you see that the commander-in-chief of the present army must not quit, the public opinion of the subjects, the abolition of the minister, and the old taste is the great use of His Majesty, such as Li Xianzhong and Shao Hongyuan, or can be used for the West Road, Yuan Qi, Liu Yuan, or can be used for the East Road and Jinzhou. [72]
Li Xianzhong and Shao Hongyuan were both generals in the Jianghuai Theater, and were used by Zhang Jun as generals during the "Longxing Northern Expedition", but were later deposed for the defeat of Fu Yuan. Yuan Qi was originally a general of Liu Qi's army, and the "Battle of Xin Wei" Soap Horn Lin became famous in the First World War, and for three years Gandao succeeded Wang Xuan as the commander of the Jingnan Capital, and the town guarded Xiangyang. [73] Liu Yuan, who was appointed as the governor of Jiankang In the early years of Qiandao, was dismissed from military service in August of the third year and moved to the post of commander of the Ma Infantry Army on Jinghu South Road, stationed in Tanzhou. [74] Among the four generals, Li Xianzhong had the highest official status and prestige, followed by Shao Hongyuan, and followed by Yuan Qi and Liu Yuan.
Judging from the three or four years of Yu Yunwen's performance in the "Discussion of Famous Ministers of All Dynasties", his most preferred candidate for Xingshuai was Li Xianzhong. This should be related to the fact that the two have had a brief experience working together. At the end of the 31st year of Shaoxing, Yu Yunwen (then a military staff officer of the Governor's Office) and Li Xianzhong (then the governor of Jiankang) were jointly responsible for the defense of the river from Jiankang to Zhenjiang. After this, whether he served as an envoy to Jinghu or a Sichuan envoy, Yu Yunwen spared no effort to recommend Li Xianzhong, hoping to lead him as an arm. [75] However, for this general, Emperor Xiaozong, who aspired to make a difference, apparently retained another role. [76]
The second is to reluctantly choose from the existing commanders in Shukou. In this regard, Yu Yunwen also submitted a recommended list:
Wu Gong was disciplined and quiet, and the soldiers were afraid of love and could be appointed. Secondly, such as Li Yuzhi's Gang Yong, Wang Chengzu's Shen Hu, and Liang Bing's Ming Lian, all have a reputation in the military, or can be selected. [77]
Like Wang Yingchen, Wu Gong is the first choice in this list, followed by Li Yu, Wang Chengzu, Liang Bing, and others.
At the end of the fourth year of the main road, Ren Tianxi and Wu Sheng'er were both deposed. At the same time, The Commander of Jingnan Prefecture, Qi, was transferred from the Jinghu Battlefield to Shu and took over the command of the Xingzhou Capital, while Wu Gong was appointed as the Commander of the Xingyuan Capital, and Wang Chengzu was appointed as the Commander of Jin, forming a new shukou three-general pattern. [78] The key to this personnel structure was that Wu Gong was in charge of the Xingyuan capital, which to some extent reflected the compromise of the imperial court with the Wu generals. Judging from the process of selecting the marshals of Emperor Xiaozong's ministers at the previous imperial meeting, the brothers Wu Gong and Wu Ting did not appear within the consideration of the imperial court, and Wang Yingchen, Yu Yunwen and other agents of Shu successively recommended Wu Gong, which had to make Emperor Xiaozong compromise. Therefore, Wu Gong was placed in the ranks of Rong Shuai, but did not allow him to take charge of Xingzhou Heavy Land became the final arrangement of Emperor Xiaozong.
The personnel arrangements of the Xingzhou and Xingyuan Divisions, which were divided into Yuanqi and Wu Gong, were praised as an important part of Yu Yunwen's meritorious deeds in Yang Wanli's "Monument to the Divine Path of Zhongsu Yu Gong". The inscription reads:
Public Shogunate Yuri Prefecture ,...... The first recommender Qi is The Western Shuai, and Wu (珙) (Gong) is the Eastern Shuai,...... The general won the people, the rear marched and stretched, the armies shouted, and the four Shu congratulated. [79]
It is worth noting here the reaction of the Sichuan soldiers after the appointment of Wu Weishuai. As the "airborne commander-in-chief", It was obvious that Yuan Qi's appointment to the commander of the Xingzhou capital was obviously not enough to arouse the enthusiastic response of the Shukou armies, and the only thing that could cause the effect of "cheering the armies" could be Wu Gong's appointment as the commander of the Xingyuan capital. The eight words "the armies cheered and the four Shu exchanged congratulations" reflected the unparalleled prestige of the Wu family in the Sichuan Theater, and also reflected the entanglement of the Southern Song Court and its agents in suppressing the Wu generals and governing the Shu land.
In the following years, the pattern of Yuanqi, Wu Gong, and Wang Xingzu in charge of the three capitals of Shukou was relatively stable. The military and political structure of Sichuan will undergo new changes after the death of Yu Yunwen in the first year of Chunxi (1174) and the return of Wu Ting to Shukou.
epilogue
During the Southern Song Dynasty, the Wu forces in the Sichuan Theater were not only the backbone of the country's resistance to the northern ethnic regime and the preservation of Sichuan and Shu, but also a potential threat factor for local division and national division. Therefore, whether at the level of system design or in the process of personnel replacement, the Song court always had two contradictory ideas for Wu: on the one hand, out of the consistent principle of "anti-fraud", the imperial court needed to try to suppress the sitting of Wu, especially the Wu generals, in order to eliminate the possibility of local division; but at the same time, the imperial court had to rely on Wu to stabilize national defense, strengthen border preparations, and ensure the combat strength of Shukou.
Wu Xuan's death was a major political event in the early period of the Xiaozong Dynasty. On the issue of Xingshuai's successor, the imperial court hoped to abandon Wu's sons and seek another good general, while Wang Zhiwang, Wang Yingchen, Yu Yunwen and other agents of Shu were interested in Wu Gong's nephew Wu Gong. Before and after Wu Xuan's death, the military and political structure of Shukou briefly underwent drastic changes in personnel from Wu Ting, Wang Quan, and Ren Tianxi to Ren Tianxi, Wu Sheng, and Wu Ting to Yuanqi, Wu Gong, and Wang Xingzu. The crux of the slightly tortuous process of marshal planning lies neither in the strong resistance of the Wu warlords' forces, nor in the differences between the imperial court and the agents of the Shu Dynasty, but because when dealing with this issue, the imperial court has always wavered in the opposite line of thinking of "suppressing the Wu generals" and "protecting Sichuan".
When the Jin side made the intention of going south to the world public, Emperor Gaozong immediately adopted the suggestion of Yang Chun, the governor of the Senate, adjusted the policy of "using literature to control force", and handed over all the military power of Sichuan to Wu Xuan, so that he could resist the strong enemy and protect Shukou. [80] However, during the war, the imperial court refused to grant the request of Wang Zhiwang, the governor of Sichuan, to transfer Wu Gong back to Shukou and take charge of the capital of Xingzhou, but the imperial court was afraid that Wu would sit on the throne. As the war on the Western Front of the Song-Jin Dynasty entered a white-hot phase, in order to secure Sichuan, Wu Gong was eventually released by Emperor Xiaozong to Shukou.
In the early years of the Gandao Dynasty, Emperor Xiaozong, on the one hand, met Wu Xuan'en, who came to the dynasty, and recognized the situation that his son Wu Ting succeeded him in charge of the Xingzhou army, but on the other hand, he frequently solicited the opinions of his predecessors or current agents of Shu Shu, and summoned the generals of the Shukou commanders to enter the dynasty, trying to bypass Wu's sons and find another successor to Xingshuai. After Wu Xuan's death, the imperial court had already selected Ren Tianxi and Wu Sheng to take charge of Xingzhou and Xingyuan, thus ending Wu's domination of the Shukou army. However, the quality of Generals Ren and Wu was not satisfactory, and they could not shoulder the heavy responsibility of guaranteeing Sichuan. In the end, under the dilemma that Shukou had no generals available, Yu Yunwen, the agent of Shu, reached an agreement with Emperor Xiaozong, and the imperial court took the initiative to make policy adjustments: from the Jinghu Battlefield, Qi was appointed as the governor of Xingzhou, and Wu Gong was used to take over the xingyuan capital commandery, which was relatively strong among the three divisions of Shukou. For the Song court, which aimed to eliminate the evils of the Wu dynasty, Wu Gong's appointment as marshal of Xing could be described as a "limited use", and it was also a reflection of the two lines of thought of "suppressing the Wu general" and "guaranteeing the Shukou" from entanglement to eclecticism.
P.S. This paper is the phased result of the Key Scientific Research Base Project of the Ministry of Education in the Humanities and Social Sciences "Information Communication and National Order in the 7th-16th Centuries" (17JJD770001) and the Western Project of the National Social Science Foundation "Research on the Formation and Evolution of the Border Defense Pattern of the Southern Song Dynasty" (19XZS007). The manuscript was submitted to the "Jusheng Academic Forum No. 8: Workshop on Information Communication and National Order in the 7th and 16th Centuries" (Beijing, November 2017) for discussion, and was criticized and corrected by Huang Kuanzhong, Iiyama Zhibao, Wang Huayu and other division leaders.
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[1] For a discussion on the road mileage and information communication between the Southern Song Dynasty court and Sichuan, see Cao Jiaqi, "The Transmission of Documents between the Southern Song Dynasty Court and sichuan region", Chinese Social Sciences, No. 5, 2014; Chen Xifeng, "The Speed of Document Transmission between the Southern Song Dynasty Court and Localities: Centered on the Sichuan Region", Sinology Research, Vol. 45, Peking University Press, Beijing, 2021.
[2] For a study of the agents of the Southern Song Dynasty, see He Yuhong, "'Acting Cheaply' and Centralizing Power: Centered on the Operation of the Southern Song Dynasty and The Shaanxi Xuanfu Disposal Department", Journal of Sichuan University (Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition), No. 4, 2007; He Yuhong, "Local Authority and Central Control: On the Death of Zheng Gangzhong", Social Science Front, No. 3, 2010; Wang Huayu, "The Central Dispatch of Shu Shuaichen in the Early Southern Song Dynasty Shaoxing Period", Journal of Sichuan Normal University (Social Science Edition), No. 1, 2014.
[3] See Chen Jiaxiu, "The Growth and Development of wu's warlord forces", Taipei Normal College Journal, No. 11, 1984; Chen Jiaxiu, "Wu's Rule over Sichuan and Countermeasures of the Southern Song Dynasty", Taipei Normal College Journal, No. 12, 1985; Ihara Hiroshi, "Southern Song Dynasty Sichuan", 1985; Ihara Hiroshi, "Southern Song Dynasty Sichuan におけゐ Wu's Forces- Wu Xi's Former History", included in the Song Dynasty History Research Office of the Oriental Bunko Library, "Ancient Rare Memorial of Dr. Aoyama Dingxiong: Song Dynasty History Series", Tokyo, Provincial Study Room, 1974, pp. 1-33; Wang Zhiyong The Rise and Fall of the Wu Family in the Southern Song Dynasty", Chengdu, Bashu Book Club, 1995; Yang Qian's sketch of "Wu Jia Jiang: Wu Jie Wu Xuan Wu Ting Wu Xi He Biography", Baoding, Hebei University Press, 1996; He Yuhong, "Research on the Administrative Operation System of Border Defense in the Southern Song Dynasty" in Sichuan and Shaanxi, Shanghai, Shanghai Ancient Books Publishing House, 2012.
[4] Wang Huayu, "The Imperial Court's Management of Sichuan in the Middle of the Southern Song Dynasty: A Case Study of Wu Ting's Deeds", Journal of Sichuan Normal University (Social Science Edition), No. 6, 2016.
[5] Li Yongcheng, revised by Li Yongcheng, Correction of the Outline of the Ten Dynasties of the Imperial Song Dynasty, vol. 25, Shaoxing, May 31, 2013, Zhonghua Bookstore, 2013, p. 721.
[6] Li Xinchuan, Miscellaneous Records of the Dynasty and the Wild Since Jianyan, Vol. 18, The Number of Large Armies Inside and Outside the Trunk Road, Beijing, Zhonghua Bookstore, 2000, p. 405.
[7] Miscellaneous Records of the Dynasty and the Wild Since Jianyan, Vol. 17, "Wang De and Guo Gao's Contending Army, Please Give", p. 818.
[8] Du Dajue, "The Collection of Famous Monuments to The Ancestors of Huang Yan, Volume 14 Wang Shuo, "Monument of Wu Wushun Wang Xuan An Min Bao Shu Ding Gong Tongde", Chinese Reconstructed Rare Books, Beijing Library Publishing House, 2003, Ye 5A.
[9] Wang Zhiwang's Hanbin Collection, vol. VIII, "On Wu Xuan's Many Illnesses and Begging Wu Gong from Xiangyang to the Shu Dynasty", Wenyuange Siku Quanshu, 1139 volumes, p. 766.
[10] Li Xinchuan, "The Year of the Lineage Since Jianyan" (hereinafter referred to as "The Year of the Jianyan Dynasty") vol. 192 Shaoxing 31 September Jia Shu Tiao, Beijing, Zhonghua Bookstore, 2013, p. 3730.
[11] The Collection of Han Bin, vol. VIII, On Wu Xuan's Many Illnesses and Begging Wu Gong from Xiangyang to the Shu Dynasty, p. 766.
[12] For the course of the war, see Yang Qian's depiction of Wu Jiajun, Chapter 8, The Battle of Qinlong, pp. 141-167.
[13] The Collected Works of Han Bin, vol. 10, Edited by Feng, p. 789.
[14] "To Be" vol. 195 Shaoxing 31 December Xin Ugly Article, p. 3833. Regarding the relationship between Wu Gong and Wu Jiu and Wu Xuan, there are two theories in the historical records, or that Wu Gong is Wu Jiu and Wu Jiu's brother, because Wu Gong is jealous, Wu Father "ordered Wu Gong (with gong) as his own son", but as Wang Zhiyong said, whether Wu Gong is Wu Jiu's son can only be doubted and difficult to determine, so this article still takes Wu Gong as Wu Jiuzi and Wu Xuan's nephew. See Miscellaneous Records of the Dynasty and the Wild Since Jianyan, Vol. 12, "Wu Jiufu Did Not Arrest Wu Xuan", p. 688; Wang Zhiyong, The Rise and Fall of the Wu Family in the Southern Song Dynasty, p. 175.
[15] The Collected Works of Han Bin, vol. VIII, "On Wu Xuan's Many Illnesses and Begging Wu Gong from Xiangyang to the Shu Dynasty", pp. 766, pp. 766, 1-2.
[16] "To Be" vol. 194 Shaoxing Thirty-first November Self Ugly Article, p. 3808.
[17] Yang Zheng and Wang Jun died relatively early; Tian Sheng entered the dynasty after Shaoxing and immediately broke away from the Sichuan Theater; and Wang Xi died on the eve of the Battle of Xin Wei (then the commander of the Xingzhou Capital). For the biographies of these generals, see Wang Zhiyong, "The Rise and Fall of the Wu Family in the Southern Song Dynasty," Chapter 2, Section 7, "The Wu Military Clique," pp. 92-98.
[18] "Yao Zhen", vol. 177 Shaoxing, August 27, 2000, p. 3395, vol. 184, Shaoxing, March 30, Gengchen and Ding You, pp. 3564, 3567.
[19] Hanbin Collection, vol. VIII, "Waiting for the Side Affairs of Shaoning Qicha Palace Ancestral Hall Chaojiao", p. 766.
[20] "To Beg" vol. 200 Shaoxing 32 June Bing Yin Article, pp. 3939-3940.
[21] History of the Song Dynasty, vol. 373, The Biography of Hongmai, Beijing, Zhonghua Bookstore, 1975, p. 11570.
[22] The Collected Works of Han Bin, vol. VI, "On the Failure of the Armies to Attack The Duwang Yan of Deshun", and "On the Tune and Protection of Wu Xuan Wang Yan", pp. 735, 736.
[23] Huang Huai and Yang Shiqi, eds., eds., Famous Ministers of the Past Dynasties, vol. 240, Yu Yunwen, Shanghai, Shanghai Ancient Books Publishing House, 1989, p. 3159.
[24] "To Begs", vol. 197 Shaoxing, February 32, 2012, p. 3867.
[25] The Concerto of famous courtiers of all dynasties, vol. 240 Yu Yunwen shang, pp. 3159, p. 3159, p. 3159, vol. 240, vol. 240, vol.
[26] The exact time of Wu Gong's return to Sichuan is not clearly recorded in historical records. According to the "Yao Wok" volume 200 Shaoxing 32 June Gengwu Tiao, Wu Gong in addition to being in charge of the official affairs of the Guards Infantry Division (p. 3941), and the "Hanbin Collection" volume 6 "On the Army's Seeing the Attack on Deshun Du Wang Yan Did Not Arrive" said that in November of that year, "Wu Xuan, Wu Gong, Wang Yan, and Li Shiyan were all in the Shukou front" (p. 734 below), and it can be seen that Wu Gong's return to Sichuan will be in the second half of the thirty-second year of Shaoxing.
[27] The Collection of Mingchen Tablets Chuan Yan Yan Shang Ji, Vol. 14, "Monument of Wu Wushun Wang Xuan An Min Bao Shu Ding Gong Tongde", Ye 7B.
[28] The Concerto of famous ministers of the Past Dynasties, vol. 306, written by Hu Quan in the Qiandaojian Dynasty (according to this song is written in August of the second year of Longxing, the "Recital Discussion" is an error in the year), p. 3969.
[29] Wei Yiweng's "The Great Collected Works of Mr. Heshan", vol. 51, "Preface to the Collection of Huang Shilang Dingshengtang", the first edition of the four series, Ye 9A, 9B.
[30] The Collection of Mingchen Tablets Chuan Yan Yan Shang Ji, Vol. 14, "Monument of Wu Wushun Wang Xuan An Min Bao Shu Ding Gong Tongde", Ye 7B.
[31] Gao Wenhu's "Monument to Shigong Baoshu Zhongde", in Zhang Wei, ed., Longyou Jinshi Zirconium Songxia, New Edition of Stone Carving Historical Materials, Vol. 1, Vol. 21, Taipei, Xinwenfeng Publishing Company, 1982, p. 16072.
[32] History of the Song Dynasty, vol. 33, Xiaozong Benji I, Gandao, April 1, 2011, p. 631, Mingchen Stele Chuan Yan Zhi Ji Shang Ji, vol. 14, Wu Wushun Wang Xuan An Min Bao Shu Ding Gong Tongde Monument, Ye 7B, 8A.
[33] Gao Wenhu, Shigong Baoshu Zhongde Monument, p. 16,074.
[34] The Fall of Wu Xuan and Wu Gong, see Yang Qian' depiction of Wu Jiajian, chapter 9, The Battle of Deshun, p. 188.
[35] Xu Song's "Song Hui Zhi Manuscript" Ritual System 11-24 Longxing 2 December Article, Shanghai, Shanghai Ancient Books Publishing House, 2014, p. 2544, History of Song, vol. 33 "Filial Piety BenJi I" Qiandao First Year May Nongshen Article, p. 631.
[36] Song Hui Zhi Manuscript, Article 12, November 12, 1911, 19th year of the official 32-39 Gandao, pp. 3831, and Gao Wenhu, Shigong Baoshu Zhongde Monument, p. 16072.
[37] Wang Yingchen's Wending Collection, vol. VI, "Should be recommended to resign from power and declare the shovel", Wenyuange Siku Quanshu, 1138 volumes, p. 635. According to the "Chronology of Song Shi Zaifu", Wei Qi, except for the Governor of the Prefecture, was in May of the second year of the main road, and in December of that year, the consultation must be made between May and December of the second year of the main road.
[38] The Concerto of famous courtiers of the Past, vol. 240, yu Yunwen, p. 3159.
[39] During the twelfth and third years of Shaoxing, Emperor Gaozong ordered the three major generals of Shukou, Wu Xuan, Yang Zheng, and Guo Hao, to enter the court one by one and investigate them one by one. Cf. "To Be Zhen" volume 145 Shaoxing 12th year 12 June 2737; volume 149 Shaoxing 13th year 6th month decay article, 2816 page; volume 150 Shaoxing 13 december 19th year of the hai article, page 2840.
[40] Song Hui Zhi Manuscript, Official 32-40 Gandao 3rd Year 56 Article, p. 3832. The Full Text of the History of the Song Dynasty, vol. 24, is a specific case of Emperor Xiaozong summoning the Shukou Commandery to meet with the Shukou Commandery.
[41] The Concerto of the Famous Ministers of the Past, vol. 240, yu Yunwen, p. 3159.
[42] "Song Hui To Be Compiled", Official 32-40 Gandao 3rd Year 56 Article, page 3832.
[43] Miscellaneous Records of the Dynasty and the Opposition Since Jianyan, Vol. 19, "The Thirteen Battle Achievements of Border Defense", pp. 449-450.
[44] Hong Shi's "Collected Works of Panzhou", vol. 12, "Edict on Giving Wu Xuan the Reward for Sending Wu Gong to Cover up the Great Victory of the Fan Thieves at Qishan Fort and Other Places", the first edition of the four series, Ye 8B; the Wending Collection, vol. 6, "The Recommendation of the General to Resign from power and declare the Right to FuZi", p. 635.
[45] "To Be" vol. 199 Shaoxing Thirty-second May Decoction Ugly Article, p. 3930.
[46] Zhou Bida's Collected Writings of Zhou Yi, vol. 95, "September 22, The Holy Will of Yao Zhong's Strike Palace and The Temple Of The Fall of The Defense of Yingzhou to Make Dazhou Reside (Seeking to Change Xiazhou)", Song Ji Rare Books Series, vol. 49, Beijing, Linebound Bookstore, 2004, pp. 544 p. 2-2.
[47] Ma Guangzuxiu and Zhou Ying co-authored Jingding Jian kangzhi, vol. 26, "Guan Shou Zhi III, Imperial Army Headquarters", Song Yuan Fang Zhi Series, vol. 2, Beijing, Zhonghua Bookstore, 1990, p. 1770.
[48] Song Hui Zhi Manuscript, Ritual Article 11-24 Longxing 2 December, pp. 2544.
[49] Yuan Bo, "The Tomb Inscription of the Founding Marquis of Taizhou Chongdaoguan Ankang County, 1,700 Households of The Founding Marquis of Taizhou Chongdaoguan Ankang County", in Wang Chang's "Compilation of Golden Stones", vol. 149, New Compilation of Stone Carving Historical Materials, Vol. 1, Vol. 4, p. 2775.
[50] Song Hui To Be Compiled, Ritual System 11-26 Trunk Road 2 September Article, p. 2546.
[51] "To Be Zhen", vol. 199 Shaoxing Thirty-second May Nonyin Article, p. 3926.
[52] Hanbin Collection, vol. VI, "Begging heavy subjects to enter Shu Town, p. 735, p. 735, p. 735.
[53] Wending Collection, vol. 15, With Chen Shumi II, p. 729.
[54] Song Hui Zhi Zhi Manuscript, Official 32-39-40 Gandao 3rd Year 3 May 6th Article, page 3832.
[55] According to the Tombstone of Ren Tianxi, in the first year of Longxing, Ren Tianxi was promoted from the commander of the Jinzhou Metropolitan Commandery to the Jinzhou Metropolitan Commandery and the Governor of Jinzhou (succeeding Wang Yan), see Li Qiliang's "Tombstone of Ren Tianxi, The Regimental Training Envoy of the Southern Song Dynasty Guozhou Regiment", Wenbo, No. 4, 1989, p. 46.
[56] According to Ren Tianxi's Tombstone, Ren Tianxi died five years after Chunxi, at the age of seventy-eight.
[57] The Collection of Mingchen Steles Chuan Yan Yan Shang Ji, vol. 14, "Monument of Wu Wushun Wang Xuan Min Bao Shu Ding Gong Tongde", Ye 8B.
[58] "Song Hui Zhi Draft", Official 3240 Trunk Road 3 June 4 Article, p. 3832.
[59] Li Qiliang, "Tombstone of Ren Tianxi, Regimental Exercise Envoy of the Southern Song Dynasty Guozhou Regiment", p. 46.
[60] Gao Wenhu, "Shigong Bao Shu Zhongde Monument", p. 16072.
[61] Song Hui Zhi Zhi Manuscript, Official 77-21 Gangdao 3rd Year 68, page 5151.
[62] The Famous Ministers of the Past, vol. 239, Yu Yunwen, on the Shu generals, on page 3156.
[63] History of the Song Dynasty, vol. 34, Emperor Xiaozong Benji II, Gandao 3rd year, June 1911, p. 640.
[64] Zhou Yi Gong anthology, vol. 167, "Rafting and Mountain Tour", vol. 1, Song Ji Rare Books Series, vol. 50, p. 447.
[65] The Deliberations of the Famous Ministers of the Past, vol. 214, Yu Yunwen on the Evils of the Golden State, on the Order of the Generals, p. 2807.
[66] Wending Collection, vol. 14, With Zhou Suffrage II, p. 712.
[67] The Famous Ministers of the Past, vol. 239 Yu Yunwen On the Shu General's Non-Material Beggar Selection, p. 3156, vol. 240 Yu Yunwen re-played, p. 3158.
[68] The Concerto of famous ministers of the Past Dynasties, vol. 239 Yu Yunwen on the Great General of Shu, p. 3153.
[69] The Famous Ministers of the Past, vol. 239, Yu Yunwen on the Great General of Shu, p. 3153.
[70] The Famous Ministers of the Past, vol. 239, Yu Yunwen, on the Shu general's non-material beggar selection, p. 3156.
[71] The Concerto of famous ministers of the Past Dynasties, vol. 239 Yu Yunwen On the Commander of the Eastern Road, pp. 3155, p. 3155, p. 3155, p. 3155, p. 315, p. 31.
[72] The Concerto discussion of famous courtiers of the Past Dynasties, vol. 239 Yu Yunwen, pp. 3156, p. 3156, p. 3156, p. 3156, p. 3156, p. 3156, vol. 339, vol. 339, vol. 3
[73] Song Hui Zhi Manuscript Bing 29-21 Road 4 September 11, p. 9247, vol. 336 Yu Yunwen on xiangyang side as a must-defend, p. 4354.
[74] Jingding Jiankangzhi, vol. 26, "Guan Shouzhi III. Imperial Army Headquarters", p. 1770.
[75] The Discussion of Famous Ministers of the Past Dynasties, vol. 239, Yu Yunwen Shangyan, Shu Zhongjun General, pp. 3156, 3154.
[76] In the sixth year of the main road, Li Xianzhongfu was an envoy to the Weiwu Army, in addition to being in charge of the official affairs of ma junsi, and thereafter presided over the military operation of Masi's relocation to Tun Jiankang. Cf. Jingding Jiankangzhi, vol. 26, Guan Shouzhi III, Guards ma Junsi, p. 1767.
[77] The Concerto discussion of famous courtiers in the Past, vol. 239, Yu Yunwen, p. 3156.
[78] The Song Hui Zhi Zhi Manuscript, Official 32-42-43 Road 5 October 11, pp. 3833-3834.
[79] Written by Yang Wanli, Xin Gengru School of Yang Wanli Jiji, vol. 120, "Song Dynasty Zuo Cheng Xiang Jie Du Envoy YongGuo Gong Gift Taishi Yu Zhongsu Yu Gong Shinto Monument", Beijing, Zhonghua Bookstore, 2007, p. 4613.
[80] The Collected Works of the Famous Ministers, Vol. 33 Chen Liangyou, Epitaph of Yang Wen'an, Ye 6B.
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