Chapter 1 Atoms deviate from straight lines and are skewed
Epicurus believed that atoms had three motions in the void. One motion is a straight-line fall; another is caused by atoms deviating from a straight line; and a third is caused by the mutual repulsion of many atoms. Acknowledging that the first and third movements are common to Democritus and Epicurus; however, the detachment of atoms from straight lines distinguishes Epicurus from Democritus.
Many people have ridiculed this deflection movement. Cicero was particularly inexhaustible when he came into contact with this topic. For example, he once said: "Epicurus asserted that atoms fall in a straight line because of their own weight; in his opinion, this is the natural motion of objects." Later, it occurred to him that if all atoms fell from above, then one atom would never touch another. So he turned to lies. He said the atoms were slightly skewed, but it was completely impossible. It is said that this gives rise to the recombination, union and condensation between atoms, and as a result forms the world, all parts of the world, and everything it contains. Leaving aside the fact that all this is childish fiction, Epicurus did not even achieve what he was trying to achieve. In Book 1 of Cicero's Treatise on the Nature of God, we see another of his statements: "Since Epicurus understood that if atoms fall by their own weight, then we can do nothing, because the motion of atoms is prescribed and necessary, and he concocts a method of escaping necessity which Democritus did not think of." Epicurus said that although atoms fall from above due to their weight and gravity, they are still a little deflected. It is less glorious to make such an assertion than to be unable to defend what one stands for. ”
Pierre Pelle equally judged:
"Before him, Epicurus, it was only acknowledged that atoms had motion caused by gravity and repulsion. Epicurus envisioned that atoms even in the void deviate slightly from the straight line, he said, and thus there was freedom... It must be noted incidentally that this was not the only motive for him to invent this deflected motion; the deflected motion was also used by him to explain the collision of atoms, for he certainly saw that if all atoms were assumed to move in a straight line from top to bottom at the same speed, it would never be possible to explain the possibility of atomic collisions, so that the world could not arise, so that the atoms must deviate from the straight line. ”
To what extent these assertions really go, I will leave aside for the time being. However, anyone can see at a glance that Saughbach, a modern Epicurean critic, misunderstood Cicero because he said:
"All atoms fall in parallel by gravity, i.e., for physical reasons, but by mutual repulsion they acquire another kind of motion, according to Cicero (On the Nature of God, vol. 1, p. 25), a sloping motion which arises by chance, and by chance that has always functioned."
First, in the passage quoted earlier, Cicero does not see exclusion as the basis for the direction of inclination, but on the contrary, the direction of inclination as the basis of exclusion. In the second place, he does not speak of contingent causes; on the contrary, he accuses Epicurus of not mentioning any causes; it can be seen that it is in itself paradoxical to see both exclusion and contingent causes as bases for tilting directions. So, at best, he was talking about the accidental cause of rejection, not the accidental cause of the tilt.
Moreover, in Cicero and Pell's assertions, there is an extremely striking feature that must be immediately pointed out. That is, they added some mutually exclusive motives to Epicurus: it seems that Epicurus acknowledged the deflection of atoms, sometimes to illustrate repulsion, sometimes to illustrate freedom. But if atoms do not collide with each other without deflection, then it is superfluous to argue for freedom with deflection, for, as we have seen in Lucretius, the opposite of liberty begins only when the collision of atoms is deterministic and coercive. If atoms collide with each other without deflection, then it is superfluous to argue for rejection with skew. I think this contradiction arises because, like Cicero and Pell, the reasons for the deviation of atoms from straight lines are understood too superficially and too inextricably linked. Generally speaking, of all the ancients, Lucretius was the only one who understood the physics of Epicurus, and in him we can see a more profound elaboration.
Now let's examine the skew itself.
Just as a point is discarded in a line, so every falling object is discarded in the straight line it draws. This has nothing to do with its characteristic qualities. An apple falls in the same vertical line as an iron falls. Thus every object, as far as it is in a falling motion, is nothing more than a moving point, and a point without independence, a point that has lost its individuality in some kind of concentration, that is, in a straight line drawn by itself. Therefore, Aristotle correctly pointed out to Pythagoreans: "You say that the movement of the line constitutes the surface, and the movement of the point constitutes the line, then the movement of the list also constitutes the line." Thus the conclusion drawn from this view is that neither the monad nor the atoms, because they are in constant motion, neither of them exists, but disappears in a straight line; for as long as we regard the atom merely as something falling in a straight line, then the solidity of the atom has not yet appeared. First, if the void is imagined as the void of space, then the atom is a direct negation of abstract space, and therefore a point of space. The solidity, the strength, which is opposed to the externality of space and which maintains itself in itself, can only be attained by the principle that negates the whole scope of space, which in real nature is time. Moreover, if this is not even agreed, then since the motion of the atom constitutes a straight line, the atom is prescribed purely by space, it is given a relative presence, and its existence is a purely material existence. But we have seen that one of the links contained in the concept of the atom is pure form, that is, the negation of all relativity, the negation of any relation to another definite being. At the same time we have pointed out that Epicurus objectified two links, which, although contradictory, are contained in the concept of atoms.
In this case, how can Epicurus realize the pure formal stipulation of the atom, i.e., how can it realize the concept of pure individuality in which each one is negated by the fixed presence prescribed by another?
Since Epicurus was active within the realm of direct existence, all regulations were direct. Thus, the provisions of opposites are opposed to each other as if they were direct reality.
But the existence of the opposite opposite to the atom, i.e., the fixed presence to which the atom should be given a negation, is the straight line. The direct negation of this motion is another kind of motion, and therefore, even from the point of view of space, it is a skew detached from the straight line.
Atoms are purely independent objects, or rather of being conceived as objects with absolute independence like celestial bodies. Therefore, they are also like celestial bodies, not in a straight line but in a diagonal line. The fall movement is a non-independent movement.
Thus, Epicurus expressed the materiality of atoms in terms of the linear motion of atoms, and realized the provisions of atoms in the form of deviations from straight lines, and these opposing provisions were regarded as directly opposed movements.
So, Lucretius correctly asserts that deviance breaks the "shackles of fate", and just as he immediately applies this idea to consciousness, so can the case with regard to the atom, which is precisely something in which it can struggle and confront.
But Cicero accused Epicurus of saying, "He did not even achieve what he had intended to achieve by making up this theory; for if all atoms were in a skewed motion, the atoms would never bind; or some atoms would be deflected and others would be in a straight line." This is equivalent to having to point out a certain position for the atoms in advance, that is, which atoms move in a straight line and which atoms move in a skew. ”
This accusation is justified, since the two links contained in the concept of the atom are regarded as directly different motions and must therefore belong to different individuals,—— which is illogical, but it is also logical, because the scope of the atom is immediacian.
Epicurus clearly felt the contradiction contained therein. Therefore, he tried to describe the deviation as much as possible as possible as it was right and wrong. Skew occurs "neither in a definite place nor at a definite time", and it occurs in a space that is too small to be small.
Secondly, Cicero, according to Plutarch, and several other ancients, rebuked Epicurus, saying that according to his doctrine there was no reason for the deflection of atoms; Cicero added that there was nothing more disgraceful to a physicist than that. But, above all, the physical causes that Cicero requires drag the deflection of the atom back to the realm of determinism, which is exactly what should go beyond this determinism. Second, the atom is not complete at all until there is a provision for skew in the atom. The question of questioning the cause of this provision, that is, the question of the cause of the atom as its origin,—— is obviously meaningless to those who think that the atom is the cause of everything and that it has no cause in itself.
Finally, if Pelle rebukes Epicurus on the basis of Augustine's authority (though this authority is insignificant in comparison with Aristotle and other ancients, according to Augustine, Democritus had endowed the atom with a spiritual principle), that he has come up with a deflection to replace this spiritual principle, then it can be refuted that the soul of the atom is only an empty phrase, while the deviation expresses the true soul of the atom, the concept of abstract individuality.
Before examining the conclusion that atoms are skewed away from straight lines, we must also highlight an extremely important link that has hitherto been completely ignored.
That is, the deflection of atoms from straight lines is not a special, accidental provision in Epicurus physics. On the contrary, the law manifested by deflection permeates the entire Epicurean philosophy, so it is self-evident that the prescriptiveness of this law at the time of its emergence depends on the extent to which it is applied.
Abstract individuality can realize its concept only by abstracting it from the fixed existence which is opposed to it—its formal prescription, its pure self-existence, its independence from direct fixation, the renunciation of all relativity. It is necessary to know that in order to truly overcome this fixed-existence, the abstract individuality should conceptualize it, and this can only be achieved by universality.
Thus, just as the atom, by detaching from the straight line and deviating from the straight line, is liberated from its own relative existence, that is, from the straight line, the whole of Epicurean philosophy is detached from the restrictive fixed existence where the abstract concept of individuality, i.e., independence and the negation of all relations with the other, should be expressed in its existence.
Therefore, the purpose of action is to detach from, to be free from suffering and confusion, that is, to attain peace of mind. So, good is escaping from evil, and happiness is escaping from suffering. Finally, where abstract individuality manifests itself in its highest freedom and independence, in its totality, where the freed presence is logically all-fixed, so that the gods also avoid the world, are indifferent to it, and dwell outside it.
People have mocked these gods of Epicurus, saying that they are similar to man, that they dwell in the voids of the real world, that they have no body, but that they have something similar to the body, that there is no blood, but that they are in the peace of happiness, that they do not listen to any prayers, that they do not care about us, that they do not care about the world, that they revere them because of their beauty, their majesty and their perfect nature, not for profit.
However, these gods are not fictions of Epicurus. They once existed. This is the gods shaped by Greek art. Cicero, as a Roman, had reason to ridicule them, but when Plutarch said that this doctrine of God dispelled fear and superstition, but did not give pleasure and favor to God, but put us in a relationship with God, as we were in with the fish of the Sea of Shirkani, from which we expected neither harm nor benefit,—— and when he said this, as a Greek, he had completely forgotten the Greek point of view. Theoretical tranquility was the main factor in the character of the Greek gods. Aristotle also said, "The best thing doesn't need action because it's an end in itself." ”
Let us now examine the conclusions that arise directly from the deflection of atoms. This conclusion shows that the atom denies all such motions and relations, in which the atom is prescribed as a special definite existence for another. This meaning can be expressed in such a way that the atom is detached and far removed from its opposite fixed-existence. But what is contained in this deflection — that is, the atom's negation of all relations with others — must be realized, must be expressed in affirmative form. This can only happen if the relation to the atom is determined by nothing else, but in itself, and therefore as an atom, and since the atom itself is directly prescribed, it is a multitude of atoms. Thus, the repulsion of the multitude of atoms is the inevitable realization of what Lucretius calls the "law of the atoms" of deflection. However, since each of these provisions is set here to be a special fixed, in addition to the first two movements, the exclusion as a third movement is added. Lucretius is right that if atoms had not been deflected frequently, there would have been no atomic shocks, no atomic collisions, and thus the world would never have been created. Since atoms themselves are their only objects, they can only relate to themselves; or, if expressed from the point of view of space, they can only collide with themselves, for when they relate to other things, every relative existence of them in this relation is denied; and this relative existence, as we have seen, is their original motion, that is, the motion of falling in a straight line. So, they only collide because they deviate from the straight line. This has nothing to do with pure material division.
In fact, the individuality of direct existence is realized according to its concept only when it is in relation to something else, and this other is itself, even if it is opposed to it in the form of direct existence. Therefore, a person is no longer a product of nature only when the other thing with which he has a relationship is not a being different from his, but on the contrary, if the other thing itself is not yet a spirit, and is an individual person. But for man to be the object of his own only reality, he must break his relative fixedness in himself, the power of desire and the power of pure nature. Exclusion is the first form of self-consciousness; therefore, it corresponds to the self-consciousness which sees itself as something that exists directly, something that abstracts individuals.
So, in the repulsion, the concept of the atom is realized, according to which the atom is an abstract form, but its opposite is also realized, and according to its opposite, the atom is abstract matter; for the thing with which the atom is related is an atom, but some other atom. But if I have a relationship with myself, as if I were with a direct other, then my relationship is a material relation. This is the most extreme externality that can be conceived. Thus, in the rejection of the original, the materiality of the atom manifested in a straight line falling and the formal stipulation of the atom manifested in the deflection are all integrated.
In contrast to Epicurus, Democritus turned what was for Epicurus the realization of the atomic concept into a coercive movement, an act of blind necessity. As we have seen above, he regards the vortex produced by the mutual repulsion and collision of atoms as an entity of necessity. It can be seen that in the exclusion he pays attention only to the material aspect, that is, to division and change, but does not pay attention to the conceptual aspect, and according to the conceptual aspect, in the exclusion all relations with other things are denied, and the movement is set as self-regulation. On this point we can see very clearly from the fact that he, through the void of space, fully and emotionally imagines the same object as something that splits into many objects, just as gold is broken into many small pieces. In this way, he hardly understood one as an atomic concept.
Aristotle rightly retorted: "Therefore, It should be said to Rukibb and Democritus, who assert that primordial objects are in motion forever in the void and in infinity, which kind of motion this is, and what kind of motion is appropriate to the nature of these objects." For if every element is forcibly propelled by another element, then every element must have a natural motion in addition to a forced motion; and this initial motion should not be a forced motion, but a natural motion. Otherwise, endless progression occurs. ”
Thus, Epicurus's theory of atomic skew changes the entire internal structure of the atomic kingdom, because through skew the formal stipulations are revealed, and the contradictions contained in the concept of the atom are realized. Thus, Epicurus was the first to understand the nature of repulsion, albeit in the form of sensibility, while Democritus recognized only its material existence.
Thus, we also found that Epicurus applied some of the more specific forms of exclusion. In the political sphere, that is the contract, in the social sphere, it is friendship, and friendship is hailed as the noblest thing.
Chapter 2: The Mass of the Atom
To say that atoms have properties contradicts the concept of atoms; for, as Epicurus said, any property is variable, while atoms are unchanging. Nevertheless, the idea that atoms have properties is a foregone conclusion. For the multitude of mutually exclusive atoms separated by perceptual space must be directly different from their own pure essence, that is to say, they must have a quality.
Thus, in the following account I do not consider Schneider and Nuremberger at all: "Epicurus did not consider atoms to have matter, and verses 44 and 54 of the letter to Herodotus in the book of Diogenes Larsius were added later." If this is the case, then how can the evidence of Lucretius, Plutarch, and all the writers who speak of Epicurus be refuted? Moreover, where Diogenes Larsius mentions the mass of atoms, there are not just two stanzas, but as many as ten stanzas, namely verses 42, 43, 44, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, and 61. The reasons given by these critics that "they do not know how to combine the quality of the atom with its concepts" are superficial. Spinoza says that ignorance is not an argument [Note: See The Appendix to Proposition 36 of Part 1 of Spinoza's Ethics. ］。 If everyone deletes what he didn't understand in the writings of the ancients, we'll soon get a blank slate!
By having a mass, the atom acquires a existence that contradicts its concept, and is set as an externalized fixed being that is different from its own essence. This contradiction was Exactly what Epicurus was primarily interested in. Thus, in setting up the conclusion that the atom has a certain characteristic and thus deriving the material nature of the atom, he also sets up some opposing regulations which in turn negate it within the limits of the characteristic itself, and in turn affirm the concept of the atom. Thus he defines all characteristics as contradictory. On the contrary, Democritus did not examine the properties in terms of the atoms themselves, nor did he objectify the contradictions between the concepts and existence contained in these properties. In fact, democritus' whole interest lies in the description of quality in terms of the relationship between the mass and the concrete nature that should be composed of the mass. In his view, quality is merely a hypothesis used to illustrate the diversity of manifestations. Therefore, the atomic concept homogeneity has nothing to do with it.
In order to prove our assertion, we must first understand the sources of material that appear to contradict each other here.
In The Insights of Philosophers, it is stated: "Epicurus asserted that atoms have three properties: volume, shape, and gravity. Democritus admitted that there were only two: volume and shape; Epicurus added a third, gravity. In Eusebius's Preparation for the Gospel, this passage is repeated word for word.
This passage is confirmed by the evidence of Cimbritius and Filoponus, who, according to them, Democritus believed only that atoms had differences in volume and shape. Aristotle took the opposite view, and in Book 1 of his Treatise on The Creation and Destruction, he argued that Democritus' atoms had different weights. In another place (In The Treatise of Heaven, Book 1), Aristotle again makes the question of whether Democritus thinks that atoms have gravity, for he says: "If all objects have gravity, then no object will be absolutely light; but if all objects are light, then no object will be heavy." In his History of Ancient Philosophy, Little, based on the authority of Aristotle, rejects the statements of Plutarch, Osebius, and Stobert; he does not consider the evidence of Cimblieus and Philoponus.
Let's take a look at whether there are really such serious contradictions in these places. In the quotation above, Aristotle does not specifically speak of the mass of the atom. Instead, in Metaphysics, Book 7, it is said: "Democritus believed that there are three differences in the atom. For the underlying object is the same thing according to the material, but the object differs either in shape by difference in appearance, or in position by different turns, or in order by different contact with each other. From this passage, at least one conclusion can be drawn immediately. [Note: Marx then deleted the following sentence: "Democritus did not propose the contradiction between the mass of the atom and its conception." Gravity is not mentioned as a property of Democritus' atoms. The particles of matter that are divided and scattered among each other in the void must have special forms, and these special forms are completely externally obtained according to the investigation of space. This conclusion is made even clearer in the following passage by Aristotle: "Rukibb and his colleague Democritus say that fullness and emptiness are elements... These two, as matter, are the basis of all existence. Like those who believe that there is a single fundamental entity from which other things arise from the change of this entity, and who at the same time regard thinness and density as the principle of all qualities, Rukibber and Democritus likewise teach that the difference between atoms is the cause of other things, because the existence of the basis differs only by appearance, contact with each other, and turning to different things... For example, A differs from N in shape, AN differs from NA in order, and Z differs from N in position. ”
It is clear from this passage that Democritus examined the properties of the atom only from the point of view of the formation of the differences in the phenomenal world, and not from the atom itself. It can also be seen that Democritus did not propose gravity as an essential property of atoms. In his view, gravity is something that is self-evident, because all objects have weight. Similarly, in his view, even volume is not a basic quality. It is an accidental stipulation that atoms have a shape when they have a shape. Only the difference in appearance intrigued Democritus, for there was nothing more to the shape, the position, the order than the difference in appearance. Since volume, shape, and gravity are bound together in Epicurus, they are the differences of the atoms themselves; and the shape, position, and order are the differences that atoms have for something else. Thus we see in Democritus only a few purely hypothetical provisions for explaining the phenomenal world, while Epicurus explains to us the conclusions derived from the principles themselves. Therefore, we shall examine his provisions on the properties of atoms individually.
First, atoms have volumes. Volume, on the other hand, is also negated. That is, atoms do not have any volume at random, but are considered to have only some volumetric variation between atoms. It should be said that only the largeness of the atom is denied, and the smallness of the atom is acknowledged, but it is not the minimum, because the minimum is a pure spatial regulation, but an infinitesimal that expresses contradictions. Thus Rossini, in his commentary on the Fragments of Epicurus, mistranslated a passage and completely ignored the other side, saying:
"But Epicurus determined that those atoms were so small that they were so tiny, and according to the evidence provided by Larsio, book 10, verse 44, Epicurus said that atoms have no volume."
I am not willing to consider Osebius now, who, according to him, was the first to think that atoms are infinitesimal, while Democritus admitted that there are the greatest atoms,—— even as large as the world, according to Stobeth.
On the one hand, this statement contradicts Aristotle's evidence, and on the other hand, Eusebius, or rather Dionysius, bishop of Alexandria, to which he cites, contradicts himself; for in the same book democritus he declares that Democritus recognizes indivisible objects which can be intuitively rationally, the origin of nature. One thing is clear: Democritus was not aware of this contradiction, which did not attract his attention, which was the main interest of Epicurus.
The second characteristic of Epicurus's atoms is shape. However, this provision also contradicts the concept of the atom and must set its opposite. The individuality of abstraction is the self-equivalence of abstraction, and therefore shapeless. Therefore, the differences in the shape of atoms are certainly uncertain, but they are not absolutely infinite. On the contrary, the number of shapes that distinguish atoms from each other is deterministic and limited. It is natural to conclude from this that there are not as many different shapes as atoms, but Democritus believed that there are infinitely many shapes. If each atom had a special shape, then there must be infinitely large atoms, because atoms would be infinitely different, different from the differences of all other atoms, like Leibniz's monad. Thus Leibniz's statement that there are no two identical things between heaven and earth is inverted; that there are infinitely many atoms of the same shape between heaven and earth, and that the rules of shape are obviously negated again, for a shape is not a shape if it is no longer distinguished from others. [Note: Marx then deleted the following passage: "Thus Epicurus also objects the contradiction here, while Democritus insists only on the material aspect, and no longer allows one to see the conclusions drawn from principle in other regulations." ”］
Finally, and most importantly, Epicurus proposed gravity as a third quality, since matter in the center of gravity has the conceptual individuality of one of the main provisions of the atom. Therefore, once atoms are transferred into the realm of appearances, they must have gravity.
But gravity also directly contradicts the concept of the atom, since gravity is the individuality of matter as a conceptual point outside of matter itself. However, the atom itself is this individuality, which, like the center of gravity, is conceived as an individual being. Thus, in Epicurus's view, gravity exists only as different weights, and the atom itself is the center of gravity of solidity, like a celestial body. If this were applied to concrete things, it would naturally lead to the conclusion that Brookle Sr. thought was astonishing, and that Lucretius wanted us to believe: that the earth has no center towards which everything tends, and that there are no rivals who dwell on opposite hemispheres. Secondly, since only atoms that are distinct from other things, are externalized, and have properties have gravity, it goes without thinking of atoms as numerous atoms distinct from each other, but only in terms of their relation to the void, that the weight of the atoms disappears, and therefore, however different in mass and shape, they all move at the same speed in the void space. Thus, Epicurus also applied gravity only in terms of the combination of repulsion and the resulting repulsion, which gave him reason to assert that gravity was only the aggregation of atoms, not the atoms themselves.
Gasandra praised Epicurus, saying that he had foreseen experience simply by virtue of receptive guidance, and according to experience all objects, though very different in weight and mass, were the same speed when they fell from above.
Thus, the results of the examination of the characteristics of the atom are the same as those of the skewed investigation, namely, that Epicurus objectifies the contradiction between essence and existence in the concept of the atom and thus provides the science of atomism, while in Democritus the principle itself is not realized, but only adheres to the material aspect and proposes some assumptions required by experience.
Chapter III: The Indivisible Origin and the Indivisible Elements
In his treatise on the astronomical concept of Epicurus, mentioned above, Schaubach says:
"Epicurus and Aristotle together distinguish between the primordial (the indivisible primordial, Diogenes Larsius, v. 10, § 41) and the elements (the indivisible elements, Diogenesius, v. 10. § 86), the former of which are atoms which can be known by reason, which do not occupy any space. They are called atoms, not because they are the smallest objects, but because they cannot be divided in space, and it should be assumed that Epicurus did not give atoms any properties related to space. But in his letter to Herodotus (Diogenes Larsio, vol. 10, v. 44, 54), he not only endowed the atom with gravity, but also gave it volume and shape... Therefore, I count these atoms as the second category, which are elementary particles that were produced from the previous kind of atoms but are considered objects. ”
Let us examine more closely a passage that Schaubach quotes from Diogenes Larsho's book [vol. 10, v. 86]. This passage says: "For example, the idea that the universe is the essence of objects and untouchability, or that there are indivisible elements, and so on. Here Epicurus was teaching Pitocles, who wrote to him that the astronomical doctrine differed from all other theories of physics, for example, the doctrine that everything was an object and a void, that there was an indivisible matrix. Obviously, there is no reason here to think that the second category of atoms is being discussed. [Note: Marx then deleted the following sentence: "If from the 'there is no origin in all this, for the atom is the cause' (this sentence, one concludes that Epicurus believed that there is a third class of atoms, 'atoms as causes'), then this conclusion can be said to be both correct and false.] Perhaps the difference between the statements "the universe is the essence of the object and the untouchable" and "the existence of indivisible elements" creates a distinction between "objects" and "indivisible elements", in which case "object" may mean the first atom as opposed to "indivisible elements". But this is completely unthinkable. "Object" refers to something tangible as opposed to the void, so the void is also called "something of the formless body.". Thus, the concept of "object" includes both atoms and composite objects. For example, in a letter to Herodotus, it is stated: "The universe is an object... If there is nothing we call the essence of emptiness, space and the untouchable... In the object, some are complexes, and others are the things that make up these complexes. And these things are indivisible and immutable... Therefore, the original must be an indivisible tangible entity. Thus, in the above passage, Epicurus is talking first of all of the general tangible things that are different from the void, and secondly of the special tangible things, that is, atoms. [Note: Marx then deleted the following sentence: "Here the indivisible elements have no meaning other than as indivisible objects, and the last quotation says of these indivisible objects that they are the original."] ”］
Shobach's quotation of Aristotle does not prove anything. The difference between the "original" and the "element", which the Stoics particularly emphasized, can certainly be found in Aristotle, but Aristotle also acknowledged that the two statements were equivalent. He even explicitly stated that "elements" primarily refer to atoms. Rukibber and Democritus similarly called fullness and emptiness "elements."
In Lucretius, in the epistles of Epicurus contained in D'Orgenie Larsio, in Plutarch's Colot, and in Sykesto Empreico, it is believed that atoms themselves have properties, and that these characteristics are therefore prescribed to renounce themselves.
But if an object that can only be perceived by reason has the quality of space and can be regarded as a dichotomy, then to say that the nature of space itself can only be perceived by reason would be a much greater reversal of the dichotomy.
Finally, Schaubach cites Stobe's following passage to further argue his point: "Epicurus said,...... Primordial things (i.e., objects) are simple; and the complexes they make up are all gravity-oriented. There are several other passages to this passage of Stobert, in which the "indivisible element" is mentioned as a special kind of atom: (Plutarch) On the Insights of Philosophers, vol. 1, pp. 246 and 249, and Stobert's Pastoral of Nature, vol. 1, p. 5. Moreover, in these passages there is no certainty at all that the original atoms have no volume, shape, or gravity. Rather, it is only mentioned that gravity is a sign of distinguishing the "indivisible origin" from the "indivisible element". But, as we have said in the previous chapter, gravity is applied only in terms of the repulsion of atoms and the aggregations that arise from repulsion.
Imagining "indivisible elements" has not yielded any results. The transition from the "indivisible origin" to the "indivisible elements" is as difficult as the desire to attribute them directly. However, I do not absolutely deny this distinction. I'm just denying that there are two different, fixed atoms. To be precise, they are different regulations of the same kind of atom.
Before explaining this difference, I would also like to draw attention to a technique of Epicurus in which he liked to regard different provisions of a concept as distinct independent beings. Just as the atom is his principle, so his way of knowing is itself atomistic. In his case, every link of development is immediately and quietly transformed into a fixed reality, as if separated from the whole by the void of space. Each provision takes the form of an isolated individuality.
This technique is clear from the following example.
Infinity, or infinitiio, as Cicero translates, is sometimes used by Epicurus as a special kind of nature. And it is precisely where the "element" is defined as a fixed, basic entity that we also find that the "infinite" also becomes something that exists independently.
But the infinite, according to Epicurus's own regulations, is neither a special entity nor something that exists outside the atoms and the void; on the contrary, the infinity is the contingent rule of the void. Thus, we find that "infinite" has three meanings.
First, in Epicurus's view, "infinity" denotes a quality that atoms and the void share. In this sense it denotes the infinity of the universe, which is infinite because of the infinite number of atoms, and because the void is infinitely large.
Second, infinity refers to the multitude of atoms, so that the opposite of the void is not one atom, but an infinite number of atoms.
Finally, if we can infer Epicurus's words from democritus' doctrine, then "infinite" in turn means its opposite, the boundless void as opposed to the atoms prescribed in itself and defined for itself.
Of all these meanings—and they are the only, if only, possible, meanings in atomism—infinity is but a prescription of atoms and the void. Yet it is independently reduced to a special existence, even juxtaposed with those principles as a special nature, which expresses the prescriptiveness of those principles. [Note: Marx then deleted the sentence: "This example is convincing." ”—］
Thus, perhaps It may be Epicurus himself who identified the regulation of atoms as "elements" as an independent, primitive atom, but this is not the case, extrapolating from the more reliable materials of history; or perhaps, it seems more likely to us, epicurus's student Metrodolos was the first to turn the different regulations into different existences, and in either case we must attribute the independence of the individual links to the subjective method of atomistic consciousness. Since people give different forms of existence to different provisions, people do not understand their differences.
In Democritus's view, atoms have the meaning of merely an "element," a matrix of matter. It is Epicurus's contribution to distinguish the atom as the "original", the principle, from the atom as the "element", the basis. The importance of this distinction can be seen below.
The contradiction between existence and essence, matter and form, contained in the concept of the atom, is expressed in the individual atom itself, because the individual atom has a quality. With the mass, the atom deviates from its concept, but at the same time attains completion in its own structure. Thus, from the repulsion of qualitative atoms and their aggregation in connection with repulsion, a phenomenal world arises.
In this transition from the essential world to the phenomenal world, the contradictions in the concept of atoms clearly reach their sharpest realization. For the atom, according to its concept, is the absolute, essential form of nature. This absolute form is now reduced to the absolute matter, the amorphous matrix of the phenomenal world.
It is true that atoms are entities of nature, from which everything arises and everything is broken down into such entities, but the constant and continuous destruction of the phenomenal world produces no result. New phenomena are taking shape, but the atom itself, as a fixed thing, is always the foundation. Thus, if the atom is conceived according to the pure concept of the atom, its existence is the void space, the destroyed nature; once the atom has entered the realm of reality, it descends into the basis of matter, which, as the bearer of a world full of various relations, will always exist only in an unrelated and external form to the world. This is an inevitable consequence, for the atom, which is assumed to be abstract and individual and finished, cannot manifest itself as the conceptual and unifying power of that diversity.
Abstract individuality is freedom from being fixed, not freedom in being. It cannot shine in the light of concentration. Concentration is an element that makes it lose its properties and become matter. Thus, atoms do not appear in the phenomenal realm, or descend into the basis of matter when they enter the phenomenal realm. Atoms exist only in the void as atoms. Therefore, the death of nature becomes the immortal entity of nature, and Lucretius has reason to shout:
"The life that will die is taken away by the death that does not die." [Note: Lucretius, On The Nature of Matter, vol. 3, line 869.] ］
The philosophical difference between Epicurus and Democritus is that Epicurus grasps and objects contradictions in extremely acute situations, thus distinguishing the atoms that are the basis of phenomena as "elements" from those that exist in the void as "primordial"; while Democritus objects only one of these links. It was this difference that, in the essential world, in the realm of atoms and the void, broke up Epicurus and Democritus. But since only atoms with matter are complete atoms, and since the phenomenal world can arise only from atoms that are completed and deviate from their own concepts, Epicurus makes this statement as follows: only the atom with mass becomes an "element", or only an "indivisible element" has quality.
Chapter 4 Time
Since in the atom matter as a pure relation to itself has no variability or relativity, it can be directly concluded that time must be excluded from the atomic conception, from the essential world. For only by extracting the factor of time from matter is matter eternal and independent. On this point, Democritus and Epicurus are also in agreement. But in the ways and means of prescribing time divorced from the atomic world, they are different in terms of where time should be placed.
For Democritus, time has no meaning for the system, no necessity. He explained that the time was to cancel the time. He defines time as something eternal in order to exclude from atoms, as Aristotle and Cimblicius put it. According to him, time itself is evidence that not everything necessarily has a origin, a beginning.
Admittedly, there is a more profound idea in this. The imaginative intellect, which cannot understand the independence of the entity, raises the question of the generation of entities in time. However, it does not see that when it regards the entity as a temporal thing, it also turns time into a physical thing, and thus abolishes the concept of time, because time that becomes absolute time is no longer a temporal thing.
But on the other hand, such a solution is unsatisfactory. The time excluded from the essential world is transferred to the self-consciousness of the subject who conducts philosophical thinking, and has nothing to do with the world itself.
This was not the case with Epicurus. In his view, time, which is excluded from the essential world, becomes the absolute form of phenomena. That is, time is prescribed as the duality of the duality. Duality is a change in general entities. The duality of the duality is the change as a reflection of itself, the transformation as a transformation. This pure form of the phenomenal world is time.
Composition is only the passive form of concrete nature, and time is its active form. If I examine the combination according to the definiteness of the combination, then the atom exists behind the combination, in the void, in the imagination, and if I examine the atom according to the concept of the atom, then the combination either does not exist at all, or exists only in the subjective appearance; for it is such a relation in which there is no relation between the independent, self-enclosed atoms, which seem to have nothing to do with each other. On the contrary, time, i.e., the transformation of finite things, when it is set to transform, is likewise the form of reality, which separates phenomena from essence, sets phenomena as phenomena, and returns phenomena to essence as phenomena. The combination represents only the materiality of the atom and the materiality of nature produced by the atom. On the contrary, the place of time in the phenomenal world is like the place of the atomic concept in the essential world, that is, time is to abstract, eliminate and return all definite fixed beings to its own existence.
From these investigations one can draw the following conclusions: First, Epicurus regarded the contradiction between matter and form as a property of phenomenal nature, and thus this nature became the reflection of essential nature, that is, of atoms. This is why it is due to the opposition between time and space, the active form of phenomena and the passive forms of phenomena; and secondly, it is only in Epicurus that phenomena are understood as phenomena, i.e., as essential alienations, which itself manifests itself in its reality as this alienation. On the contrary, in Democritus, who regards the combination as the only form of phenomenal nature, phenomena do not freely indicate that it is a phenomenon, something distinct from essence. Thus, if the phenomenon is examined in the light of its existence, the essence and the phenomenon are completely confused; if the phenomenon is examined according to the concept of the phenomenon, the essence and the phenomenon are completely separated, and the phenomenon is reduced to a subjective illusion. The combinatorial adopts an indifferent and material attitude towards the essential basis of phenomena. Time, on the contrary, is the fire of essence that eternally devours phenomena and imprints them with dependence and non-essentiality; finally, because in Epicurus's view, time is a transformation of transformation, a reflection of the phenomenon itself, so that phenomena can be justifiably regarded as objective, and perceptual perception can be justified as the criterion of concrete nature, although the atom, the basis of nature, can be observed only by reason.
Precisely because time is an abstract form of perceptual perception, the atomistic approach of Epicurus's consciousness gives rise to the natural necessity of defining time as a special existence in nature. The transmutation of the perceptual world as transmutation, the transformation of the perceptual world as a transformation, the self-reflection of this phenomenon that forms the concept of time, has its own existence in the perceived sensibility. Therefore, human sensibility is the time of form, the self-reflection of the existence of the perceptual world.
This can be derived directly from Epicurus' stipulation of the concept of time, or it can be proved with great certainty with individual examples. In Epicurus's letter to Herodotus, time is prescribed as follows: time arises when the duality of objects perceived by the senses is conceived as duality. Thus, the perceptual perception of self-reflection is here the source of time and time itself. Therefore, time cannot be defined by analogy, nor can time be expressed in terms of other things, but the direct obviousness itself should be grasped; since the perceptual perception reflected in itself is time itself, it is impossible to go beyond the limits of time.
On the other hand, in Lucretius, Sykesto Empirico, and Stobe, the occasionality, the change in self-reflection, is prescribed as time. Thus, the reflection of duality in perceptual perception and the reflection of duality itself are set to be the same thing.
Because of this connection between time and sensibility, images, which can also be found in Democritus, acquire a more logical status.
Images are the forms of natural objects, which are like a shell that falls off the natural object and moves the natural object into the phenomenon. These forms of things are constantly flowing out of them, invading the senses, thus allowing the object to appear. Therefore, it is nature that hears itself in the process of listening, smells itself in the process of sniffing, and sees itself in the process of seeing. Therefore, human sensibility is a medium, and through this medium, it is as if through a focal point, the processes of nature are reflected, and they burn up to form the light of phenomena.
In Democritus this is the inconsistency of the beginning and the end, for phenomena are only subjective things, whereas in Epicurus it is an inevitable consequence, for in Epicurus sensibility is the reflection of the phenomenal world itself, the time of its embodiment.
Finally, the connection between sensibility and time is manifested in the fact that the temporality of things and the appearance of things to the senses are set as the same thing as things themselves. For it is precisely because objects appear before the senses that they disappear. Since the images are constantly separated from the object and flow into the senses, because the images have their own sensibility outside themselves, and not within themselves, as another kind of nature, they cannot recover from this divided state, so they disintegrate and disappear.
Thus, just as atoms are nothing more than abstract, individual forms of self-consciousness, perceptual nature is only objectified, experiential, individual self-consciousness, and this is the perceptual self-consciousness. So, the senses are the only criterion in concrete nature, just as abstract reason is the only criterion in the atomic world.
Chapter 5 Celestial Signs
Democritus's astronomical insights, as seen in his time, may have been insightful, but they were not of philosophical significance. They are neither beyond the scope of empirical reflection nor are they intrinsically connected to the doctrine of atoms more certainty.
On the contrary, Epicurus's theory of celestial bodies and processes relating to them, or of celestial phenomena (he used the name celestial signs to summarize celestial bodies and processes relating to celestial bodies), is opposed not only to democritus's opinions, but also to those of Greek philosophy. Reverence for celestial bodies was a form of worship that all Greek philosophers followed. The celestial system is the original, naïve, and naturally prescribed existence of realistic rationality. The Greek self-consciousness occupies the same place in the spiritual realm. It is the spiritual solar system. Thus, the Greek philosophers worshipped their own spirit in celestial bodies.
Anaxagoras was the first to explain the sky in physics, so that he brought the sky closer to the earth in a different sense than Socrates. It was this Anaxagoras, and when someone asked him why he was born, he replied, "To observe the sun, the moon, and the sky." Xenophon looked up at the sky and said, "One is God." The religious attitude of the Pythagoreans, Plato, and Aristotle towards celestial bodies is well known.
Indeed, Epicurus opposed the views of the entire Greek nation.
Aristotle said that sometimes it seems to be a proof of concept phenomenon, and the phenomenon confirms the concept. For example, everyone has an idea of God and assigns the highest place to the divine; whether it is a foreigner or a Greek, in short, all those who believe in the existence of God, in short, they obviously associate the undead with the undead; for it is impossible not to do so. Therefore, if there is something divine — as it does exist — then our assertion of the substance of the celestial body is also correct. But as far as man's beliefs are concerned, this assertion is also consistent with perceptual perception. For throughout the ages, according to the recollections that have circulated, neither the whole celestial body nor any part of the celestial body seems to have changed. Even the name seems to have been handed down from the ancients to the present day, because what they refer to is the same thing as what we call it. For the same view has reached us now, not once, not twice, but countless times. Precisely because the primordial object was something different from earth and fire, air and water, they called the highest place "Aether" (by
[Note: Flow eternally.] ] and gave it an alias called "Eternal Time". However, the ancients assigned the heavens and the highest place to the gods, because only the heavens are immortal. And the present doctrine also proves that heaven is indestructible, has no beginning, and does not suffer all the calamities of the world of birth and destruction. In this way, our concepts are simultaneously consistent with prophecies about God. As for saying that there is only one day, it is obvious. The view that celestial bodies are gods, and that divine things surround the whole of nature, is handed down from ancestors and ancient people and preserved among future generations in the form of myths. The rest was added in the guise of mythology in order to arouse the faith of the masses, as something conducive to law and life. For the masses speak of the gods as approximations to man, to some other creature, they invent many things related to this and similar. If someone abandons the rest and insists only on the belief that the original entity is the gods, then he must think that this is a revelation of God, and that, as has happened, after all kinds of arts and philosophies were created and then disappeared, these opinions have been passed down to the present day like antiques.
In contrast, Epicurus said:
In addition to all this, it should be taken into account that the greatest confusion of the human mind arises from the fact that people regard celestial bodies as blessed and indestructible, that they have desires and actions that are opposed to them, and that they are suspicious because of myths. As for the celestial signs, it should be assumed that movement, position, erosion, rise, fall and such phenomena occur not because there is a being that enjoys all well-being and indestructibility that dominates them, arranges them — or has arranged them. Because action is not aligned with well-being, much of what happens is related to weakness, fear, and need. Nor should it be assumed that there are fire-like objects that enjoy well-being that can make these movements arbitrarily. If people disagree with this view, then the contradiction itself causes the greatest confusion of the mind.
So if Aristotle blamed the ancients for thinking that heaven still needed Atlas as its pillar, this Atlas
"Standing in the far West,
The pillars that support heaven and earth with their shoulders"
(Aeschylus, Prometheus, Chained Prometheus, lines 348 and below),
Epicurus, on the other hand, blames those who think that man needs heaven; and he believes that the Atlas that sustains heaven is itself the result of man's ignorance and superstition. Ignorance and superstition are also known as the Dietan gods.
The entire letter from Epicurus to Pitocles, with the exception of the last verse, deals with the theory of the celestial body. The last verse contains some ethical aphorisms. It is appropriate to attach some moral code to the doctrine of celestial phenomena. This doctrine was a matter of conscience for Epicurus. Our investigation will therefore be based primarily on this letter to Pitocles. We will supplement by an excerpt of his letter to Herodotus, which Epicurus himself quoted in his letter to Pitocles.
First, do not think that the knowledge of the celestial signs, whether in general or in individual parts, can attain other ends than the study of the rest of the natural sciences, which can attain peace of mind and firm confidence. What we need in our lives is not fantasies and empty assumptions, but our ability to live a life without confusion. Just as the task of natural philosophy is generally to study the causes of the most important things, so the sense of well-being in knowing the celestial phenomena is based on this basis. The theory of the rise and fall of the stars, their position and eclipse, does not contain a special basis for happiness. Fear, however, dominates those who see these phenomena but do not recognize their nature and their main causes. It is only today that the supposedly superior position of the theory of celestial phenomena over other sciences has been denied, and this theory has been placed on an equal footing with other sciences.
But the theory of celestial phenomena is also distinguished not only from the methods of ethics, but also from the methods of the rest of the physical problems, such as the existence of indivisible elements, etc., where only one explanation corresponds to the phenomenon. This does not happen in celestial phenomena. Their arising cannot be attributed to a simple cause; they have more than one essential category that corresponds to the phenomenon. For the study of natural philosophy should not be based on empty axioms and laws. It is often said repeatedly that the interpretation of celestial phenomena should not be simple and absolute, but should be diverse. This applies to the rise and fall of the sun and the moon, the profit and loss of the moon, the reflection of people in the moon, the change of the length of day and night, and other celestial phenomena.
How should all this be explained?
Any explanation is acceptable. It's just that myths have to be ruled out. But myths are excluded only when one pursues phenomena, deduces from them, and infers the invisible. It is necessary to grasp the phenomenon firmly, to grasp the perceptual perception. Therefore, an analogy must be applied. In this way, it is possible to explain the basis of celestial phenomena and other things that often occur and shock others in particular, thus eliminating fear and liberating oneself from fear.
This multitude of explanations, the multitude of possibilities, must not only calm consciousness and eliminate the causes of fear, but at the same time deny the unity of the celestial bodies themselves, i.e., the same and absolute laws as themselves. Individual celestial bodies can move in one way and another from time to time. This irregular possibility is a property of their reality. Everything in celestial bodies is not fixed, unchanging. The diversity of interpretations simultaneously removes the unity of objects.
Thus, Aristotle agreed with other Greek philosophers who also considered celestial bodies to be eternal and immortal because they always behave in the same way; Aristotle even thought that they had special, higher, gravitationally unconstrained elements, and Epicurus was in direct opposition to him, asserting the opposite. He argues that the special difference between the theory of the celestial phenomenon and all other theories of physics is that in the celestial phenomenon everything occurs in a varied and disorderly manner; in the celestial phenomenon everything must be explained by a multiplicity of reasons, with an indeterminate number. Epicurus angrily and fiercely refutes the opposing opinion that those who insist on one way of interpretation and reject all others, those who recognize in the celestial signs only the unified, and therefore eternal and divine, are caught up in false explanations and the unpractice tricks of astrologers; they go beyond the boundaries of natural science and throw themselves into the arms of myth; they try to accomplish the impossible, they waste their energy on meaningless things, they do not even know, Where the peace of mind itself is put at risk. Their rhetoric should be scorned. The stereotype that the study of those objects is merely aimed at bringing us peace and happiness of mind seems incomplete and refined. On the contrary, the absolute criterion is that everything that disturbs the peace of mind and causes danger cannot belong to the indestructible and eternal nature. Consciousness must understand that this is an absolute law.
Thus Epicurus concludes that because the eternity of celestial bodies disturbs the tranquility of the self-conscious mind, an inevitable and inevitable conclusion is that they are not eternal.
How should this unique insight of Epicurus be understood?
All the writers of Epicurean philosophy describe this doctrine as incompatible with all other physics, with the atomic theory. The struggle against Stoicism, against superstition, against astrology was taken as a sufficient basis.
We have also seen that Epicurus himself distinguished the methods applied in the theory of celestial phenomena from those of other physics. But which provision of his principles has the inevitability of such a distinction? How could he have such a thought?
You know, he fought not only against astrology, but also against astronomy itself, against the eternal laws and reason in the celestial system. Finally, the opposition between Epicurus and the Stoics does not tell much. When the celestial bodies are described as accidental compounds of atoms, and the processes that occur in celestial bodies are described as the accidental motion of these atoms, the superstitions of the Stoics and their whole view have been refuted. The eternal nature of the celestial bodies is thus denied—Democritus is limited to drawing such a conclusion from the above premises. And even the object itself is abolished. Therefore, atomists do not need new methods.
And that's not all the difficulty. This gives rise to a more difficult to understand dichotomy.
Atoms are independent, individual forms of matter, as if they were imaginary gravity. But the highest reality of gravity is the celestial body. In celestial bodies all the dichotomies that constitute the development of atoms are reversed—the dichotomy between form and matter, between concepts and existence—is solved; in celestial bodies all necessary provisions are fulfilled. The celestial bodies are eternal and unchanging; their center of gravity is within themselves, not outside themselves; their only action is motion, and the celestial bodies separated by the void space deviate from the straight line, forming a system of repulsion and attraction, in which they likewise maintain their independence and finally produce time from themselves as the form of their manifestation. Thus, celestial bodies are atoms that become reality. In celestial bodies, matter incorporates individuality into itself. Here, therefore, Epicurus must have seen the supreme existence of his principles, the highest peaks and endpoints of his system. He claimed that he postulated the existence of atoms in order to lay the foundations of immortality for nature. What is important to him, he claims, is the individuality of the substance of matter. But as long as he discovers that the celestial bodies are his natural reality (for he does not recognize any other nature except mechanical nature), that is, independent, indestructible matter, and that the eternal and immutability of the celestial bodies are proved by the faith of the masses, the judgments of philosophy, the testimony of the senses, then his only intention is to bring the celestial bodies down into the non-eternal nature of the earth, and he will vehemently oppose those who worship independent natures that contain elements of individuality. This is his greatest contradiction.
Thus Epicurus felt that his previous categories had collapsed here, and that his theoretical methods [Note: Marx made modifications that turned out to be: "the theory of his methods". ] is becoming another approach. And he feels this and says it consciously, which is the deepest understanding, the most thorough conclusion, that his system has reached.
We have seen how the natural philosophy of Epicurus as a whole runs through the contradictions of essence and existence, form and matter. However, in celestial bodies this contradiction is eliminated, and these interdependent links are reconciled. In the celestial system, matter incorporates form into itself, includes individuality in itself, and thus acquires its independence. But after reaching this point, it ceases to be an affirmation of abstract self-awareness. In the world of atoms, as in the world of phenomena, form struggles against matter; it is in this contradiction that the abstract, individual self-consciousness feels its very nature objectified. The abstract form that fights abstract matter in the form of matter is self-consciousness itself. But now that matter has reconciled with form and become independent, the individual self-consciousness emerges from its pupalization, proclaiming itself a true principle and hostile to nature, which is already independent.
On the other hand, this can be expressed in this way: since matter incorporates individuality, form, into itself, as is the case in celestial bodies, matter ceases to be an abstract individuality. It has become concrete individuality, universality. Thus, what sparkles in the celestial phenomenon towards an abstract, individual self-consciousness is the negation of its material form, the universality of existence and nature. Therefore, self-consciousness sees the celestial phenomenon as its mortal enemy. Thus, self-consciousness, as Epicurus did, blames all fear and confusion on the heavens. Because fear, the demise of abstract individual things, is exactly what is universal. Thus, here Epicurus's true principles, abstract, individual self-consciousness, are no longer hidden. It comes out of its concealment, frees itself from the shell of matter, and seeks to destroy the already independent reality of nature by explaining it according to the possibilities of abstraction,—— the so-called abstract possibilities are that what is possible may also appear in other ways; there may also be opposites of what is possible. He therefore opposes those who simply, that is, interpret celestial bodies in a particular way; for one is something that is necessary and independent within itself.
Therefore, as long as nature as atoms and phenomena represents individual self-consciousness and its contradictions, the subjectivity of self-consciousness can only appear in the form of matter itself; on the contrary, when subjectivity becomes an independent thing, self-consciousness reflects itself in itself, and in its peculiar form as an independent form is opposed to matter.
It can be said from the outset that where Epicurus's principle will be realized, it is no longer realistic for him. For if the individual self-consciousness is in fact subordinate to the prescriptiveness of nature, or if the natural world is in fact subordinate to the prescriptiveness of the self-consciousness, then the prescriptiveness of the individual self-consciousness, i.e., its existence, ceases, for its affirmation can be realized at the same time as what is universal when it distinguishes itself from its own freedom.
Thus, in the theory of celestial phenomena is expressed the soul of Epicurus's natural philosophy. Anything that destroys the tranquility of the individual self-conscious mind is not eternal. The celestial body disturbs the tranquility of the self-conscious mind, disturbs its identity with itself, because the celestial body is the universality of existence, because nature is already independent in the celestial body.
Thus, the principle of Epicurean philosophy is not the gastronomy of Alsestratus, as Krishipus believes, but the absoluteness and freedom of self-consciousness, although this self-consciousness is understood only in the form of individuality.
If abstract, individual self-consciousness is set as an absolute principle, then, since it is not individuality that dominates the nature of things themselves, all true and real science is of course abolished. But everything that is transcendent to human consciousness, and therefore what belongs to the imaginary intellect, is shattered. On the contrary, if the self-consciousness which manifests itself in the form of abstract universality is elevated to an absolute principle, then this opens the door to superstitious and unfree mysticism. Historical proof of this situation can be found in Stoic philosophy. The abstract universal self-consciousness itself has a desire to affirm itself in the thing itself, and this self-consciousness can only be affirmed in things by denying things at the same time.
Thus, Epicurus was the greatest Greek Enlightenment thinker, and he was worthy of Lucretius's praise:
People see the creatures of the earthly world with dirt and bear with humiliation,
Suffering under the weight of religion,
And religion is rising up in the sky,
Fiercely threatening mankind,
At this time, a Greek dared to take the lead in raising the gaze of mortals
In the face of rape, fight hard,
Whether it is the legend of the gods, or the lightning and rolling thunder in the sky,
Nothing can make him afraid...
……
Now it seems as if retribution has been received, and religion has been completely overcome, falling to our knees at our feet,
And we, we were lifted high into the clouds by victory.
We are in the General Section [Note: Refers to the first part of this article. ] The distinction between democritus' natural philosophy and Epicurus's natural philosophy, presented at the end, is further developed and confirmed in all spheres of nature. Thus, in Epicurus, atomism, which contains contradictions, has been realized and completed as a natural science of self-consciousness, with final conclusions, and this self-consciousness with an abstract form of individuality is an absolute principle in itself, the abolition of atomism and the conscious antithesis of the universal. For Democritus, on the contrary, the atom is only a general, empirical representation of the general objectiveness of the study of nature. Thus, for him, the atom remains a pure and abstract category, an assumption which is the result of experience, not the driving principle of experience; and therefore, this assumption is still not realized, just as the natural study of reality is not further regulated by it.
From: The Complete Works of Marx and Engels, Volume I
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