In Early 1939, the 57th Army of the Northeast Army entered the Lunan Mountains and coastal areas, and in March 1939, Yu Xuezhong led the headquarters of the Lusu Theater and the 51st Army into the Yimeng Mountains, and established the Lusu Theater General Headquarters in Yishui County, in addition to commanding the 51st and 57th Armies of the Northeast Army, he also commanded the troops of Shen Honglie, chairman of the Kuomintang Shandong Province, and Han Deloitte, chairman of Jiangsu Province.
The commander of the 51st Army of the Northeast Army, who was originally loyal to himself, was later succeeded by Mou Zhongheng, who had jurisdiction over the 113th and 114th Divisions, and Miao Chengliu, commander of the 57th Army, who had jurisdiction over the 111th and 112th Divisions. Each division has two brigades below each, each brigade has 2 regiments and each regiment has 3 battalions.
The composition of the officers of the Northeast Army that entered Lulu was mixed and the political tendencies were varied. Yu Xuezhong was a famous general in the Northeast Army. After the Xi'an Incident, Zhang Xueliang sent Chiang Kai-shek back to Nanjing, and handed over the command of the Northeast Army to Yu. After the National War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, Yu Xuezhong not only had to abide by Zhang Xueliang's instructions to him, but also had to obey Chiang Kai-shek's military and government orders because Zhang Xueliang was controlled by Chiang Kai-shek and actually became a hostage. In the 51st and 57th Armies, there were secret CCP working committees at both the army and division levels. Among the officers were secret members of the CPC, such as Wan Yi, Xie Fang, and Gu Mu, as well as resolute anti-Japanese figures such as Chang Endo, commander of the 111th Division; decadent and reactionary bureaucrats like Miao Chengliu, commander of the 57th Army, who colluded with the Japanese puppet army, and spies sent by the Kuomintang, such as Zhou Fu, then director of the Political Department of the Headquarters of the Lusu Theater.
Since the Northeast Army entered Lulu, under the harsh situation of blockade, "sweeping," co-opting, and encroachment by the Japanese puppet army, it has undergone a process of constant differentiation because it cannot mobilize and rely on the masses. Some progressive forces could not withstand the persecution and oppression of the reactionary forces, and on several occasions they pulled the contingent out of the shackles of the diehards, and the "August 3rd" incident to be mentioned later was the largest of them. Some corrupt officers, on the other hand, could not live a cruel and arduous life behind enemy lines, and they surrendered to the Japanese and became puppet troops, such as Li Yafan, the former deputy commander of Miao Chengliu, the brigade commander of the 334th Brigade of the 112th Division of the former 57th Army, and Rong Ziheng, the son of the puppet Manchu bureaucrat Rong Zhen, all of whom successively became the leaders of the puppet army.
The relationship between the Shandong Eighth Route Army and the Northeast Army was roughly bounded by 1940, and it experienced two different periods of better and worse, and the Shandong Eighth Route Army also showed different characteristics of its united front work.
In the period when relations between the two sides are good, while stressing unity, we should not forget the necessary struggle
Since the Northeast Army entered Shandong, the United Front work of the Shandong Eighth Route Army against the Northeast Army has begun.
On March 11, 1939, the Shandong Branch of the Communist Party of China formulated the policy of "thoroughly cracking down on and dividing the Qin (Qi Rong) Department, further winning and stabilizing the Northeast Army, and isolating Shen Honglie". At that time, Yu's headquarters was located in Shanggaohu, Yishui County, about 15 kilometers away from Wangzhuang, where the Shandong column was stationed. Zhang Jingwu, commander of the Shandong Column, visited Yu Xuezhong at Shanggao Lake, and Yu also paid a return visit to Wang Zhuang. At the beginning of April, Yu Xuezhong held a meeting of senior generals in the Lusu Theater, and Zhang Jingwu was invited to attend the meeting.
In June 1939, after the establishment of the First Column of the Eighth Route Army, Xu Xiangqian and Zhu Rui continued to carry out united front work against the Northeast Army. In accordance with the prior agreement, they secretly listened to a report by Xie Fang, a secret party member working at Xuezhong's headquarters, on Yu Xuezhong's political attitude and the situation of the Northeast Army. Representatives were exchanged between the First Column and the Northeast Army, and the two sides were in regular contact via radio. During an anti-"sweep," the two sides met in a ravine in Luzhong, and Xu Xiangqian, Zhu Rui, and Yu Xuezhong held cordial talks to jointly study a plan for a breakthrough.
In the autumn of 1939, after the headquarters of the 115th Division was stationed in the Baoligu Mountains, it immediately launched united front work against the 112th Division of the Northeast Army, which was staggered with the teeth of its garrison, and sent Wang Bingzhang, chief of staff, to visit the division commander Huo Shouyi at the headquarters of the 112th Division stationed in Guanzhuang, Shihe. In accordance with the prior agreement, Luo Ronghuan secretly listened to the reports of Gu Mu, the secretary of the CPC 112 division work committee, and The underground party member Li Xin on the situation of the 112th Division and Huo Shouyi at the 115th Division Headquarters. At that time, Jin Huaigang, the head of the liaison section of the 115th Division, was a cadre who was very suitable for liaison with Huo Shouyi. His father, Jin Yunlu, had served as Wu Peifu's deputy commander and had a friendship with Yu Xuezhong. His uncle Jin Yunpeng was twice prime minister in the Beiyang government, and he was a son and daughter of Zhang Zuolin. Jin Huaigang and Zhang Zuolin's subordinate Huo Shouyi had known each other for a long time, and sent Jin to communicate with Huo Shouyi, so that they could argue and even quarrel, but they would not tear their faces. In order to facilitate Jin Huaigang's work as Huo Shouyi, Luo Ronghuan also appointed Jin as the director of the rear political department.
This period was a period of good relations between the Eighth Route Army in Shandong and the Northeast Army.
As mentioned earlier, the internal composition of the Northeast Army is very complex. Progressive, middle and die-hard forces coexist. In order to consolidate and expand the united front, while developing the progressive forces and winning over the middle forces, it is necessary to wage the necessary struggle against the stubborn forces. Luo Ronghuan, political commissar of the 115th Division, handled the Guanlizhuang incident as an example.
On December 28, the border alliance peasant self-defense group of the four counties of Lin (Cheng) Tan (Cheng) Fei (County) and Yi (County) led by the CPC held a meeting at Guanlizhuang, Fei County, and invited Li Changsheng, the county magistrate of Fei County, appointed by Shen Honglie, chairman of the Kuomintang Shandong Province, to attend. Li Changsheng brought some security regiments into the meeting hall and said: To review the self-defense regiment, he forced the self-defense regiment to set up guns, line up and assemble, and then instructed its subordinates to shoot, killing 6 cadres and fighters of the self-defense regiment and wounding more than 20 people, resulting in the Guanlizhuang massacre.
Afterwards, the responsible persons of the Lunan Prefectural Committee of the CPC and the Four Counties Border Federation immediately studied countermeasures and went to ask Luo Ronghuan for instructions. Luo Ronghuan said: "To seize this incident, first organize the masses to march and demonstrate at Huo Shouyi's residence and demand that Huo Shouyi severely punish the murderer." Some cadres think that petitioning Huo Shouyi does not work. Luo Ronghuan said: "Li Changsheng's murder was in the territory under Huo Shouyi's jurisdiction. Huo Shouyi was still anti-Japanese, and although he did not want to offend his superior, Miao Chengliu, he would not support Li Changsheng. We petitioned him, created momentum, and the following article was easy to do. ”
Due to his multifaceted work, Luo Ronghuan could say that he knew Huo Shouyi very well.
The next day, hundreds of people escorting the families of dozens of victims rushed to the headquarters of the 112th Division, shouting slogans outside the door, strongly demanding that the murderer be severely punished and avenge the victims.
Huo Shouyi also felt that Li Changsheng had done something wrong in this matter, so he sent someone to meet with the people, saying that "Li Changsheng created an incident and shot and hit people wrong, and we will investigate", and promised to pay pensions and funeral expenses to the families of the victims. However, no reply was given to the "severe punishment of the perpetrators".
After listening to the report, Luo Ronghuan said: "Now that the petition has reached its goal, the diehards have lost their reasoning, we have gained the initiative politically, and the momentum of the masses demanding revenge and hatred has also been boosted. ”
Therefore, the Lunan Prefectural Committee mobilized 24 peasant self-defense regiments, divided the troops into 5 roads, and surrounded the Gukou. Li Changsheng was firmly defended, and the self-defense regiment could not attack for a long time. Some feared that Huo Shouyi would reinforce Li Changsheng. At this time, Luo Ronghuan wrote a letter to the front line, saying: After the exposure and struggle in the previous stage, Li Changsheng's crimes of sabotaging the War of Resistance and undermining unity have been exposed and have become the target of public criticism. Huo Shouyi did not agree to the demands of the masses to severely punish the murderer, and he also had an explanation for his superior, Miao Chengliu. Now Huo would not openly support Li Changsheng. With the main force of the Eighth Route Army as your backing, he did not dare to assist Li Changsheng. Therefore, you must strengthen your faith, endure the siege, do not be impatient, do not fight hard. Li Changsheng will not be able to survive one day.
At the same time, Luo Ronghuan asked Jin Huaigang to wait until Huo Shouyi's division was unblocked. Huo Shouyi remained motionless. Li Changsheng could not support it and fled on the night of January 31. The Eighth Route Army squeezed out Li Changsheng, recaptured Gukou, and established an anti-Japanese democratic government in Fei County.
On 7 February, Luo Ronghuan and Chen Guang sent a telegram to the Central Military Commission on the policy of the Northeast Army and the local powerful factions: "The stubborn forces of the anti-Eighth Route Army in the Baoligu Mountains have been destroyed, and they attempt to use the cover of the Northeast Army to create the Guanlizhuang Massacre against the diehards of the Fei County Government, which we are rubbing against, and after resolute struggle by the masses, they will give a blow and abandon their positions and abscond, and the Northeast Army will mediate, and I will win all victories." "The diehards are stirring up dissension and causing the Northeast Army to retreat, in an attempt to cause the Northeast Army to break and oppose us." We must improve our attitude toward the Northeast Army, give them a good influence on their middle- and lower-ranking cadres and fighters, work closely with their upper echelons, respect them, but not abandon our independent position, and crack down on the anti-communist and anti-Eighth Route Army activities of their political training departments. Collect the sabotage of diehards, file a complaint with the commander of the Northeast Army, and stop their attempts to sow discord. ”
On 11 July, the Central Military Commission issued a reply telegram drafted by Mao Zedong: "Chen and Luo Qiqi saw today that the policy taken is correct and hopes to be resolutely implemented. "Our policy is divided into two aspects: the policy of resolute counter-offensive and complete elimination of the anti-communist diehards, and the policy of vigorously striving for all those who still have hope. Shen Honglie belongs to the diehard faction and is frictional with us, so it must be eliminated under the principle of self-defense. In the struggle against Shen Honglie (of whom Qin Qirong was the worst part), we must pay attention to dividing his subordinates and winning over his still hopeful elements. Yu Xuezhong is different from Shen Honglie. In addition to resolutely cracking down on his anti-communist political training personnel, he should vigorously strive for the Northeast Army, at least to make it adopt a neutral attitude. ”
Although the 115th Division waged a resolute struggle against Li Changsheng, it did not affect the good relations with Huo Shouyi's forces in Lunan. On the other hand, if the unrestrained concessions to diehards like Li Changsheng because of the emphasis on unity make the diehards more and more arrogant, the united front will not be able to maintain it very well. Later, Huo Shouyi went south to northern Jiangsu and still maintained united front relations with the Third Division of the New Fourth Army.
While waging a resolute struggle against the diehards in the Northeast Army, we should not abandon principle and unity of harmony with the centrists because of the emphasis on unity and struggle. Soon after Yu Xuezhong joined Lu, he expressed dissatisfaction with the establishment of an anti-Japanese democratic regime by the CHINESE Communists in the anti-Japanese base areas. In order to ease and resolve the contradictions between the two sides, Xu Xiangqian held a meeting with Yu Xuezhong. Xu Xiangqian recalled:
The two sides first made some remarks about joint resistance against Japan, stressing that there was no fundamental conflict of interest between the Northeast Army and the Eighth Route Army, and that they should unite against the enemy, and then his topic turned to the question of political power. He said: If you resist Japan, you should not engage in local political power. The Eighth Route Army is an army and cannot exercise political power. You are also engaged in political power, how can my provincial government do wow! I said: We are an anti-Japanese army, and if we want to build an anti-Japanese base area, we must establish political power and mobilize the masses. Only with political power and the masses can we fight the Japanese devils. Moreover, without the establishment of political power, we have no food to eat. Your government, first, does not give us grain, does not give us guns and ammunition, and does not even pay the salaries that should be paid to the Eighth Route Army. He said that governments at all levels must be appointed by us, and they cannot be counted without our appointment. I said that the key lies in whether the masses support it or not, and that our anti-Japanese democratic regime was elected and won the sincere support of the masses; this is true democracy, which is fundamentally different from your appointment. What the masses do not support, it is useless to appoint them! Around the issue of political power, the two sides opposed each other, argued for more than two hours, and failed to reach an agreement. Because he is our target of struggle, I have paid attention to grasping the measure in the conversation, leaving room for room, seeking common ground while reserving differences, and avoiding the relationship being frozen.
After the negotiations returned, the Eighth Route Army followed suit. Yu Xuezhong already knew the reasons for the Eighth Route Army to engage in political power, and although he still said that he opposed it, he actually turned a blind eye.
In the period when relations between the two sides were relatively bad, while stressing struggle, they did not forget the necessary alliance
On January 6, 1941, the Anhui Incident occurred. At this time, the Northeast Army had been in Lu for more than a year. Before and after this, within the Northeast Army, the decadent forces colluded with the Japanese army, the struggle between the progressive forces and the reactionary and decadent forces intensified, the division intensified, and the "922" hoe rape, the "217 incident", and the "83 incident" occurred successively.
"922" Rape: On September 15, 1940, Miao Cheng, commander of the 57th Army and commander-in-chief of the lunan seventeen-county guerrillas, sent Dong Hanqing, commander of the 665th regiment, and Colonel Yu Wenqing as representatives, through Li Yafan, commander of the Lusu region of the Wang Pseudo-Xingya Jianguo Army who had been his deputy commander and had surrendered to the Japanese Kou, to secretly negotiate with Xin Xiusan, a japanese captain and staff officer, at Taolin Station on Longhai Road, and reached an agreement to surrender to the Japanese army. Yu Wenqing told Wan Yi about this matter in advance, saying that he was unwilling to engage in this traitorous work. Wan Yi mobilized him to act as an undercover agent in order to seize the real evidence of Miao's collaboration with the enemy. After Yu Wenqing returned, he told Wan Yi about the detailed process of the negotiations. Wan Yi and Chang Enduo, commander of the 111th Division, agreed to detain Miao Chengliu, obtain evidence, and send Miao to Yu Xuezhong's headquarters. Wan Yi decided to start a play on the evening of September 21 when Miao Chengliu was watching a play at the military headquarters stationed in Dongpan. However, the battalion commander Han Zijia, who had participated in the conspiracy, reported to Miao, and Miao Chengliu immediately fled to the headquarters of the 112th Division accompanied by Rong Ziheng, the commander of the 334th Brigade.
On the 22nd, Chang Endo and Wan Yi and others telegraphed the whole country: "Miao treacherous and the enemy compromise, and everyone is stealing." Commander Ben... Out of personal indignation and support, he fought righteously. He expressed the hope that "compatriots of all nationalities throughout the country and aspirants of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression will verbally cut down traitors and thieves and defect to the enemy and traitor Miao Chengliu." This is the "922 Incident."
However, Yu Xuezhong listened to Miao Chengliu's evil man's complaint first, and called Chang Endo on the 24th: "According to Miao Jun's telegram, it is unfortunate that your division and ten thousand brigades are making trouble in Dongpan! I hope that the truth will be reported quickly. ”
On September 30, Yu Xuezhong sent Guo Weicheng, chief of state affairs, and Zhang Peiwen, chief of staff, to the 111th Division to investigate the truth of the "922 Incident" and write a report. After receiving the reports from Yu Xuezhong and Chang Endo, Chiang Kai-shek sent a telegram reprimanding Chang Enduo for "although Yun's loyalty to the party is patriotic, it is difficult to escape the blame for the mistake of the country." In another document, he also accused Wan Yi of "ideological left-leaning." In fact, Chiang Kai-shek had already taken the opportunity to kill.
"217 Incident": In October 1940, the Kuomintang set off a second anti-communist upsurge. Seriously ill, Chang Enduo was surrounded by reactionaries such as Liu Zongyan, deputy division commander, Tao Jingkui, chief of staff, Sun Huancai, brigade commander of the 331st Brigade, and Liu Jinwu, commander of the 666th Regiment, and listened to their rumors about Wan Yijin, such as Wan Yi running to the district government of the Eighth Route Army and telling them not to give support to the 111th Division, and so on.
On February 17, 1941, after Wan Yi arrived at the division headquarters, they fired his gun and put Wan under house arrest, and then lied to Yu Xuezhong that Wan Yi was going to resign as brigade commander of the 333rd Brigade and become an attaché of the 111th Division, and Wan Yi actually became a prisoner.
The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China is very concerned about Wan Yi's detention. On March 14, the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee called Zhu Rui, Chen Guang, and Luo Ronghuan: "(1) Please telegraph the details of the damage suffered by our organization in the Central Committee of the Central Committee of the Central Committee of the Cpc Central Committee." (2) Hope to try to investigate the whereabouts of Wan Yi and other detained comrades and progressive elements, and to do his best to rescue them. (3) To investigate clearly the organizations that still exist in the Standing Division, to evacuate the exposed comrades and progressive elements urgently, and to take them into service in our army. ”
In accordance with the instructions of the central authorities, the Shandong Branch of the CPC Central Committee sent Gu Mu to lead a company close to the 111th Division's garrison and actively tried to rescue them, but they were not allowed to enter through the door.
Marked by Wan Yi's detention, the 111th Division, under the slogan of "purging the left-leaning elements," began to hunt down and kill progressive elements. Zhang Suping, secretary of the 111th Division Working Committee, Cao Jianhua, a member of the committee, Li Zhengxuan, director of the radio station, and his wife were detained. Wan Yi's guard, Li Fuhai, and Sergeant Hu Tienan, who expressed dissatisfaction with Wan Yi's detention, were killed. Song Tao, a lieutenant colonel of the 665th Regiment of the Communist Party of China, was forced to evacuate.
In the winter of 1941, Wan Yi was escorted to Yu Xuezhong's headquarters. In February 1942, the Japanese army "swept up" the headquarters of the Lusu Theater, and when Yu Xuezhong led the headquarters to leave Yishui and move to the Jushan Mountains of Zhuri, Peng Liang, chief of the Democratic Movement Section of the Political Department of the 115th Division, was killed.
"August 3rd Incident": In July 1942, Chiang Kai-shek sent a telegram to Yu Xuezhong to secretly execute Wan Yi, but Yu Xuezhong thought it was inappropriate to do so and decided to conduct a public trial of Wan Yi.
On the morning of August 2, Wan Yi was tried on military court, and Wan Yi was given three counts, including Japanese imperialism, an accessory to the "Double Twelve" incident, and "suspected of treason against the party."
On the same day, Chang Enduo was critically ill and entrusted Guo Weicheng, the chief of government affairs of the headquarters who had been Zhang Xueliang's secretary, to take control of the army after his death, and handed Guo a note that read: "We must follow Guo Weicheng and implement Zhang Han's princess Zhang Han, so as to achieve the great desire to kill the enemy and commit adultery." Officers and men of this division must know. Chang Endo. Eight and two"
That night, Guo Weicheng went to see Wan Yi and told him that he would raise an incident after Chang Endo's death to realize Zhang Xueliang's proposition, and that someone would be sent to pick wan out and ask Wan to help control the troops. After Guo left, Wan Yi considered that judging from the three "charges" announced by the judge, he would definitely be sentenced to death, and the execution would be carried out in just a few days; while Guo Weicheng's success in the incident was very small, and the matter was large, and he did not seek the opinions of the Shandong Branch of the CPC, so he escaped from prison that night and reported to the Shandong Branch of the CPC.
On the 3rd, Yu Xuezhong learned that Guo Weicheng had visited Wan in advance and asked Guo about it. Guo was afraid of the incident, and after consulting with Chang Enduo, he decided to raise an incident in advance at the site of the Jiazi Mountain District on the same day, which was called the "August 3rd Incident" in history.
On the 5th, after listening to Wan Yi's report, the Shandong sub-bureau studied countermeasures and held that the incident was forced out by Chiang Kai-shek's policy of splittism and retrogression, and that it was just and progressive in nature and should be supported. However, due to the lack of a mass base and the large number of reactionary forces, it is estimated that the troops may be in chaos. The sub-bureau decided to immediately send Wan Yi and Wang Zhenqian, who had worked in the ministry, to the ministry to assist Chang, Guo, and stabilize the troops.
Due to the haste and complicated composition, on the 6th and 7th, most of the troops mutinied, and the rebels released the reactionary officers Liu Zongyan, Tao Jingkui, and Liu Jinwu who were detained. They immediately fought back. Chang and Guo led the remaining 2,000 people to evacuate the Jiazi Mountain Area and enter the coastal anti-Japanese base area, on the way Chang Enduo fell ill and died. The Shandong sub-bureau decided that the number of the department would not change, and it would still be called the 111th Division, with Wan Yi as the division commander, Guo Weicheng as the deputy division commander and director of the political department, and Wang Zhenqian as the deputy director of the political department.
After the incident in southern Anhui, while the internal struggle and division of the Northeast Army in Shandong intensified, the stubborn forces were arrogant and arrogant, and the incidents of friction with the Eighth Route Army increased sharply, and the Shao Yan incident, the Huang Yan incident, the Border Alliance incident, the ditch incident, and the silver factory incident occurred one after another. Relations between the Eighth Route Army and the Northeast Army deteriorated.
Shao Yan Incident: In January 1941, the diehards Li Yanxiu, Xu Shusheng and other troops crossed the Juri Highway south and invaded several districts of Rizhao. On the 23rd, the anti-Japanese forces in Rizhao County led by the Communist Party of China surrounded Li and Xu and other units in Shaoyan, Shanzihe and other places, and Sun Huancai led his troops to attack the anti-Japanese forces in Rizhao County, causing more than 30 deaths.
Huang Yan Incident: On March 2, the 111th Division rebelled against zhu Xinzhai of the independent battalion of the second detachment of the Shandong Column, killing 9 cadres including Dong Zhencai, an instructor sent into the department by the Shanzhong, and nearly 100 local cadres in the seventh and ninth districts of Rizhao.
Border Alliance Incident: On April 25, 1941, Zhang Benzhi, commander of the 683rd Regiment of the 112th Division of the Northeast Army, gathered more than 2,000 people from the local diehards Wang Hongjiu, Li Yijin, and other units to seize the "sweep" of the Japanese army to occupy the border area of the four counties of Lintan, Lunan, burn and loot, bury 77 local CPC cadres and masses alive, and rob more than 2,000 militia guns.
Ditch Incident: On the same day as the Bianlian Incident, the 111th Division, with the acquiescence of Chang Endo, secretly attacked the CPC Rizhao County Party Committee and County Government stationed in Gouwa, and 8 staff members of the Rizhao County Party Committee and Government were killed and 3 people were captured.
Silver Factory Incident: On October 27, Zhang Benzhi colluded with Wang Hongjiu to sneak into the Yinchang Village (now part of Cangshan County) in the Border League of Four Counties, and Zhao Bi, political commissar of the Lunan Military Region, broke through and returned to deal with a confidential document, unfortunately, Xu Shanxiu and more than 10 other people were captured. On November 13, Zhao Wei and others were killed, known in history as the Silver Factory Incident.
In the face of the provocations and attacks of the stubborn forces in the Northeast Army, the Shandong Eighth Route Army carried out the necessary counterattack in line with the principle of "no one offends me, I do not offend; if anyone offends me, I will offend." But even at this time when relations are tense, we do not forget the necessary alliance, pay attention to "reasonable, advantageous, and moderate" and differentiated treatment, and there are fights and pulls.
The Eighth Route Army's counterattack was embodied in three dozen Koshiyama.
From August 14 to 19, 1942, the 115th Division launched the first Battle of Koshiyama to assist the 111th Division in recovering its garrison at Koshiyama. Yu Xuezhong soon appointed Sun Huancai as the commander of the 111th Division. In this way, two opposing 111 divisions appeared in Shandong, and the 111th Division with Wan Yi as the commander was also called the New Hundred and Eleventh Division. In early October, Sun Huancai's troops occupied Koshiyama. The 115th Division organized the Second Battle of Koshiyama. Soon, the Japanese puppet army carried out a "sweep." In the face of the great enemy, the Eighth Route Army withdrew from the battle in order to avoid fighting on both sides.
In November, the Shandong Eighth Route Army prepared to launch the Third Battle of Jiazishan. On November 30, Zhu Rui, Luo Ronghuan, Chen Guang, and Chen Shiyu telephoned Mao Zedong, Wang Jiaxiang, Ye Jianying, Peng Dehuai, and Teng Daiyuan on the countermeasures against the Northeast Army: "(1) It is not appropriate for the Northeast Army in our Yimeng-Mongolia region to approach it, and we should dredge up the response and seek relaxation. (2) The rebels of the 11th Division took advantage of the enemy's 'sweeping' against us and then seized our coastal Jiazi Mountainous Area, and continued to go deep into our central area to rob property, hunt down and kill our staff, resolutely counterattack, recover the Jiazi Mountainous Area, and cooperate with the united front activities of various local forces in the north of Tai (An) Lin (Yi) Road, so as not to expand military activities. (3) The Jiazi Mountains were controlled by the rebels of the 11th Division, threatening the central coastal area of our coast, which was unfavorable to the anti-enemy encroachment and consolidation of certain coastal areas in Lunan Province, and limited our main force to a position that was not easy to maneuver. (4) In order to cope with the changes in the situation in Shandong in the future and not to cause confrontation between our army and the Northeast Army, it is planned to retake the Jiazi Mountain area in the guise of the Wan Yi department of the 11th Division, and I will appear in the form of adjustment, so that this incident will be resolved as locally as possible, and the relationship will be dredged up with funds. This telegram pointed out: While stressing the struggle, we should pay attention to the rationality, advantages, and moderation, limit the struggle to a certain scope, and at the same time crack down on Sun Huancai, dredge up the 51st Army in Northern Yimeng, and win over the 333rd Brigade, which is the commander of Sun Huancai's department, Liu Jinwu, as the brigade commander.
On January 10, 1943, Luo Ronghuan, Chen Guang, and Chen Shiyu sent a telegram to the Central Military Commission and Jizong: "The campaign to retake the anti-stubborn forces in the Jiazi Mountains, under the policy of attacking the most stubborn Sun Huancai 331 Brigade and dividing and co-opting Liu Jinwu's 333Rd Brigade, was completed on December 29 after half a month. ”
After the Battle of Jiazishan, the Shandong Eighth Route Army stepped up its united front work against the Northeast Army, striving to fight the enemy together with the Northeast Army in an effort to ease the tensions arising from the battle at Koshi mountain.
On January 28, Zhu Rui, Luo Ronghuan, and Chen Guang called Liu Shaoqi to report on the situation in Shandong. Regarding the united front work, the telegram reads: "The United Front Work Department has recently been reorganized, and Xiang Yu and Li will actively carry out dredging work, and will directly open up contacts with friendly forces by all means; in addition to using newspapers to indicate my attitude toward upholding the Shandong War of Resistance and toward Li Bu's entry into Lulu, I intend to request Zhu Peng in the name of Chen and Luo to transfer to the Chongqing Military Commission." Ling Yu Xuezhong opened up contact with me, and here it is planned to convene a general party of all walks of life in various parts of Shandong in the old calendar year to expand the influence of our army. ”
On March 1, the Shandong Branch of the CPC Central Committee called the CPC Central Committee and proposed countermeasures against Wu Huawen and other ministries. The telegram said: "After Wu Huawen of the Fourth Division surrendered to the enemy, Tokyo has broadcast a post-surrender conversation with Wu, announcing that Wu is the commander-in-chief of the Shandong Front of the Peace Salvation Army. Legend has it that the 51st Army was settled by Wu, which was a major change in the situation in Luzhong. "If he crusades against the Northeast Army, I should win over the Northeast Army to fight together, so as to restore relations with the 51st Army, and gradually create a favorable situation for us.
On March 20, the Shandong Branch of the CPC Central Committee and the Political Department of the 115th Division issued instructions on the work of friendly forces, pointing out: Under the situation that "the enemy has recently continuously 'swept up' the Xuezhong Theater," "I should carry out comprehensive dredging and unity work against friends and stubbornness." The "Instructions" put forward four countermeasures and measures: (1) Friendly forces everywhere, no matter how their relations with us deteriorated in the past, should now use all their relations to write letters and send people to contact them. In various meetings and newspapers, we should express our willingness to restore our old friendship with all friendly forces, to unite in good faith and to tide over the final difficulties. This work must be done without rush and with patience. (ii) When friendly forces are 'swept away' by the enemy, we should cooperate vigorously, but we should not concentrate too much on the use of troops. Wounded and scattered soldiers of friendly forces were effectively treated. All the collected friendly troops' assets were returned, and when the friendly troops approached our base area, they tried their best to help them. (iii) In the midst of the enemy's 'sweep', where friendly forces abandon it, I shall control it with a small force, but it is not necessary to establish a democratic regime at once. The assets stored by friendly forces, we did not move at all. When friendly forces return, they should take the initiative to contact them. We may make certain concessions when certain positions are indispensable, or they will hinder great unity. When concessions are made, a large number of slogans can be posted, affirming their willingness to restore the old good with all friendly forces. (4) If a few friendly troops provoke me for no reason, I should try my best to tolerate it, and when friction is inevitable, I should first report to the division and the military region for approval before implementing it (of course, our position of self-defense will not change).
The "Instructions" stated: "This work should be mainly aimed at the Northeast Army. Recently, after Wu Huawen surrendered to the enemy, the Luzhong Military Region exchanged letters with the 14th Division. After the Lunan Military Region retreated from friendly forces, the camera recaptured the furnace. The 51st Army began to propose that it was necessary to return to the furnace. I politely negotiated, explaining that the big furnace was my old station and the hometown of the leader of the Wan (Chunpu) detachment. Then I returned all the treasures of the friendly army in the furnace, but I gave up. It is estimated that Li Bu's entry into Lulu was not easy to achieve for a while, yu bu suffered serious losses in the 'sweeping', and there are currently difficulties in local powerful factions large and small, and this work may bear fruit. ”
The "Directive" requires all localities to draw up specific implementation plans and to lay out the situation and results. Experience is reported in a timely manner. ”
After the three dozen Jiazishan, the shandong Eighth Route Army's active, meticulous, and sincere united front work against the Northeast Army not only bridged the tension between the two sides after the three dozen Jiazishan, but also contributed to the realization of the strategic decision to hinder Li Yu.
Fully understand and use the contradictions between Li and Li, and make strategic decisions to hinder Li from sending them
Ever since Yu Xuezhong led his troops into Shandong, there has been a sharp contradiction with Shen Honglie, chairman of the Kuomintang Shandong Province. This contradiction is a reflection of the contradiction between the diehards and the centrists within the Kuomintang.
According to Mu Zhongheng, who had long been Yu Xuezhong's deputy, commander of the 51st Army, and chairman of Shandong Province, in 1941, Shen Honglie's attempt to unite with Yan Xishan in Shanxi and Lu Zhonglin in Hebei to jointly oppose communism was resisted by Yu Xuezhong, who took the middle road. Shen Honglie sent the assassin Yu Xuezhong to throw grenades on his way. Yu quickly lay down and suffered only minor injuries. The Assassins then ran into the Eighth Route Army defense zone. Shen attempted to provoke yu Xuezhong's relationship with the Eighth Route Army. The Eighth Route Army uncovered its plot and handed over the Assassins to the headquarters of the Rusu Theater of Operations. The Assassins' confession was attributed to being directed by Shen Honglie's party member Li Ziqian holding Shen's handwritten letter. Upon examination, the letter was indeed Shen Honglie's handwriting. Yu Xuezhong accused Shen Honglie to Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang Kai-shek transferred Shen back to Chongqing and appointed Him as minister of agriculture and forestry. Subsequently, Mou Zhongheng was appointed chairman of Shandong Province. (According to Wan Yi's recollection, the assassin was Han Zijia, who gave Miao Cheng a circulating message during the "922" hoe rape, and was the former commander of the 1st Battalion of the 667th Regiment of the 334th Brigade of the 112th Division.) The Assassin was caught on the spot. ）
After Shen Honglie left Shandong, Shen's Kuomintang forces Wuhua Wenbu and Zhang Buyun surrendered to the Japanese Kou successively, became puppet troops, and frequently attacked Yu Xuezhong. Yu Xuezhong's situation was becoming increasingly difficult.
At the same time, Shen Honglie made a big fuss in Chongqing. Chiang Kai-shek decided to transfer Yu Xuezhong's troops out of Shandong.
In early January 1943, the Kuomintang side proposed to Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao in Chongqing whether Li Xiannian's troops could be withdrawn to Jiangbei as a condition for Yu Xuezhong's troops to move out of Shandong. Zhou and Lin reported this proposal to Yan'an. After discussion, the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee held that Li Xiannian had nowhere to go. The proposal adjourned.
Naturally, Chiang Kai-shek would not agree to Yu Xuezhong's unconditional withdrawal from Shandong, so he decided to let Li Xianzhou's troops in northern Anhui take over Yu's defense.
Li Xianzhou, a native of Changqing, Shandong, graduated from Huangpu I and was a famous Shandong general in Chiang Kai-shek's lineage. In January 1938, he was appointed commander of the Ninety-second Army. As early as 1939, in order to strengthen the strength of the Kuomintang army in Shandong, Chiang Kai-shek secretly ordered Li Xianzhou's troops to open east and prepare to enter Lu. In the spring of 1941, Li Bu advanced from the north of Tongcheng, Hubei to the first line of Fuyang in Anhui. After the Anhui Incident, Li Xianzhou led his troops to friction with the New Fourth Army on the one hand, and on the other hand, they made preparations for entering Lulu.
In Fuyang, Li Xianzhou sent a large number of personnel to Shandong to liaise with various local powerful factions and puppet armies, some of whom exchanged liaison personnel to exchange information; some established radio contacts, and some established liaison stations and intelligence stations. When many local powerful factions and puppet armies in Shandong heard that Li Xianzhou was going to enter Lu, they sent people to Fuyang to contact each other and ask for the addition of officials to the knighthood, while the puppet army demanded a talisman of "curve to save the country". Soon, Li Xianzhou contacted Wang Hongjiu, Liu Guitang, Wu Huawen and Li Wenli of Luzhong, Zhang Buyun of Binhai, and Zhao Baoyuan of Jiaodong. The Kuomintang's military and political center in Shandong was moved from behind enemy lines in Shandong to Fuyang.
In January 1943, after yu Xuezhong and Li Xiannian exchanged unsuccessfully, Chiang Kai-shek ordered Li Xianzhou to join Lu and promoted Li Xianzhou to commander-in-chief of the 28th Army. But at this time the 28th Army had only one Ninety-second Army. Therefore, Li Xianzhou was ready to expand Wu Huawen and Liu Guitang into an army.
Li Xianzhou's actions were digging into Xuezhong's corner. In order to maintain his position in Shandong, Yu Xuezhong, in the name of Mou Zhongheng, chairman of Shandong Province, unified all small groups of local armed forces in Shandong into security forces of the county and special bureaus. At the same time, Zhang Buyunbu, the 2nd Security Division stationed in the northern part of the coast, who was with Li Xianzhou, was attacked on the grounds that he did not obey the command. At this point, the contradiction between Yu Xuezhong and Shen Honglie evolved into a contradiction between Yu Xuezhong and Li Xianzhou.
On January 27, the Shandong Branch of the CPC Central Committee and the 115th Division put forward a countermeasure against Li Xianzhou's entry into Lulu: "Focus on emphasizing dredging and unity, encourage and promote it to actively fight against the enemy, use a kind and critical attitude toward his non-friendly behavior, and do not easily use armed counterattacks unless absolutely necessary." "Under the great 'sweeping' by the Japanese and Kosovo, all our corps must take advantage of the fact that Li Bu has suffered difficulties in entering Lulu and the Northeast Army itself is difficult to protect, vigorously carry out dredging and unity, lighten military operations, strictly abide by the principle of self-defense militarily, and wait and see the changes."
In early March, Li Xianzhou's main force crossed the Longhai Road into Ruxi. In early March, Lee's 142nd Division crossed Jinpu Road into Lunan. In June, the Kuomintang took advantage of the dissolution of the Comintern to set off a third anti-communist upsurge, and in the northwest, Hu Zongnan prepared to blitz the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, and in East China, Li Xianzhou stepped up his march into Lu.
In the nearly six months since Li Xianzhou entered Lunan, after his 142nd Division entered Lunan, under the slogan of "expelling the counter-current and recovering the lost land," it colluded with Liu Heiqi to attack and forcibly occupy the key areas of Shanting, Baiyan, and Dalu in the anti-Japanese base areas of Lunan, destroy the anti-Japanese democratic regime, kill the cadres of the democratic government, and threaten to drive the Eighth Route Army north of the old Yellow River.
After a moment of contemplation, the leaders of the Eighth Route Army in Shandong unanimously agreed that Li Xianzhou's entry into The Anti-Communist Forces should be stopped. On July 4, Luo Ronghuan, Zhu Rui, Li Yu, and Xiao Hua sent a telegram to the Central Military Commission and the Jizong General Assembly, reporting on the deployment that obstructed Li Zhiyu: "There is no restraint on the western opening of the ministry, and it is convenient under certain conditions. As far as possible, Li Bu should be forced to march eastward and northward, and under the principle of self-defense, when his foothold in our base areas was unstable, he would annihilate one of them, but would not relax his political dredging with them and expand the contradictions between them and the stubborn enemy. For the local troops near Yubu, to win over those who may be contended, to annihilate some of the most resolutely anti-communist parts, and to seek control over the Luzhong Mountains and the Juri Mountains..."
On July 15, the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China sent a telegram to the Shandong Branch: "I agree with your policy toward Yu Xuezhong and Li Xianzhou." ”
During this period, Yu Xuezhong decided to withdraw from Shandong without waiting for Li Xianzhou to come to the defense. In accordance with the agreement with the Eighth Route Army, when he withdrew, he used fireworks as a sign, and the Eighth Route Army immediately went to take up the defense. Yubu passed through Tanbu and Jiuzhai, passed through the defense of the Eighth Route Army in the Luzhong base area, withdrew to Luxi and Lunan, and transferred to Fuyang, Anhui. Along the way, the Eighth Route Army prepared grain and grass to send them off.
As for the Yilu Mountains and Zhuriju Mountains, which were vacated after the withdrawal of the troops, the Shandong Eighth Route Army seized control and occupation before the Japanese puppet armies around these defensive areas.
On July 26, Luo Ronghuan and Li Yu reported to the Central Military Commission and the Jizong General Administration: "We will deploy on four days, and Luzhong and Binhai will restore the Yishan and Wulian Mountains in a powerful part. At the beginning of this month, the troops began to move, and then fought with the indigenous, enemy and puppet armies more than ten times, and the first step of the task has been basically completed. In addition to controlling the area of the 14th Division of Northern Yimeng and occupying most of Yishan, the Luzhong forces extended to the east of Qingyi Road with a strong step and occupied most of the area of the former 13th Division. The coastal forces completely controlled the areas of Wulian Mountain and Ma'er Mountain between Riju and Juzhu. Because Zhang Buyun surrendered to the enemy and cooperated with the enemy to 'sweep' against us, some areas were gained and lost. A total of nearly two thousand guns were captured and peacefully captured. The established positions are being consolidated and the development of the gap zone is continued in order to partially penetrate the tasks of the strategic zones. ”
The occupation of the Yilu And Zhuriju Mountains greatly improved the strategic position of the Shandong Eighth Route Army in the struggle against the enemy and created extremely favorable conditions for carrying out a local counteroffensive in Shandong.
The decision to obstruct Li Yu was thus realized, and the Shandong Eighth Route Army played a major role in the long-term united front work of the Northeast Army.
After Yu Xuezhong withdrew from Shandong, he was dismissed by Chiang Kai-shek from the post of commander-in-chief of the Lusu Theater and replaced by the vice president of the Military Senate. After the victory of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, Chiang Kai-shek gave him the rank of a member of the Strategic Advisory Committee of the Presidential Office.
(Excerpted from: Article by Huang Yao, Party History Research Office of the CPC Shandong Provincial Committee)
