(125) Why did Yang Ho send troops in four ways
In the forty-fourth year of the Wanli calendar, Nurhaci opened the national horn in Hetuala.
What is Hetuala? It is estimated that the general netizens have no intuitive concept.
Where is Hetuala located now? Located in Xinbin Manchu Autonomous County, Fushun City, Liaoning Province, it is estimated that general netizens also have no intuitive concept of this place.
This fact in itself proves that Nurhaci did not yet occupy a decent city at that time. Otherwise, there would be no national name in a place like Hetuala.
In general, the Han ethnic concentration areas (Liaodong Dusi) directly under the jurisdiction of the Ming Empire were still completely controlled by the Ming Empire; the places occupied by Nurhaci were still those areas indirectly controlled by the Ming Empire and economically backward.
In the forty-sixth year of the Wanli Calendar, Nurhaci openly played the anti-Ming banner with the so-called "Seven Great Hates".
The so-called "seven great hatreds" are all historical issues that are extremely ridiculous. It is nothing more than to tell you that for many years, the Ming Empire has been oppressing us and enslaving us, and now it is time for us to get rid of the oppression and enslavement of the Ming Empire.
Subsequently, Nurhaci began to attack the castle centered on Fushun; as a sign, Nurhaci began to formally invade the directly administered areas of the Ming Empire outside Guanxi.
Hearing this news, the central government of the Ming Empire would naturally attach great importance to it. Because at this time, Nurhaci had basically realized the unity of the Jurchen nation; the maximum number of troops he could muster was close to sixty thousand. If the Ming Empire ignored this problem, it could gradually lose control of the entire Liaodong.
In this context, the Wanli Emperor let Yang Hao sit in Liaoyang as commander, and after more than half a year of preparation, a total of 100,000 troops were gathered in Liaodong.
Judging from the situation at that time, the situation on both sides was like this.
On the one hand, the time was not ripe for the Ming Empire to take the initiative to attack Nurhaci; on the other hand, the time for Nurhaci to expand on a large scale was not ripe.
For similar reasons, nurhaci has not been able to seize a more important city for more than half a year; but the Ming Empire cannot stop the Manchu Qing from constantly encroaching on many surrounding castles.
At that time, the Ming Empire had an unsolvable problem, that is, after more than two hundred years of development, vested interest groups had hollowed out the Ming Empire.
At this time, the finances of the Ming Empire could only maintain the basic operation of the state apparatus, and in the face of large-scale emergencies, a financial crisis would immediately occur.
Emperor Hui of Jin once said, why not eat porridge?
We always feel that Emperor Hui of Jin is a fool. The problem is that when we analyze historical problems, we usually use this logic to analyze problems.
In the eyes of Emperor Hui of Jin, money is never a problem, so he is really strange, why not let the victims eat porridge?
In the eyes of many readers, money is never a problem, so they will inevitably feel strange, why did the Ming Empire want to raise taxes vigorously? Because in the context of that time, tax cuts were the right way; even not collecting taxes was the right way; what is more, the right way to increase funding was the right solution. All in all, if you let him be the Emperor of Daming, he will do it! The question is, what is the difference between this and Emperor Huidi of Jin's why not eat meat porridge?
Whether it's a problem in history or a problem in reality, if money isn't a problem, it's usually nothing.
The problem is, people just can't solve the problem of money.
Since it is impossible to solve the problem of money, the maximum maximum military force that the Ming Empire can allocate to Liaodong is actually about 100,000, and it is only 100,000 on the books. What does the army's equipment look like? None of this can be investigated.
The point is that who knows that with such military resources, only with Nurhaci can play the city wall cannon strategy (that is, focus on defending the main city), in order to avoid Nurhaci quickly sweeping through the entire Liaodong region, but the Ming Empire can not support this strategy.
Because supporting this strategy means a large amount of unplanned military spending, which needs to be borne by the central government all year round.
What's more fatal is that the central government simply cannot afford this unplanned military expenditure, so it can only levy an additional agricultural tax, which is the famous Liao salary.
In this context, although Yang Hao has always refused to take the initiative to attack Nurhaci, the central government has repeatedly urged Yang Ho to hurry up and fight.
Because according to Yang Ho's strategy, this war is a protracted war with no deadline for settlement. This means that the central government needs to always bear a large amount of unplanned fiscal expenditure; and the people have to bear a large amount of additional tax revenue all the time.
In the face of repeated urgings from the central government, Yang Ho could only helplessly lead his army to battle. Although Yang Ho also knew that there were many fierce men and fewer evils in battle, he could not refuse.
Yang Ho's battle plan was to target Hetuala, so that the four major armies of Kaiyuan, Shenyang, Qinghe, and Kuandian would attack in a combined manner, encircling the main force of Houjin in one fell swoop and capturing Houjin's old lair.
As a result, Nurhaci let you come a few ways, and I only went all the way; so the Manchu Qing forces were concentrated, the Ming army was scattered, and the Ming army was broken one by one.
Many people always seem to think that Yang Ho is a fool. Because casually pulling out a person also knows that the result of dividing the troops in four ways is to let the enemy break through one by one. Yang Ho didn't even understand such a simple truth.
In fact, those who say such things have forgotten one of the most basic historical facts. That is, Yang Ho was a senior military commander, and many staff officers and generals assisted him in his work. Therefore, the strategy and tactics formulated by Yang Ho may not be clever, but it is certainly very professional.
Therefore, Yang Ho's defeat was by no means something that could be avoided by concentrating forces.
It's as if a professional chess player, killed by another professional chess player, is also a professional chess player.
If we study this game of chess, we always think that the professional chess player who failed will fail because he can't play chess at all. Then we study the relevant chess games, just to find a cheap sense of superiority. Because studying chess in this way will never gain anything.
The same is true of studying history. If we always think that the reason why those political and military figures will fail is because of their low ability, then we will look at history and there will be nothing but some cheap sense of superiority.
Looking at such history a lot, it only makes us feel that if we have the opportunity to travel back to ancient times, we can do the same. All in all, in Yang Hao's position, as long as he knows how to concentrate his forces, he can do the same. But Yang Ho didn't even know that.
The problem is how to do it on the battlefield if you know a concentrated force. That knows how a low buy and high sell will surely be able to do the same in the stock market.
Everything is obvious, pull out a random person, and know the importance of concentrating forces, the problem is that you can't concentrate troops if you want to. It's as if everyone knows that if you want to make money in the stock market, you have to buy low and sell high. The problem is, it's not something you can do if you want to.
In fact, as long as we look at the map, simply look at the war at that time, and then imagine how we are the commanders of the Ming Army, we will naturally know that we are in Yang Ho's position, and we will most likely do the same. The point is, we refuse to play like this, and we just fail in another way.
At that time, the Ming army was mainly stationed in the four areas of Kaiyuan, Qinghe, Shenyang, and Kuandian.
This is a map of Liaodong. I marked the city of Hetuala, Nurhaci's old lair, with a red circle, and the areas where the Ming army was stationed in Kaiyuan, Qinghe, Shenyang, and Kuandian were all marked with a blue circle.
Our first question now is.
Why did Yang Hao scatter the Ming army in these four far places?
The answer is very simple, if the Ming army really concentrated its army in a certain city (such as Shenyang). The area outside this city will become a "cotton field" and will be left to Nurhaci to pick at will.
In general, the advantages of concentrating forces are known to normal people, but the question is, what about the drawbacks of concentrating forces? That is, it will be a vast place and lose the most basic defensive ability.
Our second question now is, why didn't Yang Hao concentrate his forces on attacking Nurhaci, but from this four places, four roads to encircle Nurhaci?
The answer is also very simple, that is, Yang Hao really wants to concentrate his forces, which will create such a problem. That is, Nurhaci is not a fool, nor is he a dead man. If Yang Ho really planned to concentrate the four-way army somewhere (such as Shenyang), and then personally lead the four-way army to attack Nurhechi, what do you say Nurhaci would do?
Most likely, it must be that when Yang Hao's army has not yet been formally assembled, half of the troops will be left to defend the old nest, and then lead the other half of the army to attack those cities and pools that have lost their basic defensive ability because the Ming army has left.
In this context, what do you say Yang Ho can do? Can he continue to lead the army to attack Nurhaci's lair? Definitely not.
In general, Liaodong was a vast region, and the empire had to be equipped with a certain number of troops in the main areas of Liaodong. Otherwise, the enemy's large-scale plundering of the relevant areas will certainly be like entering a cotton field.
More importantly, if the enemy plunders the relevant areas, even if the main military force of the Ming Empire is safe and sound, do you think the Ming Empire is considered a failure? Moreover, after several rounds of such tossing, the enemy's materials will naturally not be lacking (because they have been robbed enough), and what is the logistical support of the Ming Empire maintained?
The most difficult thing to do in war is to concentrate superior forces.
If you concentrate your forces, the result is that your defensive area is full of empty doors, and then let the enemy attack at will. Then why don't you concentrate your forces at all?
War, to a lesser extent, is also written on one line. In other words, hundreds of miles, thousands of miles of defensive lines, which point, may also be casually allowed to attack the enemy.
When the war is bigger, it is written on one face. In other words, tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands, hundreds of thousands of square kilometers of the area, which point, may also be casually allowed to attack the enemy.
In this context, you simply consider concentrating forces. Without considering the enemy, you may take advantage of the void to attack the empty place of your troops. Then you will definitely only let the enemy lead the nose.
Everything is obvious, after your forces are concentrated, the enemy will definitely avoid contact with your main force, and more importantly, will take this opportunity to strike at the empty place where your troops are weak (because, your forces are concentrated in a certain place, where the troops are weak, there must be more). When will you rescue or not rescue? The point is that when your main military force passes, people will definitely hit you somewhere else.
For similar reasons, you have to disperse your forces appropriately. Otherwise, you will certainly not even be able to catch the shadow of the enemy, and will only let the enemy lead the nose.
Therefore, Yang Ho's strategy of sending troops in four ways is not wrong. The problem was that the Ming Empire's army had lost its field combat capabilities; so it could not hold out enough time in the face of enemy raids; and several other armies could not quickly come to support friendly forces.
Such an army, even if it concentrates its forces, the consequences will be catastrophic.
Everything is obvious, after such an army is concentrated, what should they do when they suddenly hear that the undefended areas (because the troops in the relevant areas have been transferred) are attacked by Nurhaci? Suddenly, what should they do when their logistical supply line is attacked by Nurhaci?
To tell the truth, this kind of army, facing the emerging Manchu Qing army, is only suitable for Yuan Chonghuan's strategy, that is, hiding in the city and never going out of the city (the beautiful name is the city wall cannon strategy). As long as you go out of the city, how to fight is also very dangerous.
Welcome to the next section Xiong Tingbi is a little bit of Liaodong