Prosperous Alarmism/Literature
During the Liaoshen Campaign, Chiang Kai-shek began to consider the fate of the North China troops. He and Fu Zuoyi studied a total of 3 sets of solutions.
First, abandon Zhangjiakou and concentrate forces between Tianjin and Tangshan, with Tanggu Harbor as the center, forming a 60-mile radius beachhead position, so that at the necessary moment, 600,000 Chiang Kai-shek troops in North China can be transported by sea to Jiangnan.
However, this plan was only the wishful thinking of Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang Kai-shek's elite troops had been exhausted in the northeast battlefield, and he wanted to transport the north China troops to Jiangnan to seek to defend half of the country. However, Fu Zuoyi was reluctant to bring his elite troops to Jiangnan, and the generals of his troops were unwilling to leave their homeland, because they knew that leaving their territory Jiang Jun would slowly encroach on their forces.
Second, retreat west to Suiyuan.
This plan is Fu Zuoyi's wishful thinking. Because Fu Zuoyi was a local power faction in Suiyuan, his power and starting family were in the Chahar and Suiyuan areas, so of course he was not willing to easily leave his sphere of influence. For this reason, Fu Zuoyi suggested to Chiang Kai-shek that the land retreat should pass through the liberated areas, and the sea retreat would soon be in winter, and it would be better to withdraw the troops to Suiyuan, so that they could fight with the "three horses" in the northwest and Hu Zongnan's troops, and this method could preserve the great northwest.
Both sides have their own "little nine-nine", so the third scheme was born. Temporarily holding Pingjin and maintaining Haikou, not only not abandoning Zhangjiakou, but also expanding strength (using the gap between wars to replenish troops), and then adjusting the direction according to the changes in the situation.
At the same time, the United States has also put forward its own ideas based on its own interests in China. The Americans believed that holding Pingjin would be able to contain the Northeast and North China Field Armies of the People's Liberation Army from moving south. If the situation deteriorates, the Tanggu Haikou can be used to transport troops to Qingdao. At that time, Fu Zuoyi was born, and the Americans paid for it, and they could turn the Shandong Peninsula into a US military base in the Far East.
Chiang Kai-shek finally agreed to the third plan. First of all, because he obeyed the orders of the United States, and secondly, because "temporarily guarding Pingjin and maintaining the Tanggu Haikou", if Fu Zuoyi really could not support it, he could withdraw south from the sea at any time to strengthen the defense of Jiangnan.
Fu Zuoyi also agreed to the third plan. First, this plan can accept US aid. Second, they can use the military and political power they have at their disposal to expand the new army and enhance their own strength. Fu Zuoyi considered that the Liaoshen Campaign had just ended, and the People's Liberation Army would have to rest for at least 2 or 3 months before entering the customs. At that time, he can strive to expand the new army by 200,000-300,000 people, wait for him to have a million troops, can be defended, in case it is not possible, it is not too late to withdraw to the west.
In early November, in order to implement the third plan, Fu Zuoyi shrunk nearly 600,000 people in 4 corps, 12 corps, 52 divisions of the Jiang Fu and Fu clans under the General Headquarters of north China, and shrunk them into a long snake array on the 1,200-mile railway line from Tangshan in the east to Zhangjiakou in the west. On November 3, Fu Zuoyi suddenly received an urgent telegram from Chiang Kai-shek from Nanjing, asking him to fly to Nanjing on the 4th to attend the supreme emergency military conference.
The meeting lasted for four days, mainly to study how to use the armies of the north and south to save the defeat after the defeat in the Liaoshen Campaign. At the meeting, Chiang Kai-shek announced: Concentrate all possible concentrated forces to fight a decisive battle against Chen Yi and Liu Bocheng in the Xu beng area. In northern China, the defensive line was contracted, and the troops were concentrated in Beiping, Tianjin, and Tanggu, to contain the northeast communist army into the customs, and when necessary, it retreated across the river to strengthen the defense of Beijing and Shanghai. In order to induce Fu Zuoyi to agree to abandon the southward crossing of the river in north China, Chiang Kai-shek formally announced the appointment of Fu Zuoyi as the military and political chief of southeastErn China at the meeting, and conveyed through He Yingqin that Fu should withdraw all the north China troops across the river by sea and land, and said that the ship was ready and under Fu's full command.
In the face of Chiang Kai-shek's persecution, Fu Zuoyi completely presented himself as a main war faction at the meeting. He resolutely advocated a bloody battle with the communist army to the end, proposed to hold on to north China to the death, and blocked the southward movement of the north and northeast communist armies, and said: Only in this way can we buy time and let Chiang Kai-shek smoothly form a second line of defense in Jiangnan.
Fu Zuoyi's attitude made Chiang Kai-shek have no choice but to show respect for Fu Zuoyi's opinion.
After Fu Zuoyi returned to Beiping from Nanjing, in order to express his determination, he decided to implement the strategic plan of "relying on US aid and maintaining Jingu" to the east: Chen Changjie was transferred to Tianjin, the fortifications in Tianjin were rebuilt and strengthened, and Zhuangding was recruited to form a garrison brigade; Deputy Commander-in-Chief Song Kentang was dispatched to organize fortifications to supervise trains, and to move on the Beining Line to inspect the fortifications in Tianjin and Tang; and ordered Hebei Provincial Chairman Chu Xichun and Security Commander Chen Guangdou to quickly form security regiments, one to three regiments in each county, and send weapons to regular regiments as a plan to expand the army by 200,000 It is necessary to move the headquarters of the General Headquarters of suppression from Pan to Tianjin; to move the small arsenal in Zhangjiakou, some economic organizations, and military and political dependents to Tianjin.
Although Fu Zuoyi made these actions, his basic strength of the 35th, 104th, and 105th armies was still deployed on the pingsui road line, and he deliberately placed Chiang's troops on the Beining line. Once the main force of the Northeast People's Liberation Army entered the border, Chiang Kai-shek's troops bore the brunt of it, while Fu's troops could withdraw westward to Suiyuan under unfavorable circumstances.
It can be seen from here that whether to hold firm in Pingjin, or to retreat from Pingjin or to withdraw from Suiyuan in the west, the Kuomintang is still undecided. Between the Americans, Chiang Kai-shek and Fu Zuoyi, the Americans, the same bed, different dreams, each has its own plan.
When Analyzing the National Situation after the Liaoshen Campaign and the dynamics of the enemy and us in North China, Chairman Mao gained insight into the hesitant and indecisive hearts of Chiang Kai-shek and Fu Zuoyi. In order to ensure that chiang fu's army in north China would not flee or shrink, Chairman Mao decided to divide and encircle Chiang Fu's army in north China.
In order to achieve this goal, Chairman Mao commanded the advance troops of the Northeast Field Army to quickly drive into Guannei after the Liaoshen Campaign. Then he commanded the main force of the Northeast Field Army to enter the pass as quickly as possible, separating the enemies of Beiping and Tianjin, Tianjin and Tanggu, Tanggu and Tangshan. The most important thing about this tactical command is that the early troops should not hit the enemy too lightly, so that they can shrink and concentrate to improve their combat effectiveness; nor can they beat the enemy too hard, so that they will collapse and retreat quickly from the sea. Of course, it is also necessary to let the main force of the Northeast Field Army enter the customs secretly and cannot be discovered by the enemy.
Chairman Mao therefore instructed in his telegram:
The movements of the troops must be secretive, and Jiang Fu has always underestimated the enthusiasm of our army, and they have not yet expected your main force to enter the border immediately. Therefore, in addition to the fact that the troops' actions are very hidden, we ask the Northeast Bureau, Lin, Luo, and Tan Ling Xinhua News Agency, and the northeast radio stations to issue more and more news in Shenyang, Xinmin, Liaoyang, Yingkou, Jinzhou, and other places in the next two weeks that the main forces of our army are celebrating their meritorious deeds and celebrating victories and training troops to hold meetings, so as to confuse the enemy.
Although the chairman thought very thoughtfully and meticulously, the entry of the main force of the million Northeast Field Army was not an easy task after all, and it would take a while. At this time, the pressure fell on the advance troops of the Northeast Field Army and the North China Field Army.
In late November, Chairman Mao urgently ordered the First Corps of North China to slow down the attack on Taiyuan, and ordered the three corps of Yang Chengwu and Li Jingquan to take the initiative to withdraw from the siege and return to Sui, so as not to allow Fu Zuoyi to send the main force to the west, so that Fu Zuoyi's main force could be sucked in and could not escape south from the sea, and it was also convenient to cover the secret entry of the main force of the Northeast Field Army.
In early December, the entire Pingzhang line was attacked by the People's Liberation Army, and the South Yaojiazhuang Airport in Zhangjiakou was captured by the People's Liberation Army. At that time, the 105th Army and two cavalry brigades of Fu's Sun Lanfeng Corps were stationed in Zhangjiakou, and Fu Zuoyi asked for reinforcements. Sure enough, the PLA's attack made Fu Zuoyi anxious, afraid of losing Zhangjiakou, blocked the road to Suiyuan under unfavorable circumstances, and ordered two divisions of the 35th Army stationed near Beiping and one division of the 1104th Army stationed in Huailai to reinforce Zhangjiakou by train and car respectively. In this way, most of fu Zuoyi's troops of about 100,000 troops were attracted to the Pingsui Line and could not move, which was just the plan of the People's Liberation Army.
Chairman Mao immediately ordered the Cheng Zihua Army of the Northeast Field Army to quickly surpass the enemy on the Miyun, Huairou, and Shunyi lines and advance toward the Yanqing and Huailai areas in order to block the rear road of the 35th Army, catch turtles in an urn, and completely solve Fu Zuoyi's ace army.
In the telegram, Chairman Mao made it clear that Cheng Zihua's advance troops should surpass the enemy of Miyun, but Cheng Zihua believed that the Bai river and chaohe river near Miyun were the only way for the troops to advance westward, and that after taking Miyun, the worries of the troops could be relieved. At the same time, Cheng Zihua reconnoitred and learned that the defenders in Miyun had only one security regiment, so he decided to take Miyun and then march to Huailai.
On December 2, Cheng Zihua sent an advance force to attack Miyun. It is reasonable to say that a division of the Northeast Field Army fought against the enemy's security regiment division with a handle, but after the battle was launched, the enemy's situation changed greatly. The three regiments of the enemy 13th Army stationed outside Miyun all shrank back into the city, so that the enemy army inside the city suddenly increased to more than 7,000 people. The advance was blocked and the battle reached a stalemate.
After Cheng Zihua received the battle report, he immediately ordered the remaining troops to join the battle against Miyun. After 3 days of bitter fighting, our army finally captured Miyun, annihilated more than 7,000 enemy troops, and suffered more than 1,000 casualties.
Knowing that the PLA troops attacking Miyun were all wearing dog skin hats, Fu Zuoyi was keenly aware that the Northeast Field Army had entered the customs in advance, so he hurriedly sent a telegram to the 35th Army, asking the 35th Army to return to Beiping as soon as possible, and at the same time sending the 104th Army to meet it.
On December 6, the 35th Army set out from Zhangjiakou, at this time Cheng Zihua's advance troops were still far from Huailai, and if the 35th Army fled back to Beiping, it would have a very adverse impact on the battle situation.
After Chairman Mao received the war report, he was also very angry. Immediately sent a telegram to Cheng Zihua:
The telegrams that you (referring to Cheng Huang) have given to Yang (referring to Yang Chengwu) and Li On several occasions are not in accordance with the specific circumstances, and they all clash with the Regulations of the Central Military Commission on severing zhang Xuan's ties with the two enemies. Now that Yang Li has allowed the 35th Army to flee eastward, he does not know whether Yang (referring to Yang Dezhi) Luo Geng can stop the enemy at the new security guard, and you yourself will not fight Miyun with the rear guards, but with the vanguard army to fight Miyun, causing delays. In this case, it may be that you have not yet arrived, and the 35th Army and the enemy of Huailai have fled east together, and you will have nothing to do when you arrive, and you will go back and forth empty-handedly. Nevertheless, you must rush in by the starry night. I hope that Yang Luogeng can seize the main forces of the 35th Army and the 104th Army on the Lower Garden and the New Security Line as early as the night of the sixth or seventh day, and the enemy of Huailai has not run away, and you can cooperate with Yang Luogeng to annihilate the enemy.
From this telegram, we can see Chairman Mao's dissatisfaction with the unauthorized attack on Miyun by Cheng Zihua's advance troops. In fact, if it were not for Zheng Weishan of the North China 3rd Column attacking in time and blocking the 104th Army in the area of the horse pen and the alkali beach, the 35th Army would have really been rescued. In the Miyun Battle, Cheng Zihua almost lost a lot of money because of a small loss, and after the war, he was severely criticized by his superiors. Later, although Cheng Zihua served as the commander of the 13th Corps of Siye, he was transferred from the army before the Battle of Guangxi was completed, transferred to Shanxi, and never returned to work in the army, so when he was awarded the title in 1955, he regrettably lost the rank of general.
Criticized by Chairman Mao, Cheng Zihua was very unconvinced, and later went to Chairman Mao to discuss the twists and turns. After many years, he did not reflect deeply. When writing "Cheng Zihua's Memoirs", he repeatedly defended himself on this matter. There are also some people who believe that although Cheng Zihua is wrong, he cannot bear all the responsibility, after all, he will not be affected by the fate of the foreign king.
Is this really the case? I would like to say that Cheng Zihua did not understand Chairman Mao's strategic thinking when he was old. If every general had his own ideas, then the army would have no way to command. The great general is not affected by the king's order, and the young general is also the king's order. Everyone has their own judgment and does not accept the judgment of their superiors, so how can they command?
The phrase "the king" meant that the ancient kings should try to let those who could hear the cannon make decisions and try to control their impulse to remotely control their command. I think Chairman Mao did a good enough job in this regard, and when he commanded, he only gave the generals below him only a general policy, rather than crossing the command level like Chiang Kai-shek, and the front-line generals were unknown. Moreover, Chairman Mao was still a man who could hear the opinions of others, and the Battle of Huaihai was a very obvious example. If Cheng Zihua had sent a telegram to Chairman Mao at that time, he would not have been so criticized.
At this time, some people said that the reason why Cheng Zihua failed was because of inaccurate intelligence. If the intelligence is accurate, there is only one security regiment in Miyun City, then Cheng Zihua has made a great contribution. In his judgment at that time, such a small matter did not need to be reported, which is why he made such a big mistake.
At this point we will talk about the second meaning that the foreign monarch's fate will be exempted. If you have the determination to be unaffected by the king's destiny, you must first be prepared to be criticized. If a general's judgment is correct, it is your credit, but if it is wrong you must also accept criticism, especially if it is inconsistent with the orders of the superiors. The situation on the battlefield is changeable, and a general must be responsible. At that time, Lin Biao wrote to Chairman Mao to ask how long the red flag could be played, and Chairman Mao replied to others that Lin Biao knew anything, and he was still a doll. This is not a preference for Lin Biao, but a matter of seeking truth from facts. Because Lin Biao could not see a lot of intelligence and materials at that time, he did not have the strategic vision of Chairman Mao, and Chairman Mao would patiently answer him and tell him that the spark of a spark would surely burn.