Fragments are difficult to be a universal killer, and "touching porcelain" is even more a laughing stock - what cowardice did Wang Zhengxing, a bricklayer in military history, show when questioning the movie "Chosin Lake"?
The author of this article: Xiao Xiao, authorized the original release of this number.
The public account @ this is the war published an article on June 13, questioning the plot of this year's summer gift blockbuster "Chosin Lake", arguing: "The script of the movie "Chosin Lake" has a history of fabrication, that is, the volunteer army in the movie tried to blow up the Watergate Bridge and launch an attack on the US troops defending the Watergate Bridge. I said there was no fighting at all on the Watergate Bridge, there were no American troops stationed there. ”
Later, in the June 15 article, Wang Zhengxing, who claimed to have been the "commander of the infantry detachment," added that it was a serious error in the CCTV documentary "Ice and Snow Changjin Lake" that misled Lan Xiaolong's screenwriter to come up with "Oolong". The author finally concluded: "By looking at the original archives of the volunteer army and the US army, it can be seen that the Watergate Bridge is not the most critical terrain in the Huangcaoling area, and the US military has not sent troops to garrison it, nor has there been a battle, but it is only a small part of the process of the volunteer army breaking roads and bridges." ”
Indeed, "Ice and Snow Changjin Lake", released in 2011, made a serious mistake and gave Zhang Guanli the troops involved in the war. But the author's view that "there was no battle at the 'Watergate Bridge'" and "the 'Watergate Bridge' is not a key terrain in the Huangcaoling area" is too subjective to be sensational.
"Shuimen Bridge" is indeed the "key terrain" of the Huangcaoling area, but the title on our historical records and maps is "Gate Da Nang"
When our army entered Korea, it used a military map of 50,000th of the Japanese and pseudo-Japanese era (Taisho years), when the Chosin Reservoir had not yet been built, and the location of the Shuimen Bridge on the map was marked as "Gate Dae" (門岘). See figure below -
Figure: One-fifty-thousandth of a military map of the Japanese and pseudo-mapping sites used by our army
In the maps and battle narratives of the history of my 20th Army, it is mentioned many times that there was a battle between "Men Da Nang" and "Men Da And Bao Hou Zhuang". Moreover, in the formation log and orders, there are also contents of deploying troops at the "gate point". (See posted later)
As for the terrain is not critical, at least the US war history believes that it is the key - once this narrow bridge is completely damaged, the US tanks and vehicles cannot pass through, and can only break through on foot! What does this mean for the U.S. military? They couldn't have been clearer.
Pictured: The Shuimen Bridge is located at the southern foot of the HuangcaoLing Mountains
To read the history of the war, you must look at the map, and you must also look carefully
Historical problems must be empirically verified from the perspective of examination. Subjective inference from one-sided sources is essentially a manifestation of historical nihilism, and such an approach is unacceptable. For some problems that cannot be empirically proved for the time being, we must not blindly draw subjective conclusions until we find conclusive evidence. It is extremely irresponsible to rely on fragmented historical materials and subjective speculation to create "explosive" remarks.
It is true that in the first-hand documents of that year and the later two versions of the military history of the 20th Army, there is no direct record of the four explosions of the "Watergate Bridge". However, combing through the above information, in fact, you can make the most basic distinction.
See the operational map of the 20th Army -
Before the battle began, the Watergate Bridge area was under U.S. control
Unfortunately, however, @this is the war in the June 15 article, apparently did not understand the location on the map label. The image below is @This is the map of the war supplemental label. Apparently, he deliberately separated the "power plant number four" marked on the US military map from the gate on our map.
Interlacing is like a mountain, after all, @ this is not the war is not engaged in water conservancy and power industry, it is inevitable to distinguish the difference between dam-type hydropower stations, diversion hydropower stations and hybrid hydropower stations. The power station at the Chosin Reservoir is water-diverting, and the so-called "Shuimen Bridge" is not built on a dam, but a bridge that crosses the diversion pipe from above.
Opening the satellite map, loading the contours, and comparing it to the topographic map, it's a clear thing at a glance - isn't the power station just at the gate?
A breaker is also a battle, even if it is "quietly entering the village to shoot a gun"
This needs to start on November 29. At that time, our side had already divided the US 1st Marine Division into LiutanLi, Hagaru-ri and Gutushui. Among them, the 89th Division of the 20th Army coordinated with the 79th Division of the 27th Army to attack the troops of the 5th and 7th Regiments of the 1st Marine Division in Liutanli in the north; the 59th Division of the 20th Army was responsible for blocking the southward escape of the American troops in Liutanli; and the 58th Division and the 60th Division of the 20th Army coordinated with each other to attack the troops including the 1st Division headquarters of the US Marine Division, which were divided into Hagaru-ri and Gutui (Gutuli).
The operational order to breach the road was issued by the 20th Army's forward commander in a telegram at 1:25 a.m. on November 29. Among them, the 60th Division was required to cooperate with the reconnaissance battalion of the army and make every effort to destroy the road from Gutushui to Hagaru-ri and south of Gutushui.
A telegram at 20:45 that evening mentioned an important message that the 179th Regiment had damaged two bridges south of Fusheng (St.) Lane, but the Americans, under the cover of tanks, repaired the bridges. The 180th Regiment, on the other hand, destroyed the road west of the ancient tushui and southwest of lower Madei. However, the 180th Regiment troops south of the ancient earth and water, with only 15 pounds of explosives left, encountered great difficulties.
By November 30, the enemy who had broken through from Liutan was moving closer to Xiayuli, while the 59th Division, which was tasked with blocking the attack, had lost control of the road north of Hill 1419.2 and the mountains east, and the Americans were advancing towards Dead Eagle Ridge and Dedong Mountain. In the direction of the 58th and 60th Divisions, we divided the U.S. forces and surrounded them in Hagaru-ri and Gutushui. At this time, our side was preparing to concentrate its forces to take Hagaru-ri. However, in the previous offensive, our side failed to make progress, and the casualties of the troops were not small.
The U.S. army continued to try to advance from Kotosui to support Shimogaru-ri, while also mobilizing troops from Shinheung-ri to the north to meet. At that time, our deployment was for the 58th Division to attack Hagaru-ri, and the 60th Division was responsible for cutting off the connection between Gutushui and Hagaru-ri in Cigankai and Fusheng (Sheng).
However, at that time, due to the severe attrition of our side due to freezing and starvation, the structure of the troops was disrupted, and there were no longer enough troops to complete the task of encircling and annihilating the US army. In desperation, our side could only choose to destroy the road and continue to isolate the enemy army, while trying to attack xiayuli again after nightfall, while waiting for the follow-up reinforcement of the 26th Army to arrive. Against this background, the 60th Division was ordered to send a force to occupy the blocking positions on the front line of Huangcaoling, ensuring that even if the offensive was not successful, it could at least maintain the state of dividing the enemy.
In the telegrams at 13:30 and 45 p.m. on November 30, Chief of Staff Yu Binghui of the 20th Army reported the discovery of 3 American tanks and 1 company of infantry south of Huangcao Ridge, and the 180th Regiment of the 60th Division, which was responsible for blocking the enemy, and then went out to Huangcaoling with 1 battalion. This shows that at that time, the area south of The Yellow Grass Ridge was still under the control of the US military, and there were US troops active.
Most of our first sabotage operations showed that they occurred on 1 December. At 2:40 p.m. on the same day, the content reported by the Operations Section of the 20th Army specifically mentioned that the main task of the 60th Division was to destroy the road and prevent the enemy tanks from passing. Moreover, blowing up bridges on the road was the only effective method of delaying American tanks at that time.
There is also a detail in the telegram that the bazookas we carried at that time could not effectively damage the American tanks. Because the anti-tank bazookas carried by the various units of the 9th Corps at that time were mainly the two models of the American 60mm caliber M1A1 and M9 captured during the Liberation War, their power was indeed unable to effectively penetrate the M4A3E8 and M26E2 tanks equipped by the US army at that time from the front.
The telegram at 3 a.m. on December 1 was telling. The 180th Regiment discovered that the first unit of the American Army had entered and occupied Huangcao ridge, and concentrated forty or fifty tanks in the courtyard. As already introduced at the beginning of this article, the so-called "Watergate Bridge" was located on the map (printed in the Japanese and pseudo-Japanese periods) used by us at that time in a place called "Gate Da Nang". To reach this place, you must cross the Yellow Grass Ridge. In this way, how can it be ruled out that the enemy was not engaged in the process of breaking the road? Taking a step back, even if there is no direct exchange of fire, is crossing the enemy fire blockade part of the battle?
The above-mentioned operational order emphasizes that "the task of breaking the road south of Huangcaoling in the north of Zhenxingli is the primary task, and after the destruction, the faction will control it, kill and injure the enemy who is building the road, and send a small number (troops) to contact the enemy." This shows that our army is ready to fight around the bridge and the enemy!
Based on the previous situation, on November 29, the 180 regiment had already encountered the problem of insufficient use of explosives. If our army wants to break through the highway, is there any more reasonable choice than to blow up the bridge? By this time, the bridge at the No. 4 power station and the bridge at Baohouzhuang had become the lifeblood between Zhenxingli and Huangcaoling!
At that time, the climate of the battlefield was very bad, even the temperature during the day was less than 0 °C, and at night it was often as low as -20 °C, and the ground had long been frozen as hard as stone, and the troops of our army were starved and frozen to the point of incomplete formation.
During the day, American planes dropped bombs on their heads, and Underground American tanks fired artillery, and the only way to act was at night. Will Americans not know the importance of bridges along the line? Moreover, south of Huangcaoling is still under the control of the US military, in the 887 heights and 1081 highlands near the gate, the US troops do not have any vigilance forces? With sporadic exchanges of fire with the enemy's vigilant forces, the war history of both sides must be recorded in its entirety like a running account? Taking another step back, is it considered that our army's sabotage detachment evaded the US military's vigilant forces and blew up the bridge?
The concept of "sabotage warfare" or "sabotage warfare", Wang Zhengxing, who claimed to have been the "commander of the infantry detachment", would not be unaware of it, nor would he be confused?
Sabotage warfare, also known as sabotage warfare, refers to the method of warfare that destroys or attacks the enemy's lines of communication, fuel pipelines, communications facilities, airfields, engineering facilities, and rear facilities. The purpose is to cause difficulties in the enemy's movements, contacts, supplies, etc., and to consume or destroy the enemy.
The "Gate Point" - that is, the "Watergate Bridge", was garrisoned by both the enemy and us
On this issue, the annotation of the operational map of the 20th Army's combat history also shows that the area from Mendaan to Baohouzhuang was controlled by the US army before the war, and was controlled by our army during the battle, and it was within the composition of the enemy positions that blocked the south and fled to the north to help!
The 60th Division's diary also addressed this issue —
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="40" > (i) the first time the Watergate Bridge was broken</h1>
The telegram from Yu's chief of staff at 5:30 a.m. on December 2 to Deputy Political Commissar Tan Youming and the subsequent telegram to Commander Zhang Yixiang are also strong evidence. It can be seen from the cables that the 180th Regiment took the Huangcao Ridge and the area south of it after a battle. Moreover, 1 company in front of our side also found the reconnaissance unit of the US army. This proves conclusively that we must have crossed the battle line when we attacked the Watergate Bridge on 1 December.
Therefore, based on the available information alone, although it cannot be proved for sure, we cannot deny that there was a battle when the bridge was first blown up. So, what is wrong with the film "Chosin Lake" as a literary and artistic work, which is properly artistically interpreted? Even if you use a searchlight to hide from the US military and touch the bridge section all the way under the bridge, it cannot be said to be untrue. At least on an artistic level, this is a reasonable form of expression.
Pictured: After the battle was launched, our army took control of the area from Mun Da To Baohouzhuang
(2) The second and third breaches of the Watergate Bridge
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="45">
</h1>
After the first blow-up bridge above, let's look at the next three times.
In a December 2 cable, detailed deployments were made for the defenses around Yellow Grass Ridge.
We can clearly see in the above telegram that the first is to ask the 60th Division to dispatch one or two battalions to occupy Baohouzhuang, do a good job of fortifications, and destroy the road at Menda. The cable that day mentioned that the 1st Battalion of the 180th Regiment of the 60th Division (referred to in the telegram as the "10 1st Battalion") was responsible for the main points south of Huangcaoling.
The main points south of Huangcaoling are actually very clear - south of Huangcaoling and east of Gaochengzhuang, 1304 Highland; 1348 Highland southwest of 1304; 1081 Highland southeast of Mendain and northeast of Baohouzhuang; 987.2 Highland west of Baohouzhuang; 819.2 Highland east of Baohouzhuang. In this way, the Baohouzhuangdong Bridge and the Gate Da Nang (where the "Water Gate Bridge" is located) are controlled by our side.
December 2 was a turning point. While the battles on Hill 1159 at Dead Eagle Ridge, 1652.6, 1520, and Hill 1357.4 west of Tokdong Hill were still ongoing, the two attacks on Hagaru-ri in the early hours of the same day were ineffective, the casualties of the troops were greatly reduced, and there was a great shortage of anti-tank weapons, and confidence in the encirclement of Hagaru-ri was severely frustrated. U.S. troops are already evacuating the wounded through the airfield. At 14:00 on the same day, the headquarters of the 9th Corps ordered the 58th Division and the 60th Division to hand over the task with the 26th Army (owed 1 division) in the evening of the same day, and to move to the north and south of the Huangcao Mountains and Gutushui to prevent the enemy from aiding the north and fleeing south. However, because the 26th Army did not arrive on time, the handover of defense was delayed until the evening of December 5, and did not end until December 6.
On the evening of December 2, the 58th and 60th Divisions of the 20th Army had already begun to adjust. At 20:30 p.m. that night, Commander Zhang Yixiang's reply to Chief of Staff Yu Binghui had asked the 1st Battalion of the 180th Regiment of the 60th Division to control the main point south of Huangcaoling, and the unit had set off at 4:30 a.m. that day. At the same time, the rest of the 180th Regiment was also required to rush to the yellow grass ridge line - and clearly instructed "occupy the fort houzhuang, resolutely do a good job of fortifications, and destroy the road at the gate".
At 8:00 a.m. on December 3, Chief of Staff Yu Binghui said in a telegram to Deputy Commander Liao Zhengguo that "Huangcao Lingnan Gate is indeed invincible." That's easy to understand. On the one hand, our army has blown up the "Watergate Bridge", and at the same time has also controlled the main points from the gate to the back of the fort, and has also repaired the fortifications, and has already controlled this area. Under such circumstances, the area between Mendaan and Baohouzhuang will naturally no longer have American troops.
According to the current popular saying, the next two explosions of the "Watergate Bridge" by our side were around December 4. There is no detailed record of this operation in our first-hand information or in the history of the war. However, looking at the official history of the U.S. military, I found such a record in the "U.S. Marine Operations in Korea Vol3 1950-1953 The Chosin Reservoir Campaign" section of United States Marine Crops. (Located in the first paragraph of the "Air Drop of Bridge Sections" section on page 309)
The red line part translates to "The Supreme Commander [of the U.S. military on the front line] had been told as early as December 4 that a vital bridge 3.5 miles south of Guturi (see Figure 29) had been blown up by the enemy for the third time." Compared with the map, this clearly refers to "Watergate Bridge"!
That's interesting. Because in the records of both sides, the specific time of the first three bombings of the bridge is not clear. Judging from our operational orders, the first time to blow up the bridge was about the early morning of December 1. By December 2, we had captured the Yellow Grass Ridge line, and on the morning of December 3, the fortifications at the gate were repaired! In this way, according to the US military itself, the bridge has been broken for the third time by December 4, which means that the US military has repaired it twice from December 1 to 4!
Since you want to repair the bridge, you can't always swing under the eyes of the other side and do it with a big wave - that is, in the period from December 1 to 4, especially after our first blow-up of the bridge, the US military once controlled the area around the "Watergate Bridge".
Looking at the picture above, it is Figure 29 excerpted from the history of the US military. Since the marking habits of the US military are different from those of our army, in order to facilitate everyone's reading and understanding, the author has added some Chinese annotations, and improved the elevation of some highlands according to the topographic map. The "Treadway Bridge" in the picture is the so-called "Watergate Bridge".
Looking back at our deployment, in the early morning of December 1, we ordered the bombing of the bridge, and at the same time instructed to keep people after destroying the road and kill and wound the enemy who came to repair the road. And by the morning of December 3rd, the fortifications at the gate were repaired! At least from the night of December 2 to the early morning of December 3, our army had already had people here.
As a result, it is at least certain that between 1 and 4 December, the area around Mentang has undergone at least one change of hands. Then, until we seize control, regardless of direct presence, the U.S. military will at least have a wandering patrol force operating here. After our side blew up the bridge twice, the US military repaired the bridge twice, which is obviously impossible to complete without the cover of the surrounding points.
The existing records can make it clear that both the enemy and us were stationed in the area of the "Watergate Bridge."
Based solely on the available information, it cannot be ruled out that there was a battle between the enemy and us at and near the "Pratunam Bridge." According to the records of the US military, it is obvious that in the three days from December 1 to December 4, the US military repaired the bridge twice, and our army blew up the bridge twice. In the meantime, the area around the gate has been controlled by us. When the U.S. military comes to repair the bridge, won't there be a skirmish?
In any case, the possibility of fighting around the "Watergate Bridge" from December 1 to 4 cannot be ruled out, at least. Moreover, from the perspective of the relationship before and after, the possibility of an exchange of fire between the two sides is extremely high. So, what's wrong with the film choosing to behave this way?
It is easy to say that there are no clear and specific records in the military histories of both sides. First of all, our side's attrition at that time was very serious, and the 20th Army was the most frostbitten and attrition, and the formation of the troops was incomplete, and even some companies suffered almost all casualties. In such a situation, can the battle record be meticulous?
Let's take a look at the state of the 20th Army at that time. When the reorganization was carried out on December 6, the situation was as follows: the 172nd Regiment of the 58th Division formed 8 platoons to defend Huangcaoling and the first line in the courtyard; the 173rd Regiment formed 11 platoons to reach The Xiao'an-dong, Da'an-dong and the 1478.5 Heights; the 174th Regiment formed 17 platoons to defend the first line of Polo and Xiaomintaili; the 178th Regiment of the 60th Division formed 5 companies to defend the high ground west of Guxingli and Xiangzaidong; the 179th Regiment formed 4 companies to defend the first-line positions northwest of Shuinanli; and the 180th Regiment firmly guarded the gate point. 1081 Heights and the first line position of Fort Houzhuang. Most of the regiments under the 20th Army were not enough for a complete battalion!
And military history is not a running account, there is everything in it. From December 1 to 4, the U.S. military was fighting with our army in the dark of Dedong Mountain and Hagaru-ri, and the records of the U.S. military's war history revolved around these two places. At this time, our troops at Mendaan, in addition to the small number of troops that began to be sent to blow up the bridge, also passed on December 2 by a dilapidated 1st Battalion of the 180th Regiment of the 60th Division. On the entire defensive area from the gate to the fort, there are 4 important commanding heights that need to be seized. In this way, the scale of the firefight is the highest, that is, the level of squad and platoon, and it is normal that it is not detailed in the history of the war.
After the first three bridge explosions, let's talk about the fourth blast.
On December 8, the enemy from Gutushui attacked us fiercely on the front line of Huangcao Ridge. The 172nd Regiment of our 58th Division fought desperately in the courtyard, 1350 heights, 1304 highlands, Huangcaoling, Gaolong and other places, and only about 20 people were left to fight until the end of the night, and only the positions west of the courtyard were still under control. That night, our 173rd and 174th Regiments cobbled together 4 more companies to prepare for a counterattack to retake the 1304 heights, but due to the difficulty of the mountain road and the slow movement of the troops, they failed to launch the attack as planned.
At the same time as the 172nd Regiment was fighting hard, the 180th Regiment was also fighting with all its strength at Houbaozhuang and Menda. In order to strengthen the resistance, the 60th Division transferred the 179th Regiment to the northeast highlands of Mentang and the 1081 highlands to assist in the defense.
On December 8 our army carried out the fourth and last blast of the "Watergate Bridge" in this battle. Although we do not have a clear first-hand record of the blasting operation, in the "Diary of the Formation", we can sort out the general situation of the operation by looking at the telegrams exchanged on that day.
In a 10.40 a.m. cable exchange that day, Chief of Staff Yu said that the bridge had not been damaged yesterday (from the night of December 7 to the early morning of December 8) because of emotional problems with the troops. After that, Commander Zhang said that he would immediately order the troops to go and destroy. Moreover, in connection with the foregoing, it can be seen that the purpose of blasting the bridge is not only to prevent the enemy from escaping southward, but also to avoid the enemy from going north to attack our defensive position at the gate.
By 19:00 p.m., Commander Zhang sent a telegram to Chief of Staff Yu saying that the bridge on the highway had been blown up and that tanks could not pass. It is not difficult to see that the last time we blew the "Watergate Bridge" of the gate should be at noon or afternoon on December 8. During this time period, the gate is controlled by us.
The blast was actually a targeted supplementary damage, which not only completely destroyed the remaining bridge building equipment, but also blew up the concrete abutments on both sides.
U.S. sources confirm that there was a battle at Pratunam Bridge
Logically, there would be no fighting near the "Watergate Bridge" during the fourth blast. However, this does not mean the end of the battle. In Bevin Alexander's documentary work Korea, Our First Defeat, Chapter 47, The Breakout, describes the following passage:
It can be seen that when the US military seized the broken bridge on December 9, it was through an exchange of fire. How can this be said that there has been no fighting?
Some readers may find this not true enough, after all, Bevin Alexander's work is not a first-hand document. Is there any record of the official war history of the U.S. military? There really is! On page 321 of the chapter in the "U.S. Marine Operations in Korea Vol3 1950-1953 The Chos in Reservoir Campaign" section of United States Marine Crops:
This passage is actually consistent with what Bevin Alexander said in North Korea: Our First Defeat. This fully shows that when the US military seized the positions around Mentan on December 9, the process of occupying the "Watergate Bridge" was skirmishing. There was indeed a battle on the Watergate Bridge.
And in our war history, there is also a description of this process. In the second chapter of the "History of the Twentieth Army of the Chinese Volunteer Army to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea", "Fighting the First Battle Abroad -- Participating in the Second Battle" (page 21), there is this description:
It should be pointed out in particular that there is indeed no narrative of the so-called "Watergate Bridge" in the history of our army's warfare. We collectively refer to this area as "Gate Da Nang" according to the geographical name. At that time, the map used by our army was a Japanese military map captured after the victory of the War of Resistance Against Japan. Interested readers can compare the map of Japan used at the beginning of this article with the map in the history of the US military posted later, and it is easy to clearly distinguish the location relationship between the so-called "Watergate Bridge" and the gate point.
Before this article was issued, the author also carefully examined the "20th Army Hamgyong South Road Battle Log (November 29 to December 13, 1950)" and the "Preliminary Summary of the 20th Army Hamgyong South Province Campaign", and found that in the 20:00 battle log of the 20th Army on December 3, 1950 and the "Summary of the Battle of Hamgyong South Province" after the war, there are also records of the battle at "Men da Nan Dao":
The 20th Army's mid-line log was recorded at 20:00 on December 3, 1950
Summary of the battle of Hamgyong South Province of the 20th Army
brief summary
In summary, in the entire battle to block the retreat of the US 1st Marine Division, after our army blew up the "Watergate Bridge" for the fourth time, from December 8 to 9, our army and the American army fought around the "Watergate Bridge". Moreover, in the first three bridge bombing operations of our army from December 1 to 4, it cannot be ruled out that there was an exchange of fire with the US army.
In the Battle of Chosin Lake, the Volunteer Army fought three "ice sculpture companies" - 6 companies of 2 battalions of the 177 regiment of the 59th division of the 20th army, 2 companies of the 1st battalion of the 180th regiment of the 60th division of the 20th army, and 5 companies of the 2nd battalion of the 242nd regiment of the 80th division of the 27th army - of which the 1st battalion and 2nd company of the 180th regiment were sacrificed on the 1081 high ground, an important commanding height southeast of Menda. If the four explosions of the "Watergate Bridge" are the image of the people who will not yield in the face of any strong enemy, Chinese the people will not yield to their indomitable deeds; then the "Ice Sculpture Company" that maintains the fighting posture until the last moment of life is the heroic totem of Chinese people who would rather die and dare to win in the face of the fierce and vicious imperialists.
If the film were to do a modest amount of artistic work here, combining the battle over the "Watergate Bridge" with the battle for 1081 Heights, and show it in the same set of shots, it would have been the best choice.
The upcoming "Chosin Lake" is a feature film, not a documentary, and the appropriate interpretation is to add luster and color; and the "Ice and Snow Chosin Lake" produced in 2011 is not a feature film, it is a documentary, and the protagonist is worn by Zhang Guanli, which is really a laugh and generosity.
And the public number @ this is the author of the war Wang Zhengxing did not carefully analyze, seriously study the down-to-earth spirit, holding a half-cut material, he self-righteously came to an unreliable conclusion, to "touch porcelain" literary and artistic works, hard to accuse it of not completely restoring history, how can this not be spit on is sensationalism, for the eyeballs to attract traffic and hype the topic?