In September 1934, Mao Zedong came to Yudu, where he carefully inspected the terrain in order to choose a possible breakthrough route for the Central Red Army.
In October 1934, the fifth anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaign in the Central Revolutionary Base Area failed.
From October 10 to 17, the CPC Central Committee and the Central Revolutionary Military Commission led the main force of the Central Red Army of more than 86,000 people, starting from Ruijin, Yudu and other places in Jiangxi, and were forced to carry out a strategic shift.
Taking advantage of the dry period of the Du River, the Red Army built five pontoon bridges at selected locations and safely crossed the Yudu River. This path was the breakthrough route chosen by Mao Zedong.
From late October to mid-November 1934, the Central Red Army continuously broke through the first, second, and third blockade lines set up by the enemy and entered the Shonan region.
At this time, Chiang Kai-shek had already determined the Intention of the Red Army to advance westward, and immediately deployed "pursuit and suppression" and blockade in an attempt to "annihilate" the Red Army in the area east of the Xiang River and LiShui.
The Gui warlords Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi, who were deployed on the Xiang River, moved the main force of the Gui army deployed on the Xiang River to Defend Gongcheng in order to prevent the Red Army from attacking Guilin. As a result, a large gap of about fifty kilometers wide appeared on the Xiang River. This military information was deciphered in time by the Intelligence Department of the Red Army and quickly sent to the headquarters of the Red Army.
On November 25, the Central Revolutionary Military Commission decided that the Red Army would cross the Xiang River from Xing'an and Jeonju in Guangxi and break through the fourth blockade line of the Kuomintang army.
Wang Xiaojian is an expert in military history
When they crossed the Xiang River, the Column of the Central Military Commission reached Wenshi and Guiyan, north of Guanyang, only about eighty kilometers away from the crossing point. At this time, if they had left their weight behind and advanced lightly, the column of the Central Military Commission could have crossed the Xiang River quickly, and the pressure on the north and south wings would have been suddenly reduced. But the Red Army, dragging the altar jars and jars, walked only twenty or thirty kilometers a day.
The column of the Central Military Commission was slow to move because it carried too much weight, and before it crossed the river, it was attacked by the superior strength of the Kuomintang army, and in order to win precious time to cross the river, the Red Army on both sides of the Xiang River fought a deadly decisive battle with the Kuomintang army on all sides. On the evening of December 1, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the Central Revolutionary Military Commission and most of the main forces of the Red Army finally crossed the Xiang River.
The Battle of xiangjiang was the most fierce battle and the heaviest loss since the central Red Army withdrew from the central revolutionary base areas.
However, the heavy losses suffered in the Battle of the Xiangjiang River did not make Bogu and Li De aware of the problems in the strategic policy, but strictly ordered the heads of the various corps to "not change the general direction of advance."
On December 11, the 2nd Division of the 1st Army, the vanguard of the Central Red Army, captured the county seat of Tongdao County, and whether to continue north to join the Red 2nd and 6th Red Armies became the focus of debate within the Central Revolutionary Military Commission.
Yuan Ye is an associate professor at the National Security College of the National Defense University
Mao Zedong had no military leadership position at that time, but in a critical situation between the Party and the Red Army, he stepped forward and made it clear that the Red Army could not go further north.
On December 12, 1934, at the centuries-old Gongcheng Academy, the decision-makers of the Party and the Red Army held an emergency meeting.
At this meeting, Mao Zedong's proposal for military action was adopted for the first time since he was stripped of military command in October 1932. According to Mao Zedong's proposal, the Red Army would detour through Liping and Jinping in Guizhou, go north to Xiangxi to join the Red Second and Sixth Red Armies, and leave more than 100,000 Kuomintang troops in western Hunan Province.
At 7:30 p.m. on the same day, the Central Revolutionary Military Commission issued a telegram of "Ten Thousand Fires and Urgency," stipulating: "Our army will continue to advance westward on The 13th Ming Dynasty" and that "if the First Division has arrived at the Hongzhou Division today, it should enter liping with its camera."
On December 18, 1934, the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee held a meeting in Liping. This was the first Politburo meeting held since the Long March of the Central Red Army. Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Zhang Wentian, Wang Jiaxiang, Zhu De, Bogu, and others attended the meeting. Li De was unable to attend the meeting due to a high fever from malaria. The meeting, chaired by Zhou Enlai, focused on the strategic direction of the Central Red Army's advance.
Proceeding from the actual situation on the battlefield, Mao Zedong resolutely advocated abandoning the original plan of rendezvousing with the Red Second and Red Sixth Armies, diverting the route to northern Qianbei, and first creating a new base area in the Border Area of Sichuan and Qianzhou centered on Zunyi.
The Liping Conference finally accepted Mao Zedong's opinion and adopted the Decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee on Strategic Guidelines, written on the basis of Mao Zedong's speech.
After the Li Ping meeting, Zhou Enlai sent the translation of the meeting decision to Li De. Li De was furious after reading this, and quarreled with Zhou Enlai in English, but the meeting resolution had already been formed, and Li De, who was greatly annoyed, could not change the new line determined by the Li Ping meeting.
Shao Weizheng is an expert in the history of the Communist Party of China
The Liping Conference was a crucial decision-making meeting after the bloody battle on the Xiang River, because it not only determined the question of whether the Red Army would move north or west, but more importantly, it made clear provisions on the military command system.
From Liping to the northwest, with the continuous debate along the way, handing over the leadership to Mao Zedong, who had foresight and profound understanding of the reality of the Chinese revolution, gradually became the common demand of the whole party and the whole army.
The Red Army ushered in the dawn of Liping and unveiled the prologue to the great historical turning point.
Source: CCTV National Memory