U.S. military history records that the "Polar Bear Regiment," known to Chinese military enthusiasts, the combat unit of the 31st Regiment of the U.S. 7th Infantry Division, commonly known as Task Force McLean (later known as The Fleet), was almost completely annihilated in the area east of the Chosin Lake Reservoir. The experience of American soldiers who fought and lost their lives in the bitter cold of the Chosin Lake region proved to be the most painful and tragic experience in the history of the U.S. Army. In the initial nearly 3,000 troops of the task force, only more than 1,000 survivors in total reached the ranks of the Marines, of whom only 385 were considered healthy, the rest were wounded or frostbitten, none of the cars or heavy equipment escaped the encirclement, and the commander of the 31st Regiment, Colonel McLean, became the second and last American regimental commander to die in the Korean battlefield, and his successor, Lieutenant Colonel Donald Feith Jr., was also killed in the battle. As commander of the 1st Battalion of the 32nd Infantry Regiment, Feith was the son of an American general, how did he and his units get incorporated into McLean's Task Force, and how did he die? What happened after his death?
Lieutenant Colonel Fiss
Born as a shogun, he served as a staff officer of the U.S. Military Advisory Group in China
Fiss is considered one of the most promising officers in the army. He was the son of a retired brigadier general, and his father, Donald Feith Sr., served as a brigadier general at the U.S. Army Training Center.
The then Brigadier General Matthew M. B. Ridgway personally selected him from the Fort Benning Officer Candidate School to serve as his aide-de-camp. He had been serving on the European front at Ridgway's side and fought with the 82nd Airborne Division on Normandy Landing Day. On the battlefield, he was seen as a virtual clone of Ridgway: intense, fearless, aggressive, intolerant of mistakes or caution.
After the end of World War II, he came to China as the commander of the US Seventh Infantry Division, batavi, and served as a staff officer of the US Advisory Group in China.
On the morning of November 21, 1950, the vanguard unit of the 17th Regiment of the US Infantry Division, the "Cooper Task Force", did not fire a single shot and a bullet into the town of Huishan on the east section of the Border between China and North Korea, on the south bank of the Yalu River, and on the opposite bank was China's Changbai Mountain. Since the 9th Corps of the Volunteer Army Song Shilun had not yet entered the DPRK at that time, the vanguard of the 17th Regiment only encountered weak resistance from the Korean People's Army. It was the first and only U.S. formed unit to reach the Yalu River in the Korean War.
A delighted MacArthur called Commander Almond of the 10th Army from Tokyo: "Most heartfelt congratulations, Ned, to Barr, that Barr's 7th Division won the jackpot"!
The original mission of the US 31st Regiment was to follow the 7th Division in the direction of the Yalu River. Almond and Smith, commander of the First Marine Division, quarreled in hajarus, and Smith demanded that his right wing be secured. Although Almond was MacArthur's confidant and superior to the 1st Marine Division, because he was an army general and did not have full control over the Marine Corps, he had to swallow Smith's request. Although the commander of the 7th Division, Batavi, was also a major general, but he could not speak at all in the face of these two men, so he had to press this chore to Colonel McLean of the 31st Regiment closest to Chosin Lake, but not only McLean was unlucky, but Also Lieutenant Colonel Feith of the 1st Battalion of the 32nd Regiment next door was also dragged down.
Since the 31st Regiment's own troops were scattered everywhere, it happened that Feith's 1st Battalion was very close to Chosin Lake. Because Batavi's 7th Division was too scattered to assemble on time to carry out the 10th Army's battle plan, it temporarily formed a 31st Regimental Combat Team, the McLean Task Force, including the 3st Battalion, 2nd Battalion, 1st Battalion of the 32nd Regiment, and the 31st Tank Company of the 31st Regiment; The regimental combat team was commanded by Colonel Alan McLean, commander of the 31st Regiment. In total, McLean's contingent had a total of 3,200 soldiers, including 700 South Korean soldiers.
Colonel McLean and his deputy, Lieutenant Colonel Feith
Performance in the Battle of Chosin Lake
From 25 to 26 November, the vanguard of McLean's Task Force, the 1st Battalion of the 32nd Infantry Regiment, led by Lieutenant Colonel Fiss, received the Fifth Marine Regiment and redeployed to join the rest of the 1st Marine Division on the west side of Lake Chosin. However, due to delays in the redeployment of other members of the contingent, the 1st Battalion of the 32nd Infantry Regiment, occupying the most forward positions of the 5th Marine Regiment, was left unsupported and received no artillery fire support for a full day.
Most of the remaining forces of Task Force McLean arrived in the eastern chosin lake area on 27 November. McLean was one of the first to arrive, and he immediately drove a jeep to meet Feith. He confidently confirmed that the next day, whatever units were in hand, the task force would attack northward, and that the 1st Battalion of the 32nd Infantry Regiment would be the vanguard of the attack.
Half-track anti-aircraft gun car
McLean deployed troops from north to south in the approximate order of arrival: 1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry Regiment; McLean Forward Command Post (CP); 31st Heavy Mortar Company; 3st Battalion of 31st Infantry Regiment; Company A and B of 57th Field Artillery Battalion; Command Post of 57th Field Artillery Battalion and 8 anti-aircraft artillery vehicles; and finally 31st Infantry Regiment Headquarters, located in a schoolhouse in Houpu, with 22 tanks of the 31st Tank Company. Company C of the 57th Field Artillery Battalion and the 2nd Battalion of the 31st Infantry Regiment were left behind and had not yet left the Toyoyama area.
Later in the day, McLean ordered the Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon of the 31st Regiment to reconnoiter enemy positions. The platoon was ambushed by Chinese volunteers on a hill near Lake Chosin, and the soldiers were either killed or captured.
That night, McLean and Brigadier General B. Hankholtz, assistant division commander of the 7th Infantry Division, drew up a final plan for the next day's offensive. He then went to Fors to finalize the details of the offensive plan. While McLean and Fiss remain confident, McLean Task Force is already facing serious problems. In addition to the disappearance of intelligence and reconnaissance platoons, communication between dispersed units was poor at best. There was no time to lay mines, and radio communications were almost non-existent. In addition, the task force did not have radio contact with the Seventh Infantry Division in Toyosan or the Marines stationed in Hagaru-ri.
The scattered units of Task Force McLean were dangerously isolated, isolated not only from the Seventh Infantry Division and other units of the Marine Corps, but also from each other.
In addition, without the knowledge of the Marines and McLean Task Force, a large number of volunteer units were preparing to attack the scattered units of the US Tenth Army on the evening of the 27th. Three divisions of the Chinese Volunteer Army (the 59th, 79th, and 89th Divisions) will strike marines stationed in Hagaru-ri and Liutan-ri, the U.S. 7th Infantry Division, the U.S. 3rd Infantry Division, and U.S. troops further afield, and the Volunteer 80th Division will strike McLean Task Force.
On 27 November, the Tenth Army began its offensive, with the 5th and 7th Marine Regiments attacking from Ryutan-ri along the western flank of Lake Chosin. The Marines were initially reluctant to attack, and only advanced 1500 yards before encountering stubborn resistance from the Chinese volunteers, suffering heavy casualties. After dark, in zero-degree weather, the volunteers began to attack. Two divisions attacked the Fifth and Seventh Marine Regiments head-on, and the third division cut off the road between Yanagitan-ri and Hagaru-ri. Other units of another division also attacked the Seventh Regiment. The situation soon plunged the U.S. military around Lake Chosin into despair.
East of the Chosin Lake Reservoir, the situation is equally chaotic. In the evening, the Volunteer 80th Division surrounded the unsuspecting units of McLean's Task Force. At about 22:00, the division attacked in the darkness, the volunteer soldiers blew their horns and launched an attack, and the isolated American troops were isolated from each other and could only fight for survival.
The 1st Battalion of The 32nd Infantry Regiment of Fiss was the first target of the Volunteers' attack on the northern flank of its outer flank. Marine Corps Captain Edward M. P. Stamford was the forward air controller sent to the task force, who took over command of the A Company after the death of its commander, while also calling for Marine air strikes. Although Marine Aircraft and the 1st Battalion of the 32nd Infantry Regiment inflicted heavy casualties on the Volunteer forces, the battalion suffered more than 100 casualties.
A few miles to the south, the situation is similar. The Volunteers attacked two artillery companies of the 3rd Battalion of the 3st Infantry Regiment and the 57th Field Artillery Battalion, breaking through most of the American lines, and most of the senior American officers were either killed or wounded.
The fighting went on all night, and fearing American air raids, the Volunteer forces finally retreated at dawn. Like the 1st Battalion of the 32nd Infantry Regiment, the 3rd Battalion of the 31st Regiment and the 57th Field Artillery Battalion suffered heavy casualties, with one of the anti-aircraft gun vehicles destroyed. In addition, the medical company of the 31st Regiment was wiped out. Brigadier General Holtz, who had returned to the rear command post of the 31st Regiment, heard the fierce gunfire from the north and immediately felt that something was wrong. He soon ordered Lieutenant Robert E. Lee to resign. E. Drake led two platoons of the 31st Tank Company to the border between the 3rd Battalion of the 31st Regiment and the 1st Battalion of the 32nd Regiment. However, Drake's rescue column soon fell into trouble. Some tanks slipped out of control on the icy road, while others got stuck in the mud. The column was then attacked by American rocket launchers captured by volunteers. Two tanks were destroyed, followed by a fierce battle, with volunteer troops flocking to try to open the tank hatches. Two more tanks got bogged down and had to give up. The remaining 12 tanks were ordered to return to Hudong. Once the tanks returned, Hodder soon realized that McLean's task force was in serious trouble. He borrowed a tank and rode it to Shimogaru to ask for help.
At about 13:00 on 28 November, Major General Almond flew to the outer position of the 1st Battalion of the 32nd Regiment to negotiate with McLean and Fiss. Unaware of the crisis at hand, Almond announced that McLean's task force would continue to attack, claiming that the Chinese facing them was nothing more than a remnant of the retreating force. He went on to add, "We're going all the way to the Yalu River. Don't let a bunch of Chinese washers stop you. ”
For Almond, who did not listen to the advice regardless of the facts and did not care about the lives of his subordinates, the AMERICAN troops present dared to be angry and did not dare to speak. Before leaving, Almond remembered the three Silver Star Medals he had brought and handed them to Lieutenant Colonel Feith and the others. As soon as he was on his front foot, Feith threw the Silver Star Medal into the snowdrift.
Took over as contingent commander
On the morning of the 29th day of the day after Almond left, mcLean, the commander of the 31st Regiment, was seriously wounded and killed, plus the commander of the 3rd Battalion of the 31st Regiment and the commander of the 57th Artillery Battalion were seriously injured, and the American troops in Xinxingli were commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Feith. Now, this team has officially become the "Fester Detachment".
Dave Barr, commander of the 7th Infantry Division, arrived by helicopter, giving Feith more bad news. All units of the Tenth Army, including the Feste Detachment, now under the command of the Marines, would be withdrawn. The Marines would provide air support to Fiss, but other than that, the soldiers were on their own. To make matters worse, the task force has many wounded, which will make their withdrawal more difficult. In addition, the command post of the 31st Infantry Regiment, the 31st Tank Company, and the headquarters of the 57th Artillery Battalion had withdrawn from Hudong for Hagaru-ri, further isolating the Feste detachment.
Destroyed U.S. convoys
At about eight o'clock in the afternoon, Chinese volunteer troops launched another attack. The Fester detachment suffered another 100 casualties. Fiss quickly concluded that his troops were not immune from another major attack. He gathered the remaining officers and told them they were ready to evacuate at 12 o'clock. The task force, after destroying its artillery, mortars and other equipment, began moving south, carrying 600 wounded people on 30 trucks.
Led by a 40mm twin-engine anti-aircraft gun vehicle, the formation began to move around 1 p.m. It was immediately attacked. Stamford called for Marine Air Support, but the lead plane's petrol bombs were thrown at the front of the column, engulfing several soldiers and causing panic throughout the task force.
The situation deteriorated rapidly. Fire from the flanks killed many of the wounded on the truck. The fire became more intense when the convoy reached Highland 1221, which was the surrounding vantage point. In the northern subterranean of the hill, the Volunteers blew up a bridge and had to delay the operation for two hours as the leading anti-aircraft gun truck had to drag 30 trucks across a small river. Then the barricades stopped the task force, while the volunteer troops on the hill maintained heavy fire. There is only one way to break through: take Hill 1221. Hundreds of soldiers rushed up the hill, including many wounded, some of whom said they would rather die in the attack than wait in trucks. Despite the heavy casualties, the men drove the volunteer troops out of most of the hills. However, many simply continue over the hillside and over the other side, venturing into the frozen reservoir and then walking towards the lower yuri.
The task force then encountered another obstacle at the narrow turn. Fiss led an attack to clear the enemy out. However, he was hit by fragments of enemy grenades and was mortally wounded. Once Fiss was lost, the command structure of the task force's belief collapsed. Robert Jones of the 1st Battalion of the 32nd Regiment described: "When Fiss was hit, the task force ceased to exist. Lieutenant Colonel Feith's bravery led him to be posthumously awarded the U.S. Military's highest honor, the Congressional Medal of Honor.
The remains were not confirmed until 62 years later
On April 10, 2013, the United States conducted DNA identification of a batch of remains excavated in the Chosin Lake area that year, and confirmed that one of the bodies was Lieutenant Colonel Feith, commander of the 31st Regiment (Polar Bear Regiment) of the 7th Division, although our military's war history says he was killed, but the United States previously insisted that he was missing. His family has not been able to enjoy survivorship treatment because he is not on the list of dead. After 66 years of disappearance, Lieutenant Colonel Fiss was finally killed.
The death certification of the US military is very strict, and the first requirement is that it must be killed on the spot while performing a combat mission. The death of the U.S. military is literally translated as killed in action (KIA), which is defined as death due to enemy fire before arriving at a medical facility, and the death after arriving at a medical facility is called DoW (Die of wounds died of war wounds). If there is still a breath to be dragged on the stretcher, even if the breath is swallowed immediately, it can only be counted as DoW. Second, there must be conclusive evidence that the person was killed by an enemy firearm, otherwise it can only be recorded as an "accident death". The third is that the body of the deceased must be found by his comrades-in-arms, and the identity (face) can be identified, and the identity tag of the person can also be collected.