Generally speaking, forwarding combat experience is usually a very beautiful battle battle. It is extremely rare for the Central Military Commission to forward combat experience at the highest level. For example, during the Liberation War, Su Yu fought seven battles and seven victories, and Xu Xiangqian fought the Jinzhong Campaign, which were classic battles in the classics, so his combat experience was forwarded to the whole army at the level of the Central Military Commission.
Judging from the content of forwarding combat experience, it is generally nothing more than the content of good reconnaissance of the enemy's situation, good deployment of troops, good use of tactics, good command and control, and good coordination and cooperation.
However, in the western front of the second campaign to resist US aggression and aid Korea, the 38th Army, which played the name of "Long Live the Army," also reported a summary of combat experience after the war. What people did not expect was that chairman Mao Zedong personally drafted and forwarded the summary of the combat experience of the whole army on December 18, 1950, with a total of 9 articles, the first of which was: "Carrying enough dry food is the main guarantee for the smooth progress of the campaign."
Let's look at the other 8 operational experiences: there are mobile precautions, there are strengthening observation and liaison, there are interspersed detours, there are various tactical applications, and so on.
We cannot help but ask why the 38th Army, which fought the name of the "Long Live Army" in the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, the 38th Army, which fought the most classic battle, and the 38th Army, which played the "loveliest man," summed up the fact that carrying enough dry food as the first important combat experience and as the main guarantee for the smooth progress of the campaign?
First, it is because they have a profound understanding of the logistics of modern warfare.
Our army's understanding of the logistical importance of fighting a modern war should be said to have begun in the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea. The same was true of the 38th Army. As one of the first units to enter the Korean War, in fact, in the first battle, after the 38th Army received the enemy in Xichuan and launched a combat march, due to the logistical support could not keep up, "most of the troops in the frontal garrison stage had reached the situation of running out of ammunition and food", thus affecting the smooth progress of the entire battle. This gives a good lesson to the logistics support work of the 38th Army.
In particular, foreign wars do not have the same strong support as in civil wars. This undoubtedly posed a greater problem for the logistical support of the Volunteer Army. It also enabled the 38th Army to think of everything it wanted and was anxious in terms of logistical support, especially grain and grain support, so as to ensure that when the entire campaign was implemented, it could be supplied in a timely and effective manner.
Second, it was because their pre-war logistics, especially grain and grain, were fully in place.
Commander Liang Xingchu attached great importance to logistics support work, and he asked the logistics department to rush the required materials for three days before the launch of the second campaign, that is, before November 19. In order to strengthen the organization and leadership of this work, Comrade Wu Dai, director of the Political Department of the Division of Labor of the Standing Committee of the 38th Army, was responsible for leading the logistics work, and sent 60 people from the Minister of Military Security, the Minister of Democracy Movement, and the Cultural and Labor Corps to participate in the logistics work.
At that time, the logistics of the 38th Army was divided into two military stations. In order to ensure the smooth supply of the campaign, the two stations launched a surprise call to raise supplies from November 14 to 16. The 1st military station has a total of "1489195 kilograms of grain reserves and 7340 kilograms of side food"; the 2nd military station is prepared for "95640 kilograms of grain and nearly 10000 kilograms of side food".
Not only that, the logistics department also extensively launched "the use of shovels, iron slices, stone chips and other flaky cakes, fried beans, fried buds and rice flowers, and made a week of cooked food." Some combat detachments even replenished 10 days of food and some side food."
In addition, taking into account the various uncertainties in wartime, the Military Political Department also printed grain loan certificates and issued them to the troops separately in order to raise and purchase grain in a timely manner during the battle.
Undoubtedly, the 38th Army has exhausted its wisdom and methods in logistical support, especially grain and grain support, and has made full logistical support preparations for the smooth implementation of the second campaign.
The third is because they have enough backup dry food to ensure a large range of long-term interspersed detours back to the position.
The reason why the 38th Army played the name of "Long Live the Army" in the second campaign was mainly because the army fought well in the battle interspersed with detours. In particular, the interspersed Sansho-ri, Longyuan-ri, and blocking the main points of Songgu peak played a crucial role in the total victory of the campaign.
And this kind of large-scale and long-term interspersed and roundabout operations undoubtedly puts forward extremely high requirements for logistical support. In fact, the 113th Division's operation of Interspersed Sansholi was already three days after the campaign was launched. Without enough backup dry food, it is hard to imagine interspersing 70 kilometers day and night, with the enemy interspersed in place in 5 minutes before the battle begins. It is hard to imagine being able to divide the troops into Dragon Source after that. In the next few days of fighting, if there is no dry food, let alone continue to fight the battle bravely, and the light is hungry and hungry.
The operations of the 9th Corps on the Eastern Front are a good example of this. In fact, when the enemy general retreated at the Chosin Lake Campaign and I carried out the campaign pursuit, because the soldiers had not eaten for several days, there was already a phenomenon of interspersed and unmoving. Only a few frozen potatoes in the movie "Chosin Lake" are a true portrayal of the main dry food of the 9 Corps at that time. In fact, later, even frozen potatoes were not guaranteed. It can be said that this has become another lifeline for the 9th Corps to expand the annihilation of the achievements of the US First Marine Division in the Eastern Front, in addition to the extremely cold weather.
Of course, we are not here to compare the logistics of the 9 Corps with the poor performance. After all, the 9th Corps rushed into the DPRK to fight, after all, it was a covert engagement, and all kinds of logistical support were simply too late to do. This is just a question of the importance of logistics in fighting modern warfare.
Analyzing this, we cannot help but feel that the 38th Army of the "Banzai Army" regarded carrying enough dry food as the first important combat experience; although it was too ordinary to be ordinary, and it was too simple to be simple, it was the most practical, effective, and simple experience of the second campaign to resist US aggression and aid Korea, and it was also an experience that still makes us cry today. This ordinary and practical experience precisely reflects the profound truth that we must pay attention to logistics in fighting modern warfare.
Main references: "Mao Zedong's Military Writings", "History of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea", "Military History of the 38th Army"