Li Hao: A new exploration of the relationship between the Qing Dynasty and Afghanistan during the Qianlong period

Early contact between the Qing Dynasty and Afghanistan: two empires that met on the Pamir Plateau

In the twenty-fourth year of Qianlong (1759), when the Qing Dynasty finally eliminated the Dzungars after a long war, quelled the rebellion of Dazhonghe and Zhuo, unified the north and south roads of the Tianshan Mountains, and once again extended the territory of the Central Plains Dynasty to the Pamir Plateau, the political structure of western Central Asia was also in fierce turmoil and reorganization. By the middle of the 18th century, the Astrakhan dynasty of the Bukhara Khanate, which had previously dominated Central Asia, had collapsed in name only after endless infighting between Uzbek tribes and the invasion of the Persian conqueror Nadir Shah. In July 1747, Ahmed, the Pashtun tribal chief who had been a general under Nadir Shah, became king in Kandahar (1), founded the Durrani Empire, the predecessor of the modern Afghan nation-state, and expanded during his reign, conquering a vast area from Khorasan in the west to Kashmir in the east, to the Amu Darya River in the north, and to the Indus Valley in the south. ［１］［ｐ． 223-228] Around 1751, Ahmed Shah launched an expedition "to subdue Balkh, Badakhshan (2) and other provinces north of Hindu Kush",[2][p. 595] Extending its power to the southwestern Pamir Plateau, it met the Qing Dynasty, which entered Central Asia at the same time.

In the course of the war of unification, the Qing Dynasty had already had direct contacts with some Central Asian regimes west of the Pamir, thus gaining an understanding of the rise of Afghanistan in Central Asia. For example, after the Qing Dynasty asked the Qing Dynasty to capture Ando, the ruler of Badak Mountain, Suletansha explained to the Qing envoys the difficult situation he faced: "I believe in the classics and send others to people who have no self-restraint. If we make sacrifices immediately, there will be trouble in the enemy of our neighbors Ehan and Tarbass"; when Dahe and Zhuo were imprisoned, "Hundus led five thousand troops, did not remember the descendants of the Sultan Sha faction Habar (3), plundered all the way, and extorted two and Zhuo Mu"; when the Qing envoy resigned, "Sultan Sha immediately led two thousand troops to the army of Hun Dus". ［３］［ｐ． 942] Of these, "Ehan" means Afghanistan. As early as the Dzungars' power, BadakShan, which had been feuding with the surrounding countries as a springboard for its invasion of Central Asia,[4] was at this time even more embattled by the opposition of religious forces for the capture of Dashao and Zhuo,[5] and was even more powerless to resist Afghanistan, which was behind the support of Kunduz and other regimes, and had to submit to it. In the twenty-fifth year of Qianlong (1760), after incorporating kokand and Badakshan into the Qing dynasty's clan system, the Qing government also sent envoys to the Bukhara Khanate and Chendustan (4), with the intention of going forward

Establish official ties with local authorities,[6] but from later history

___________________

(1) Ahmed called the queen herself Ahmet Shah, and "Shah" means king.

(2) The Badak Mountains are an ancient Central Asian country located in the western part of the Pamir Plateau, adjacent to and controlling important traffic channels ——— the Wakhan Corridor.

(3) That is, the ruler of Badak Mountain, Suletansha, the same below.

(4) Present-day Pakistan and the northern part of India.

See, these goals were not achieved (1), but these activities were undoubtedly of great help to the Qing government in improving its understanding of the Central Asian countries, including Afghanistan.

It should be noted that BadakShan not only established a clan relationship with the Qing Dynasty, but also submitted to Afghanistan, which means that it is in a state of instability of "two genera" in the two major empires of the Qing Dynasty and Afghanistan. The Qing government was not unaware of this situation in Badak Mountain. According to qing dynasty historical records: "In the twenty-fourth year of Qianlong, the large soldiers of The Great Army, who were chased by Huo Jizhan, would enter the territory of AiWuhan (2) and sacrifice them for the chieftain of badak Mountain, Suertansha, and his subordinates, who were ben ai Wuhan, had the sentiment to tell Ahmer Tsha (3) that if they were killed in Huo Jizhan's opinion, they would be blamed on Mount Badak and sent to the badakh mountain first." Sultan Sha was afraid, and sent two lamps and Wen Qi to the Emperor, and said that Huo Ji occupied the favor of the Great Emperor, and the army in the interior was very strong, and if he did not capture the Badak Mountain as a ruin, all the last resorts" [7][p. 440] From this, it can be seen that the Qing government was well aware of the fact that BadakShan surrendered to Afghanistan and even contributed what the Qing Dynasty had given to Ahmad Shah. Another example is that in the thirty-fourth year of Qianlong (1769), when the Afghan and Kundushi armies attacked the Badak Mountains, Suletansha asked the Qing army for assistance, otherwise they would "surrender to AiWuhan", to which Emperor Gaozong ordered Ermin and Zhuo to refute it: "Er used to offer things to Aiwuhan, and I have heard about it earlier. Now he was poor and scheming, but he had paid tribute to Aiwuhan. ”［８］

Just as Emperor Gaozong acquiesced to the kazakh middle account as a "two genus" between the Qing Dynasty and Russia,[9][p. [169] The Qing government's "tolerant" attitude was, on the one hand, due to its reluctance to invest too much energy in running Central Asia as a barbaric land on the edge of the world, and on the other hand, out of jealousy of the great power of the countries concerned. The Qing government has mastered intelligence through various channels and has realized that Afghanistan's strength cannot be underestimated. For example, in September of the twenty-seventh year of Qianlong (1762), the Yeerqiang office was all unified with the new pillar and other reports: "The leader of Wen Aiwuhan, Ahmet Sha, attacked the Chendustan tribe by bullying, took the city of Zanabat, and defended it with Aqimu Burke. Self-contained in the city of Lagour. And the old leader of the Kashmiri tribe, named Sekzhuan, Ahmet Sha ordered him to see and not to follow. Tens of thousands of troops attacked it, and Seik was defeated and sent to his subordinates. Ahmet Shapo can sympathize with farmers and merchants, such as the ancient Nisirwan, sheep and tigers cohabitation, and do not harm each other, etc. [10] Ahmed Shah has been committed to the conquest of Northern India since the beginning of his reign, and the reports of Shinju and others should reflect Ahmed Shah's fourth invasion of Punjab between 1756 and 1757, followed by a war with the Marathas and quelling rebellions in the Kashmir region. ［１］［ｐ． 225-226] Given Afghanistan's strength and belligerence, the Qing government has always been quite cautious in formulating foreign policy involving the country. For example, in the twenty-seventh year of Qianlong (1762), Xinzhu and others played the title of "Kashmir (4) of Yasperk, sent its leader Gulban Burke into the song chapter, according to the translation: Ni Yasperk is a Kashgar, living in Zanabat, because of chaos in Kashmir. There were about four or five hundred households in the cities of Yeerqiang and other cities, and they were willing to migrate inward. Jasperk led his leader into the court and wanted to take Kashmir for sacrifice." In this regard, Emperor Gaozong expressed his agreement with Xinzhu and others that "the Kashmir Road is remote, the middle is estranged from Tumut, and the whip is beyond reach; and it is owned by AiWuhan and Ai Hammet Shah", so it is "not necessary to handle it", instructing "Niyasbock to allow him to enter the waiting order, and there is no need to talk about the matter of Kashmir". ［１１］

To sum up, in the early days of the reunification of Xinjiang, the Qing government, on the basis of its understanding of Afghanistan's national strength and its influence over the surrounding areas of Xinjiang, followed its long-standing and clear understanding of the countries west of the Pamir as "the so-called return to Theras, but the subordinate states, such as Annam, Ryukyu, and Siam, and the Heavenly Dynasty"[12], and proceeded from the fundamental purpose of maintaining xinjiang's security and stability, hoping to "restrain the part of the country, always guard the border, and avoid trouble"[13]. Afghanistan has adopted an attitude of avoiding conflict as much as possible, acknowledging its sphere of influence and carefully maintaining peace between the two countries, but there is no strong will to establish and develop official relations with it. In short, the Qing government's Central Asian policy was content to maintain the status quo. However, "the trees want to be quiet and the wind is not stopping", and Ahmet Shah, who harbors imperial ambitions, will never turn a blind eye to the Qing Dynasty, whose influence has crossed the Pamir Plateau. As Afghanistan continued to act unilaterally, its relationship with the Qing Dynasty soon became complicated.

(1) The Bukhara Khanate sent envoys in the 29th year of Qianlong and the 21st year of Jiaqing to try to establish official ties with the Qing Dynasty without success. The events of the twenty-ninth year of Qianlong are described below. For the twenty-first year of Jiaqing, see: "The Bingbu "Copied out the Suna et al. For the Cabinet" Transfer meeting, "Ming and Qing Historical Materials", Vol. 10, pp. 970-972; China's First Historical Archive: Record of the Second Recital, "Kashgar Counsellor Wulong Aquan for The Purpose of Reviewing songfusuna to handle the situation of the Bugar Yi envoy", file number 03-2816-053; "Former Kashgar deputy minister Gong Chuke Zhabu played for demotion to call Xie Enshi", file number 03-2866-014.

(2) i.e. Afghanistan.

(3) That is, the Ruler of Afghanistan, Ahmad Shah, the same below.

(4) That is, the present-day Kashmir region, the same below.

Second, the "controversy over etiquette" and the change in the Qing government's policy toward Afghanistan

In September of the twenty-seventh year of Qianlong (1762), Xinzhu and others reported to the Qing court: "On the sixth day of the first month, The Badak Mountain (1) Murat Burke and others came to trade, and told them that before they set out, Wen Aiwuhan wanted to send envoys to Gongma and had arrived at The Badak Mountain. I waited for the leader, Suletansha, and sent envoys to Beijing with me." [14] The fact that badakshan's envoys accompanied the Afghan envoys to Beijing shows to some extent that Badakshan's belonging to Afghanistan has the political implications. However, the Qing government did not express any objection to this and attached great importance to the "tribute" of Afghan envoys. Emperor Gaozong specifically instructed: "AiWuhan is a large tribe. It makes people travel through the interior for the first time, and the heavens and the dynasty have never seen it. All who pass through the provincial capitals should prepare feasts and display dramas to show their richness and seriousness",[15] and prepared to send special envoys to accompany the Afghan mission back to the country,[16] expressing their willingness to establish stable relations with the other side. However, the performance of the Afghan envoys disappointed Emperor Gaozong. In the records of the official revision history, the process of "tribute" was smooth,[17][p. 587] Afghanistan was thus listed as a vassal state of the Qing Dynasty along with Kokand and Badak Mountain. But in fact, these records deliberately conceal the diplomatic storm caused by the "etiquette" issue in this "tribute".

Examining the relevant documents, it can be seen that in the first month of the twenty-eighth year of Qianlong (1763), Emperor Gaozong instructed Xinzhu and others: "After the envoys of Aiwuhan arrived, although they knelt down to present the chapter, they refused to kowtow, and pleaded that they still make the pilgrimage with the courtesy of Yi and so on. The Minister of Military Aircraft and others rebuked him: What is the purpose of Erhan's dispatch of Ru, is it not that he has come to the Hajj? The Great Emperor was the unified king of the world, and not only did he love Uhan, but all Russians, Westerners, and former Dzungars came to the court, and all of them did not bow down. If the king is like heaven, doesn't he worship heaven? etc. Repeatedly, he and Zhuo Fang turned to prostration, but in the end they were reluctant." [18] The refusal of Afghan envoys to kowtow was not only a matter of face for Emperor Gaozong, but its essential significance was that the refusal to identify with the world order centered on the "Heavenly Dynasty" and the hierarchical order between the monarchs and vassals was a denial of the traditional worldview that underpinned the legitimacy of Qing rule. This undoubtedly created a very bad impression on the Qing dynasty ruling clique headed by Emperor Gaozong, and made it more vigilant against the Central Asian powers represented by Afghanistan.

The Russian account of the matter, which was then active in Central Asia, can also be contrasted with the Chinese account: "According to Ф. Gordieyev, the Afghan Shah Ahmad informed in a letter to the Kazakh Sultan Abu Ghaz, that he had sent a mission of 40 men to see Bogda Khan, and (2) expressed such words as the Great Greeting: '... Bogda Khan does not seem to be an Islamic ruler, but if he does not absorb other Muslims in his territory, there are absolutely no Muslims from Kashgar and Arqiang (Yarkand);" He (Ahmad Shah) also took diplomatic action, sending a mission to Beijing to protest the Qing Empire's occupation of East Turkistan. The Qianlong Emperor defended himself by saying that the Uyghurs and Zhuo were ungrateful people who rebelled against their benefactors when they were freed from the shackles of the Dzungars. The Qing dynasty made concessions under pressure from Ahmad Shah and other Muslim rulers because it prioritized efforts to control the descendants of uighurs and zhuo through diplomatic means." ［１９］［ｐ． 219] These contents, which were reported to the relevant Russian institutions as a basis for their formulation of their Central Asian policy, may differ from the actual situation, especially taking into account the reports made by Afghan envoys after their return, which are undoubtedly modified by their own positions, but still have important reference value.

Even the whitewashed records of the Qing Dynasty also have clues that show the significance of Afghanistan's "tribute". When receiving Afghan envoys, the Qing government, in addition to arranging activities such as visits and banquets as usual, also specially invited them to observe the large-scale military parades and exercises of the Eight Banners Army. Judging from the edict issued by Emperor Gaozong later, the military parade was an ad hoc decision. [20] Apparently, after perceiving the unfriendly and even confrontational posture of the Afghan side, the Qing government demonstrated its force through military parades to achieve the purpose of deterrence. In the letter of state submitted by the Afghan envoys, in addition to the euphemistic diplomatic rhetoric, they boasted about the Panipat victory that the country's army had just won against the Marathas in northern India, flaunting the martial arts of Ahmad Shah, which in fact implied the use of force to intimidate the Qing Dynasty. In this regard, Emperor Gaozong commented: "As the co-lord of the world, China and foreign countries are regarded as one, rewarding the good and punishing the evil, but only by being impartial." Er this time the factor Letansha lyrical dispatch, its rational observance can be known. And as Erqu played, for several years of fighting everywhere, there was no peace. Zel's people are also very laborious. Shang Qi and Xie Linfeng, recuperate their subordinates, and enjoy the blessings of peace for the masses, so as to receive the blessings of infinity",[20] Despite the euphemism, he actually criticized Ahmet Shah

(1) i.e. Badak Mountain, the same below.

(2) That is, the emperor of the Qing Dynasty.

He's poor soldiers. When the Afghan envoys returned home, Emperor Gaozong instructed "Ai Uhan to love HammetSha, and send the envoy to the shrine for the first time." He sent down to the governors of the provinces and feasted along the way. Now that the envoys have finished their ceremonies and returned to the nomadic places of Iraq, the items that should be supplied should still be taken care of in compromise, and there is no need for a feast." [21] Although not specifically stated, it is clear that dissatisfaction with his disrespectful behavior led to a deliberate reduction in the reception specifications on the return journey.

As for the policy toward Afghanistan under the new situation, Emperor Gaozong also set the tone in the letters sent to Xinzhu and others, and made specific arrangements: "As for Aiwuhan, I originally wanted to send envoys, and now looking at the behavior of his envoys, it is clear that Aiwuhan is not a reasonable tribe... Looking at the manners of the envoys sent by AiWuhan, it is clear that Ai Hammetsha is not a man who keeps to himself. Over time, I am afraid that the Badakshan people, or people who are in place with Andijan and so on, will wait for the opportunity to gather and harass me and return to Xinjiang, and nothing can be determined. ...... Now that we have this matter in Xinjiang, it is also advisable to make preparations. He wrote an edict to Xinzhu, Emin and Zhuo, Yonggui, Mingrui, etc., to postpone the handling of Kazakh affairs, to deal with the return to Xinjiang with all their strength, and once the troops were used, they would follow the instructions of the successive edicts. [18] Gaozong's attitude actually shows that the Qing government has viewed Afghanistan as a major potential threat to Xinjiang's security and stability.

Further ahead, the new understanding of Afghanistan has also affected the entire Central Asian policy of the Qing government. In the 29th year of Qianlong (1764), the monarch of Badak Mountain, SuletanSha, wrote that "now there are two people from NorrosBok and DayarBok of Buhar (1) to The Badak Mountain. After hearing that I was attached to it, I was blessed with great favor, and his Khan Abul Kazi (2) and other willingness to be attached." This situation is very similar to the original Afghan envoy, but this time the Qing government did not answer his request. [22] Although this is related to the poor relations between the Qing government and Badakshan at that time, it also reflects that since Afghanistan challenged the Qing Dynasty's "Heavenly Dynasty" order, the Qing government was particularly cautious about further developing relations with Central Asian countries, and was reluctant to show anything until the "sincerity" of the other side was fully examined. In fact, the Qing government never established official relations with other Central Asian countries. The Qing government called Afghanistan "the extreme western frontier of hui west of the Onion Ridge" and considered it "the West Sea beyond this",[23][p. 102] This understanding is clearly false in terms of world geography, but it truly reflects the limits of Qing official diplomacy in Central Asia.

Third, the so-called "anti-Qing alliance" examination

So what are the real attitudes and intentions of the Afghan monarch Ahmet Shah, corresponding to the Policy Shift of the Qing Government? Foreign scholars, mainly based on Russian historical materials, generally believe that Ahmad Shah at that time proceeded from a religious standpoint, harbored deep hostility towards the Qing Dynasty, and organized a military alliance against the Qing Dynasty. ［２４］［ｐ． 122] Chinese scholars often do not fully agree with this view. As Pan Zhiping pointed out: "It was possible that Kokand and other Central Asian ministries were once suspicious and wary of the Qing. The so-called Kokand, Bukhara, Kazakh and Aiwuhan ministries in Russian historical materials are secretly connected to each other, which is probably a reflection of this political situation. But in the face of facts, his doubts and wariness eventually disappeared." ［２５］［ｐ． 30] In fact, based on the afghan Shichen's performance during the "tribute", it can be assumed that Ahmad Shah did have a certain degree of hostility and confrontation towards the Qing Dynasty. However, the nature, purpose, duration and actual role of the so-called "anti-Qing alliance" are debatable.

As mentioned above, due to the rude behavior of afghan envoys, Gojong effectively suspended official contacts with Afghanistan, and there has been little direct contact between the two sides since then. Kokand, who was said to have joined the so-called "anti-Qing alliance," had a conflict with the Qing government because its monarch Erdenibek attempted to occupy the Esh region owned by the Qing Dynasty' subordinates, and the negotiations between the two sides were relatively frequent, and the signs of the tandem between Afghanistan and Kokand were revealed in the process of negotiations between the Qing and Hao sides around the Osh dispute. According to Russian sources, afghan troops appear to have reached between Kokand and Tashkent in 1763, but were soon withdrawn. ［２６］［ｐ． 462] In fact, various Qing Dynasty historical records of the tandem activities of central Asian regimes around Xinjiang occurred in the 29th year of Qianlong (1764). For example, in May of that year, Nashtong said: "The minister Voss Erdene and Ai hammet sha are good, and the love is unpredictable." Now, according to Akbark and others, the visit to Ai Hamotsha was trapped by Daiyinsha, who was not enough to rely on, and who intimidated the army, and was obedient with affectionate words." [27] In September, the Ili side received news: "Since the Kazakhs came to vote for Erut and other courtesies, Kokand Erdenibek and Kazakh Taiji Abu Rao and others sent envoys to exchanges, but after we garrisoned Ili, Yi and others joined forces with the white hat tribe to try to strengthen and other reasons." [28] In November, Mingrui et al. played: "The Tote documents submitted by kazakh Abbes, Tszebötekji, etc. are called ,...... Now Inbruth sent someone to make a date with Abrebis and Abu Ghaz to discuss reconciliation, and now Abrebis and Abu Ghraibir went to the other place and waited for the cause. ...... It is not known whether Yi was related to Erdenebok or used the excuse of reconciliation and yin communication." ［２９］

(1) i.e. the Khanate of Bukhara, the same below.

(2) Abul Gazi, that is, the then Bukhara Khan Abul. Abūl Ghāzī.

From these records, it can be seen that the central position in these tandem activities, and which was particularly valued by the Qing government, was not the "ally lord" of the so-called "anti-Qing alliance", but Ahmad Shah, who was already exhausted by the military defeat in North India and the turmoil in the country.[30][p. 91-92] But Erdenibok of Kokand. The reason for this was that after the Abdul Layim Incident in the twenty-eighth year of Qianlong (1763), Erdenibek feared that the Qing Dynasty would therefore use troops against Kokand and took many precautions, including contacting foreign aid everywhere. [32] However, these activities are unlikely to be effective: Ahmad Shah, who may have played a leading role, is taking care of himself; the rulers of Khozante and Uratpe (1) west of the Fergana Valley are attacking Erdene; (2) the nomadic Kazakh ministries also have intractable conflicts of interest with Central Asian regimes such as Kokand, and (3) in this case it is clear that it is difficult to unite these regimes by religious factors alone.

Thus, the context of the so-called "anti-Qing alliance" is roughly as follows: in order to consolidate its conquest of the southwestern Pamir region and lay the foundation for further expansion north of the Hindu Kush Mountains, Ahmet Shah wanted to fill the power vacuum left behind by the collapse of the Dzungars, so he took advantage of the suspicion of the surrounding regimes in Xinjiang about the Qing Dynasty and tried to establish an image of a leader in the local area with a call for common religious beliefs. To this end, Ahmad Shah presented himself as the representative of the "Islamic world" in Central Asia and sent envoys to "demonstrate" to the Qing Dynasty. He may have intended to take further action to exclude the Qing forces, but soon due to changes in Afghanistan and northern India, his attempts for further expansion had been dashed, and he naturally had no intention of investing resources north of the Hindu Kush Mountains. As for Kokand, which had disputed with the Qing Dynasty for its attempt to expand to the East, it hoped to use Ahmed Shah's prestige to continue relations between the Central Asian countries in order to compete with the Qing Dynasty, but because the contradictions between these regimes were actually far greater than the contradictions and conflicts between them and the Qing Dynasty, this purpose could not be achieved. Common religious beliefs are the main possible basis for the so-called "anti-Qing alliance", but although at the convenience of time, the rulers of Central Asia often use the banner of religion to create a legal basis for their expansion and plunder, but after all, religion is only a tool, as long as more benefits can be obtained, the monarchs of various countries are willing to fight with the neighboring countries of the "same religion" and shake hands with the "pagan" Qing government.

Even if the so-called "anti-Qing alliance" in Central Asia once existed, or had a tendency to form, it could only be a very short period when the Qing Dynasty had just unified Xinjiang and Ahmad Shah shifted the spearhead of expansion to the north of the Hindu Kush Mountains, and its scope and role were very limited. Compared with the frequent disputes between the Central Asian countries, the relationship between these regimes and the Qing Dynasty was the most peaceful. As for the Qing government, it finally made a compromise with Kokand on the issue of Eshi,[25][p. 172] It was determined by the conservative nature of the Qing Dynasty's Central Asian policy, not by external threats. During the Ush Incident in the thirtieth year of Qianlong (1765), the rebels sent messengers to Kokand for help, only to be intercepted by the Brut tribe loyal to the Qing Dynasty. Emperor Gaozong was once worried about the internal and external collusion of the anti-Qing forces, but the facts showed that the monarch of Kokand did not care about Ush, and the matter was closed. [33] According to this, some records link the Ush Incident to the so-called "anti-Qing alliance" in order to exaggerate the existence and scope of this "alliance", such as the Mingrui biography of the Qing History Manuscript that "[Ush] thieves waited for Aid from Afghanistan, but tied up and sacrificed forty-two people, including Eemmutula"; Kuropatkin wrote in Kashgar: "The people of Ush expected the help promised to them (by the anti-Qing alliance) and first revolted.". But it is difficult to find clues to the connection between the Ush rioters and Afghanistan, both in the official historiography and archival materials.

In addition to the Ush Incident, the subsequent Afghan invasion of Badak Hill was seen by some foreigners as related to the activities of the so-called "anti-Qing coalition",[24][p. 122] But this is also clearly inconsistent with historical facts. Thirty years after Qianlong (1765), the surrounding regimes in Xinjiang that had been in contact with Ahmad Shah maintained peaceful and friendly relations with the Qing government, but they were constantly fighting with each other. For example, in the thirty-second year of Qianlong (1767), a fierce war broke out between Kokand and the Kazakh Middle Tent for the city of Tashkent, and the Kazakh Middle Tent Khan Abu Rao also did this

(1) Uratpe, adjacent to Hozante, was jointly under the rule of the Pisel regime.

(2) Khozante, nominally a dependency of the Khanate of Bukhara, is in fact in a state of independence. Known as the "Hozante Gate", it was a central Asian traffic channel that the rulers of Kokand spared no effort to compete for.

(3) Kokand and Kazakh ministries fought repeated wars over the strategic city of Tashkent. See "Pacifying the Dzungar Strategy" Sequel Volume 16, Qianlong Twenty-seventh Year April Xin Wei; "Records of Emperor Gaozong of the Qing Dynasty" volume 792, Qianlong Thirty-second Year August Ugly, etc.

The Qing government was requested to support the artillery in order to besiege the city,[34] and the Qing government's attitude was to urge reconciliation between the two sides and arrange for the envoys of the two countries to go to Beijing for a pilgrimage to meet and interview. [35] Kazakh ministries maintained a solid clan relationship with the Qing Dynasty, performing various rights and obligations normally, and successive Khans regularly sent envoys on pilgrimages and accepted canonizations from the Qing government until the third year of Guangxu (1877). ［９］［ｐ． 136] Although Kokand had contradictions with the Qing Dynasty during the Qianlong period, since the expansion of the country at this time was mainly directed to the West, qing-Hao relations were stable, and Emperor Gaozong was generally satisfied with the "obedience" of Erdenibek and his heir Narbatu. [36] Foreign scholars also argue that "Erdene recognized the supreme rule of China" and that "he (Nalbhatu) united with China and clashed with Bukhara". [1] It can be seen that the so-called "anti-Qing alliance" around Xinjiang has completely disappeared by this point, and has nothing to do with the invasion of Badak Mountain in Afghanistan in the following years.

The Fall of the Badakshan Suletansha Regime: Afghanistan at the End of the Crossbow and the Self-Imposed Qing Dynasty

The war between BadakShan and Afghanistan is the result of developments in the local situation. In the 24th year of Qianlong (1759) and the 20th year (1763), the Monarch of BadakShan, Sultansha, under pressure from the Qing government, successively captured Dahe Zhuo and handed over his family,[37] angered the religious forces in Central Asia, and from then on, when neighboring countries attacked Badakshan, they often used this as an excuse. But fundamentally, the chaos in the Badak Mountains was due to the conservative and defensive Central Asian policy pursued by the Qing Dynasty after unifying Xinjiang, creating a power vacuum in the region west of the Pamir, which was originally under quasi-control, inducing Central Asian countries to compete with each other. In this situation, Kunduz and other Uzbek regimes, which had previously been intimidated by the power of the Quasi-Army, hoped to restore their rule over the Badak Mountains and constantly put pressure on Suletansha, who also hoped to maintain its former regional hegemony under the wing of the Quasi-Ministry, and fantasized about getting substantial support from the Qing Dynasty. As mentioned above, around the twenty-seventh year of Qianlong (1762), Suletansha was forced to submit to Ahmed Shah under pressure from many sides, but perhaps because Afghanistan was also unable to reconcile the tension between Badak Mountain and its surrounding regimes, the two countries fell into hostility shortly after. ［３８］

In the thirty-first year of Qianlong (1766), Suletansha submitted a letter to the minister of affairs in Yarkand, saying that "after Zahan Khan became the leader of Aiwuhan, he came to conquer Yizhinagong", and asked the Qing government to send envoys to mediate and provide military assistance on his behalf. Emperor Gaozong believed that this matter was caused by letansha's "hegemony of the Wari tribe", but if he wanted to use the qing dynasty's prestige to preserve his "nine departments", the Qing government naturally should not contribute to it. [39] However, developments soon showed that the nature of the war was much more than that. In the thirty-third year of Qianlong (1768), the Afghan officer Shawari Khan, together with the Kundus army and the opposition forces within BadakShan, coerced Samsak, the son of Yamato Chobrani Dun, and sent an army to attack Suletansha. Yonggui, then Counsellor General of Ush, suggested: "The nomadic land of Badak Mountain is my territory and must not be acquired by others. It is advisable to send one or two men from Yarkand and Kashgar Berkene to aiwuhan with a book, to explain the stakes, and to persuade aiwuhan to love Hamotsha, (1) to reclaim the nomadic herders of Mount Badak; if Aihamotsha does not comply, he will march into the army to pacify Mount Badak without arrogance. "This plan should be said to be reasonable. Badak Mountain, which guards the Pamir Plateau traffic channel, has been a strategic barrier to the western region since ancient times, and it is also one of the most important, earliest and most closely related vassals of the Qing Dynasty in Central Asia; if it is destroyed by other countries, it will not only greatly deteriorate the security situation in Xinjiang, but will also cause a heavy blow to the prestige of the Qing Dynasty in Central Asia, and as for the issue of Hezhuo descendants, it is more related to the core interests of the Qing government in maintaining the security and stability of Xinjiang.

Compared with the dispute between the Central Asian vassals that the Qing government had actively intervened in before, the impact of the Afghan invasion of Badak Mountain on the Qing Dynasty was much more serious, even though the objective conditions did not allow the Qing army to confront the Afghan army head-on, and it was the right way to communicate and indicate the Qing government's position. However, Emperor Gaozong ordered Yonggui and others to "not interfere in the dispute between Aiwuhan and Badakshan", and that it was "not necessary" to send envoys and send troops. Emperor Gaozong's reasoning was that although Badakshan was a vassal of the Qing Dynasty, suratan Shadh's kingdom was not right, and he had repeated disputes with his neighbors, and now his fate was purely self-inflicted; as for the descendants of Hezhuo, "I have been living a prosperous life and establishing a family business for several years, and I will not have another heart because the son of Branidun is the son of the old hezhuo, such as Yi, and others, and moreover, the son of Branitown does not dare to come, even if he comes with the Aiwuhan soldiers, he is exhausted, and we cannot destroy Keye, what is the difficulty?" [40] It is true that BadakShan and its neighbors are at odds, and it is clear that Afghanistan is the one who provoked the incident in this war, and Emperor Gaozong talked about Sultansha's old accounts, but did not say anything about Afghanistan, which was obviously deliberately avoided, and his contemptuous evaluation of the descendants of Hezhuo was even more undesirable.

(1) i.e. Ahmet Shah, the same below.

In September of the thirty-third year of Qianlong (1768), the news of Suletansha's repulsion of the Afghan army reached the capital, and Emperor Gaozong instructed that "the army of Aiwuhan has retreated, and the nomadic herding of Suletansha has been restored, and there is no need to send people to inquire", "The whereabouts of the son of Brantendun do not need to be investigated",[41] it is completely a pretentious attitude and a cover-up. In December of the same year, The envoy surattansha said that the Afghan army would again "assist the son of Brantendun to attack BadakShan" in the coming year, and asked the Qing government to send 10,000 reinforcements, but Emperor Gaozong refused, and made it clear that he would never interfere in the affairs outside the territory of Xinjiang: "If [Suletansha] can resist Aiwuhan on its own, if there is no such ability, I will not help, and if I say that I am unable to resist and leave, I will do as I please." [42] A few months later, he ordered the Yerkand authorities to "find out what it was like to "find out what it was like to live in peace with Suletansha or Yanran at this time, or to form an army with Aiwuhan". [43] Qianlong 35[1][p. 175] In 1770, Afghan troops finally eliminated the Suletansha regime, but did not stay in the Badak Mountains for long,[44][p. 306-307] The Kunduz army took advantage of the chaos and plunder, which caused dissatisfaction among the magnates of BadakShan, who planned to install the son of Suletansha as the new monarch, and to test the attitude of the Qing government for this purpose. When the Yarkand authorities asked Beijing how to handle the hajj when the new regime in Badakshan sent envoys, Emperor Gaozong replied: "Even if the envoys are dispatched, they do not have to be sent to Beijing, they should be returned", "If you are desperate, whoever sends the envoys, I will allow who to enter, and when they ask for troops, I will not send troops to help, but I will be ridiculed by the people of the small tribesmen and so on, and I will not be able to convince the people of other tribes." [36] It can be seen that Emperor Gaozong had to admit that the Qing government was unable to influence the local situation, and the authority of the "Heavenly Dynasty" withdrew in the face of the military power in Afghanistan, and the prestige of the Qing Dynasty in Central Asia suffered a heavy blow.

The Afghan invasion of Badak Mountain did not directly threaten the Qing dynasty's Xinjiang. After a period of chaos in the country, the son of Suletansha was successfully restored. [45] Ahmad Shah, on the other hand, was unable to recover Northern India, which had been occupied by the Sikhs, and had no time to expand north of the Hindu Kush Mountains. After Ahmad Shah's death in 1773, Afghanistan fell into endless infighting among its heirs, and as the imperialist powers represented by Britain and Russia became the true masters of Central Asia after modern times, the imperial hegemony created by Ahmet Shah could only stop at the Pamir Plateau. However, although Xinjiang was not invaded, the Qing Dynasty's main purpose of maintaining the status quo was to expose the limitations of its passive, conservative, and purely defensive Central Asian policies. The Qing government's response to the Afghan invasion of the Badak Mountains fully proves that the Qing Dynasty's foreign relations structure established with the idea of the clan as the main purpose is seriously deviated in form and substance, and its difficulty in adapting to the special geopolitical environment of Central Asia. The reason why Emperor Gaozong avoided the incident, which would obviously have a serious impact on Xinjiang's security and stability, was that he knew very well that the Qing government could not deal with Afghanistan in the same way as it treated its vassals, and that the incident could not be resolved within the framework of the clan system. In order to insulate the traditional worldview and the entire dynastic system built on it from shock, Emperor Gaozong chose to turn a blind eye to the challenges of Afghanistan. However, after all, this challenge cannot be compared with the "three-thousand-year unprecedented change" caused by the invasion of China by the Western powers after the modern era, and the Qing Dynasty finally "passed the pass" by chance, and the "shelf" of the "heavenly kingdom" was maintained in Central Asia for several decades. When the Kokand Khanate rose during the Jiadao period and once again threatened to rebel with the descendants of Zhuo, the declining Qing Dynasty was even more powerless to reverse its passive and conservative Central Asian policy, so it had to retreat step by step, and could only barely maintain the "face" of the "Heavenly Dynasty" in Beijing, while allowing the Kokand people to truly enjoy the treatment of "shangguo" in Xinjiang.

5. Conclusions and evaluations

Criticism of the Qing Dynasty's Central Asian policy in domestic academic circles mainly focuses on the inability of the Qing government to cope with the rise of Kokand during the Jia and Dao dynasties, and the gradual concessions in the face of aggression by imperialist powers such as Britain and Russia in the modern era. However, judging from the exchanges between the Qing Dynasty and Afghanistan during the Qianlong period when relations between the Qing Dynasty and the Central Asian countries were inaugurated, due to the long-rooted "Heavenly Dynasty and The Kingdom of Heaven" way of thinking and the inherent limitations of the centralized imperial autocracy, the Qing government's Central Asia policy became increasingly weak, so that it was ultimately unable to achieve its fundamental goal of maintaining Xinjiang's security and stability, which was the inevitable result of the joint action of the local development law and the trend of world history.

To be fair, the Qing Emperors' understanding of the world was relatively progressive, which was mainly due to the introduction of geographical scientific achievements in the modern world in the West since the end of the Ming Dynasty. But this did not change the concept of "heavenly kingdom" inherent in the Ruling Clique of the Qing Dynasty, represented by Emperor Gaozong. As reflected in his descriptions of the Central Asian countries and Islam in his officialLy revised Atlas of the Western Regions and in the private writings of some ministers in charge of Central Asian affairs, it was under the guidance of this concept that the Qing government interacted with the "Islamic world" in Central Asia. ［４６］［ｐ． 48] Because of the distance and the mistake of "not understanding China since ancient times", the Central Asian countries were naturally regarded by the Qing Emperor as on the fringes of the "Heavenly Dynasty" world order, and even in the surrounding areas of Xinjiang, they believed that "only the Kazakh and Brut tribes are the Kazakhs and Bruts",[47][p. 2] Fundamentally, the impact of the situation in Central Asia on China is belittled. When clan relations were established with Kokand, Badakshan, and other countries, the Qing government still regarded them as insignificant, and was only satisfied with fulfilling the most basic clan rights and obligations, with no intention of strengthening its control or taking on more responsibilities. Under such circumstances, it is naturally not difficult to understand that the Qing government willingly defined the "demonstration" of Afghan envoys as "tribute", but when it realized the gap between fantasy and reality because of the occurrence of the "ceremonial dispute", it adopted a passive and passive policy of cutting off contact with Afghanistan and turning a blind eye to its actions. This situation cannot but be reminiscent of a similar scene encountered by the British Magarni mission in the last years of Qianlong, except that Afghanistan, which was also a medieval empire, was eventually engulfed by the torrent of history as the Qing Dynasty, and did not bring a strong impact on the Chinese as the Western powers, and this event was not particularly valued by historians like the latter. However, in these two similar incidents with very different consequences, the ideological understanding displayed by the Qing government was consistent.

In addition to the ideological understanding that could not adapt to the actual situation, the state system of the Qing Dynasty and the policy orientation determined by it were also important factors restricting the Qing government's achievements in Central Asia. During the Han and Tang dynasties, the influence of the Central Plains dynasty government once reached as far as Hezhong, Khorasan, and northern India, and Chinese officials in charge of the western regions often used political and military means more flexibly and proactively to actively operate west of the Pamir, with remarkable results. However, in the final Qing Dynasty, as Joseph Fletcher pointed out, "on the eve of the rise of Kokand as a regional power and the infiltration of British power into Central Asia of the Qing Dynasty, the Qing government seemed to regard East Turkistan, with the Tianshan Mountains and the Pamir as a barrier, as a political and military dead end",[48][p. 64] He was very conservative about exerting influence west of the Pamir, and never used force. When Afghanistan invaded the Badak Mountains, a part of the Qing dynasty, the Qing government's passive response clearly reflected this characteristic. On the one hand, this is because the external threats faced by the Qing Dynasty are not the same as those of the Han and Tang dynasties, and on the other hand, because the state system of the Qing Dynasty is not the same as that of the Han and Tang Dynasties. The imperial system of centralized power and emperor autocracy in ancient China was fully matured during the Song and Ming dynasties, and the military feudal aristocratic groups that were active in the political arena during the Han and Tang dynasties almost disappeared. The rulers took the emphasis on literature over force as the national policy, adhered to the passive and introverted military strategy of internal and external weakness, and took the emphasis on the light, and deliberately snuffed out all factors that might lead to splitting and dividing the country and impacting the emperor's dictatorship, although to a certain extent, they ensured political stability and internal peace, but at the same time they also produced the side effect of impoverishing the country and weakening it. The territory and martial arts of the Song and Ming dynasties could not be compared with those of the Han and Tang dynasties, and the success of the Qing Dynasty was due, on the one hand, to the fact that in its early years, the military feudal aristocratic system outside Guanwai remained alive, and on the other hand, it was largely due to the historical trend of the decline of nomadic peoples. During the Qianlong period, with the completion of the great cause of reunification, the focus of the Qing government's national policy also shifted from pioneering to shoucheng, and its introverted characteristics became increasingly obvious. Although the pattern of passive military deployment of "guarding the inside and the outside" has changed with the military strength of Manchuria and Mongolia, the main thrust of the inward-looking military strategy of "focusing on the heavy and controlling the light" has not changed, but has been further strengthened. The Qing Dynasty's troops deployed in Huijiang were very weak, especially in the Western Four Cities area, where there were only a few hundred garrisons, which was entirely a force of a security nature. [49] Although there were eight banners stationed in the Ili region of northern Xinjiang, which was also the main reliance force for dealing with the threat in the direction of Central Asia in the planning of the Qing government, under the guidance of all national policies that proceeded from the maintenance of the emperor's autocracy, the authority and autonomy of the military and political officials in Xinjiang were strictly restricted, and under the heavy constraints, local officials could not be "exempted from the orders of foreign kings" as in the Han and Tang dynasties, and flexibly handled external threats. As a result, the Qing government not only lacked the ability to cope with the challenges of Central Asian powers such as Afghanistan and Kokand, but even a small number of bandits such as the fledgling and Zhuo descendants were difficult to take decisive measures to cut down the grass and roots when they were active in the surrounding areas of Xinjiang, so that there were endless troubles in the future.

Of course, this is not to say that the Qing Dynasty's Central Asia policy is undesirable. The self-restraint on expansion displayed by the Qing Dynasty after the realization of national reunification showed a high degree of rationality in the ruling clique; the clan system that the Qing Dynasty established in the surrounding areas of Xinjiang by using the prestige it had won in eliminating the Dzungars, quelling the great and zhuo rebellions, indeed achieved the goals of the Qing government's Central Asian policy to the greatest extent possible for a period of time at the least cost, and also maintained the peace and stability of the local situation; the Qing Dynasty adhered to strict borders and non-interference in internal affairs in its dealings with the countries of the "Islamic world" in Central Asia. A peaceful foreign policy of respecting the traditional relations between various countries and the Xinjiang region is also in the fundamental interests of the people of all countries; all of this is in sharp contrast to the central Asian policy of conquest, plunder, and enslavement pursued by the imperialist powers represented by Britain and Russia in modern times. However, the realization of all good intentions in the field of foreign relations requires the guarantee of strong military strength and firm national will, and the Qing Dynasty, as a medieval empire, did not have an advantage in the face of the Islamic power in Central Asia, which was also a medieval empire, and even more defeated in front of the strong ships and cannons of the modern imperialist powers, and the final failure of the Central Asian policy was also a historical inevitability.

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