The author of this article: Li Xiangqian, originally published in "Centennial Tide", No. 8, 2001
Chairman Mao once joked that China's atomic bomb was only "frightening." But this "scare" really frightened the Americans not lightly. In the 1960s, what was the response of the United States to China's nuclear weapons that were being developed and developed? What kind of contradictory and vigilant state are the U.S. government and its think tanks, led by Kennedy and Johnson, when they detect that China will explode its own atomic bomb? These "old stories" have been sealed in the top secret archives of the United States in the past. In recent years, thanks to the efforts of American archivists, the tense and hectic scene in the White House and the Pentagon more than 40 years ago has gradually been revealed. Li Xiangqian's article "The Secret of the Us Attempt to Crack Down on China's Nuclear Program in the Sixties" published in this journal synthesizes the materials disclosed by the US side and reproduces the embarrassing days when US policymakers and think tanks wanted to take risks and had no choice.
When history entered the sixties, when the American public finally chose their future president, John F. Kennedy, in a dizzying television debate, they probably did not know that beneath the charismatic exterior of the new president, the United States was in a state of tension unprecedented. In addition to the Cold War confrontation between the two great powers of the United States and the Soviet Union for more than a decade, regional issues such as the Cuban issue, the Laos issue and the Berlin issue have also plagued the president-elect and the US administration. However, what makes Kennedy particularly sensitive and even fearful is not just these few things on the table. At the end of 1960, the CIA claimed to have accomplished one of their most significant missions: finally confirming the existence of China's nuclear program. At the time, they defined the mission as "the earliest moment before Beijing was able to explode its nuclear device." Things always go in opposite directions. Knowing China's nuclear program means, on the one hand, an intelligence front, but on the other hand, it exacerbates tensions within the U.S. government. For considerable time in the 1960s, the top decision-makers of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations conducted a series of assessments and debates on how to respond to China's nuclear program, whether military or diplomatic means were used to contain China's nuclear program; how the So-called impact of China's nuclear program would have on the situation in Southeast Asia and the world; and how to coordinate with the Soviet Union against China's nuclear program. Among them, the plan to use force to attack China's nuclear program has not only been proposed, but has even taken shape. Of course, these debates and plans were made in great secrecy.
Recently, thanks to the efforts of American Cold War historians, these secrets, which are sealed in archives, have begun to be exposed. Several influential major newspapers in the United States have published articles exposing the proposed attack of the United States on China's nuclear program in the 1960s. William Bohr and Jeffrey Richardson, researchers at the U.S. Unofficial National Security Archives, are two tireless archivists. Their article "Whether to Strangle Babies in the Cradle" reports on the intelligence reconnaissance, policy debates, and strike plans of the United States against China's nuclear program throughout the 1960s through a large number of meticulous investigations into the archives, and the reasons for their subsequent failure to implement these programs. The report revealed a lot of historical insider information, and it is still shocking to read to this day.
The origin of things
As early as 1964, less than a year after Kennedy's assassination, William Foster, the administrator of the U.S. Office for Arms Control and Disarmament, revealed in a meeting with a historian that Kennedy had considered a dangerous operation to force the People's Republic of China to comply with part of the nuclear-test-ban treaty. At the time, Kennedy even tried to abandon his ongoing "multilateral nuclear forces" program between the United States and Europe in exchange for Soviet cooperation with the United States if necessary to strike china. Foster's transcript of the conversation was kept in the Kennedy Library until 1994, when it was declassified.
The first person to use archival material to illustrate Kennedy and his advisers' attempts to strike Chinese nuclear facilities by force was the Chinese-American historian Zhang Shaoshu. He first revealed the secret in a 1988 essay titled "Kennedy, China, and the Atomic Bomb." But as soon as the article was published, it was refuted by McGeord Bundy, a former Kennedy national security adviser. Bundy said that at the time at the White House, the discussion of actions to prevent China from achieving its nuclear program was simply "talking about it" and there was no serious plan and real intention. Contrary to the wishes of the man concerned, however, historians, far from believing his testimony, sparked interest in the matter. They hope to find out how far the U.S. government has done to block China's nuclear program.
As a result, this long-unknown history has finally been "churned" out.
Newly declassified archives show that discussions between Bundy and the president about China's nuclear program far outweigh the so-called "talk.". Behind a thick curtain, Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, along with a host of their advisers, racked their brains to deal with China's nuclear program. They did every possible design for this purpose, used the most advanced reconnaissance equipment in the world at that time, and tried to persuade the Soviet Union to work together. The degree of "danger" of the whole incident is beyond people's imagination. The newly declassified archives have finally told this complex and mysterious story for the world.
"Lifting the Veil"
We know from the available materials that China's plans to develop its atomic energy business began in the mid-1950s. In 1953, the famous physicist Qian Sanqiang proposed to the state to develop his own atomic energy business. In January 1955, the Secretariat of the Central Committee held a special enlarged meeting. Chairman Mao pointed out at the meeting that our country already knows that there are uranium mines, and scientific research has a certain foundation, and now it is time to grasp it. If you grasp it carefully, you will definitely be able to get it done. A year later, in "On the Ten Great Relations," Chairman Mao mentioned again that China "must not only have more planes and artillery, but also atomic bombs." In today's world, if we want to be free from being bullied, we can't do without this thing. ”
In the books published in the United States in recent years, there is a basic and accurate record of the approximate time when China's nuclear industry began. The works also record the approximate time of the establishment of the China Nuclear Weapons Research Institute, the Baotou Nuclear Fuel Plant, the Lanzhou Gas Diffusion Plant, and the Lop Nur Test Base. The materials on which these works are based are basically officially published in China.
In the early 1960s, however, Americans were not entirely aware of China's nuclear program. For example, it wasn't until September 1959 that the United States received photographs of the Lanzhou Gas Diffusion Plant. At that time, their progress in China's nuclear weapons development was largely speculative. It wasn't until August 1960 that U.S. spy satellites had their first valid images of China. Because of the voyage, it is difficult for U-2 aircraft to fly to China's far-reaching interior like Lop Nur . At that time, American intelligence analysts lamented that what we knew about China's nuclear program was so fragmented, just as we knew the nature and extent to which the Soviet Union had aided China's nuclear program.
By the end of 1960, U.S. intelligence analysis had concluded that China had mined uranium raw materials and established a uranium enrichment plant, presumably using uranium to produce plutonium. Meanwhile, intelligence analysis suggests that China's first nuclear reactor will be nearly completed by the end of 1961, and it will provide plutonium in 1962. Accordingly, intelligence experts are very sure that China's first atomic bomb, like other nuclear powers, had a key component of plutonium rather than uranium. Because the process of enriching uranium as atomic bomb material is relatively long and difficult, and as a first-generation atomic bomb, only less plutonium is needed. At this point, there is finally a clear statement on the manufacture of China's atomic bomb.
Feel threatened and look for countermeasures
Just as China's nuclear program was confirmed, Kennedy succeeded Eisenhower as the 35th president of the United States. Kennedy's anti-communist stance was no weaker than that of his predecessors. He has a hostile attitude towards the CCP regime. As one of his aides recalled, Kennedy once regarded China's attempted nuclear tests as the worst thing to do in the sixties. But the president doesn't really understand the very limited goals of China's nuclear program.
During Kennedy's first two years in the White House, no one conducted a comprehensive analysis of China's nuclear program. The reports have largely failed to make clear the political and military significance of China's nuclear program, but have only concluded that if Beijing acquires nuclear capabilities, it will endanger the security of the United States and the free world, especially in Asia. A State Department report also said Beijing's nuclear program would cause political and psychological problems worse than the military. Because it will form an idea in the world: "communism will be the trend of the future", thus causing people to "psychologically divide". In Asia, China's nuclear test could add credibility to its economic development model. People will have doubts about their own and even the power of the United States. This influence has a certain impact, driving many countries to approach China, thereby weakening the influence of the United States and causing trouble for the United States to intervene in various ways in the interests of its allies.
In addition, the United States is extremely concerned about the so-called nuclear proliferation problem. The United States officially believes that once the number of nuclear powers increases slightly, then the world's instability will increase, and the possibility of irrationality and desperate bets will be there.
So, some people began to propose countermeasures. In September 1961, George McGee, director of the State Council's Policy and Planning Committee, suggested to Secretary of State Dean Rusk that an effective way to eliminate the psychological effects of China's atomic bomb was to encourage and even help India develop nuclear weapons. Because India's first nuclear device at that time was close to an explosion test. At this time, McGee did not care at all about the instability that India would bring to Asia after it possessed nuclear weapons, but only wanted to "punch communist China hard" with a non-communist country. At that time, it was proposed that Jerome Wesner, the president's scientific adviser, visit the Chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission during his visit to India and ask him how much of an impact China's nuclear program would have on India. The intention was to elicit India's request for assistance. This plan was eventually rejected. Because U.S. policymakers are still afraid to take the credit for proliferating nuclear weapons. Rusk eventually agreed to another of McGee's proposals, a propaganda war touting the absolute superiority of U.S. nuclear weapons while disparaging China's nuclear capabilities.
It was also at this time that Robert Johnson, an expert on East Asian issues at the State Department, began his research on the significance and consequences of China's nuclear test. We'll cover this study later. But note that it was Johnson's research that largely changed U.S. policy toward China's nuclear program.
New intelligence
In order to get a clearer picture of China's nuclear program, U.S. intelligence is also trying to improve their reconnaissance methods. One of the more effective methods is for Kuomintang Air Force pilots to fly U-2 aircraft with high-resolution imaging cameras from Taiwan to the mainland's far-reaching interior for reconnaissance. Although this practice is quite dangerous, it has covered many of the goals of the Chinese mainland since 1961.
Another means of reconnaissance is the use of spy satellites. From 1961 onwards, U.S. intelligence began a satellite reconnaissance program code-named CORONA. This spy satellite carries an improved high-resolution camera with plenty of film, allowing for sharper and larger numbers of photographs. From January 1961 to June 1963, the Korona Satellite Program conducted a total of 24 reconnaissance flights. In December 1961, Corona first identified the Lop Nur base, even though the Americans did not know that this was the future atomic bomb test site.
In April 1962, U.S. intelligence analysis once again speculated that China's first atomic bomb would be made from plutonium. Analysts believe that if China had accelerated and successfully pursued its nuclear program from 1960, according to the fastest schedule, it would have exploded a plutonium-fed atomic bomb in early 1963. However, they are not very sure of this inference and doubt that China can achieve this speed. Therefore, it is also estimated that China's first nuclear bomb will only explode for a few years after 1963. In any case, though, they all decided that China's first atomic bomb would only be made from plutonium.
In early 1963, the CIA felt increasing pressure. On Jan. 10, U.S. National Security Adviser Bundy met with C.I.A. Director Mikhail McCorn. The former revealed that there are two things that have brought the highest concern to the highest parties, and that is the nuclear programs of China and Cuba. McCohn acknowledged that little is known about China's nuclear program and that reconnaissance needs to be stepped up.
A month later, Taiwan's U-2 reconnaissance plane photographed the nuclear plant in Baotou. But at the time, based on photographic footage, U.S. intelligence officers still mistakenly believed that it was a plutonium reactor. George Danny of the State Council's Intelligence and Research Bureau told Rusk that the size of the plant shows that China already has enough plutonium raw materials for annual nuclear tests. The discovery in Baotou confirms that China would explode a small nuclear device around the end of 1963.
However, there are still gaps in estimates. One intelligence analysis believes that photos of the Baotou nuclear plant show that it has undergone "careful security disguise." Facilities include a small gas-cooled plutonium reactor, as well as an accompanying chemical separation and metal processing plant. Based on precedents for plutonium reactor facilities in France, analysts believe it is a plutonium plant. It wasn't until 1964 that U-2 aircraft and spy satellites detected that China was building a plutonium reactor in Jiuquan. At the time, it was estimated that it would not be in production until several years later.
Between March and June 1963, U-2 aircraft photographed the Lanzhou gas diffusion plant, located next to a hydropower project, in progress. Atomic energy experts believe the Lanzhou gas diffusion plant can accommodate 1,800 compressors, but it is still less than the 4,000 materials needed to produce nuclear weapons. Interestingly, Chiang Kai-shek's intelligence system had judged at this time that the Lanzhou reactor had already begun to operate in 1963. But in Washington, no one paid any attention to Taiwan's intelligence.
Because China's ability to produce nuclear fissile material is still not accurately grasped, it is still difficult for US intelligence personnel to answer at this time, when did China explode its first atomic bomb? Given that the nuclear plant in Baotou has been confirmed to produce plutonium raw materials, and that China's first atomic bomb will be fueled by plutonium has been determined, the most reasonable judgment is that China will explode its first atomic bomb in early 1964. However, the intelligence agents explained that if "usual difficulties" were encountered, the date of the explosion could also be postponed, for example until the end of 1964 or 1965. Moreover, if there are other plutonium reactors that go undetected, it would even mean that China could explode its first atomic bomb at any moment.
Regarding China's foreign policy after the atomic bombing, the analysis of U.S. intelligence personnel is contradictory. One view is that China will not drastically change its foreign policy as a result of the atomic bombing. A drastic change in foreign policy means that it adopts a policy of military aggression or is willing to take greater military risks. Because China's leaders know that their nuclear capabilities are still very limited. Another way of thinking is that China will feel much stronger after it explodes its first atomic bomb. It will reflect this mentality of the strong in the surrounding conflicts. In addition, China would argue that with the atomic bomb, U.S. intervention on the Asian continent would be somewhat restrained. The attitude of China's foreign policy will be tougher and unquestionable.
Seek to join forces with Moscow
Unlike intelligence agents who focus on technically analyzing China's nuclear capabilities, the top U.S. policymakers are thinking about how to "get rid of" China's nuclear program. As Sino-Soviet hostility intensified, President Kennedy hoped he would win over the support of the Soviets to destroy China's nuclear program.
At a meeting of the National Security Council on January 22, 1963, Kennedy made it abundantly clear that our basic purpose in negotiating a partial nuclear-test-ban treaty with the Soviets "was to halt or delay Communist China's nuclear advances." If one imagines that part of the nuclear-test-ban treaty would be largely meaningless without China's participation, Kennedy has reason to believe that the Russians, like him, are as keen as he is to use the treaty as pressure to prevent China from developing its nuclear capabilities. For Kennedy, this is very critical and important. Because Kennedy believed that China would "become the main enemy of our United States in the late sixties and beyond." A nuclear China would jeopardize America's position in Asia. Advisers around Kennedy at the time agreed with him that the Soviet leadership's position on peaceful coexistence and the dangers of an escalation of nuclear force was credible. This attitude is clearly less dangerous than china's.
Just after the meeting, Ambassador-at-Large Evril Harriman wrote to Kennedy saying that the Soviets were very disgusted by the denuclearization of West Germany. He suggested that the United States and the Soviet Union should reach an "understanding" on the German and Chinese issues. The key components are non-proliferation and the prohibition of nuclear testing. In Harriman's conversations with Soviet diplomats, they seemed to share a common view: a treaty banning nuclear tests could target China. Harriman argues that if Washington can agree with Moscow, then "together we can force China to stop its nuclear program." If necessary, to threaten China, we will get rid of its nuclear facilities. ”
In the eyes of the Americans, there is a reliable basis for joining forces with the Soviet Union against China's nuclear program. Because the Soviet Union has cut off aid to China's nuclear program. More importantly, the Soviet Union supported a nuclear test ban and a nuclear non-proliferation treaty, which had the meaning of targeting China. Beginning in August 1962, the Soviet Union reacted positively to the United States' proposal to conclude an international nuclear non-proliferation treaty. In Rusk's view, the treaty targeted China.
The possibility of a US-Soviet hand made the US top brass somewhat unable to hold back. The Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted a lengthy report to the Secretary of Defense in April 1963, outlining two options, indirectly and directly, against China's nuclear program. Indirect programmes are the use of diplomatic and propaganda offensives, while the direct ones are the use of coercive means. Both options could be done by the United States alone or by the Western allies. The United States hoped to have the active or tacit support of the Soviet Union. The direct programs proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff include: A. Infiltration, sabotage, and launch of attacks on the mainland by the Kuomintang troops; B. Maritime blockade; C. South Korea attacking North Korea to exert pressure on China's borders; D. Conducting conventional weapons air strikes on China's nuclear facilities; and E. Selectively attacking Chinese targets with tactical nuclear weapons.
Although the soldiers presented the report with the will of the highest party, they were not without fear. In a memo on the report, General Li Mei, acting chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, admitted that it would be unrealistic to openly use force to coerce China. Even if China were forced to sign a treaty, there would be no guarantee that it would be implemented. Moreover, if the United States takes unilateral action, whether it is a blockade or the use of force, it cannot fail to take into account China's retaliation and escalation of war. As for how to legitimize U.S. behavior internationally, it is even more difficult. But the situation would have been different if there had been even tacit cooperation from the Soviet Union. Because once the United States took action, the Soviet Union would act as a buffer between the two poles of the escalation of the war and the imposition of conditions on the Ccp.
In fact, the military was not firm, and they doubted whether they could join forces with the Soviet Union against China. But administrative officials are interested. National Security Adviser Bundy was in fact the first senior official to test the Soviet side. In mid-May, Bundy met with Dobrynin, the Soviet ambassador to the United States. Bundy told the latter that he wanted to "privately and seriously" "exchange views" on China's nuclear program. But Dobrynin wasn't interested. He brought the conversation to the issue of the U.S. "multilateral nuclear force" program. At that time, "multilateral nuclear forces" were the most difficult issue in the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Soviet ambassador said not to let our Soviet government take China's nuclear development too simplistically. Despite Bundy's temptations, Dobrynin refused to talk about China.
In June 1963, Khrushchev publicly announced that the Soviet Union had agreed to send a special envoy from the United States to Moscow to discuss part of the nuclear-test-ban treaty. The news once again stimulated the U.S. decision-making level. They saw this as an opportunity to explore the possibility of the United States and the Soviet Union against China. But since it is known that the Soviets were more concerned with "multilateral nuclear forces", which was a basis for U.S. European policy, it was contradictory to the agreement against nuclear proliferation. In the face of this complex relationship, to get the Soviet Union's consent to join forces with China, it was necessary to choose between the two: either to stick to the "multilateral nuclear force" or to please the Soviet Union. In the end, Kennedy seemed determined. At a cabinet meeting before Harriman's imminent mission to the Soviet Union, Kennedy proposed that the possibility of "abandoning the policy of multilateral nuclear forces" should be studied as a price to be paid for an agreement to prevent nuclear proliferation. At that time, some agreed and some opposed. Proponents argue that "multilateral nuclear forces" can be used as bargaining chips; opponents argue that "multilateral nuclear forces" have deeply entangled U.S.-Europe relations and have no chance of giving up.
Kennedy didn't hold his point too hard. But he still can't throw away the idea of the United States and the Soviet Union curbing China's nuclear program. As soon as Harriman arrived in Moscow, he was instructed by Kennedy to stress to Khrushchev that a nuclear China, even with a small nuclear capability, was "very dangerous to all of us." Kennedy wanted Harriman to test what Khrushchev had in "limiting or stopping China's nuclear program and whether it would approve of the United States acting accordingly if the Soviet Union were to act." Although Harriman eventually succeeded in signing part of the nuclear-test-ban treaty, he was never able to induce Khrushchev to engage in any discussions about taking political or other steps against China's nuclear program. As long as France insists on not participating in the nuclear-test-ban treaty, Khrushchev feels that he will not be able to isolate China. In addition, the first secretary also tried to downplay the sino-Soviet differences. He disagreed with Harriman's view that China's possession of nuclear weapons would pose a threat to the Soviet Union. He told Harriman that China's nuclear program was not as robust. With nuclear weapons, China will be more self-restrained. Because, "when a man does not yet have nuclear weapons, he is the one who shouts the fiercest."
Although Kennedy did not get Khrushchev's promise, he did not give up on his ideas. At a press conference on August 1, the president spoke of what he called a "threatening situation." While he acknowledged that it will take time for China to reach a "full fledged" level of nuclear program, "we now want to take steps to mitigate this dangerous prospect."
Conniving with the Kuomintang
In September 1963, Chiang Ching-kuo visited the United States. Before talking with Kennedy, Chiang Ching-kuo visited the CIA. During the talks, the two sides touched on the possibility of using airborne forces to attack Chinese nuclear facilities. Later, Chiang Met with Bundy, who also talked about operations against Chinese mainland nuclear facilities. Chiang Ching-kuo energetically proposed that as long as the United States provides transportation and technical support for surprise operations, it can strike at the mainland's nuclear facilities. Bundy supported Chiang's ideas, but feared that military action would prompt a reassertation between China and the Soviet Union and provoke a major conflict. Therefore, he told Chiang Ching-kuo that the crackdown also needed to be carefully planned.
On September 11, Chiang Ching-kuo had a lengthy meeting with Kennedy. During the conversation, Kennedy asked Chiang Ching-kuo bluntly: "Is it possible that a commando force of 300 to 500 people will be sent as far away as Baotou without the plane being shot down?" According to the transcript of the conversation, Chiang Ching-kuo replied at the time that the proposal to send commandos "was discussed yesterday with CIA officials." They think such a plan is feasible." In this regard, Kennedy is still not completely at ease. Given the experience of the Bay of Pigs incident, both Washington and Taipei need more accurate intelligence about the mainland. Kennedy told Chiang Ching-kuo: "No matter what action is taken, it must be suitable for the actual situation." ”
A few days later, Chiang Ching-kuo met with McNe. The two sides agreed to establish a planning team to study the feasibility of sending Nationalist fighters to attack Chinese mainland nuclear facilities. The two sides agreed that any action must be approved by the highest levels of both parties. However, the work of this planning group has not yet been revealed.
I want to give up
After Chiang Ching-kuo's departure, the Kennedy administration continued to study how to stifle the viability of China's nuclear program. Among them, the airdrop of Chiang Kai-shek's sabotage team by US aircraft is still the most important plan for the CIA. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also proposed the so-called "BRAVO" plan, the unconventional operational plan. It is paramilitary in nature, with a cross-sectoral team "considering ways and means to block the CCP's nuclear program." In addition, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at the invitation of Assistant Secretary of Defense William Bundy, considered an emergency conventional attack on China's nuclear facilities. The main thrust of the program is to destroy and paralyze China's nuclear facilities with multiple strikes.
Just then, the U.S. ambassador to India, Chester Bowles, made a warning. He claimed that if the United States did not act, then India would seek to develop its own nuclear weapons for fear of China's atomic bomb, thus causing nuclear proliferation on the South Asian continent. Bowers's position is very different from his attitude in the Bay of Pigs in 1961.
Kennedy himself was considering options other than force. He also wanted to get the Soviet Union to cooperate on a partial nonproliferation agreement against China. In the autumn of 1963, Rusk met with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko at the United Nations. The two discussed the issue of preventing nuclear proliferation. When Ge mentioned multilateral nuclear forces, Rusk deliberately provoked Ge to say that because the Soviet Union had aided China's nuclear program, it had lost "the purity of its virginity." However, the Soviets remained interested in a nuclear proliferation agreement. In a meeting with Kennedy on Oct. 10, Gromyko expressed his willingness to exert indirect pressure on China. Ge acknowledges that a nuclear proliferation agreement would make China's political situation more difficult and fragile.
When Kennedy considered what to do against China's nuclear program, a different tone emerged from the State Department. By this time Robert Johnson had completed his study. The report is more than 200 pages long and is titled "Nuclear Explosion and Nuclear Capability in Communist China." Given the report's sheer size, Johnson rewrote it into a 100-page version in October for circulation.
The most desirable thing about Johnson's research is that it is not alarmist. China's nuclear capabilities "will not alter real power relations between the world's major powers in the future, nor will it affect the balance of military power in Asia," the report said. In Johnson's view, the huge power gap between China and the United States, as well as the fragility of China's nuclear capabilities, has minimized China's nuclear threat. A nuclear China is within the range of the United States, but China cannot do this to the United States. Therefore, China has to consider that when it engages in aggression, it will be countered by U.S. nuclear or conventional weapons. This situation makes it impossible for China to use nuclear weapons first unless Chinese mainland under serious attack. Johnson believes that China's purpose in manufacturing nuclear weapons is to deter enemy attacks on its territory. It is unlikely to change its cautious, post-emptive military policy.
While Johnson minimized the possibility of a Chinese venture, he did not forget to emphasize the political implications of China's nuclear tests. He believes that china, having its own nuclear weapons, will believe that its nuclear capabilities can "weaken" the "will" of its neighbors allied with the United States, make them reconcile with China, and thus erode U.S. influence in Asia. As another State Department report supporting Johnson's views put it, China would "avoid reckless military action" or "nuclear blackmail" and use its nuclear weapons as "political weapons to earn respect, promote neutralism, and encourage revolution."
According to this, Johnson suggested that the United States has done enough for China's nuclear program so far, and there is no need to do more. Once China's nuclear test is successful, the United States should recommit itself to all friendly countries that it will help them confront China. Such a renewed commitment would both counter Pressure from China and prevent other Asian countries from developing their own nuclear weapons on their own.
Neither version of the Johnson report has been officially approved, but it can still be considered to represent the State Department's position. And in April 1964, it was submitted to President Johnson in the form of an outline.
Johnson's report still had an impact among U.S. officials. As Robert Comer, an official at the National Security Council, said, if Johnson had reckoned, we would be too far off the mark to block China's nuclear program. He told Bundy that if I am not mistaken, if China still adheres to its prudent policy, then we have greatly lost the impetus to attack Chinese nuclear facilities.
On November 22, 1963, Kennedy was assassinated. Lyndon Johnson was sworn in on the plane as the 36th President of the United States. Johnson acknowledged that the United States needs to adopt a more flexible policy toward China. There was no doubt that he had called Senator Richard Russell a few weeks after taking office and told him that the United States would recognize China sooner or later. However, Johnson was clearly restrained by the foreign aid group of the hospital. He still sees China's influence in East Asia as a huge threat to the United States in the Pacific. In fact, Johnson was worried about two things at the same time, A. the upcoming election; B. China's nuclear capabilities. In an interview with Time magazine reporter Hugh Sadie, he said we can't let Goldwater (the Republican presidential candidate) and China get the atomic bomb at the same time. In any case, Johnson is different from his predecessors. He has not commented publicly on China's nuclear program and has rarely mentioned taking steps to combat it.
In mid-April 1964, Robert Johnson completed his new report. The report is entitled "Exploring the Possibility of Attacking Communist China's Nuclear Facilities." The report was classified as "top secret" at the time. It has not yet been declassified. People only know its conclusions from the Foreign Relations compiled by the State Department.
In his report, Johnson summarized four ways to strike Chinese nuclear facilities: A. Open air strikes by the United States; B. Air strikes by the Kuomintang; C. Hiring agents inside China to sabotage; and D. Airdropping kuomintang action groups. Johnson believes that air strikes by the United States are in fact very difficult. Because only by sending many waves of flight can the target be completely destroyed. And the way in which agents are hired to sabotage within the mainland is also extremely unrealistic. Because you can't hire such people at all. The Kuomintang was also incapable of carrying out air strikes alone. Johnson also summed up the drawbacks of striking Chinese nuclear facilities by force: First, the intelligence gap was so great that Washington simply could not pinpoint all targets; second, the strike only delayed the time. In four to five years, Beijing will launch its nuclear program again. Third, China will retaliate against Taiwan or U.S. bases in East Asia. In the end, a division's nameless military strike would pay a heavy diplomatic price.
Johnson mentioned that there is a theory that if you want to win the support of world opinion for the U.S. approach, the only possible way is to conclude a worldwide agreement to prevent nuclear proliferation and verify the production of nuclear material. Once such an agreement is negotiated, China openly ignores it, giving it a pretext to crack down on it. Johnson, however, believes that by the time such an agreement is negotiated, China will have roughly completed its nuclear tests and become an "existing" nuclear force, like France. Under no circumstances would France be able to support such an agreement. In addition, Johnson believed that it was "absolutely impossible" for the Soviet Union to acquiesce in the United States' attack on China.
Johnson believes that world public opinion will only accept military strikes if it reacts to aggression. For example, if China appears as a supporter and intervenes in Laos or Vietnam to create a limited war, military strikes will be supported by public opinion. In addition, there is a closed strike programme. This is done by the Kuomintang. But Johnson pointed out that even if it can be believed that the Kuomintang sabotage group has the ability to take down the nuclear facilities in Baotou and Jiuquan respectively, because they can hardly succeed in both places at the same time, they will inevitably be retaliated against by the CCP. The CCP's attack on Taiwan will put the United States in "a very difficult situation." Overall, Johnson's view is that the blockade of China's nuclear program is dangerous and likely to fail; it would tarnish the image of the United States, weaken its position, and make the world power structure elusive. These conclusions are very different from the ideas of President Kennedy in 1963.
Johnson later wrote that his research at the time reflected "broad agreement across departments." So there's still considerable weight for senior officials as they consider dealing with China's nuclear program. At the end of April 1964, Rusk presented President Johnson with a highly compressed Johnson report. In view of Rusker's approach, the views of Johnson at the highest level in the United States should be said to be endorsed.
Just as the Americans were about to give up, the manufacture of China's first atomic bomb made great strides in the first eight months of 1964. The Lanzhou Gas Diffusion Plant produced its first enriched uranium in January and began testing; in April, the Jiuquan base produced its first nuclear component; in June, the Ninth Research Institute conducted a homogeneous proportion of explosion tests; and in August, the Jiuquan Plant assembled the first nuclear explosive device.
All this made the Americans nervous again.
Newly positioned China's nuclear progress
In early 1964, the United States learned from secret sources that China would "affirmatively" explode an atomic bomb in 1964. Alan Whiting, a former State Department intelligence research office, recalled that he learned from an intelligence report about Premier Zhou's visit to Mali that China was about to conduct a nuclear test. At the time, Premier Zhou told Mali's prime minister, Mobedo Kita, that China would conduct a nuclear test in October. But for some reason, the value of this message was not fully noticed.
At that time, the United States obtained China's nuclear intelligence mainly through aerial reconnaissance. From the spring of 1964, U-2 spy planes took off from Chapadiya in eastern India and were already capable of flying over Lop Nur . Since July 1963, the United States has launched a total of 10 Gabett satellites. These satellites carry high-resolution cameras that can clearly distinguish objects up to 18 inches on the ground. In early August 1964, spy satellites discovered that towers and other equipment had been erected at the Lop Nur Proving Ground. Based on this, the intelligence analysis concluded: "The apparent suspicious object in the Lop Nur area indicates that it was a testing ground." It is in preparation for use after two months. ”
But the Americans are still not sure when China will explode the atomic bomb. On July 24, McNe told President Johnson that it was not yet possible to predict when China would detonate its nuclear device. The C.I.A. believed that nuclear tests would not take place until the end of 1964. Their basis is that China will not be able to get enough nuclear fissile material to explode its atomic bomb in the months to come. The reason is that China's nuclear material is plutonium, not uranium. The plutonium produced at the Baotou nuclear plant could not reload an atomic bomb until at least 1965. According to this speculation, U.S. intelligence agents believe that China's first atomic bomb should have exploded in mid-1965. In addition, U.S. intelligence agents also suspected that France had supplied China with fissile material. However, they have no positive evidence. Today, it seems that only State Department expert Alan Whiting's judgment is the wisest. He was sure at the time that China's nuclear test was imminent. If nuclear tests are not conducted, there is no need to erect an iron tower at the Lop Nur test site. In addition, Premier Zhou's remarks about conducting the test in October are by no means empty.
At the tipping point
China's nuclear tests are imminent. That makes the topic of "nuclear danger" an important part of the president's luncheon Thursday. Attending the dinner party was the core of Johnson's team. They are: CIA Director McNe, Secretary of Defense McNamara, Secretary of State Rusk, and National Security Adviser Bundy. At the Sept. 15 dinner, the small group concluded by saying whether it would be riskier if it weighed between China's own schedule of exploding atomic bombs and the United States' unilateral, undeclared war strike. The possibility of an attack on China's nuclear facilities can only be established when something like "military hostility" occurs. Nevertheless, these members of the presidential team did not give up the possibility of testing joint action with the Soviet Union. Such joint actions include "threats against nuclear testing". It was at this time that a message encouraged the advisers. On September 15, Khrushchev delivered a speech on the Sino-Soviet border issue. He threatened that the Soviet Union would use all means, including "the latest weapons of annihilation," to defend its borders. This was the first time the Soviet Union had hinted that it had the potential to use atomic weapons.
But in Washington, when Bundy wanted to have a private and serious conversation with Dobrynin about China's impending nuclear test, Dobrynin was still the old saying that China's nuclear weapons were not important to the Soviet Union and the United States. It would only have a "psychological impact" in Asia, but would be of little importance to the Soviet government.
President Johnson is cautious about China's nuclear issues, in part because of the upcoming election. At the time, he was creating a so-called "platform for peace" to fight Republican rival Goldwater. Another important reason is that the Johnson administration, while fighting the Vietnam War, was also afraid to expand the war even wider. Although in the war, there are still people in the Upper Echelons of the United States who advocate that when bombing North Vietnam, they should consider attacking Chinese nuclear facilities. But Johnson did hold on to that line. After the war escalated in 1965, he remained careful to avoid triggering a direct conflict with China.
Satellite reconnaissance in late August and mid-September showed that preparations for the Lop Nur test site were largely complete. A member of a Malian government delegation visiting China provided information that China was preparing to explode the atomic bomb on October 1, national day. State Department officials finally thought that they would have to prepare a statement for China's nuclear tests. Whiting recalled that such a public statement could be a head start and reduce the political impact of the nuclear test. And "reassure China's neighbors that the United States is concerned and aware of this." McNe was one step ahead. He had already revealed to the North Atlantic group in mid-September that China would conduct nuclear tests in the last six days.
On September 29, State Department spokesman Robert McCloskey read a statement agreed by the president. Judging from all sources, China will explode its nuclear device at any recent time, the statement said. Later, the statement took a sharp turn, saying that although China exploded the nuclear device, it still had a long way to go to have the means of delivery. Obviously, this is both masturbation and other consolation.
On October 15, photos from U.S. spy satellites showed that the Lop Nur test site had completed its final preparations. It includes a 340-foot-tall tower surrounded by a double-decker fence, rows of instrument bunkers, two smaller towers, and various bunkers and platforms. At the same time, U.S. intelligence agents observed that large batches of aircraft that had been shuttling to and from the test site since September 1963 resumed flights at the end of 1964. This shows that final preparations are under way in an intense manner. Donald Chamberlain, the CIA's assistant director for scientific and technological intelligence, affirmed that the explosion was just a few days away.
The atomic bomb exploded
On October 16, 1964, a huge and beautiful mushroom cloud rose over the desert in western China. Of the 13 U.S. intelligence observatories in various locations, 11 immediately captured the huge electromagnetic pulses released by this beautiful mushroom cloud. The U.S. military base in Japan, called the "Toe Dancer", took off several times after the explosion to collect nuclear dust from the Chinese atomic bomb. When the experts at the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission examined the dust collected from the radiation cloud, they were taken aback. It turned out that the nuclear filler used in China's first atomic bomb was not the plutonium long recognized by the US intelligence agencies, but U-235. That is to say, China's first atomic bomb was a uranium bomb. This means that China's nuclear capabilities are developing at a rapid pace. It was not until the end of the year that the U-2 aircraft confirmed that the Lanzhou gas diffusion plant had already been put into operation.
A few hours after the nuclear explosion, President Johnson issued a statement. But this statement can no longer be new. It simply says that the nuclear forces of the free world remain committed to the protection of Asia. However, the statement issued by China at the same time has landed in front of the world: First, China developed nuclear weapons in order to break the nuclear monopoly of major powers; second, China promised not to use nuclear weapons first; third, all nuclear weapons should be destroyed.
In Taiwan, Chiang Kai-shek was shocked by the nuclear explosion. Because, this explosion was a heavy blow to his dream of counterattacking the mainland. Chiang proposed shortly after the nuclear explosion that military action should be taken to destroy Chinese mainland's nuclear facilities before they developed their means of delivery. But in the Americans, Chiang touched the soft nail.
President Johnson appointed a panel after the nuclear explosion to study the issue of preventing nuclear proliferation. These former senior government officials, who joined the panel and are known as "smart people," reviewed various so-called anti-proliferation options, including the possibility of striking Chinese nuclear facilities by force. In fact, the crackdown on China's nuclear facilities was proposed as part of an overall "radical" nonproliferation policy. These policies also include a policy of commitment not to use nuclear weapons first; the substantive withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from Europe; the blockade of French nuclear test bases in the Pacific; and a minimum deterrent nuclear strategy. In terms of policy orientation, the panel agrees with Robert Johnson and does not advocate a direct strike on China's nuclear facilities. But they take nuclear proliferation seriously, viewing it as a "major threat". They therefore recommended a strong nuclear policy and the formation and adoption of an international treaty. The Panel believes that acceptance of China as a nuclear Power is inevitable. This requires a reconsideration of China policy. The key point is to accept China into the Arms Control Treaty.
Obviously, this is a proposal intended to be "bondage". But because it contradicts the State Department-backed "Multilateral Nuclear Forces" program, it is not supported by President Johnson. While Secretary of State Rusk is studying a nuclear non-proliferation treaty on the one hand, on the other hand, he advocates the creation of a "nuclear weapons bank," even if India and other potential Asian countries join in to counter China's nuclear forces. In effect, this is a tacit endorsement or recognition that these countries have developed their own nuclear programs.
In essence, then, although the successful explosion of the Chinese atomic bomb led to new research on nuclear proliferation policy at the top of the United States, the pressure caused by the atomic bomb was so great that President Johnson was still struggling to come up with a significant nuclear non-proliferation treaty.
At the end of this "farce" of blocking China's nuclear program by force, there is another small episode: In the spring of 1965, the U.S. Naval intelligence system somehow detected through what channel China would have the ability of submarines to launch ballistic missiles in the next few years. This means that China can use nuclear weapons at sea to directly hit U.S. territory, Hawaii or the West Coast. The Navy even envisions a "catalytic war" in which China uses ballistic missiles launched from its submarines to attack the U.S. mainland, mistaking the United States for a nuclear strike from the Soviet Union, forcing the United States to strike back. Then-Secretary of the Navy Paul Nietzsche had suggested to the State Department that The Chinese missile submarine should be sunk while it was on its maiden voyage. Later, it turned out that the U.S. Navy had become nervous to the point of being noisy and full of soldiers. It wasn't until the 1980s that China tested its own missile submarines.
The sixties were spent in such tension. In this decade, China not only completed its own atomic bomb tests, but also possessed short- and medium-range missiles and hydrogen bombs. Become a nuclear power that cannot be despised. And the United States, under the surface of fear and seemingly aggressiveness, has not come up with a decent response. None of the various schemes they had devised were reliable. This makes the image of the "paper tiger" of the United States more real. Although China's successful nuclear weapons test did not change the U.S. Policy toward China in the 1960s, it created credible pressure to change that policy. In the 1970s, the situation changed dramatically. China entered the United Nations, and diplomatic relations between China and the United States began to resume. This cannot but be said to be an era of "changing the history of the world". Chairman Mao once joked that China's atomic bomb was only "frightening." But this scare really frightened the Americans a lot. They lived in the "crater" throughout the sixties and had a very difficult time.
I hope that today's people can learn this historical lesson: in this world, those who dominate and those who bully others have no good life.