The Western Route Army has always been under the leadership of the Central Military Commission, and important military operations have also been instructed by the Central Military Commission or approved by the Central Military Commission. Therefore, the issue of the Western Route Army was of a different nature from the issue of Zhang Guotao arbitrarily ordering the Fourth Front Army to move south in September 1935. The establishment of a base area in the Hexi Corridor and the opening up of the Soviet Union by the Western Route Army in accordance with the instructions of the central authorities cannot be said to be the Zhang Guotao line implemented. The complexity of the question lies in why did the Western Route Army fail? Judging from the fighting course of the Western Route Army, the reasons for the defeat should be said to be many. In retrospect, after the Ningxia campaign plan was abandoned, if the Western Route Army had rapidly advanced westward and penetrated directly into the Suzhou, Yumen, and Anxi areas, it would have been able to preserve the vital strength of the troops. If the Soviets could come to their aid, and the troops had artillery and plenty of guns and ammunition, it would be at least possible to fight back to the east. However, due to the drastic changes in the international and domestic situation, after wandering in the Hexi Corridor for more than three months, the fighter plane was lost. From the point of view of international relations, at that time, the Soviet Union wanted to draw the Chiang Kai-shek government and Britain and the United States together to fight fascism and openly aid us. Judging from the domestic situation, the main force of our Red Army fighting against Chiang Kai-shek's army in Hedong, and the possibility of another civil war breaking out after the Xi'an Incident requires the strategic cooperation of the Western Route Army. Therefore, the central government asked the Western Route Army to establish a base area in the Hexi Corridor, and on several occasions considered whether to continue to advance westward or return eastward. The Western Route Army itself also had concerns about going directly westward under the circumstances of the time. It is understandable that such changes in the guiding ideology are caused by changes in the situation. However, the course of action wavered, but it was a taboo for soldiers.
The sequence of the Red Fourth Front
The conditions for the establishment of a base area in the Hexi Corridor are also extremely unfavorable. The most important thing is that the area in this area is small, which is not conducive to the maneuver of our heavy troops, and there are many fortresses, and the city is difficult to break. Second, the contradictions between the Hui and Han that have formed in history are acute, the reactionary forces of the "Second Horse" are very tightly controlled, and there was no party foundation in the past, so it is very difficult for us to win over the masses in a short period of time. Third, the cavalry units of the Ma family are very mobile, and we have no experience in fighting cavalry in the past. Fourth, the economy was backward, and it was also very difficult for the Red Army to obtain provisions. It can be said that relying only on the strength of the Western Route Army itself, it is very difficult to eliminate the main force of the "Second Horse" and establish a base area in such a narrow strip of nearly 2,000 li long, connecting Xinjiang to the west and Hedong to the east.
From the point of view of the Western Route Army itself, although some feasible claims have been made, there are also many weaknesses. Although Zhang Guotao was not in the Western Route Army at that time, his mistakes had not yet been criticized, let alone eliminated. The leadership of the Western Route Army began to underestimate the difficulties of establishing a base area in the Hexi Corridor and the strength of the enemy. Before arriving in the Lingao area, it was always said that the situation was too good, and the enemy had been basically defeated by us. Comrade Xu Xiangqian did not agree with this estimate, but Comrade Chen Changhao did not listen to it and seriously underestimated the enemy. Sometimes the use of troops was too scattered, and some battles were not fought well. These were also related to the defeat of the Western Route Army.
Li Xiannian self-report
Although the Western Route Army failed, under the leadership of the Party Central Committee and the Central Military Commission, the vast number of instructors fought tenaciously under extremely difficult conditions to accomplish the tasks assigned by the Central Committee, and tens of thousands of comrades sacrificed their precious lives for the revolution. In the past, the Central Committee only criticized Zhang Guotao and Comrade Chen Changhao, and not only did not hold other comrades accountable, but also fully affirmed the heroic fighting spirit of the vast number of commanders of the Western Route Army. However, some articles, writings, speeches, and documents inappropriately comment on the history of the Western Route Army, such as Zhang Guotao's unauthorized order to form the Western Route Army and cross the Yellow River to the west, that the Western Route Army was driven by Zhang Guotao's erroneous line to advance in the direction of Xinjiang, and that the Western Route Army was a victim of Zhang Guotao's line, and so on. It is understandable that these statements may be due to the lack of possession of a large number of historical materials. I myself have been unclear about some of the situations for more than 40 years. Now that many of the circumstances are clearer, they should be corrected in the light of historical facts. In doing so, it is more conducive to unity.
(The materials are selected from the fourth volume of Li Xiannian's Manuscripts since the Founding of the People's Republic of China, Central Literature Publishing House, 2011, pp. 239-241.) ）