In the face of the asymmetrical warfare of the Houthis, the United States is embarrassed and will respond in the future

Abstract: On May 6, 2024, the Jewish Institute for National Security Studies in the United States released a report titled "The United States Must Thwart the Houthis' Asymmetric Warfare Concept." The report argues that the Houthis' incompatible warfare has taken a toll on the United States, and that while the United States has succeeded in intercepting the various weapons fired by the Houthis, the cost is enormous and unsustainable. Therefore, the US military needs to find a strategy to deter the Houthis and their supporters at a very high cost in the short term.

Keywords: United States, Houthis, Iran, iron ties

The report argues that the Houthis' asymmetrical warfare has taken its toll on the United States. Although the U.S. military successfully intercepted the various weapons launched by the Houthis, it consumed a large number of key tactical missiles. So far, the total cost of interception by the US military may be close to $1 billion, and most of the targets intercepted are low-cost drones and missiles assembled from parts provided by Iran. Such operations have seriously affected the combat readiness of the US military, and such operations are not sustainable.

The U.S. military needs to find a strategy to deter Houthi attacks at a very high cost to the Houthis and their supporters in the short term. In addition, in the medium to long term, the U.S. military needs to accelerate the development of directed energy weapon systems such as the Iron Beam laser air defense system to develop a more cost-effective defense system.

Background information

On April 16, 2024, U.S. Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro confirmed that the U.S. Navy had consumed a significant amount of ammunition to intercept missiles and drones launched by the Houthis since the Houthis launched attacks on Western merchant ships last October, with the total cost of the ammunition consumed could reach $1 billion, the report said.

According to the Jewish Institute for National Security Studies (JINSA), the Houthis have launched 127 attacks on ships passing through the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden since October 2023. In the March attack, the Houthis fired a total of 93 missiles and drones at Western merchant ships and warships, 20 more than in February.

The importance of relevant operations

The report pointed out that although the U.S. military successfully thwarted multiple attacks launched by the Houthis, it consumed a large number of key tactical missiles in the process of intercepting Houthi missiles and drones, and such operations seriously affected the combat readiness of the U.S. military. The Houthis' asymmetric warfare has shown that attrition-based asymmetric tactics can force the enemy to pay real costs while minimizing the costs incurred by the attackers. In the course of this war, the United States has paid huge military expenditures and global economic losses.

• The Houthis appear to have been undeterred by repeated warnings from the U.S. that their incessant attacks on international commercial shipping and other vital U.S. interests would have serious "consequences."
• The Houthi attacks have reduced international shipping in the Red Sea by 40 percent, and before the Houthis attack, 15 percent of the world's seaborne trade passed through this waterway, so the impact of the Houthi attacks was significant.
• For a shipping line like Maersk, the cost of container freight has more than tripled. Insurance costs have risen by 50% for merchant ships transiting the Red Sea, and large insurers are increasingly avoiding insurance contracts with merchant ships transiting the Red Sea. A U.S. shipping company boss said the increase in freight rates caused by the Houthi attacks would be "shared by the entire supply chain and will affect consumers."
• Houthi leaders have noticed the change and praised their attacks for raising insurance costs and transportation costs for shipping companies around the world.

The main reason why US deterrence has failed is that Houthi weapons have the ability to inflict huge economic losses on the global economy, the US military, and the allies at a very low cost and at a fraction of the military capacity.

• Houthi fighters are assembling missiles from Iranian-supplied components, and the drones they use are extremely low-cost, typically costing between $2,000 and $20,000 per unit.
• Since October last year, the U.S. Navy has reportedly launched more than 100 Standard-2 or Standard-6 missiles to intercept drones and missiles launched by the Houthis. The unit price of the "Standard-2" missile is about $2.2 million, while the unit price of the "Standard-6" missile is about $4.3 million, and the interception-cost ratio is about 100:1, and sometimes even 1000:1.
• According to reports, the Houthi attacks have depleted the US military's missile stockpile, leaving the US military with a certain opportunity cost. The US Department of Defense may not be able to replenish these missiles in a short period of time, which will affect the combat readiness and deterrence capabilities of the US military.
• Over the past decade, the US military has spent relatively steadily on the procurement of tactical missiles such as the Standard-2 and Standard-6 missiles, but has increased in recent years. In total, the U.S. Navy is armed with only about 500 Standard-6 missiles, which is less than the Houthi launch capacity in three months.
• The U.S. Department of Defense currently expects to purchase 155 Standard missiles in fiscal year 2025, 195 missiles in fiscal year 2026, and 230 missiles in fiscal year 2027.

In response to Houthi attacks on global shipping, the United States has adopted largely defensive and reactive tactics that have not been tactically and strategically successful.

• U.S. and British airstrikes came to an abrupt halt after U.S. and British airstrikes on more than 100 Houthi targets in the Yemen region from mid-January to early February 2024.
• According to Ari Cicurel, assistant director for foreign policy at the Jewish Institute for National Security Studies, "the scale of these airstrikes is not large enough to destroy all of the Houthi ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones." It is not even able to destroy most of this equipment. ”
• Since then, the U.S. military has only carried out periodic strikes at Houthi firing sites that are ready to launch missiles or drones. This passive "whack-a-mole" campaign has not been effective in deterring the Houthis' capabilities or slowing down Houthi attacks.
• Instead, sporadic U.S. strikes on the Houthis prompted more attacks. In February 2024, the Houthis launched 33 attacks on ships passing through the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. In March 2024, the Houthis launched a record 35 attacks on ships passing through the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.

USS Eisenhower

The current deployment of the U.S. military in the Red Sea may not be sustainable, and this deployment puts pressure on the U.S. military's platforms and personnel.

• The USS Eisenhower Carrier Strike Group has been deployed in the Red Sea for more than five months, making it impossible for the US Carrier Strike Group to carry out aggressive deterrence and power projection in other global hot spots within any time frame.
• The U.S. has 11 active carriers, and at any given time, only half of them will be able to deploy overseas. Aircraft carriers often need long shore resupply periods.
• In February 2024, the U.S. military deployed three aircraft carriers to the Indo-Pacific theater of operations to bolster its combat readiness, making it difficult for the U.S. Navy to project power in other parts of the world and respond to crises.
• In addition, the USS Eisenhower Carrier Strike Group is staffed with about 7,000 sailors who have been in a high state of combat readiness throughout the deployment and are facing tense combat conditions.
• In February 2024, the Associated Press reported that the sailors of the USS Eisenhower carrier strike group "spent four months in a constant pace of operations, without a single day of port rest." Christopher "Chowdah" Hill, captain of the USS Eisenhower, said it had a big impact on sailors."

In recent months, the U.S. military has been using "self-defensive" strike tactics to strike at Houthi missiles and drones as they prepare to launch. However, this tactic may not be enough to deter Houthi attacks, as evidenced by the Houthis' incessant strikes.

• The U.S. military may need to carry out regular strikes on Houthi arsenals inside Yemen, as well as strikes on Houthi fighters, especially senior leaders, to force them to suffer actual losses and significantly reduce their capabilities.

In addition, the United States has tried to use certain policies to make it impossible for Iran to provide weapons, expertise, training and intelligence to the Houthis. However, these policies did not work as well as they should have had a slight and temporary impact on the organization. The Houthis continue to rely heavily on weapons and advisers from Iran to carry out their attacks.

• In February 2024, the U.S. military intercepted a weapons carrier bound for Yemen in the Gulf of Aden loaded with Iranian-made ballistic missile parts and cruise missile parts. In a similar operation in January 2024, U.S. Navy SEALs intercepted an Iranian cargo ship bound for Yemen loaded with parts for intermediate-range ballistic missiles.
• However, the goods intercepted by the US military are only a fraction of the many Iranian aids provided to the Houthis. Iran has provided substantial assistance to the Houthis to ensure that they are well armed. Such assistance routes may also involve land routes in Africa as well as Oman.
• Sam Mundy, a former commander of the U.S. Marine Corps Central Command, recently said of the U.S. effort to curb Iran's supply of weapons to Yemen: "The problem is that it's a large geographic area and we don't have the resources to do it."
• Iran has also provided the Houthis with advisers to Allah and Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to provide the Houthis with missile assembly technology and intelligence and targeting support. Iran has also reportedly used its naval vessels to provide targeted intelligence directly to the Houthis.

In the medium to long term, Houthi attacks on global shipping also provide an opportunity for the U.S. military to change its strategy to better respond to asymmetric attacks by conventional adversaries with weaker militaries, including Iran's other proxies.

• The directed energy system is a potential means to effectively improve the cost-effectiveness of interception by the US military. Instead of expensive interceptor missiles to destroy drones and other missiles, directed energy weapons use high-power microwaves and lasers to disrupt the drone's electronic systems, making it flightless.
• Israel has pioneered breakthroughs in the field of directed energy, such as its "Iron Beam" laser weapon system. This provides an ideal opportunity for the United States to move away from its current cost-effective methods of interception in the coming years. The Iron Beam laser weapon system, developed by Israel's Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, can use lasers to destroy multiple drones from miles away and is expected to be operational by the end of 2025. In May 2023, Rafael unveiled a naval version of the "Iron Beam" laser weapon system, which protects ships from drone swarms and short-range ballistic missiles. The system will significantly improve the U.S. military's ability to respond to Houthi attacks.
• The U.S. Department of Defense has reportedly begun exploring the use of directed energy weapons in intercepting Houthi drones, which are significantly more cost-effective than surface-to-air missiles.
• At present, the Iron Beam laser weapon system may not be able to intercept cruise missiles or medium-range ballistic missiles, but it is not technically impossible to achieve these effects. According to reports, the US Department of Defense plans to achieve the goal of intercepting cruise missiles with lasers by 2030.
• The recent passage by the U.S. Congress of the National Security Supplementary Assistance Program, which includes $1.2 billion for the procurement of the Iron Beam laser weapon system, is also evidence that the Iron Beam laser weapon system program is rapidly moving towards full speed production.

"Iron Beam" laser weapon system

What the U.S. can do in the future

According to the report, the United States can take the following measures in response to Houthi attacks in the future:

1. The United States needs to take a sustained, proactive, "increasingly frequent, deadly, and destructive" approach to confronting the Houthis head-on in order to weaken their ability to launch attacks and rebuild deterrence.

2. The United States needs to adjust its strategy against Iranian proxies from a reactive process to a preemptive one, and focus on attacking Iranian military equipment and personnel in Yemen. As part of this effort, the United States needs to prioritize attacks on Allah and IRGC advisers and facilities in Yemen.

• This U.S. action could send a signal that the U.S. is committed to forcing the Iranian regime to stop providing the Houthis with the critical intelligence, weapons, and advisory support they need for their attacks.
• Even if the Houthis insist on continuing their attacks, their ability to continue attacking shipping vessels around the world will be affected in the absence of weapons supply chains and Iranian advisers.

3. According to UN Security Council Resolution 2216, the United States needs to increase its interdiction efforts to intercept more ships transporting arms and weapons parts between Iran and Yemen. The resolution calls on States to "immediately take the necessary measures to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transit" of weapons into the hands of the Houthis. The United States should also look at how to incentivize partners in the region to better facilitate such interceptions by enhancing intelligence sharing.

4. In the future defense budget, the United States needs to provide more funds for the Department of Defense's tactical missile procurement program. Increasing funds for the procurement of tactical missiles, especially for the procurement of the Standard-6 missiles, will help alleviate the problem of the dwindling stockpile of the Standard-series missiles caused by the Houthi attacks and will improve the military readiness of the United States and its deterrence capabilities against other countries.

5. The United States needs to continue to work with Israel to accelerate the deployment of the "Iron Beam" laser weapon system and advance joint directed energy projects, including the development of a naval version of the "Iron Beam" laser weapon system, to help respond to threats such as Houthi drone attacks.

• A portion of the partnership funds will be used to accelerate and expand the ongoing collaboration between Lockheed Martin and Rafael to develop and test a derivative of the Iron Beam laser weapon system for use by the U.S. and Allied forces.
• As part of bilateral cooperative research and development efforts to develop and ensure that the Iron Beam laser weapon system is operational ready, the United States and Israel need to ensure that the Iron Beam laser weapon system is interoperable with other U.S. weapons systems. According to the Jewish Institute for National Security in the United States, although the "Iron Beam" laser weapon system has extremely high effectiveness, it may not be able to carry out smooth coordinated operations with other systems of the US military.
• The U.S. needs to focus on expanding the directed energy research and development cooperation program and integrate it into the U.S.-Israel Operations Technology Working Group. The task force was formed in November 2021 to better address the two countries' shared defense needs and increase funding for the project. The U.S.-Israel Combat Technology Working Group has at least six sub-working groups to deal with the large defense needs of the two countries, including the directed energy working group and the anti-drone working group. The two working groups need to focus on working with each other and on how to thwart Houthi attacks.
• The U.S. Congress needs to discuss the postponement of the U.S.-Israel anti-drone system program and provide it with more funding. The program, which includes directed energy weapons research, was originally scheduled to expire at the end of 2026, with U.S. funding capped at $40 million per year.
• The United States could also establish a joint test facility in the United States or Israel to test directed energy weapons, modeled on the British Spadeadam Electronic Warfare Tactics Range. The British Spaddam Electronic Warfare Tactical Test Ground enables the United States and Great Britain to conduct joint and interoperability tests of electronic warfare systems in a simulated real-world environment.