To those who served in the 90s of the 20th century, the two branches of the military still look quite familiar
Daily Telegraph article by Tom Sharp, 15 May 2024
The British Royal Navy and the U.S. Navy are arguably the most important maritime powers in the Western world. Of course, judging by the reality of the situation, the strength of the US Navy is unique.
Both navies are capable of deploying fifth-generation fighters from aircraft carriers. Both are capable of launching Tomahawk cruise missiles at targets thousands of miles away. In a historic engagement with the Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen, both militaries have proven that they can shoot down incoming ballistic missiles. While the U.S. Navy is much larger, both navies are capable of other top-tier missions: nuclear submarine deterrence, attack, and covert operations; effective anti-submarine warfare (in this area, the Royal Navy of Great Britain sometimes has a slight lead); As well as amphibious assaults. Or, in any case, the U.S. Navy can conduct an amphibious assault, and the British Royal Navy – in fact, the Royal Fleet auxiliary fleet – will soon be able to conduct an amphibious assault.
However, both services have their own problems, especially with regard to the introduction of new ships.
In the UK, these problems were masked, since the planned number of shipbuilders was not bad. New Dreadnought-class deterrent submarines and the last Astute-class attack submarines are under construction. Cooperation with the United States and Australia on the next generation of attack submarines remains good, although this is still far from and there are many obstacles. The news that the Type 26 and Type 31 frigates, both of which will be equipped with Mark 41 vertical launchers capable of carrying a wide range of effective American missiles, is well underway.
It seems to me that the fact that the British "golden age of shipbuilding" was covered with gold leaf was the fact that due to the fact that these projects were launched too late, there were many ships that were called upon to continue construction beyond their planned life. Resource constraints have made the implementation of the project so difficult that it seems that we will not be able to start a complex construction program in time for it to be completed by the time the ships of the previous class are completed. The problem has been exacerbated by political factors, shipyard capacity issues, and construction delays due to design tinkering. Capability gaps have become the norm, sometimes dramatically.
The historic Type 23 frigate is a typical example. Built in the 90s and 90s of the last century, these frigates are designed for reasonable low-intensity towed array patrols in the North Atlantic Ocean and have a lifespan of 18-20 years. Even the newest and best one, my former command ship "St. Albans", is 24 years old. By the time the T26 ships were ready to replace them, they were all nearly 30 years old.
This way the ship operates beyond its design life and creates two problems. The first is the cost of maintaining its mechanical properties and operational safety. The cost of retrofitting is higher than the cost of construction. Secondly, from a technical point of view, you have to spend money on already "old" battleships. Recent advances in weapons, sensors, artificial intelligence, communications, and satellite networks are increasingly incompatible with aging platforms. After all, those are all of these things that we've worked so hard to develop to stay technologically advanced.
Older ships will also use more personnel, which is why I believe we won't see our two Royal Navy amphibious assault ships put into service anytime soon, although we have announced that we will not be reimbursing both ships in advance.
It is doubly frustrating that we are repeating the mistakes of the past in order to replace Type 45 destroyers. The Royal Navy's destroyer HMS Daring, the lead ship of this class, was launched in 2006 and is therefore expected to be decommissioned by 2036 at the latest. If a replacement for the Type 45 destroyer is to be ready in time, a full-fledged design is needed now, and the contract is immediately signed.
The Type 26 frigate first cut steel in July 2017, but the ship will not reach initial combat capability until October 2028. But this was achieved on the basis of seven years of contract discussions and awards, that is, it took 18 years from "concept" to "operational".
At the same time, in the United States, the Zumwalt-class is a case study of what happens if you try to pack too many untested new technologies into one hull. The original plan was to build 32 ships, but as costs soared, the plan was reduced to 24 and later to seven. The US Navy ended up building only 3 ships. Related to this is the submarine "Seawolf", which is powerful but frighteningly expensive. Again, the US Navy received only three, but in this case, the more reasonably priced Virginia-class follow-up project was a great success.
In terms of surface ships, the recovery of the US Navy is not ideal. If any. The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) is perhaps a good example, the operational concept of the project was chaotic at the very beginning, rushed into production, and the results got worse and worse. It took about 12 years from its launch to what is popularly known as the "Little Broken Ship". Needless to say, the U.S. Navy did not allow the almost unarmed Littoral Combat Ship to approach the current littoral battlefield in the southern part of the Red Sea.
Now the Constellation-class frigates, which are American Type 26 frigates, are also in trouble. This time, the US Navy adopted the excellent and full-fledged design of the "European Multi-Missile Defense System" (FREMM), but instead of modifying 15% of it for American purposes, as was originally stated, it modified 85%. This is basically a new ship. This "overstepping" approach, combined with a shortage of labor at the shipyard to build the ship, led to delays and price increases.
Thus, "too expensive", "unreliable", and "too much fiddling" appear in order. The US Navy will hardly be able to build new surface combat warships anymore. Fortunately, in the long-standing Arleigh-Burke destroyer project, the United States created not only one of the best warships ever built at the very beginning, but also one of the easiest to modify. The latest Arleigh-Burke destroyer to roll off the assembly line is similar in appearance to its counterpart from 33 years ago, but that's about it: the old destroyer that is still in service has been upgraded according to the new one.
In the UK, our replacement air defense destroyer Type 83 needs to avoid all these traps. It had to be advanced (but not too advanced), write what it should have from the beginning, and then build it without any changes.
However, it is not easy. What needs to be done by air defense destroyers is constantly expanding and transforming. Future Air Dominance Systems (FADS) is the umbrella term for this, and while it is developing rapidly, the concept is still in its infancy.
Whatever the future air supremacy system ultimately looks like, it must be advanced, but not too expensive. It must be survivable, and there cannot be too many people on board. It must carry a large number of (reloadable at sea) missiles, but not too big and too expensive. It must be able to counter swarm attacks by cheap, simple UAVs or missiles (the upcoming "Dragon Fire" laser should be useful in this regard). It also needs to shoot down ballistic missiles in space, supersonic or hypersonic missiles from the upper layers of the atmosphere to sea level, and defend against surface attacks (and drones as well). It should be able to shoot down targets below the horizon that are being tracked by other equipment such as airborne radars, aircraft, etc.
There is no doubt that the events in the "Red Sea" have confirmed the need for warships to have the ability to strike shore targets – and while the navies of most countries except the Royal Navy already have this capability, add to this. Type 83 ships will need to be able to disperse thousands of miles from other ships, but also be able to disperse in task forces next to aircraft carriers (a key requirement).
These requirements are so complex and sometimes even conflicting that some future air supremacy system concepts do not need large ships at all, but rely on a fleet of smaller arsenal ships and non-crew ships. This may work in wartime and even save money (which is never far from the discussion), but such a solution often ignores the fact that the task of the battleship 99% of the time is to prevent war from happening in the first place.
So, in my opinion, peacetime operations, deterrence efforts, radar physics, and a small amount of conventional wisdom mean that the core of the future air supremacy system will still be the appearance of a destroyer, with the option to add remotely controlled operations or heavy weapons. It will not be a massive cruiser, like the Zumwalt, or a small and under-armed cruiser, like the Littoral Combat Ship.
However, the future air supremacy system needs to mature now, because the equation is simple: no destroyers = no aircraft carriers = no conventional deterrence in too many parts of the world. And if they are not ready in time, we can know from the Type 23 ships the cost of running ships that exceed the expected lifespan, and given the complexity and difficulties of the Type 45 power system, it will be even worse if we have to do it again.
Therefore, I question the claim that British shipbuilding is in its golden age. If we have entered a golden age, it would be that the budget chiefs have finally recognised how tight the Royal Navy's budget has become, which could affect the country's defence in the face of growing threats, and the constant demands placed on the Navy's excellent staff.
In the United States, the problem is not a lack of funding and vision. Because, for a long time, the United States had a clear idea of creating a strong navy and provided ample funding. The problem for the United States is in execution, and over the past three decades, at least three major classes of ships have failed to enter service in large quantities, which has left the US Navy, like the British Royal Navy, with a large number of ships from 30 years ago.
Fortunately, both countries share the desire to deal with future threats. The navies of the two countries now only need access to resources and freedom to achieve this. In the case of Type 83 destroyers, now is the time to act decisively.