Involved in "proliferation of weapons of mass destruction"? The rejection of an Australian study visa for a Chinese doctoral student has been appealed

/*This article is translated from SBS, which only represents the original source and the original author's point of view, and is for reference only, and does not represent the attitude and position of this website. */

SBS reported on May 15 that Xiaolong Zhu, a PhD student at Queensland University of Technology, was in the national news over the weekend, but not for good reasons.

Zhu Xiaolong, a Chinese national, was denied a visa to study in Australia on the grounds that he was "directly or indirectly involved in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction".

The story begins in October 2019, when the university offered Zhu a scholarship to pursue a PhD in robotics. His research focuses on how drones can navigate urban environments without GPS. But in June 2020, Zhu was informed that the foreign minister had determined that he was at risk of proliferating weapons of mass destruction, particularly missiles and rockets.

Part of the reason for the decision may be that Mr. Zhu was educated at Beihang University, which has close ties to the Chinese military and is a major developer of ballistic missiles and stealth aircraft.

Chu's appeal is still ongoing, and he has not done anything clearly wrong and has not been charged or convicted. So, why is his story so sensational? Zhu Xiaolong's case is the fifth case in which a researcher has been barred from entering the country on suspicion of being related to weapons of mass destruction, and this is only the latest result of Australia's non-standard and lax approach to "research safety."

(Image source: SBS)

*Australian Research Safety Approach*

Australia's approach to protecting certain types of research from national security threats is not prescriptive and inconsistent with what many of its allies do. The United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, the European Union, and New Zealand all have national research security policies. Not in Australia. Instead, Australia has voluntary University Foreign Interference Taskforce guidelines.

First written in 2019 and updated in 2021, the guide was originally written before the pandemic, the US-China "chip war" and the AUKUS announcement.

One of Australia's largest university research funding agencies, the Australian Research Council, has only released a research safety framework in the past six months.

Our other major research funding agencies, such as the Federal Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation and the National Health and Medical Research Council, do not appear to have a similar framework. At the same time, most, if not all, of Australia's universities are increasingly turning to foreign funding in response to government funding cuts.

*blunt instrument*

At present, the Australian government seems to intend to use blunt instruments to regulate research safety. For example, the Minister of Foreign Affairs may deny or cancel a visa if a person poses a threat to security, fails the "good character" test, or (as in the case of Zhu Xiaolong) is considered to be likely to be associated with weapons of mass destruction.

From April 2024, foreign ministers can also refuse or cancel visas if someone poses an "unreasonable risk of critical technology transfer".

International education is one of Australia's largest export industries, and such controls can pose significant risks when universities are at risk of cutting the cap on the number of international students. Australian university researchers are also facing export controls. If they share or publish military or "dual-use" technology (i.e., research with military and civilian applications, such as radar), they must apply for a license.

Many countries have similar controls, but the definition of "dual-use" technology can be very subjective. In 2012, a Dutch researcher was taken to court for publishing research on influenza that could allegedly be used to create biological weapons.

Australian universities are also required to publicly list each arrangement with a foreign government entity. A recent study of these arrangements found that there are a number of potentially troubling, high-risk projects in our universities.

Disclosures do not appear to prevent problematic research collaborations from proceeding. A congressional investigation even found that the public register was no longer applicable.

*Australia can do better*

There has been a lack of concerted action in Australia on research security. Two years ago, a parliamentary inquiry found that Australian universities continued to be subject to foreign interference.

To date, less than a quarter of the Committee's recommendations have been implemented.

The final report of the Universities Accord, released this year, was called "the blueprint for the next decade and beyond" by federal education secretary Jason Clare, but it makes no mention of research safety at all.

In fact, the 408-page report mentions national security only three times. Another problem is the complete secrecy of such cases. If Zhu Xiaolong hadn't appealed, we might never have heard about it.

Neither the government nor the university has made a substantive public statement on the case. And Zhu Xiaolong himself may never know what information the minister considered to ban him from entering the country. Instead, the government has issued various certificates to protect "lawful means of preventing, detecting and investigating violations of the law or circumvention of the law" as well as "sources of confidential information".

*Go*

Australia can learn from its allies. In Canada, any federal funding involving "sensitive technology" that is linked to anyone on a particular organization's list will be denied entry.

In New Zealand, high-risk research can be secured by using encrypted devices, security clearances, and keeping all study data offline. In the U.S., universities can be fined or even suspended for grants if they don't follow disclosure rules. That said, Australian universities are unlikely to welcome more regulation. Such rules can infringe on academic freedom, i.e. protect the right of academics to pursue risky or controversial subjects.

Universities have complained that they are one of the most "overregulated" departments in Australia. To make matters worse, universities say that stifling international competition could hinder our innovation and put us "in a worse position". But these objections shouldn't be the end of the story.

In 2021, Mike Burgess, director of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, said that "a sensible approach to national security risks should not prevent [universities] from fulfilling their core responsibilities".

Three years have passed, and even the discussion of this "sensible approach" seems to have been put on hold. We need to reopen the discussion, otherwise any 'Made in Australia future' could die before it even starts.