In the early days of the Liberation War in 1946, Zhangjiakou was the capital of our army's Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei base area, and its geographical location and political significance were very prominent. However, Zhangjiakou was faced with the situation of being attacked on both sides, and in order to change the situation of the enemy and us, Nie Rongzhen, commander of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region, consulted the central authorities and decided to launch the Datong Jining Campaign to deal a heavy blow to the North China National Army. However, the results of the battle were not satisfactory, and our army not only failed to conquer Datong, but also lost the more important Zhangjiakou soon after. The Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region suffered serious losses in its troops, rapidly shrank its base areas, and was in a very passive situation, and was basically on the defensive until the Pingjin Campaign.
Nie Shuai took this battle as a lesson, and he always lingered in his military and political career. However, when writing his memoirs in his later years, Nie Shuai called Fu Zuoyi's victory a "fluke factor", and quoted Fu Zuoyi himself: The victory in the Battle of Jining was a fluke. The two important parties both said that the Kuomintang army was "lucky" to win the battle, but is this really the case? A PLA commander held a different opinion, believing that the battle was fundamentally wrong and should not have been fought, rather than by luck.
The person who said this was the founding general Zhang Zongxun. Zhang Zongxun's level is lower than that of Nie Shuai, but he dares to speak, because the battle of Datong Jining is also closely related to General Zhang Zongxun's reputation. At that time, the front-line person in charge of our army was none other than Zhang Zongxun, then commander of the Datong Frontline Command, who unified the dispatch of nine brigades of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region, the Jinsui Field Army, and local troops. Zhang Zongxun's troops squeezed the enemy's three divisions of Dong Qiwu in Datong City, and the enemy was very difficult.
Dong Qiwu is Fu Zuoyi's favorite general, Fu Zuoyi naturally will not sit idly by, he sent reinforcements to the 101st Division and other troops, and engaged our side on September 12. In the face of this change, Commander Zhang Zongxun made a decision: to change the all-out siege of the city to "send reinforcements first, then attack the city". This was the most annoying thing for Nie Rongzhen afterwards, he believed that Dong Qiwu had fallen into a desperate situation and was frightened, and our army should hold on and continue to attack the enemy in Datong City with all its might, instead of dividing troops to resist the enemy. Later, Dong Qiwu and the reinforcements attacked from both sides, and the situation on the battlefield reversed, and our army had to withdraw from the battlefield, completely failing to achieve the combat goal.
Zhang Zongxun was seriously criticized by Nie Rongzhen at the Laiyuan Conference and was criticized for "poor command"; However, Zhang Zongxun believed that the head of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region should bear the main responsibility, and there was no problem in ordering him to block the reinforcements, so he had an unpleasant quarrel with Nie Shuai for this. Due to the disharmony of the generals, Zhang Zongxun was transferred out of this theater soon after and went to the northwest battlefield to assist Mr. Peng. If it weren't for the Datong Jining War, maybe Zhang Zongxun would not have become the deputy commander of the Northwest Field Army.
Who's responsible? When future generations look at historical materials, they can only see their opinions, and it is not good to make arbitrary comments. Like Nie Shuai, General Zhang Zongxun also has a memoir that analyzes the defeat in detail. He concluded: In the early stage of Jin-Cha-Ji, there was too much active disarmament, and the lack of troops in the big war was a major problem; The second is that the military region is permeated with the mood of underestimating the enemy, and insists on fighting a tough battle when the conditions are not ripe. Finally, Zhang Zongxun stressed: Chairman Mao and the Party Central Committee sent three telegrams in advance instructing "do not move Fu Zuoyi's troops", but the relevant heads of the military region did not think so, and provided wrong feedback to the central authorities.
It is difficult to say which is right and which is wrong. However, it cannot be seen that the Battle of Datong Jining was a major knot in General Zhang Zongxun's heart, and he was still very regretful in his later years. Interestingly, about this battle, Fu Zuoyi did call himself a "fluke", and there are two factors in this: Fu Zuoyi is a generation of famous generals, very good at fighting, and he is more rational and comprehensive when he summarizes after the war, and he is unwilling to boast; In addition, after the Beiping Uprising in 49, Fu Zuoyi finally belonged to the generals who "abandoned the darkness and turned to the light", and it was normal for him to speak modestly and low-key.
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