After being reminded by my friends, I found out:
Recently, Yan Peixian's fund has been intensively changing fund managers.
On May 6, Yan Peixian stepped down from the "Sino-Canadian Juying Four-month Scheduled Opening" and was independently managed by Zou Tianpei.
Yan Peixian's independently managed "Sino-Canadian Ju'an 60-day rolling short-term bonds" were co-managed by Wei Taiyuan.
On May 9, Yan Peixian stepped down from the "China-Canada Pure Debt for one year" and handed over to Zhang Nan for management.
On May 10, Yan Peixian's representative fund, which is also the largest "China-Canada Pure Bond", was hired by Yu Yue Co-management.
At this point, Yan Peixian has no independently managed funds~
Take a look at the resumes of Wei Taiyuan and Yu Yue,
Neither of them is a rookie fund manager, Wei Taiyuan independently managed the "Sino-Canadian Mövenpick Pure Bond" for 3 years and 152 days, and Yu Yue independently managed the "Sino-Canadian Mövenpick Pure Bond" for 4 years and 73 days, which can rule out the possibility of the old and the new.
Therefore, some people are already guessing: Is Yan Peixian leaving?
The fund house's response was:
"At present, I have not received any notice from Yan Peixian (resignation), and Yan Peixian currently has no new products."
01
Yan Peixian
The first time I wrote about Yan Peixian was in September 2023,
https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/ZosJoJ4akhhrTLDYNntTMg
The "Sino-Canadian Pure Debt" he managed turned out to be on par with the "Penghua Fenglu" managed by Liu Tao.
The "Penghua Fenglu" has a single-day purchase limit of 100 yuan, which is a window fund, and the "Sino-Canadian Pure Bond" has a single-day purchase limit of 100,000 yuan, which is relatively more friendly, so it began to pay attention to Yan Peixian.
From 2008 to 2013, he successively served as a bond trader in the capital trading department of Ping An Bank and the capital trading department of the Bank of Beijing.
Sino-Canada Pure Bond is a new bond base issued by him on December 17, 2014, which was originally a graded bond base, and was transformed into an ordinary bond base on December 23, 2016, and does not hold any stock and convertible bond positions.
Since then, the fund has risen by 44.01% at an annualized 5.06% annualized and in the top 4% of its peers, while the maximum drawdown is only 2.77%.
Looking at the whole market,
Since December 23, 2016, there have been a total of 21 funds with returns of more than 40%, the maximum drawdown of no more than 3%, and the fund manager's tenure date before 2020.
In terms of investment methods,
For fixed income fund managers, macro is a compulsory course, and Yan Peixian's investment framework is "top-down".
And he is more cautious, and his requirements for himself are "the bull market should decisively increase the level of leverage and duration, and the bear market should be stable and not aggressive".
This is evident in the changes in bond positions, where he usually increases leverage at the end of the bear market, waits for the market to go for a while, unloads the leverage after there is a divergence, observes and observes, and if there is an opportunity in the future, he will add the leverage back.
Taking the operation from the end of 2020 to the end of 2023 as an example,
From May to November 2020, there was a half-year-long bear market in the bond market, Yan Peixian reduced his bond position to 91% in the third quarter, and then raised the bond position to 123% at the bottom of the bear market in the fourth quarter, 136% in the first quarter of 2021, and 137% in the second quarter, and the high position ate the bond bull market in the first half of 2021.
Then, out of an abundance of caution, he quickly reduced his bond position to 108% in Q3 2021, only to mention 125% in Q2 2022, and then lowered his position again in Q3, quickly raising his bond position to 129% after avoiding the debt disaster at the end of 2022.
In terms of specific positions,
Yan Peixian mainly took corporate bonds.
He said that risk control should always be put in the first place, and on the premise of strict selection of credit risks, he would buy medium and high-grade credit bonds with appropriate duration and relatively high coupons.
02
Alternative fund managers
To be honest, Yan Peixian's alternative is not easy to find.
Of the first 21 funds, there are 9 remaining after excluding the fixed bond base and several funds that hold stocks.
These 9 funds can be divided into two categories:
The 6 funds marked in blue are pure bond funds that do not hold or hold very few convertible bonds.
3 of the standard purple hold some convertible bonds.
(1) Among the 6 pure bond funds marked in blue,
Liu Tao, Ma Long, and Liu Wanfeng have all been famous for a long time.
Comparing the net value trend, except for Penghua Fenglu, which is more leading, up 50.01%, the other funds have a return of around 45%, which is suitable as an alternative.
In terms of limits,
Penghua Fenglu (Liu Tao) has a daily limit of 100 yuan, China Merchants Industrial Bond (Ma Long) has a daily limit of 10,000 yuan, and China Merchants Double Bond Enhancement (Liu Wanfeng) has a daily limit of 5 million yuan.
Huatai Berry's two fund managers, He Zijian and Luo Yuanhang, compare the changes in their bond positions with Yan Peixian, basically fluctuating in the same direction, and it can be seen that they are also cautious bond fund managers.
He Zijian, joined Huatai Berry in May 2014, began to manage funds in 2019, and is now the deputy director of the fixed income department of Huatai Berry.
His strategy is "not to sink credit, but to gain income through flexible strategies", which is actually trading.
Luo Yuanhang, the top science student in Guizhou Province in 2005, a master's degree in applied economics from Tsinghua University, has been managing the fund since 2014, and is currently the co-director of the fixed income department of Huatai Pineapple.
After experiencing the money shortage in 2013 and the pumping of the money market fund in 2014, he regarded maintaining the liquidity of the fund and the safety of the fund's assets as particularly important, and did not sink credit.
The investment strategy is to "see accurately and run fast", try to explain most of the market variables in your own framework to improve the winning rate; At the same time, it is keenly aware of the undercurrents surging under the sea level, and can respond quickly when the wind and waves hit.
It is worth mentioning that
Thanks to their steady style, both of them are fund managers who are more optimistic about institutions and have heavy positions for a long time.
Huatai Barry is quarterly red, and the institutional holding ratio is 80.19%.
Huatai Berry Fengsheng pure debt, the proportion of institutional holdings is 44.97%.
There may be friends who care about the changes in the positions of Liu Tao, Ma Long, and Liu Wanfeng.
The lazy cat also pulled it down, and the convergence could be seen in the general direction, but the details were disorganized.
It can only be said that all roads lead to Rome, and the bigwigs have their own ways of playing, and they rely on performance to speak~
(2) Among the 3 funds of Standard Purple,
Since 2021, the convertible bond position has been hovering around 50%, and it reached a high of 88.62% in the first quarter of this year, which can be said to have been out of the scope of the debt base.
However, because the heavy position is mainly bank convertible bonds, the maximum drawdown of the fund is only 1.88%.
Penghua Industrial Bond (Zhu Song) and Dacheng Jingxing Credit Bond (Sun Dan), the convertible bond position is only about 20%, and the main thing is financial convertible bonds, and the maximum drawdown of the fund is 2.24% and 2.78% respectively.
Compare fund trends,
Although these funds have controlled the maximum drawdown, after all, they have taken a considerable position in convertible bonds, and the daily volatility is still greater than that of pure bond funds.
(3) Hu Jian, Wang Xiaochen, Huang Jiliang
There are also several fixed income bigwigs who are not on the list, Hu Jian, Wang Xiaochen, Huang Jiliang, etc.,
They are mainly screened out because of slightly lower returns, but their performance has outperformed the long-term bond fund index~
Disclaimer: The content of this article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice