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Intelligence warfare in the context of the Cold War: the defection of Anatoly Golitsyn
In 1961, when the weather in Helsinki was unusually cold, snow covered the entire city, and a man in a heavy coat hurried towards the U.S. Embassy in the midst of the wind and snow. The man's name was Anatoly Golitsyn and he was an official at the Soviet Embassy in Finland. His face was tightly obscured by the brim of his scarf and hat, revealing only the tip of his nose and eyes, which gleamed with determination and tension.
Golitsyn arrived at the gate of the embassy, where two US Marine Corps sentries stood in uniform, with serious expressions. They watched vigilantly everyone who approached the embassy. Golitsyn walked up to one of the soldiers, took out a passport and identification from his coat pocket, and identified himself as a major officer of the KGB. After a brief intercom confirmation, the guard nodded to Golitsyn and motioned for him to enter.
Golitsyn quickly made his way through the embassy's security area and into a pre-arranged reception room. The interior of the room is simple, with several American landscape paintings hanging on the walls, and an American official in a suit is already waiting there. With a formal and cautious expression, the officer invited Golitsyn to sit down, and then cut straight to the point and asked about the information that Golitsyn had brought.
Golitsyn carefully removed a stack of documents from the inside pocket of his coat, which were wrapped in multiple layers of waterproof material, which were very important. He handed them to American officials and explained that they were documents on Soviet intelligence activities in Finland and other Nordic countries, including Soviet spy lists, communication codes, and plans for Soviet influence in Northern Europe.
U.S. officials took the document and flipped through it carefully, and each page seemed to contain information that could change the pattern of the Cold War. Their conversation gradually turned to Golitsyn's personal request to arrange a secret relocation to the United States for his family. Golitsyn explained that his family is currently at great risk and that if his actions are discovered by the Soviets, they will face unforeseen dangers.
The U.S. official's expression became more serious, and he said that the request needed to be escalated to higher leadership, and he assured that the information provided by Golitsyn would be analyzed in detail to ensure that the information was verified. Golitsyn understands this, knowing that this kind of thing takes time and a high degree of caution.
After the meeting, Golitsyn was placed in a secure room at the embassy for a temporary rest. The wind and snow continued outside, and in this small room inside the embassy, Golitsyn sat on the edge of his bed, waiting for a decision on his future fate.
Defection or bait: the confusion of intelligence agencies
Immediately after the intelligence provided by Golitsyn was sent to the CIA headquarters for preliminary analysis, the intelligence services convened an internal meeting to discuss how to deal with this contingency. The room was filled with senior officials from various departments, each with a different view and position on the matter.
Some officials expressed skepticism about the authenticity of Golitsyn's defection, arguing that Golitsyn's sudden defection and extensive intelligence as a high-ranking Soviet agency abroad may have hidden an elaborate trap behind it. The officials stressed that the Soviet Union had used multiple double-play and misleading tactics during the Cold War, and that Golitsyn's actions could have been a sophisticated counterintelligence operation.
Others, however, hold a different view. Among them was the head of the counterintelligence service, Angleton, who, after a personal meeting and long conversation with Golitsyn, was convinced of Golitsyn's sincerity and the content of the information provided. Angleton pointed out that the documents and materials provided by Golitsyn showed a high degree of inside knowledge in terms of content and details, and that the authenticity of the information was difficult to falsify by conventional means.
During the meeting, Angleton presented a detailed investigative plan that recommended verifying the intelligence provided by Golitsyn through multiple channels, including interception of Soviet communications, cross-checking with other Western intelligence agencies, and cross-validation using existing sources within the Soviet Union. He stressed that while vigilance is necessary, ignoring possible true intelligence would be a greater risk.
In addition, Angleton suggested that Golitsyn and his family should be provided with temporary protection against retaliation from the Soviet side. This suggestion was supported by some officials, who saw the protection of Golitsyn as a way to test his sincerity while also ensuring his safety as a source of intelligence.
In the weeks that followed, a special team was formed within the C.I.A. to analyze each of the documents and information provided by Mr. Golitsyn. They searched for historical context, verified the identities of those involved, and compared them with known Soviet patterns of action.
In the course of an in-depth investigation, the CIA gradually discovered that some of the information provided by Golitsyn matched the information they had obtained from other sources, which strengthened their trust in Golitsyn's sincerity. Especially after the confirmation of certain Soviet covert activities in Northern Europe, the value of Golitsyn was further recognized.
Intelligence confirms the involvement of JFK
By February 1962, Golitsyn's intelligence had been gradually collated and confirmed, covering details of Soviet espionage in a number of Western countries. This intelligence has been rigorously verified and proven to be highly reliable and valuable, and has gradually been highly valued by US intelligence agencies. As the intelligence was further analyzed, the information provided by Golitsyn was reported to the office of US President John F. Kennedy.
President Kennedy spoke highly of Golitsyn's intelligence. After learning the important content contained in this intelligence, Kennedy realized that this information was not only related to the national security of the United States, but also directly related to the internal security of its allies. In particular, the part concerning France points to specific information about the existence of Soviet spies within the French government, which directly threatens the security of France and even NATO as a whole.
Given the sensitivity and importance of intelligence, Kennedy decided to step in personally to deal with this diplomatic and intelligence issue. He wrote a handwritten letter detailing Golitsyn's intelligence on Soviet espionage in France and expressing U.S. concern and support for the security of its allies. Through this letter, Kennedy hopes to communicate directly with French President Charles de Gaulle to ensure that this critical information is handled correctly and that appropriate security measures are in place.
To ensure the safe and swift delivery of this extremely important letter, Kennedy directed that a special plane be arranged to be carried by a trusted envoy and fly directly to France. The envoy was not only responsible for the delivery of the letters, but was also given the task of explaining to de Gaulle the content of the intelligence and its possible implications.
After a short flight, the envoy arrived in France and went directly to the official residence of Charles de Gaulle. In a private and urgent meeting, the envoy handed over Kennedy's handwritten letter to de Gaulle. The letter detailed information confirmed by U.S. intelligence agencies about four Soviet spies who existed within the French government and were not only active in high-level government departments, but were also involved in a number of sensitive national security matters.
France's reaction with the internal investigation
After receiving Kennedy's warning letter, de Gaulle immediately took action, realizing that this was a serious matter of national security. He quickly ordered the formation of a special investigative team of six senior intelligence officers, tasked with traveling to the United States and conducting detailed face-to-face discussions with American intelligence agencies to verify the veracity of the information provided by Golitsyn.
The team consisted of top intelligence analysts and senior officials from France's National Security Agency, who traveled to the United States on a government plane with the necessary documents and pre-existing intelligence records. Upon arrival in the United States, the French investigative team held a series of closed-door meetings with CIA officials. The U.S. side showed detailed documents provided by Golitsyn, including records of communications interception and details of the operation of the Soviet spy network, which had previously been provided directly to the United States by Golitsyn.
At the same time, the French investigation team also provided the US side with information on the suspicious activities of the Soviet Union in France that they had for comparison and verification. After several days of intense information exchange and discussions, the two sides reached a consensus on the authenticity of the information, confirming that part of the information provided by Golitsyn was highly consistent with France's own intelligence materials.
Upon his return to France, de Gaulle instructed the investigative team to immediately launch a comprehensive security review and counter-espionage operation in the country, which became the largest self-examination ever conducted by French intelligence agencies. The self-examination involved extensive phone calling, email checks, and personal background checks aimed at finding out if there were other undetected espionage activities.
In doing so, the investigation team used a variety of intelligence-gathering tools, including intensive surveillance of suspicious persons and in-depth background checks. They launched a detailed investigation into the activities of de Gaulle's private intelligence adviser and the director of the Foreign Intelligence and Counterintelligence Service, and found that the two men had numerous secret contacts with the Soviet spy network.
As the investigation deepened, more evidence surfaced that the two officials were not only leaking state secrets, but were also involved in the monitoring and manipulation of internal communications of the French government. This discovery caused a great shock, because they were all high-ranking officials who were directly trusted by de Gaulle, and their betrayal not only jeopardized the security of the country, but also posed a serious threat to the stability of the French government.
After confirming all the evidence, de Gaulle ordered the arrest of the two inmates and a series of purges within the French intelligence community to eliminate possible Soviet influence.
The dilemma and consequences of intelligence work
After exposing the treason of high-ranking officials inside, the French intelligence system suffered an unprecedented blow. The atmosphere of the entire institution quickly shifted, from proactive intelligence gathering and analysis to a state of mistrust and suspicion. Fears began to spread within the intelligence service, with employees fearing that their actions might be misunderstood or framed as guilty.
Driven by this climate, many intelligence agents began to reduce communication with their colleagues, fearing that any inadvertent words and actions could be used as evidence of cooperation with hostile countries. Some key intelligence projects have been slow or stalled altogether because of mutual suspicion among participants. This collective act of self-protection seriously affects cooperation within the department, and the necessary information sharing and teamwork are greatly hindered.
In addition, in order to prevent the recurrence of similar intelligence leaks, the French government and the leadership of the intelligence agencies have implemented a series of new security measures and censorship. This includes increased background checks on intelligence officers, the implementation of stricter security protocols, and more intensive surveillance of all intelligence activities. While these measures have restored some sense of security to some extent, they have also resulted in significant resources and time being invested in internal oversight rather than external intelligence activities.
In this environment of regulation and suspicion, many talented intelligence officers are frustrated and dissatisfied. Some veteran intelligence analysts have chosen to retire or change jobs because they are dissatisfied with the new working environment and ongoing internal pressures, which further undermines the professional competence and efficiency of the French intelligence agencies. At the same time, it is difficult for new intelligence personnel to receive training in this environment, and it is difficult for them to receive the guidance and support they deserve, resulting in a decline in the overall quality of intelligence work and innovation ability.
In addition, the crisis has exposed some of the vulnerabilities of Western intelligence systems during the Cold War. The presence of internal traitors reveals the loopholes in the personnel vetting and internal security measures of Western intelligence agencies. This not only poses a direct security threat to France, but also negatively affects intelligence sharing and collaboration across the NATO alliance.
References: Compiled by Yu Xiling, Deng Hongfeng, Zhou Lulin, etc. A complete collection of modern scandals in the world[M]. 1992