I'm Tang Tang, a history buff. Welcome everyone to [follow] me, talk about the past and the present, and discuss the general trend of the world. Gentleman I, just to learn and make friends!
On the morning of December 23, 1950, a major car accident occurred 20 kilometers north of Seoul:
A U.S. jeep was hit by an oncoming ROK truck on icy roads, and a sharp piece of window glass sharded into Walker's head, who was sitting in the passenger seat of the jeep, killing him instantly.
1. The feud between Walker and MacArthur
On the Korean battlefield, the discord between Walker and MacArthur has been a topic of private discussion. MacArthur did not appreciate or trust the general who had commanded the armored corps under Patton and was known as the "fierce dog", and Walker also had a grudge against MacArthur, who was stubborn and self-serving.
Even when the Inchon landing was successful and MacArthur's prestige was in full swing, Walker was not convinced. He believes that Incheon's success was superficial, and it did not achieve the goal of destroying the main force of the Korean People's Army in one fell swoop, and as for the subsequent actions, both tactically and strategically, they were more failures.
In his view, when the US military hastily crossed the 38th parallel, it left behind many hidden dangers, and after crossing the 38th parallel, it rashly advanced in disregard of the enemy situation in front of it, the widening gap between the east and west lines, and the lack of security on the flanks of the troops, which put the US troops in a dangerous situation.
He complained that MacArthur sat in a building in Tokyo and gave orders to the front line with a map, far from the reality of the battlefield, and that the reasonable handling he himself took at the front according to the actual situation was not carried out because of MacArthur's interference and rebuke.
After the defeat of the 8th Army, Walker felt an indescribable sense of frustration. He privately told acquaintances that the day when he would be removed from command would not be far off.
On December 3, Walker ordered the abandonment of Pyongyang and the withdrawal of all troops to the line of the Imjin River.
This day happened to be his 61st birthday.
The 8th Army retreated so quickly that war correspondents reported the situation with the words "Walker fled as fast as possible." However, the Chinese forces did not pursue him, leaving Walker puzzled whether this was due to political considerations, constrained by other forces, or if he was planning a new, larger detour.
On December 22, Walker ordered the blowing up of every bridge and tunnel on the road and railroad north of the 38th parallel, which was about to be abandoned. The engineer commander asked if it was possible to blow up only a few key bridges and only one hole for the others, so that they could be reused with minor repairs in the event of a counter-offensive in the future.
Walker replied categorically: blow them all up, and don't think about repurposing.
The next day, Walker was killed in a car accident.
2. MacArthur and Ridgway's "Cooperation"
Previously, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had an agreement with MacArthur:
In the event of an accident for Walker, his first replacement will be Matthew Ridgway, and his second replacement will be Van Vliet.
Therefore, as soon as the news of Walker's death reached Tokyo, MacArthur telegraphed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and demanded that Ridgway immediately take up his post in the 8th Army.
Ridgway was the deputy chief of staff of the U.S. Army at the time, five years younger than Walker. This person has come out of the combat unit and has rich experience in actual combat.
During World War II, he commanded the 82nd Airborne Division and the 18th Airborne Corps, and participated in the battles of Sicily and Normandy. He had met MacArthur since he was at West Point, but he was only a young captain at the time, and MacArthur was already a prominent principal.
MacArthur's attitude towards Ridgway was markedly different from that towards Walker:
MacArthur had no sense of trust in Walker, could not let it go, and often intervened remotely in his actions; MacArthur, on the other hand, trusted Ridgway and let him go in an all-round way, giving him completely autonomous command of the battlefield.
On December 26, Ridgway and MacArthur met in Tokyo, and MacArthur made it clear:
"You can draw your own conclusions and make your own judgments. I will definitely support your work, and I am completely at ease with you. ”
3. Li Qiwei's perception of entering the battlefield for the first time
Li Qiwei entered the Korean battlefield with the idea of "resuming the offensive as soon as his strength permits."
In this regard, he is very different from MacArthur and Walker, and it is this difference that makes him a tough character to deal with.
It can be said that the appearance of Li Qiwei had an impact on the course of the subsequent war that cannot be underestimated.
Regarding the state of the U.S. military at that time, Ridgway found:
The greatest weakness of the US military in combat is that it is "unwilling to give up certain material comforts, afraid to leave the few highways, unwilling to carry out campaigns without radio and telephone contact, and in addition, too simplistic in its thinking when fighting the enemy." In combat, "it relies on roads in such a way that it does not attach importance to seizing high ground along the way, is unfamiliar with the terrain and makes difficult use of the terrain, is unwilling to abandon the cars that cause heavy casualties to the troops and replaces them on foot, and is unwilling to go deep into the mountains and jungles to fight at the enemy's garrisons."
He pointed out that the U.S. military is not strong enough to build a solid front across the entire peninsula, but "I don't understand why these forces don't support each other, such as between divisions and between armies."
Li Qi wrote with emotion:
"Their infantry ancestors would be so angry that they would roll in their graves if they could really see the current state of this army."
As for the advantages of the Chinese army, what Li Qiwei praised the most was that they were not afraid of hardship, and could solve the problem of logistics and supply by means of human pulling, shoulder-carrying, animal packing, and vehicle transportation, and were familiar with the terrain and climatic conditions, and usually marched lightly at night, and were masters of night and mountain warfare.
He believes that as long as the U.S. military does not change its over-reliance on roads, it will not be able to defeat the Chinese army, which has these advantages, in the mountains of Korea. Ridgway demanded that the U.S. military abandon comfortable conditions and "go into the mountains to search for the enemy and pin it down from the position." He also inspired troops with an old U.S. Army slogan: "Find them!" Bite them! Hit them! Destroy them! ”
4. The U.S. Army's understanding of the weaknesses of the Volunteer Army after the Second Campaign
As a matter of fact, after two battles, the US military has a first-hand feel for the strengths and weaknesses of the other side in the confrontation with the Chinese army. At that time, two US military documents made a more specific analysis of this.
One is the "Combat Situation Report No. 6" of the headquarters of the 8th Army captured by the Volunteer Army.
The report is based on the oral reports of officers and men of the 16 infantry companies of the 2nd Division of the US Army, which participated in operations in the Gunyu-ri area, and its main content is to analyze the tactical characteristics of the Chinese army's offensive operations, and in particular to point out the weaknesses of the Chinese army in reconnaissance and firepower.
According to the report, according to the investigation of 16 companies of the US military, with two exceptions, the positions of the US positions attacked during the battle were not accurately grasped by the Chinese army before the war, and the battles were basically encounters, and "both sides were very surprised at first." Even the command posts, artillery positions and sensitive rear facilities that were successfully knocked out by the Chinese army were mostly accidental, and "not the result of detailed reconnaissance and planning."
In terms of firepower, the report said that the Chinese army's artillery fire was not very effective, and it was difficult to inflict losses on the American army, and the soldiers were not afraid of this. In battle, the greatest threat to the U.S. military was accurate machine-gun fire, not exaggerated grenades.
Although the Chinese army tends to use grenades to solve problems in close combat, the actual combat effect is not good. The reasons are, first, "Chinese soldiers have weak arms and are not suitable for throwing grenades" (according to statistics, the maximum distance for Chinese soldiers to throw grenades from bottom to top on flat ground is 20~25 yards (18-22 meters)); The second is that "the grenade itself has little lethal effect" (American soldiers are injured by grenades in battle, but very few are killed, and it seems that serious injuries only occur when the body or head is in direct contact with the grenade).
If we rank the actual power of the weapons in the hands of Chinese soldiers according to their killing effect, light machine guns are in first place, mortars (usually 60 mm in caliber) are in second place, and hand grenades, Tom portable submachine guns, and rifles are in the next place.
Another material is the "Memorandum on the Assessment of China's Operational Situation" issued by the Operations Research Office of the 8th Group Army, which was written on the basis of the combat experience of the 1st Marine Division in the Changjin Lake area.
The memorandum states:
In the Changjin Lake area, the Chinese army "has never succeeded in encircling our army or separating any important part of our army, or breaking through the overall defensive front of our army in a simple external offensive"; After the various divisions of the Chinese army were put into operation, "it seems that they quickly ran out of their supplies in advance." Since the resupply did not keep up, their combat effectiveness did not exist at that time".
In terms of artillery fire, the Chinese army was supported by small artillery units in all six attacks, but no more than 2~3 guns each time, "and the shelling was also limited to the use of only a few shells". During the attack, their main armament was 12.7 mm heavy machine guns, as well as submachine guns, rifles and wooden-handled grenades.
In terms of obstacles, although they "used explosives appropriately in the most critical places" and were able to "achieve maximum damage with the least amount of explosives", they were unable to cause damage to a few small bridges and not cut off an entire road that could be blocked with a few boulders due to the lack of heavy explosives.
The memo described the severe impact of the cold weather on Chinese troops, saying that "we have found that many enemy soldiers died without being hit by bullets or shrapnel, falling victim to the freezing cold."
The memo also reads:
"In the course of repeated attacks on the same positions, their use of firepower has changed little or nothing, either due to an extreme lack of supplies or simply a lack of tactical literacy, and when they expand their offensive and it is possible to achieve a partial victory, they sometimes stop taking the enemy's positions by force."
The above two documents, one from Junyuli on the Western Front and the other from Changjin Lake on the Eastern Front, represent the perceptual understanding of the operational characteristics of the Chinese army by the front-line troops of the US military.
It shows that through actual combat, the US military has gained a preliminary understanding of the weaknesses of the Chinese armed forces, although these understandings are still only at the technical and tactical level, and have not yet risen to the level of a campaign. However, as far as the entire US military is concerned, the panic caused by the defeat continued to ferment at this time, and it was not reversed until Ridgway took office.
After taking command of the battlefield, Li Qiwei went all out to restore the confidence of the troops, and for this reason, he deliberately packaged himself as a "tough guy" who could go into battle at any time:
He was dressed in an airborne combat suit, with a melon-shaped grenade pinned to his right chest and a first-aid kit on his left chest.
Wearing this iconic "cool suit," he ran around the front-line troops all day long, tirelessly patrolling, inspecting, agitating, and cheering up, but the morale and fighting spirit of the entire unit were far from being activated by a few high-profile instructions, and it was difficult to completely change the dull and negative situation in a short period of time.
Faced with the grim reality, Ridgway could only adopt a pragmatic attitude, focusing his work on preparing for "the offensive that China will almost certainly launch on New Year's Day." A few days later, when the Volunteers did launch a new offensive, Ridgway would face another collapse of the entire front, and would have to organize a new mass retreat.
5. Loopholes in the "line of defense" of the U.S. military
When the U.S. forces retreated to the 38th parallel, MacArthur issued the "Order No. 5 of the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Forces" on December 8, which determined that Seoul would be the hub and set up nine lines of defense, and the last line of defense at the southern end would be the Busan ring defensive position along the Nakdong River.
Although he frequently sent telegrams to Washington urging him to withdraw from North Korea if he could not get reinforcements, he still demanded that Walker not abandon Seoul unless he faced the danger of being encircled.
To this end, he drew four lines of defense north of Seoul, the most important of which stretched from the mouth of the Imjin River in the west, through Pocheon and Chuncheon, to Yangyang on the east coast, and was roughly in the same position as the 38th parallel.
On Walker's defensive deployment map, this line of defense is referred to as the "B Line".
MacArthur believed that this line traversed the entire peninsula and was even narrower than the "waist of the bee," and that there was a relatively complete road transportation network, which was conducive to the logistical supply and mobility of the troops, and should be regarded as a key point of defense.
On 11 December, MacArthur flew to Korea, the first time he had reached the front line since the failure of his "general offensive to end the war by Christmas."
He arranged the first stops at Hamhung and Hungnam on the Eastern Front, first meeting with Almond and then going to Seoul to consult with Walker on the redeployment of troops, and announced that Almond's 10th Army would be included in the 8th Army sequence. He believed that the 8th Army and the 10th Army, when combined, would be enough to hold the most important line of defense north of Seoul.
After MacArthur left, Walker added two more lines of defense south of Seoul:
One is the "C Line", which runs eastward along the Han River, passes through Hongcheon, and ends near Nanya-ri on the east coast; The other is the "D Line", which passes through Pyeongtaek, Anseong, Janghowon-ri, and Wonju, and then turns to the end of the C Line on the east coast.
Walker intended to organize resistance on both lines if the Chinese offensive forced him to abandon Seoul, but it was not enough to force the entire 8th Army to the Nakdong River.
Walker's elaborate arrangements south of Seoul were suspected by MacArthur of preparing for the abandonment of Seoul.
In the face of this question, Walker assured MacArthur:
The 8th Army was to defend Seoul with all its might, but it was also pointed out that the ROK units deployed on the right flank of the front were extremely unreliable, and the first two battles were due to the sudden collapse of the ROK army, which exposed the flanks of the 8th Army; If this scene is repeated in the next round of Chinese attacks, the positions north of Seoul will still not be able to hold, and the American forces will have to organize a retreat. Therefore, "extensive and comprehensive preparation should be regarded as a reasonable prudence".
The specific deployment of the "general line of defense from the Imjin River to the 38th Parallel" determined by Ridgway after taking office was also based on MacArthur's Order No. 5 and Walker's concept of multiple lines of defense.
This mobile defense deployment, which relies on multiple positions, is an attempt to make use of the 300-kilometer-deep area north of Pusan, relying on the existing positions, to minimize the losses of the "United Nations Army," and at the same time to use the powerful firepower prepared in advance to inflict maximum casualties on the opponent so that he will pay the greatest price When the defense line may be broken through by the opponent, he will retreat to the next line of defense one after another, and so on repeatedly, alternately, so as to achieve the goal of smashing the opponent's offensive.
In order to realize this attempt, Walker deployed 8 divisions on Line B, including 2 U.S. divisions (24th and 25th Divisions) and 6 ROK divisions (1st, 2nd, 5th, 6th, 8th, and 9th Divisions). The other divisions and brigades took up positions as second-line troops in the next line of defense.
Because the various units of the "United Nations Army" suffered losses to varying degrees in the battles of the Qingchuan River and Changjin Lake, although the casualties were not too great, the equipment was seriously damaged and discarded, the structure of some units was disrupted, and their morale suffered a heavy setback.
On the wide frontage from the mouth of the Imjin River to the east coast, the average width of the defensive front of each division of the US and South Korean armies was 20~30 kilometers, and it did not form the necessary density of force firepower, nor did it establish a reasonable depth of defense, and the rear did not maintain a strong reserve. Once a point is breached, it can lead to the collapse of the entire line of defense.
In late December, all units of the US 10th Army, which had withdrawn from Hungnam, arrived at the port near Pusan, and after reorganization, they were successively included in the battle sequence of the 8th Army, and one part was sent to the vicinity of the 38th parallel. The addition of the 10th Army alleviated the contradiction of insufficient front-line troops of the "United Nations Army".
Walker made some adjustments to the original deployment:
East of Chuncheon to the defense line of the east coast, the ROK Army's 3 corps defended the US 9th Army (under the jurisdiction of the 24th Division, the ROK 6th Division, and the British 27th Brigade) to defend the front of the Uijeong, which may be the main offensive direction of the Chinese army; The U.S. 1st Army (25th Division, ROK 1st Division, and Turkish Brigade) defended the westernmost front of Wenshan.
The other five U.S. divisions (the 1st Marine Division, the 1st Cavalry Division, the 2nd, 3rd, and 7th Divisions) and the 1 ROK Division (the 7th Division) were reorganizing and replenishing while occupying rear positions and preparing them for subsequent operations.
6. Estimation of the strength of the Volunteer Army
For the U.S. military, nothing is more troubling than a long period of lack of understanding of the Chinese military's strength, disposition, and operational intentions.
After Li Qiwei took office, he inspected the headquarters of various armies and divisions, and found that many commanders and staff officers did not know at all how many Chinese troops they were facing in front of them, but only randomly planted many small red flags on the map, each of which represented a division of the Chinese army.
In an internal briefing, Ridgway saw that the enemy situation plotted on the map was "a large goose-egg-shaped red circle, and a line of numbers scrawled on the circle - 174,000".
Before his death, Walker estimated that the next offensive of the Chinese army could be launched on Christmas Day (December 25). Mr. Ridgway, who took office on Christmas Eve, predicted that the Chinese army's offensive "would definitely be launched on New Year's Day."
The strength of the Chinese and North Korean armies was estimated at 440,000 at that time, including about 270,000 in 21 divisions of the Chinese army, 12 divisions in the North Korean army, and about 160,000 guerrilla troops in South Korea.
In addition, an estimated 650,000 troops are massed in northeast China, and another 250,000 troops are concentrating in northeast China from all over China. The total strength of the "United Nations Army" is about 365,000, and the ground combat force is only 250,000, including 100,000 US troops, 140,000 ROK troops, and 10,000 from other countries.
Based on this comparison of forces, Ridgway believes:
Although the Chinese and North Korean armies surpass the "United Nations Army" in numbers, the US military has strong artillery and tank strength, and holds air supremacy; Although the 8th Army could not stop the night offensive of the Chinese and North Korean troops, it could take the following measures to strike at it:
"Shrink the troops at night, so that the troops are closely connected with each other, and during the day, launch a strong counterattack with a coordinated detachment of infantry and tanks."
Ridgway knows:
No matter how tough he was in words, he still had to abandon many positions once the fight really started, so he demanded: "After careful reconnaissance and careful construction of rear positions, an orderly retreat should be carried out in accordance with the adjustment line." ”
He instructed the commanders of the armies and divisions:
"It is not permissible to leave no troops to be crushed and annihilated by the enemy; Fight to free the severed troops, unless the main commander himself confirms that the liberation of these forces will result in the loss of as many or even more troops. ”
When he discovered that a corps commander had in his instructions to a division commander to hold a certain position "at all costs", he immediately ordered this passage to be crossed off.
He said:
Only the commander of the army group himself could give such an order to a large force, and unless he personally surveyed the terrain, observed the situation on the spot, and determined that it was necessary to do so, he "would never give an order to hold his position to the death."
Ridgway was determined and confident to fight in Korea, but he was also worried that "the headquarters and even Washington would think that we might be forced to evacuate the Korean Peninsula in its entirety."
He strongly demanded that "if a decision is made to retreat, all possible measures must be taken to prevent leakage of rumors."
In addition, he also made full use of the tens of thousands of laborers provided by the Syngman Rhee government to vigorously build positions in areas where it was possible to retreat, and built a very deep defensive area in the far-reaching rear more than 300 kilometers away from the front line, which was named the "Davis Line."
7. Li Qiwei's sober grasp of the battlefield
By the end of December, the 8th Army had formed "a general front from the Imjin River to the 38th Parallel" in the intended defensive area.
Except for the four seriously damaged U.S. divisions (the 1st Marine Division and the 2nd, 3rd, and 7th Divisions) that were resting and replenishing in Jecheon, Daegu, and Pusan, south of the 37th parallel, the other units had reached the mobile position south of Uijeong-seoul.
The first line deploys 8 divisions and Turkish brigades of the ROK Army, from west to east: the 1st Division of the ROK Army, the Turkish Brigade, the 6th, 2nd, 5th, 8th, 3rd, 9th Divisions and the Capital Division of the ROK Army.
The 1st Cavalry Division and the 24th and 25th Divisions of the US Army, and the 27th Brigade of the British Army are the second echelon.
The characteristic of this deployment is that the ROK troops are on the front line, and the US and British troops are retreating to the second line, and most of them are assembled around Seoul and on the north-south communication arteries of the Han River, assuming a posture of being able to follow the rules and not being able to retreat as planned at any time.
Li Qiwei instructed that the 1st and 9th armies of the US army, which were deployed in the most dangerous areas, should draw up a special retreat plan for the US 1st Army and the 9th Army, and that the relevant matters for organizing and coordinating the retreat of the two armies should be clarified in advance.
Later actual combat showed that the deployment and operational policy adopted by Li Qiwei played an important role in bringing into play the operational superiority of the US military and in exploiting and expanding the inherent weaknesses of the Chinese volunteers.
As the "United Nations" defensive line moves back one after another, the attacking volunteer units will encounter greater and greater difficulties in logistical supply, so that it is inevitable that they will reach the peak of the offensive at some point in time and space.
In Li Qiwei's view, sticking to the front end of the 38th parallel, including the Seoul area, does not have much strategic significance; The so-called natural danger of the Han River will not have much tactical value in the case of frozen river surface; The area along the 37th Parallel, 50 kilometers south of the Han River, is the narrowest part of the southern part of the peninsula (the so-called "second bee waist"), and there are still east-west roads along the northern foot of the Xiaobaishan Mountain Range that can be used, which is a good position for the "United Nations Army" to stabilize the defensive line and switch from defense to offensive.
If it still can't stand up here, the "United Nations Army" can continue to retreat south, and relying on the Jinjiang River, the Xiaobai Mountains, and the Nakdong River, there will still be considerable room for maneuver.
It should be said that Li Qiwei's understanding of the characteristics and laws of the Chinese army's offensive operations has indeed reached a new level, which his predecessors could not match.
The countermeasures he has taken are also highly targeted and practical. This indicates that the contest between the Chinese and US militaries is bound to enter a new stage. The strengths and strengths of the Chinese military will be increasingly limited, while its weaknesses and weaknesses will be further revealed.
The battle below will become more and more difficult to fight.
(End of text)
If you have other topics or opinions about the field of history, you can [follow] me for a private chat, or you can leave a message in the comment area below and reply as soon as possible.