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Bandit forces and their activities
In August 1945, at the end of World War II, the tide of war began to shift with the Soviet Red Army sending troops to the Northeast on a large scale. The entry of Soviet troops not only meant the final assault on the Japanese Empire, but also heralded a major adjustment of the strategic pattern of this important region in the northeast. In order to cooperate with the strategic deployment of the Soviet Union and ensure regional stability, the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region of the Eighth Route Army was quickly mobilized and sent more than 10,000 officers and soldiers to the Rehe and Liaoxi regions. These units already had extensive experience in guerrilla warfare before entering the Northeast, and their movements were fast and stealthy, and they were able to quickly engage in operations in difficult terrain.
After entering these areas, the troops of the Eighth Route Army found that the situation on the ground was far more complicated than expected. Although the Japanese puppet regime has collapsed, its long-term oppression and exploitation has caused profound social unrest. In addition, the Kuomintang government's influence in these areas was extremely limited, and it was unable to effectively control or manage these areas, which directly led to the aggravation of the banditry problem.
These bandit gangs usually range from a few dozen to a few hundred people, and they usually gather in mountainous or hilly areas with poor traffic and complex terrain. For example, forested mountainous areas and intricate ravines make them ideal hiding places. Using their familiarity with these places, they easily evade pursuit and launch a surprise attack on the surrounding villages at the right time.
The activities of bandits are usually highly mobile and sudden. They carefully observe the movements of the target village before the operation, choosing to attack at night or early in the morning, when the villagers are at their least alert. They would quickly storm the villages, looting food, livestock, and anything of value, and sometimes even kidnapping villagers for ransom. After completing their raids, they quickly retreat into forests or ravines, disappearing into complex terrain.
These frequent plundering operations have severely damaged the economic base and social order of the local community. Many peasants have been plunged into deeper poverty by the bandits, and their safety and basic survival are threatened. In addition, the bandits also cut off the village's economic ties and supplies by controlling the main road to the market, making the village's economy even more depressed.
The Eighth Route Army's anti-bandit operation
In order to completely eradicate the bandit forces in the Jireliao region, the Eighth Route Army carefully planned a large-scale anti-bandit operation against Dage Town. Located in the core area of Fengning County, Dage Town has long been a base for bandits because of its critical geographical location and complex terrain. The bandit suppression team commanded by Zhong Huikun was selected as the main force of the operation, and they were responsible for coordinating and directing other brother units to complete this task together.
On the eve of the operation, Zhong Huikun's troops quickly and secretly approached the town of Dage, occupying several key heights around it. The selection of these heights was precisely calculated and scouted, and could be used both to effectively monitor the internal situation in the town of Oko and to serve as a springboard for an attack. The troops quietly completed their deployment under the cover of night, ensuring the concealment and suddenness of the operation.
In order to synchronize his operations, Zhong Huikun maintained close communication with the other three forces through liaison officers. Each line of troops has a specific mission and offensive line, which together form an all-round encirclement network for the town of Dage. Among them, the first unit is responsible for cutting the main road to the town of Dage to prevent bandits from escaping or foreign aid; The other two lanes approached from the flanks and the rear, forming a convergence trend.
After making sure that all the troops were in place, Zhong Huikun gave the order to attack. As the first rays of morning light pierced the sky, all the troops launched a general assault on the town of Bigage almost simultaneously. Taking advantage of the high ground occupied during the night, the main attacking force quickly descended the hill and went straight to the center of the town. As a result of the adequacy of the previous reconnaissance activities, the troops quickly broke through the initial line of defense set up by the bandits outside the town.
At the same time, the troops that cut off the road also managed to intercept small groups of bandits trying to come to the aid from outside the town, ensuring the blockade of the battlefield. The flanks and rear units closely followed the pace of the main attacking force and entered the town from several directions, leaving the bandits in a dilemma of fighting on multiple fronts.
Under the efficient coordination and fierce offensive of the Eighth Route Army, the resistance of the bandits appeared very fragile. They lacked adequate organization and command, and soon began to break up under the fire and charge of the Eighth Route Army. The battle in the town lasted several hours, and the Eighth Route Army demonstrated extremely high combat efficiency and tight tactical execution.
Resistance and annihilation of bandits
As the leader of a major local bandit gang, Han Jigong chose Sabaogou as the last base of resistance in the Eighth Route Army's anti-bandit operation against Dage Town. Located to the north of the town of Dage, Sabaogou is made up of steep mountains and dense woodland, which provides a natural advantage for bandits to hide and defend. Han Jigong and his more than 600 men took advantage of these geographical conditions to make final preparations for stubborn resistance.
The entrance to Sabaogou is narrower, and once it goes deep, the terrain becomes more complex and difficult to traverse. The winding of the mountains restricts the view, and the cover of trees adds to the concealment. Once here, the bandits quickly occupied several key vantage points, which allowed them to effectively monitor and control the path into the ravine. They deployed hand-held machine guns and other fire equipment at these points, forming a strong defensive circle.
To further strengthen the defense, the bandits set up ambush points between the ditch and the high ground, using improvised camouflage measures such as covering bunkers with branches and shrubs. These ambush points were set up in locations where the terrain was difficult to predict and were designed to inflict a surprise blow on an enemy trying to approach. The bandits also laid improvised traps and barricades, such as sharp bamboo sticks and hidden potholes, near the mouth of the ditch to slow down the enemy's attack and inflict damage.
As the Eighth Route Army gradually approached Sabaogou, Han Jigong's troops began to conduct more frequent alerts and patrols. They sent squads to patrol inside and outside the ravines in order to detect the movements of the Eighth Route Army in advance. Taking advantage of the terrain, these patrols were able to quickly conceal themselves in the woods and report back as soon as they spotted the enemy.
In the battle of Sabaogou, the disadvantage of the bandits gradually became apparent. Due to their long-term dependence on the mountains and forests for survival, they lacked formal military training, which led to their obvious disadvantages in organizational discipline and tactical use. Although their movements were rapid, they were mostly disorganized and lacked effective coordination and tactical planning, which was particularly prominent in front of the Eighth Route Army.
When the 24th Regiment of the Eighth Route Army approached Sabaogou from the north, the bandits' sentries were conducting daily patrols. Most of these sentinels are young members of bandit gangs, and they have a poor sense of vigilance and are extremely inaccurate in their judgment of the enemy's situation. As soon as they saw the vanguard of the Eighth Route Army, these sentries instinctively panicked, and did not take any concealment or alarm measures, but opened fire directly.
Outcomes and effects
The 24th Regiment led by Commander Wu Di quickly made a tactical assessment after encountering machine gun fire from bandit sentries in Sabaogou. Commander Wu Di's rich combat experience made him immediately realize that this firefight could not be initiated by some scattered small bandits, but must be Han Jigong's main force. This judgment is based on the bandits' firepower deployment and the terrain they choose to defend, which shows that the bandits are organized and prepared.
After realizing this, Wu Di quickly issued an order, adjusted the original tactical plan, and decided to go all out to attack Sabaogou and directly exterminate the main force of the bandits. He ordered the signal corps to convey the latest combat orders, and all squads quickly adjusted their formations and prepared for a full-scale attack. After a brief pre-battle mobilization, the soldiers of the 24th Regiment quickly assembled and launched a charge against Sabaogou.
The soldiers of the Eighth Route Army attacked very quickly, and they were experienced in fighting in mountains and woodlands, and were able to quickly adapt to changes in the terrain and effectively use the terrain as cover. When the order to attack was given, the fighters broke through the front line defenses of the bandits with amazing speed. Due to the bandits' lack of rigorous training and command, they quickly lost their organization under the fierce offensive of the Eighth Route Army, and their positions were in disarray.
During the battle, the 24 regiment, taking advantage of the high flexibility and combat qualities of its soldiers, did not make a long stop or prepare for heavy fire at the entrance to Sabaogou, but directly adopted the tactics of rapid assault. The soldiers took advantage of the terrain and dense tree shelter and advanced rapidly, effectively cutting down the space for the bandits to resist. The tactical superiority of the Eighth Route Army allowed the bandits' resistance to be suppressed in a short time.
After losing the command of the organization, the bandits fought separately, and the scene was chaotic. Some bandits tried to build temporary fortifications, but these defenses were quickly broken through in the face of the continuous offensive of the Eighth Route Army. Most of the bandits chose to flee the battlefield under the onslaught of the Eighth Route Army, and fled into the forest in a panic, trying to take advantage of the difficult terrain to avoid pursuit.
The assault almost wiped out Han Jigong's main force, most of the bandits were killed or captured, and only a few managed to escape. However, Han Jigong's keen reflexes as a leader and familiarity with the terrain allowed him to escape the chaos. He hid his identity during the battle and fled the battlefield in the chaos. Although the 24th Regiment conducted a thorough search of Sabaogou, Han Jigong successfully avoided the pursuit and finally disappeared into the mountains and forests, and his whereabouts became a mystery.
Reference: From Fengning Manchu Autonomous County Old Area Construction Promotion Association. Development history of old revolutionary base area in Fengning Manchu Autonomous County[M]. 2019
From the Chengde CPPCC Cultural and Historical Materials Committee. Chengde Literature and History Vol.11[M]. 2015