At present, in addition to the persons directly responsible, the responsible persons of the departments to which they belong also bear the corresponding management responsibilities for the occurrence of many leaks of secrets.
If the management is negligent, the relevant requirements are not clear, the relevant responsibilities are not implemented, and the hidden dangers of the department's confidentiality management are ignored, it is easy to violate the confidentiality law, and even lead to the loss of secrets, causing losses to national security and interests, and they will inevitably bear the corresponding management responsibilities.
Typical cases
Case 1
Failure to pay attention to confidentiality education reminders
In 2022, a provincial unit A seconded a staff member from the prefecture and city to help with the work. One day, the confidentiality department found that Wang used mobile phone image recognition software to identify 1 confidential document in violation of regulations. After verification, in the process of writing a report, because he was not familiar with the business, he used his mobile phone to take pictures and identify the documents involved in the case in the computer involved in the secret, and imported them into the Internet computer for use. Upon further verification, it was also found that Wang was using his personal laptop, and that there were still many confidential and sensitive documents stored in his private mobile hard drive. According to Wang's confession, these documents were copied to him by Lin, another seconded person who had already left Division A, when he left his post. After the case occurred, Wang was given an intra-party warning, and the director of the division, He Moumou, was given an admonishment and conversation because of his management responsibility.
Case 2
Failure to stop confidentiality violations
In 2022, the relevant departments found in their work that Xu, a staff member of Department B of a municipal unit, passed 1 secret-level document in the WeChat group of his department. The secrecy department verified and found that because he was engaged in comprehensive clerical work, Xu often sent notices and relevant business documents in the department's WeChat group less than a year after graduating from university, and not long ago sent 1 work secret document, but Sun, the head of the department and the owner of the WeChat group who was also in the WeChat group, was accustomed to it and did not make any reminders. Therefore, Xu did not pay much attention, and this time he also sent a secret notice to the WeChat group, and Sun did not carry out any reminder and education after seeing it, let alone take remedial measures. After the case occurred, Xu was given an intra-party warning, and Sun was given an admonishment and an inspection because of his management responsibility.
Case 3
The management of classified carriers has not been strengthened
In 2021, when the C Division of a provincial unit cleared the classified documents at the end of the year, it was found that 2 secret-level documents were "missing", and there was still no whereabouts after multiple searches. During the investigation, the secrecy department found that Zhang, the person in charge of the department, and other staff members worked together in an office, and a large number of documents were stacked at each station in the office, which were mixed with confidential documents, and the department did not establish a ledger of confidential documents, and the classified documents whose whereabouts were unknown were collected and handled from the confidential room of the unit in 2020. In the end, Zhang, the person in charge of the department, was given an administrative warning, and other personnel in the department were given criticism and education, and their qualifications for evaluation were cancelled.
Case 4
Failure to organize self-inspection and rectification of hidden dangers
In 2020, when carrying out a confidentiality inspection, the secrecy department of a certain unit found that two secret-level documents were stored in violation of regulations in an Internet computer in a certain place. After verification, the two documents were created in 2018, and the computer user was a new secondee, Du. After Du arrived at his post, the department arranged for him to use this computer for seconded personnel to handle some non-confidential matters. Du found that the computer stored documents that had been processed by previous secondments, but he did not clean them up, and he did not know that there were classified documents mixed in them. After the case occurred, Chen, the person in charge of the department, was given an admonishment and a conversation.
Case Study
In the above four cases, the responsible persons of the relevant internal institutions were all held accountable for their management responsibilities, and the reason for this was that the supervision and management of the department's secrecy work was not in place, which led to the occurrence of secrecy violations and even leakage of secrets. Specifically, there are several reasons:
Ideologically not attached. Some department heads focus only on business and do not pay attention to confidentiality. For example, in Case 1, when the seconded officer first arrived at Division A, the director only explained the requirements of the business work and arranged the work tasks, and passed on other disciplinary requirements and confidentiality requirements, resulting in the secondment staff not knowing, understanding and not paying attention to the confidentiality requirements.
Supervision and reminders are not in place. For example, in Case 2, the person in charge of the department turned a blind eye to the new recruit's illegal act of secrecy; in Case 3, the person in charge of the department turned a blind eye to the chaotic situation of the department's secret-related carriers and adopted a laissez-faire attitude.
Confidentiality self-examination is not implemented. Confidentiality self-examination is an effective means to discover the hidden risks of confidentiality management in a timely manner, but the person in charge of some internal institutions does not organize self-examination as required, resulting in the problem and hidden danger not being discovered for a long time. In case 4, if the person in charge of the department regularly organizes self-inspection, he can discover the classified documents stored in the non-classified computer in time, so as to eliminate the hidden danger of the problem.
Countermeasures and suggestions
The head of the internal organization has overall responsibility for the work of the department, and confidentiality management is also an indispensable and important responsibility. The responsible persons of internal institutions should not only set an example and strictly abide by the confidentiality requirements, but also earnestly perform their main responsibilities according to their own work duties, strengthen the confidentiality management of their own departments, and firmly guard against the loss and leakage of secrets.
Attaches great importance to management responsibility. Practice has proven that whether or not an internal organization does a good job of secrecy work and whether or not it is strictly managed has a direct relationship with whether or not the person in charge of the department attaches importance to secrecy work and whether or not he earnestly performs his or her management duties. The level of secrecy management often reflects the overall level of management within a department, and the responsible persons of internal organs should fully understand the importance of fulfilling their responsibilities for secrecy management, and with an attitude of being highly responsible for national security and interests, from the perspective of improving the overall work of their own departments, grasp implementation, strict management, and frequent reminders, and constantly consolidate the foundation of secrecy work.
It is clearly required to be strictly implemented. In practice, each internal organization has its own business characteristics, especially some internal institutions that have a large number of secret-related businesses and a high degree of confidentiality, and it is even more necessary to refine the requirements for confidentiality management in light of the actual business conditions. Therefore, when organizing the establishment and refinement of the confidentiality system requirements of the department, the person in charge should pay special attention to the detailed decomposition in combination with the actual business, and avoid copying and mechanical application. In addition, attention needs to be paid to the development of supporting measures to ensure that the confidentiality requirements are implemented.
Strengthen inspections and rectify them in a timely manner. When arranging important secret-related business and important secret-related meetings, the responsible persons of internal organs should make the same arrangements and requirements for secrecy and operations, strictly supervise whether or not the staff members have implemented the secrecy requirements in the course of handling them, promptly stop any behavior that does not meet the secrecy requirements, and criticize and educate them in light of the circumstances; in the event of a leak of secrets, they should immediately take effective measures to prevent the consequences of leaking secrets from expanding, and at the same time report them in a timely manner as required. In addition, it is also necessary to make good use of the effective means of confidentiality self-examination, organize and carry out regular confidentiality self-examination, clarify the requirements for self-examination, and promptly rectify problems and hidden dangers.