On the 1937 Sichuan Army went out of Sichuan to resist the Japanese
Yin Xiaoyu
Abstract: This paper focuses on the historical process of the Sichuan army going out to resist Japan after the outbreak of the all-out war of resistance in the second half of 1937, and uses archival materials and oral memories of the parties concerned to sort out the decision-making of the Sichuan army to resist Japan in 1937, the difficulties encountered in Sichuan, and the heroic war of resistance of the troops in different theaters. This article points out that the sudden occurrence of Japan's full-scale invasion of China disrupted the original rhythm of the Sichuan Kang's army, and under the urgent situation of sending troops to resist the enemy, the Sichuan army had to complete the reorganization as soon as possible in order to go to the anti-Japanese front as soon as possible. Such an "incomplete" reorganization, as well as the difficulty of food and salary, and the inconvenience of transportation, actually affected the process of sending troops to the Sichuan army. However, the Sichuan army overcame difficulties, fought bravely on the battlefield of resistance against Japan, and made great sacrifices.
Keywords: Sichuan Army; Dekawa; anti-Japanese; LIU Xiang; 1937
In July 1937, the all-out war of resistance broke out. As an important part of the Chinese army, the Sichuan Army also went to the front line to resist Japan in September of the same year, and began the great journey of defending the country with blood for eight years. Previous studies have focused on the Chuankang Army Consolidation Conference held before the Sichuan Army left Sichuan in 1937, emphasizing the positive role of the success of the Sichuan Army in Sichuan and the Nationalist Government's relocation to Chongqing. However, the process of the Sichuan army going out of Sichuan to resist Japan after the Sichuan Kang Army Consolidation Conference is less involved. However, the descriptions of the Sichuan army's departure from Sichuan in previous treatises were mostly oral accounts of veterans who experienced the incident at that time, and the nature of recollection was strong, and the research significance was slightly insufficient. In view of this, this paper intends to examine the decision-making process and implementation of the Sichuan army's departure from Sichuan to resist Japan, as well as the contradictions between the central and local governments on the way out of Sichuan, from the perspective of historical research, based on the historical archives of the time and oral recollections, hoping to help us better understand the actual relationship between Sichuan and the central government before and after the outbreak of the all-out war of resistance against Japanese aggression.
1. The decision to resist Japan in Sichuan
On July 6, 1937, the Chuankang Army Reorganization Conference opened in the mountain city of Chongqing. He Yingqin, minister of military affairs and director of the Chongqing camp, who came to Chongqing on behalf of the Kuomintang Central Committee, and Gu Zhutong, director of the Chongqing camp, gathered in Chongqing with the leaders of the various armies of Chuankang to discuss specific matters concerning the reorganization of the Chuankang army. Before the adjournment of the third day of the meeting (July 8), He Yingqin conveyed to the participants the news of the Japanese clash with the 29th Army in Beiping, thousands of miles away, and believed that a major war between China and Japan was inevitable. According to the author of Liu Xiang's annals, "the whole audience was indignant when they heard the news," and the generals of all the armies in Sichuan and Kang expressed their willingness to lead their troops out of Sichuan to participate in the war against Japan. On 9 July, the meeting on the reorganization of the Sichuan and Kang armies was closed, at which the specific details of the reorganization of the various armies in Sichuan and Kang and the dates and steps for implementation were adopted, and it was decided to set the period for the reorganization to one month.
On the day of the conclusion of the Sichuan-Kang Conference on the Reorganization of the Army, Chiang Kai-shek received a letter from Xu Yongchang, director of the General Office of the Military Commission, suggesting that Chiang Kai-shek take advantage of the tense situation in North China to move a part of the Sichuan Army to Jiangsu or Anhui in order to "tighten the Sichuan affairs as soon as possible" in order to completely resolve the Sichuan issue. However, Chiang Kai-shek did not give a clear reply to Xu Yongchang's suggestion. On July 12, Gu Zhutong, who was in charge of the reorganization of the Sichuan Kang army, sent a telegram to Chiang Kai-shek, saying that the reorganization plan of the Sichuan army would start on July 31 and be completed on August 31, a total of one month. On 13 July, Liu Xiang, director of the Sichuan Pacification Office, sent a telegram to Chiang Kai-shek in Lushan, pointing out that the Sino-Japanese conflict was deliberately done by the Japanese side, and hoped that Chiang Kai-shek would "coordinate the overall situation and make an early decision on the plan," and said that he would complete the reorganization of the army as soon as possible so as to help resist the enemy and resist the enemy's aggression. After Chiang Kai-shek received Liu Xiang's telegram, he replied to Liu Xiang praising his attitude of actively reorganizing the army and saying that the central authorities were "determined to defend territorial sovereignty with all their might." 7 After sending a telegram to Chiang Kai-shek, Liu Xiang sent a telegram to the military and political chiefs of all provinces on July 14, advocating a general mobilization of the whole country and going to the national disaster together under the whole national plan. On July 17, Chiang Kai-shek recorded in his diary "Scheduled for Next Week" the "Discussion on the Question of the Dispatch of Troops from Sichuan and Guizhou", indicating that with the changes in the situation of the Sino-Japanese war, the issue of the dispatch of the Sichuan Army had been put on the agenda. On the same day, Gu Zhutong reported to Chiang Kai-shek that Liu Xiang said that the Sichuan army could send 10 divisions to resist the Japanese, and was determined to personally lead the anti-Japanese troops out of Sichuan. It was also on July 17 that Chiang Kai-shek issued the "Lushan Statement", saying that if it came to the "last moment", China would be determined to resist Japan. On July 21, Liu Xiang telegraphed to Chiang Kai-shek, saying that he was deeply moved by reading the newspaper and seeing the contents of Chiang Kai-shek's speech at Lushan, and once again expressed his willingness to lead the troops and obey Chiang Kai-shek's command to resist Japan.
If the Sichuan army wants to go out of Sichuan to resist Japan, it must first complete the reorganization of the army. For this reason, on 25 July, Liu Xiang ordered the commanders of all armies and divisions directly under the Chuankang Sui Administration to return to their original defensive areas within three days to reorganize the army. On August 6, the Chongqing camp also sent a telegram to all the armies in Sichuan and Kang, demanding that the army be completed by August 15, and Liu Xiang advanced the army reorganization deadline of the troops directly under the Sui Administration to August 10. Compared with the telegram sent by Gu Zhutong to Chiang Kai-shek after the previous meeting of the Chuankang Army, the schedule of the Chuankang Army Reorganization was advanced by half a month due to the needs of the Anti-Japanese War situation. The news that the Sichuan army was preparing to go out of Sichuan to resist Japan was also widely circulated in society, and the well-known newspaper "Xinxin News" in Chengdu once commented on this matter, saying that if the Sichuan army could go out of Sichuan this time, it would be able to wash away the long-standing impression of the Sichuan army of "sitting on the ground and charging down," establish the image of the Sichuan army as a "pioneer and save the country," and write the glory of the history of the Sichuan army and the nation.
On 7 August, Liu Xiang flew to Nanjing to attend a national defense conference and discuss state affairs with military and political leaders. During the meeting, Chiang Kai-shek instructed He Yingqin and Gu Zhutong to discuss with Liu Xiang the location and date of the concentration of the mobilized troops of the Sichuan Army. On August 13, the Battle of Songhu broke out, and the Chinese and Japanese armies fought in the two battlefields of northern and eastern China, and the anti-Japanese situation became more severe. On August 18, Liu Xiang, who returned to Sichuan, discussed with the relevant parties that the Sichuan Army was preparing to send 11 divisions to resist Japan, including six divisions of Pan Wenhua, Tang Shizun, and Wang Zhangxu under the direct jurisdiction of the Sui Administration, as well as two divisions of Deng Xihou's 45th Army, two divisions of Sun Zhen's 41st Army, and one division of Li Jiayu's 47th Army. As soon as the central government gives the order, it will be immediately opened. At this time, the Yang Sen Department of the Sichuan Army, which was stationed in Guizhou for the purpose of "suppressing the Communists," also planned to start marching eastward at the end of August, and assemble near Wuchang via the Hunan-Guizhou Highway. With the change of the war situation, Chiang Kai-shek hoped that the Sichuan army would go out of Sichuan as soon as possible to resist the war, he sent a telegram to Liu Xiang to ask the Sichuan troops about the time of the Sichuan troops, and ordered He Guoguang, the acting director of the Chongqing camp, to urge Liu Xiang's troops to set off, if there were indeed difficulties in sending troops, Deng Xihou and Sun Zhen could be allowed to set off in advance. On August 30, after consulting with Liu Xiang, He Guoguang decided on the sequence of the Sichuan army going out of Sichuan to resist the Japanese, and divided it into two columns. 19 The 1st Column was commanded by Deng Xihou and Sun Zhen, including 2 divisions of the 41st Army, 2 divisions of the 45th Army, and 1 division of the 47th Army, a total of 20 regiments; The 2nd Column was commanded by Tang Shizun and Pan Wenhua, including 2 divisions of the 21st Army, 3 divisions of the 23rd Army and 2 independent brigades, a total of 26 regiments. The date of the start of the troops is scheduled for 1 September, and no later than 5 September.
The outbreak of the all-out War of Resistance disrupted the original rhythm of the Sichuan army. After the Sichuan army hastily reorganized, it prepared to go out of Sichuan to resist Japan.
The people bid farewell to the Sichuan army
Second, the twists and turns of the process of leaving the river
On September 1, the vanguard of the Sichuan army that went out of Sichuan to resist the Japanese was drawn and divided into two routes, east and north. The first column is the North Road, which goes north from Sichuan-Shaanxi Avenue and concentrates in the direction of Xi'an; The second column is the East Road, which goes down from the east of Sichuan-Hubei Avenue and concentrates on Yichang. In addition, Yang Sen's troops, which were concentrating on the Wuhan side, were preparing to reinforce the front line of the Battle of Songhu.
The speed of the march of the Sichuan army out of Sichuan was not ideal, so much so that on September 26, more than 20 days after the dispatch, Chiang Kai-shek sent a telegram to He Guoguang, requesting that the places where the various units of the Sichuan army arrive be reported every Sunday, and urging the Sichuan army to march quickly. On October 23, Chiang Kai-shek complained in his diary's "Reflections of the Week" that the troops in Sichuan and Yunnan had only been dispatched until now, and they were careless in confronting Japan, so what reason do we have to blame the countries of the world for taking a wait-and-see attitude towards the Sino-Japanese conflict?" The various ministries of Sichuan and Yunnan have dispatched to this side, so why wonder the countries are waiting and seeing", and the dissatisfaction was overflowing. On the same day, Liu Xiang issued an order to the commanders of all army divisions and brigades that went out of Sichuan to resist Japan, asking them to arrive at the designated place by mid-October and stand by. And this is a month and a half away from the date of the opening of the vanguard of the Sichuan army.
On 4 October, Deng Hanxiang, secretary general of the Sichuan Provincial Government, revealed the reason for the slowness of the movement of the Sichuan army troops who went out of Sichuan to resist Japan? On 4 October, Deng Hanxiang, secretary general of the Sichuan Provincial Government, revealed the reasons for this in response to doubts from all walks of life at the Chengdu party-government-military joint commemorative week. The first is the delay in the whole army. Deng Hanxiang pointed out that the changes in the situation at the front have accelerated the process of reorganizing the army, and many units have not had time to fully reorganize. The second is the financial constraints. Deng Hanxiang said that after it was agreed that Sichuan would raise the funds and arrears of the troops going out of Sichuan, the fund-raising process delayed the process of the Sichuan army leaving Sichuan. The third is the inconvenience of transportation. The transport soldiers lacked modern means of transportation such as cars and ships, and basically relied on marching on foot. Reviewing the archival materials and corroborating from oral recollections, we can basically be sure that Deng Hanxiang's statement is well-founded, and that the Sichuan army's operation out of Sichuan has indeed encountered such unfavorable factors.
The first is the delay in the reorganization of the army. As mentioned earlier, due to the tension of the Anti-Japanese War situation and the urgency of the demand for sending troops, the process of Chuan Kang's army reorganization was artificially compressed, shortening the time by half a month, and it can be said that the army was completed in a hurry. Moreover, the garrisons of various units in Sichuan are far and near, and it takes time for the troops to assemble and conduct inspections. Take the Li Jiayu unit of the 47th Army stationed in the western Sichuan region as an example. On August 2, Li Jiayu immediately telegraphed to Chiang Kai-shek, expressing his willingness to complete the reorganization under the command of Chiang Kai-shek and the Central Committee under the changing situation in Pingjin, so as to facilitate the resistance against Japan. If possible, it is hoped that troops can be sent to the front to kill the enemy. On 20 August, after learning that Chiang Kai-shek had been appointed Generalissimo of the Army, Navy and Air Force, Li Jiayu telegraphed Chiang again, saying that if he was recruited, he would "be willing to serve the country with all his lives".27 At the meeting of the Chuankang Appeasement Office on August 30, a division of Li Jiayu's 47th Army was incorporated into the 1st Column, planning to go north from the Sichuan-Shaanxi Avenue to resist the enemy. On September 10, Li Jiayu sent a telegram to Chiang Kai-shek, reporting on the march of the regiments of the 47th Army, saying that the troops would concentrate in Chengdu in a "step-by-step" manner, and then join the 1st column. 28 It was not until October 31 that the troops under the command of Li Jiayu successively arrived at Xindu in the north of Chengdu from the western Sichuan region, and completed the assembly and inspection work in Xindu, and marched in the direction of Baoji. The units of the 29th Sichuan Army were scattered, and it took time for each unit to concentrate at the designated place, which delayed the trip to a certain extent.
Secondly, there are the difficulties of financing. In a telegram dated 30 August from He Guoguang to He Yingqin, he mentioned the difficulty in raising food and salary for the troops, and said that efforts should be made to "raise and distribute one department, that is, open one section as much as possible".21 That is, let the troops who have received arrears of pay and promotion fees be the first to be promoted. On September 1, He Guoguang sent another telegram to He Yingqin, saying that Liu Xiang's attitude towards sending troops to resist Japan was "still sincere", but the funds were indeed very tight, and efforts were being made to raise them, which might postpone the dispatch date, but He Guoguang optimistically said that "I don't want to go too far." This shows that the difficulty in raising funds has indeed delayed the schedule of the Sichuan army to leave Sichuan.
Take the Sichuan troops led by Sun Zhen and Deng Xihou of the 1st Column of the North Road as an example. On 5 September, Sun Zhen sent a telegram to He Yingqin, saying that Wang Zhiyuan's brigade, the vanguard of the 1st Column, had been advancing from Mianzhu to Hanzhong via Mianyang and Guangyuan since the morning of 5 September, but the rest of the troops had not yet received their salaries from the Pacification Office for the period from May to September. "Due to the need for cash support, it is still necessary to wait for the power to advance." On 6 September, the Sichuan Army's negotiations on the financing of the opening fee finally reached a result, with the central bank and the Bank of China borrowing 2 million yuan from the central bank and the Bank of China for the total opening fee, and the Sichuan Provincial Department of Finance borrowing 1.5 million yuan from the financial sector with four months' land endowment as collateral, and the remaining 1.1 million yuan being raised by the Sichuan provincial government itself. On 9 September, 3.5 million yuan of the promotion fee was remitted from Chongqing to Chengdu, and Liu Xiang convened four army commanders, Deng Xihou, Tang Shizun, Pan Wenhua, and Sun Zhen, to discuss the method of distributing the funds at the appeasement office, and strive to distribute the funds to all units at an early date, so that the troops could be mobilized. On the 10th, Sun Zhen sent another telegram to He Yingqin, reporting that the troops stationed in Mianyang were still waiting to be withdrawn after receiving the money. It was not until September 21 that Sun Zhen telegraphed He Yingqin after the troops received the September salary, ordering the troops stationed in Mianyang to "advance to Baoji in Hanzhong at the same time", and Sun Zhen's own military headquarters also planned to move forward on September 24. On September 25, "Xinxin News" specially reported the news that Sun Zhen traveled from Mianyang to Chengdu and then took a plane to the headquarters of the Shaanxi Command Office. Before leaving, Sun Zhen did not forget to ask the Sui Administration to issue the troops' salaries for October as soon as possible. 35 As mentioned earlier, on September 26, the day after the Xinxin Shimbun report, Chiang Kai-shek sent a telegram to He Guoguang requesting weekly reports on the location and schedule of the Sichuan army's dispatch and supervising it. Due to the delay in raising funds, the departure date of the 1st Column on the North Road was more than 20 days later than that of the vanguard troops that had started on 1 September. In other words, the actual dispatch date of the North Road Sichuan Army was postponed by 20 days compared to the beginning of September when He Guoguang and Liu Xiang negotiated and decided.
In addition to the North Route Sichuan Army, the East Route Sichuan Army also faced funding problems. It can even be said that the funding problem of some of the East Route Sichuan Army is more serious than that of the North Route Sichuan Army. According to Xinxin News, on October 4, Bai Chongxi sent a telegram to the Chuankang Pacification Office, urging all units of the Sichuan Army to quickly dispatch troops. After discussing with Liu Hangchen, director of the Department of Finance, Liu Xiang decided to issue a starting fee of 200,000 yuan in September. In order to urge the Sichuan army to dispatch as soon as possible, Liu Hangchen divided the 200,000 yuan opening fee into two, and the Sichuan Provincial Department of Finance in Chengdu first distributed 100,000 yuan to the troops, so that the troops could be mobilized first, and when the troops passed through Chongqing, they would receive the remaining 100,000 yuan in Chongqing. The report of "Xinxin News" did not mention which Sichuan troops the 200,000 yuan were distributed, but the report mentioned that this unit was going to pass through Chongqing, which was inconsistent with the marching route of the Sichuan Army on the North Road of the 1st Column. Therefore, we can deduce that this unit belonged to the 2nd column of the Eastern Road. It can be seen that the East Road Sichuan Army is facing the same food and salary problem as the North Road Sichuan Army, and it is impossible to open without receiving funds.
Again, the inconvenience of transportation. The difficulty of the Shu Road is difficult to go to the blue sky, and the Republic of China period is still no exception. The traffic inconvenience is a problem that the North Road Sichuan Army and the East Road Sichuan Army also encounter. The North Road Sichuan Army went to Shaanxi along the Sichuan-Shaanxi Avenue to concentrate, which meant that it was necessary to cross the Qinling Mountains, a barrier in northern Sichuan. Due to the insufficient number of cars, the brigade could only march on foot. Nearly 20,000 officers and men of the 41st Army crossed the Qinling Mountains to Baoji along the Sichuan-Shaanxi Highway, wearing straw sandals or barefoot, and then took a train to Xi'an. 36 And the train conditions are very poor, historical data reflect that more than 2,300 people and nearly 100 horses of the 727th Regiment of the 41st Army were ready to take the train to Xi'an after arriving in Yangping, but the wagons were only 27 cars, most of them were open cars, a few stuffy tank cars, according to the veterans' recollections, "crowded like canned sardines", after running for five or six hundred miles by such a train, "people were sleepy and tired, and they reached the extreme"37. Li Jiayu's division of the 47th Army, which went north from distant Xichang, had a more bumpy road. From Xichang, he first arrived in Chengdu to assemble, and then went north out of Jianmen Pass, marched on foot over the Qinling Mountains to Baoji, Shaanxi. After arriving in Baoji, he then transferred to the train to Xi'an, and finally arrived in Shanxi through Henan, joining the front-line operations, and when the whole army arrived in Shanxi, it was already early December 1937.
The Sichuan Army on the North Road drove to the front line by land, while the Sichuan Army on the East Road faced the obstacles of the rivers. On 5 September, He Guoguang sent an urgent telegram to Chiang Kai-shek and He Yingqin, reporting that in recent days, "flash floods have occurred in two rivers, large and small," and that all the steamers heading for Chongqing from Yichang have been blocked on the road because of the flood, and that there is no way for the troops leaving Sichuan to reach Chongqing on time, and that "the units may not be able to arrive at the designated places as scheduled according to the original transportation plan." On 10 September, He Guoguang reported to He Yingqin that the Chongqing steamer would not be able to carry out the task of transporting troops until after 22 September. 39 When the weather conditions improved, the river receded, and the shipping conditions were suitable for transporting troops, and because the capacity of the steamers was insufficient, it was necessary to adopt the method of transporting some troops to the designated place first, and then letting the steamers turn back, and transport the troops in batches, which caused a large number of troops to wait near Chongqing to board the ships. In order to speed up the speed of troop transportation, Lu Zuofu, chairman of the Minsheng Steamship Company, also broke the convention that "the Sichuan River never sails at night" and let the steamers transport the Sichuan army out of Sichuan day and night. However, due to the large number of troops and the lack of ships, although Guo Xunqi's 144th Division had already arrived in Jiangbei in Chongqing on October 12 and 13, it only arrived in Hankou on November 8 because the troops waited too long in Yichang for the ship to be transferred.
Under the circumstances of incomplete internal reorganization, untimely payment of military salaries, and imperfect transportation conditions, the Sichuan army overcame many difficulties and rushed to the front. In addition to Li Jiayu's division of the 47th Army, which departed later, the 41st Army and the 45th Army that went north arrived at the Shanxi battlefield at the end of October and fought with the Japanese army. The eastbound troops also arrived near Hankou in early November to assemble and await the next order.
Dead Word Flag
3. Separation operations after leaving Sichuan
In the "War Guidance Plan" promulgated by the base camp on August 20, 1937, the Sichuan Army was designated as the 2nd Reserve Army, with Liu Xiang as the commander and Deng Xihou as the deputy commander, as the reserve force for reorganization and mobilization. On August 26, Liu Xiang and others took office in Chengdu and appointed Deng Xihou as the commander of the 1st Road Column of the 2nd Reserve Army, and Sun Zhen as the deputy commander; Tang Shizun was the commander of the 2nd Route Column of the 2nd Reserve Army, and Pan Wenhua was the deputy commander. 42 In fact, the Sichuan Army was divided into two routes, the North Road and the East Road, and it was in accordance with the battle sequence of the 1st and 2nd columns of the 2nd Reserve Army that the Sichuan Army was divided into two directions to go out of Sichuan, but according to the establishment, the troops on both routes were under the command of Liu Xiang, commander of the 2nd Reserve Army.
On October 15, with the change of the war situation, Liu Xiang was appointed commander of the seventh theater, and the commander's headquarters was located in Zhengzhou. 43 The 1st Route Column of the 2nd Reserve Army, which was originally reorganized from the 2nd Reserve Army in the North Road to Sichuan, was still led by Deng Xihou and Sun Zhen, with Deng Xihou as the commander-in-chief. The 2nd Route Column of the 2nd Reserve Army from the East Road out of Sichuan was reorganized into the 23rd Group Army, which was still led by Tang Shizun and Pan Wenhua, and Liu Xiang concurrently served as the commander-in-chief of the Group Army. At this time, the 22nd and 23rd Group Armies were assigned to the Seventh Theater and were under the unified command of Liu Xiang. However, when Deng Xihou and Sun Zhen's northbound troops were reorganized into the 22nd Army, Chiang Kai-shek ordered them to continue eastward and go to Shanxi, "temporarily under the command of Commander Yan." After the vanguard of the 23rd Group Army arrived in Hankou, it was also ordered by Chiang Kai-shek to be transferred by train to Xinxiang, Boai, Rongze and Huayuankou in northern Henan, under the command of Cheng Qian, commander of the First Theater of Operations.
In this case, the Sichuan army, which was originally a whole, was in danger of being divided, which was not good news for Liu Xiang, who had occupied an important position among the Sichuan warlords since the mid-30s. Therefore, he requested the Nanjing side that the 22nd and 23rd Group Armies should still be placed under the command of the Seventh Theater, and that he, as the commander of the Seventh Theater, first go to Nanjing to ask Chiang Kai-shek for instructions on the issue of preparing for the establishment of the Seventh Theater Commander's Headquarters and contacting the troops under the command of the theater, so that he could command the two group armies to take up the combat mission of one theater. On October 15, Nanjing agreed to Liu Xiang's request. On November 9, Liu Xiang flew from Chengdu to Nanjing via Shaanxi to preside over the Seventh Theater and the anti-Japanese war of troops out of Sichuan, and the government affairs of the Sichuan Provincial Government were represented by Deng Hanxiang, Secretary General of the Provincial Government; The affairs of the Chuankang Pacification Office are handled by the General Senator Zhong Tidao.
Although Liu Xiang arrived in Nanjing, his body at this time no longer allowed him to command the troops to fight. On November 28, more than 10 days after arriving in Nanjing, Liu Xiang had to go to Hankou Wanguo Hospital for treatment because of an aggravated stomach problem. Liu Xiang's idea of calling for the formation of the Seventh Theater and personally commanding the troops in Dechuan was recognized by Nanjing. In the "Operational Guidance Plan for the 728th Theater" drawn up by the base camp in November 1937, it was clearly stated that "Deng Xihou's 4th Division and the Sichuan Army that had arrived in Henan were both used in the 7th Theater and fought exclusively against Jindong", which meant that the troops out of Sichuan were reassigned to the command of the 7th Theater in terms of subordination from the 2nd and 1st Theaters under the condition that the operational area remained unchanged.
However, Liu Xiang's illness and hospitalization made him gradually lose control of the Seventh Theater, with the gradual end of the Shanxi war, the Japanese army began to advance along the Tianjin-Pudong Railway to Xuzhou, the 41st Army and the 45th Army of the 22nd Army led by Deng Xihou were ordered by Chiang Kai-shek to march to the Lunan area, under the command of Li Zongren, the commander of the Fifth Theater, and the 47th Army led by Li Jiayu was still stationed in the southwestern part of Shanxi and northern Henan. Before leading the 22nd Group Army to Xuzhou, Deng Xihou and his colleagues in the Sichuan Army rested in Huaqingchi, Xi'an. Deng Xihou hoped that Liu Xiang would strive to fight with Chiang Kai-shek and concentrate the Sichuan army for use, and Deng Xihou, who had had an unpleasant experience with Liu Xiang, even said, "We will definitely obey his (referring to Liu Xiang)'s command." When the Sichuan army left Sichuan, I felt that everyone was very affectionate, and we were all willing to die together ...... death", which was very sad and sincere.
However, at this time, Liu Xiang's physical condition no longer allowed him to actually control the Sichuan army. As mentioned earlier, while he was ill and hospitalized, the North Route Sichuan Army was transferred from Shanxi to Lunan under the command of the Fifth Theater of Operations, while the East Route Sichuan Army participated in the battle to defend the periphery of Nanjing, and although Liu Xiang was able to maintain contact with the commanders of each group army, Chiang Kai-shek appointed Chen Cheng as deputy commander of the Seventh Theater at the end of December, acting as Liu Xiang's commander.
On January 20, 1938, Liu Xiang died of stomach cancer in Hankou International Hospital. Soon after Liu Xiang's death, Chiang Kai-shek ordered the dismissal of Liu Xiang as commander of the Seventh Theater, director of the Sichuan Kang appeasement, and chairman of Sichuan Province, and Liu Xiang's original post of commander-in-chief of the 23rd Group Army was replaced by Tang Shizun as early as New Year's Day in 1938, and Zhang Qun also acted as the chairman of Sichuan Province after Liu Xiang's death. The establishment of the Seventh Theater of Operations from October 1937 to January 1938 was short-lived. Due to the objective reasons of the change in the battle situation and the subjective reasons of Liu Xiang's body, the Sichuan army that went out of Sichuan to resist the enemy was not able to form a joint force, but was assigned to different theaters to fight, which was very different from the situation of the troops in Yunnan and Guangxi. The 60th Army, which was dispatched in 1937 by the Yunnan Army, was led by Lu Han, a relative of Long Yun, and had a strong cohesion. The three armies dispatched by the Guangxi army in 1937 all belonged to the battle sequence of the Fifth Theater and were under the direct command of Li Zongren, commander of the Gui Army. The Sichuan army is really as Deng Xihou said, and after leaving Sichuan, he became a "motherless child".
Although Liu Xiang, the commander of the Sichuan Army, died of illness in Han and the Seventh Theater was abolished, the 22nd and 23rd Group Armies, which originally belonged to the battle sequence of the Seventh Theater, fought bravely on their respective battlefields, actively resisted Japan, and demonstrated the spirit of the Sichuan Army in serving the country with heroic battles.
The 22nd Group Army of the North Road out of Sichuan first participated in the War of Resistance in Shanxi. Among them, after the 41st Army got off the train in Yangquan, it was temporarily under the command of Sun Lianzhong, commander-in-chief of the 2nd Group Army, and participated in the Jindong Campaign, blocking the Japanese army in the area of Yukou Town on the south side of Niangzi Pass. The 45th Army first assembled in Wenxi and Houma to stand by, and then advanced north to the first line of defense in Hongdong Qinyuan, and the subordinate 122nd Division once recovered Pingyao City.
In December 1937, due to Han Fuyu's retreat in Jinan without a fight, Xuzhou was exposed to the Japanese army. In order to defend Xuzhou, the Military Commission ordered the 22nd Army to be transferred from Shanxi to Xuzhou and placed under the command of Li Zongren, commander of the Fifth Theater of Operations. On January 14, 1938, the 125th Division of the 22nd Army, which had just arrived in Lunan, launched a night attack on the Japanese-occupied Liangxiadian, recovering Liangxiadian, "capturing forty or fifty prisoners and obtaining a lot of firearms"52, and achieving its first victory on the Jinpu Road. The 22nd Group Army participated in the Battle of Xuzhou and undertook the garrison task of the strategically important Tengxian County, defending Tengxian County for 3 days with great sacrifices, laying an important foundation for the victory of the Battle of Taierzhuang. In the battle of Tengxian Defense, Wang Mingzhang, the commander of the 122nd Division, was martyred, and the chiefs of staff Zhao Weibin, Zou Mutao, and the regiment commander Wang Lin also died. Chen Li, commander of the 127th Division, Wang Zhiyuan, commander of the 364th Brigade, and Lu Kang, commander of the 370th Brigade, were wounded, and "no less than 10,000 officers and men were killed or wounded." Wang Mingzhang was posthumously awarded the title of army general by the Nationalist Government, and grand memorial ceremonies were held in Chongqing and Chengdu.
After the Battle of Xuzhou, the 22nd Group Army retreated to Xiangyang and Fancheng, Hubei Province for rectification and replenishment. During the Battle of Wuhan, the 22nd Group Army transferred fighters to form the 124th and 125th Divisions, led by Chen Dingxun, commander of the 45th Army, and went to the Dabie Mountain area in southern Henan to participate in the battle on the northern front of the Battle of Wuhan. After the 54th Anti-Japanese War entered the stalemate stage, the 22nd Group Army, which was subordinate to the Fifth Theater, was stationed in northern Hubei for a long time. In the winter of 1939, the 22nd Army took part in the "Winter Offensive", fought bravely in the Battle of Rolling Mountain, and was praised by Yermolov, a Soviet adviser stationed in the 22nd Army at that time. After Japan announced its unconditional surrender on August 10, 551945, the 22nd Army was ordered to advance to Zhengzhou, Xuchang, and Luohe, and accept the surrender of the Japanese 115th Division and the 9th Japanese Cavalry Division in Shangqiu.
The 23rd Army of the East Road went through two stages of the War of Resistance.
In the first phase, from late November 1937 to the end of January 1938, the 23rd Army took part in the perimeter battles for the defense of Nanjing. In late November 1937, the Central Army in the Songhu area withdrew westward, and three divisions of the Japanese army landed in Zhapu in an attempt to outflank the retreating Central Army. The 23rd Army was ordered to block the Japanese army, cover the westward retreat of the Central Army, and fight the Japanese near Taihu Lake. During the battle, the commander of the 144th Division, Guo Xunqi, was seriously wounded in the leg, and his subordinate brigade commander Huang Baiguang was also seriously wounded. After the Battle of Taihu Lake, the 23rd Army carried out the battles to defend Si'an and Guangde. Due to the outnumbered enemy, Si'an and Guangde were lost one after another. Before the fall of Guangde, Rao Guohua, the commander of the 145th Division, wrote a desperate letter and shot himself to repay the country with death. 45
The second phase lasted from February 1938 to the end of the Anti-Japanese War. After Liu Xiang's death, the 23rd Group Army was succeeded by Tang Shizun as the commander-in-chief of the 23rd Group Army, and the troops were changed to the battle sequence of the Third Theater and retreated to southern Anhui and eastern Jiangxi. During the Battle of Wuhan, the 23rd Group Army was ordered to cover artillery attacks on Japanese ships along the coast of southern Anhui, cut off river transportation, and retarded the pace of the Japanese attack on Wuhan. 46 After the Battle of Wuhan, the 23rd Group Army continued to engage in shelling Japanese ships and laying mines on the surface in southern Anhui and eastern Jiangxi, forcing the Japanese army to change its day voyage to night sailing, and from driving on the south bank of the Yangtze River to driving on the north bank, and the 23rd Group Army's achievements in shelling and laying mines were also praised and commended by the Military Commission in December 1940. In 1942, the 23rd Group Army, as a unit of the Third Theater of Operations, participated in the battle of garrisoning Lanxi in the Battle of Zhejiang-Jiangxi, and laid mines on the east bank of the Lanjiang River, resulting in the death of Lieutenant General Naoji Sakai, the commander of the 15th Division of the Japanese Army. After the victory of the 54th Anti-Japanese War, due to the reorganization of the Kuomintang army, the 23rd Army was abolished, and only the number of the subordinate 21st Army was retained.
Since 1937, the first batch of Sichuan Army divided into two columns out of the Sichuan War of Resistance, and then organized two batches of Sichuan Army out of the Sichuan War of Resistance, a Sichuan Army composed of Wang Zhangxu and Wang Lingji 8 divisions, organized as the 29th, 30th two group armies, out of Sichuan in May 1938, the 29th Group Army led by Xu Shaozong, under the Fifth Theater; The 30th Army was led by Wang Lingji and was subordinate to the Ninth Theater of Operations. The other Sichuan army consisted of Fan Shaozeng's and Wang Zhangxu's troops, and in 1939 they were led out of Sichuan by Fan Shaozeng (March) and Wang Zhangxu (September) respectively. According to scholars' research, during the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, there were about 3.4 million soldiers in Sichuan, of which 3 million were strong men in the Kuomintang troops. Another 400,000 people formed a regular Sichuan army unit, with more than 12 corps, and these 400,000 Sichuan troops participated in 28 battles and battles in the northern and southern battlefields, and a large number of Sichuan army officers and soldiers died on the battlefield of resistance against Japan.
Remaining
With the outbreak of the all-out War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the national disaster across the country, the Sichuan army was obliged to go to the front line and join the upsurge of resistance against Japan and salvation. The Sichuan army hastily entered the war in the course of reorganization, and the normal process of reorganizing the army was interrupted by a sudden war, and it had to speed up the completion of the reorganization because it was in a hurry to go out of Sichuan to resist the war. In the absence of full reorganization, the Sichuan army was divided into two routes, east and north, and went to the front, which was really a last resort. Examining the specific process of the Sichuan army's departure from Sichuan, it is not difficult for us to find that the problems left over from the inadequate reorganization, including the problems of equipment and food, actually had an adverse impact on the Sichuan army's departure from Sichuan and operations. Although Liu Xiang had the ambition to unite the troops in Sichuan to fight the war together, his personal physical condition made him "die before his ambition was rewarded", leaving behind historical regrets. However, the officers and men of the Sichuan Army who went out of the Sichuan War of Resistance were united and fought bravely on the frontal battlefield of the War of Resistance against Japan, and many officers and men of the Sichuan Army died on the battlefield of resistance to the enemy. The heroic behavior of the Sichuan army in bravely going out of Sichuan, daring to fight, and willing to sacrifice at a time when the Japanese invaded China and the national crisis was serious, is a propagation of the patriotic dedication of the Chinese nation that has continued since ancient times, and it deserves to be remembered forever.
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Source: Research Trends in Modern and Contemporary History (According to Military History Research, Issue 5, 2020)
Author: Yin Xiaoyu (Ph.D. candidate, Department of History, Peking University)