#桅杆笔谈 ##三野战将#
Author: Mast
Statement: Bing said that the original was first published, and the whole network has been opened to protect rights, and plagiarism and manuscript handling must be investigated
On October 24, 1949, the 10th Corps decided to launch the Battle of Kinmen with the strength of six regiments. After nearly three days of fierce fighting, the three regiments of the first echelon of the landing island and the four companies of the subsequent reinforcements were all wiped out. In the War of Liberation, although our army also suffered defeats, it was the only one that lost three formed regiments at a time. The Battle of Kinmen was organized and carried out by the 28th Army. After the battle, Ye Fei said to Xiao Feng, "I am responsible for the failure of this attack on gold, as the commander of the corps." So, are Ye Fei and the 10th Corps responsible? Let's talk about this today.
(1) The march into Fujian is like a storm
In February 1949, according to the order of the General Headquarters, the whole army was reorganized, and the East China Field Army was renamed Sanye, and its subordinate units were reorganized into four corps. Ye Fei served as the commander of the 10th Corps (under the jurisdiction of the 28th, 29th, and 31st Armies), and was the only corps commander from the New Fourth Army in Sanye, and he was the youngest and the least qualified: Wang Jian'an, the commander of the 7th Corps, was the military political commissar during the Red Army, and Chen Shiyu, the commander of the 8th Corps, and the commander of the 9th Corps both served as chiefs of staff of Shanye and Huaye.
Reading Ye Fei's memoirs, it can be seen that there are two major regrets in his military career: the first regret is that he missed the Huaihai Campaign, fell ill on the eve of the war due to severe black fever, and had to go to recuperate. It was not until the eve of the Battle of Crossing the River that he rushed to Taizhou and commanded the 10th Corps to participate in the Battle of Crossing the River and the Battle of Shanghai. The second regret is the loss of Kinmen, which is the focus of this article.
At the end of May 1949, as soon as the Battle of Shanghai ended, Sanye ordered the 10th Corps to prepare to fight in Fujian. For this decision, Ye Fei must be happy in his heart. Born in the Philippines, Ye Fei began living, studying and participating in the revolution in Fujian at the age of 5. At the beginning of 1938, Ye Fei led 1,300 Mindong disciples to the north to resist the Japanese, and now, he has led 130,000 troops to his hometown. 11 years, through hardships, brilliant achievements.
At that time, it was expected that the Jiang army that fled to Fujian at this time would be defeated as a remnant of the army, and there would be no major battles. This is also the case: the 10th Corps launched the Fuzhou Campaign on August 13 and occupied Fuzhou four days later, destroying more than 50,000 enemies and suffering less than 500 casualties.
After the liberation of Fuzhou, the army moved south, launched the Zhangxia Campaign, occupied Zhangzhou on September 25, occupied Xiamen on October 17, annihilated more than 50,000 enemies, and formed a three-sided encirclement of the two islands of Kinmen.
After the 10th Corps marched into Fujian, it could be described as a bamboo, and the wind and clouds were whirling. The next target is Kinmen Island. But sea-crossing operations are completely different from land operations. At that time, many people in the fighting forces were not aware of this problem.
(2) The widespread sentiment of contempt for the enemy
In fact, the 31st Army attacked Gulangyu on October 15, but because of the strong wind, the fleet was blown apart, and a small number of troops were frustrated after landing, and they were only conquered by relaunching the offensive on the 17th. And the 28th Army also encountered problems when it attacked Pingtan Island in mid-September. These two examples have already exposed the problem that our army is not familiar with sea-crossing operations. However, because of the victory, the lessons learned have not been comprehensively and systematically summed up.
Therefore, before attacking Kinmen, the troops generally had an optimistic and contemptuous mood of contempt for the enemy, "not afraid of the enemy's defense, but afraid of the enemy's escape." From the following examples, we can see the sentiment of despising the enemy before the battle of Kinmen:
On September 26, the 10th Corps held a meeting in Quanzhou to study the Jinxia operation plan. At the meeting, three plans were put forward: the merger of gold and Xiamen, the first gold and then the Xiamen, and the first and then the gold. After repeated discussions, it was believed that the enemy forces on the two islands were already frightened, and in order to prevent the enemy from escaping, they were determined to "capture Jinxia at the same time in one go" and issued an order to prepare for battle.
An important condition for sea-crossing operations was the boat. However, until early October, the three corps of the 10th Corps had only collected ships capable of crossing seven regiments at one time, and it was impossible to attack Jinxia at the same time. Even so, the 10 Corps was still determined to fight together with Jinxia and asked the troops to prepare according to this plan to "prevent the enemy from escaping to Taiwan Island." There was another reason, at that time, the enemy Hu Lian's corps stationed in the Chaoshan area was retreating, and it was possible that it would be transferred to Jinxia, hoping to take Jinxia before Hu Lian's corps arrived.
On October 11, Sanye replied to the 10th Corps: "If the conditions are ripe, they can launch an attack (Jinxia) at the same time." Otherwise, a force will be used to suppress Kinmen and attack Xiamen first. This case is more appropriate. ”
Because of Sanye's telegram, the 10th Corps changed its plan, with the 29th and 31st Armies attacking Xiamen first, and ordering the 28th Army to monitor Kinmen. Xiamen had permanent fortifications, and the defenders had sufficient troops, and they were conquered in 2 days. Therefore, Ye Fei believes that "the capture of Kinmen is not a big problem". Therefore, after the liberation of Xiamen, Ye Fei moved the headquarters of the 10th Corps to Xiamen, focused on the takeover of the city, handed over the daily affairs of the Corps to Liu Peishan, director of the Political Department, and handed over the task of "liberating Kinmen to the 28th Army."
At that time, the commander and political commissar of the 28th Army were resting due to illness, and the deputy commander Xiao Feng was in charge of military command.
(3) Two objective reasons for the failure of Kinmen
Objectively, there were two important reasons for the failure of the Kinmen operation: First, there was a serious miscalculation of the Hu Lian Corps' stationing in Kinmen, and second, the tidal factor was not fully taken into account in the sea-crossing operation.
According to the intelligence at that time, it was Li Liangrong's 22nd Corps guarding Kinmen, with about 12,000 people. From October 9 to 15, the 28th Army successively captured several small islands north of Kinmen. During the inventory of prisoners, it was found that among them were officers and soldiers of Hu Lian's 12th Corps and 18th Army. The 28th Army immediately reported the situation to the 10th Corps. But the head of the corps was skeptical, believing that it was "unlikely".
On the 22nd, the 10th Corps informed the 28th Army that the ships transporting the 18th Army of Hu Lian's Corps had arrived in the Jinxia Sea area on the 20th. Ye Fei called Xiao Feng and said, "It's not clear where they are going to retreat." We want to attack Kinmen before Hu Lian lands." In fact, Hu Lian's corps began to land on Kinmen Island one after another on the 10th, and by the time the battle began on the evening of the 24th, the enemy force on the island had increased to about 40,000.
At 21:30 on the 24th, more than 300 wooden boats carried three regiments of the first echelon launched a sea-crossing operation, and landed on the island one after another after 1:30 a.m. the next day. The original plan was that after the first echelon team landed on the island, the ships would immediately return to pick up the second echelon. However, due to the low tide of the sea, all the ships ran aground, and were later blown up on the beach by enemy aircraft and artillery fire. There were no ships in the second echelon, and reinforcements could not go up. This was one of the key reasons for the failure of the Kinmen operation.
[On the eve of the Battle of Kinmen, the participating troops held a swearing-in meeting. The couplet on both sides of the rostrum reads: Eliminate the remnants of the enemy and liberate Kinmen, and prepare to make great contributions]
Why is this happening? The author has been a seafarer for 8 years and knows the tides well. In landing operations, the tide is an important factor, and with the high tide landing, the ships must return before the low tide. Otherwise, the boat will run aground on the beach and become a fixed target. Because the author has read a lot of reminiscences of the combatants, and they do not mention the important factor of tides.
Behind the above two objective factors, there is still an ideological underestimation. According to the available information, the light enemy was mainly at the corps level, there was no light enemy in Sanye, and there was no light enemy in the 28th Army. Due to insufficient preparation or changes in the enemy situation, Xiao Feng asked for the postponement of the attack three times: from the 20th to the 23rd, and then to the 24th. On the evening of the 24th, when the Corps informed the 28th Army of the landing of Hu Lian's Corps at Kinmen, Xiao Feng again asked to postpone the attack, but "the Corps' determination remained unchanged."
The first echelon set sail immediately, a battle of uncertainty and a tragedy was born.
[To be continued]