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The biggest question facing the US military in crossing the 38th parallel and attacking north is whether China will fight.
For a long time, U.S. intelligence analysts and policymakers held this preconceived assumption:
China was a "satellite state" of the Soviet Union; whether China would send troops or not did not depend on the Chinese themselves, but mainly on the attitude of the Soviet Union.
The CIA later summed up the lessons learned about the fallacies in intelligence assessments, stating:
"In the case of the CCP's involvement in North Korea, the first axiom is the long-accepted view that the Soviet Union did not want and would not risk a world war"; When the CIA noted signs of further action by the CCP after the war began, it concluded:
(1) China would not have acted without an order from the USSR: (2) the USSR would not have issued such an order, because the outcome of a direct clash between the CCP army and the US army would be a war between the communist and non-communist worlds".
It is precisely this preconceived assumption that makes the United States' judgment of whether China will fight in North Korea lose its crosshairs from the beginning.
1. Why did the United States "miscalculate"?
On 2 October, just as U.S. forces were massing near the 38th parallel to prepare for an attack northward, representatives of the Soviet government put forward a proposal at the United Nations for an armistice in Korea, the withdrawal of foreign troops, and a peaceful settlement of the Korean question.
This vague proposal was regarded by the United States as a clear signal of weakness from the Soviet Union at a critical moment.
Since the Americans measured China's reaction with the attitude of the Soviet Union, after ruling out the fear that the Soviet Union might be directly involved, the United States' estimate of the likelihood of China's entry into the war quickly fell to a very low level.
On October 6, the CIA's Weekly Digest stated:
"The likelihood of Soviet or Chinese militarily intervening to prevent the United Nations from occupying North Korea continues to dwindle. ”
On the 12th, the CIA submitted a report entitled "An Assessment of the Intentions and Capabilities of China and the Soviet Union in the Far East," asserting that neither the Soviet Union nor China "showed clear signs that they intended to use armed forces outside their territory in 1950."
The report carries "a lot of weight" in the U.S. intelligence community because it "represents a consensus on a key and potentially controversial issue among five different intelligence agencies that have not been on the same page."
It should be said that judging from the decision-making process of the Chinese to enter the war in Korea, the attitude of the Soviet Union undoubtedly played an important role, but this was not at all what the Americans estimated, and China, as a "satellite country", could only act according to the will of the Soviet Union.
In fact, sending troops to the DPRK is an independent decision made by the Chinese leadership in light of the serious threats to its own strategic interests and national security. On this issue, U.S. intelligence agencies and policymakers have both ignored China's major concerns about the Korean war for national security reasons and misread the true nature of the strategic alliance between China and the Soviet Union.
After the outbreak of the Korean War, the U.S. intelligence community followed up and analyzed the deployment and adjustment of the Chinese military, but the results played a very limited role in judging the direction of China's troop deployment.
On 30 June, when assessing the military situation in North Korea, the US Strategic Joint Planning Committee quoted MacArthur's report that "some personnel of the Chinese communist army have appeared on the battlefield" and held that "the appearance of these personnel may indicate that a large number of Chinese communist troops are about to enter the DPRK and expand the scope of the current conflict."
The committee estimates:
"There were about 400,000 CCP troops in Manchuria, including 70,000 North Korean troops," and "210,000 CCP troops stationed in Beiping and Tianjin." They will be able to throw themselves into the fighting in Korea in 20~30 days."
Although the assessment report concluded that "the capabilities of the CCP military cannot be ignored", the final conclusion is:
"Given the need to maintain internal security in a volatile region, it is unlikely that the CCP will move these troops to North Korea on a large scale. ”
After the outbreak of the Korean War, the CIA's focus on China remained focused on the Taiwan direction.
An assessment report in mid-July stated:
"Obviously, a large number of Chinese troops are stationed on the mainland across from Taiwan, and they could also launch an attack on Hong Kong. ”
Another assessment in mid-August further suggested: "China appears to be struggling to engage in military preparations for an attack on Taiwan"; Although there was no time limit in the Chinese statement, from a military point of view, the most favorable time for a communist offensive would be the period before mid-September 1950."
The report concludes:
"While some of the other targets were tempting, or even more vulnerable in strictly military terms, the political gains from the raid on Taiwan at the time were greater than the gains from the assault on any other border area. ”
Later, as news of large numbers of Chinese troops heading for the northeast continued, U.S. intelligence agencies began to realize that closer to the border with North Korea might need more attention than Taiwan.
2. Why is the US intelligence community indifferent when the troop movement is discovered?
On September 8, the CIA noted in a memo:
"It is reported that the CCP's continuous military buildup in Manchuria, coupled with the existing military forces in the region, obviously means that intervention in North Korea is completely within the scope of the CCP's capabilities. ”
The memo cites a "credible source of intelligence":
"At the moment the main forces of the four fields are either in Manchuria or on their way to Manchuria"; The CCP also continued to build military facilities near Andong and along the Yalu River. The intensification of the Manchurian border defense is either a logical security precaution in the light of the Korean conflict, or a prelude to an offensive with the intention of mobilizing the forces of the region."
Specific information on the adjustment of the deployment of Chinese troops comes more from the monitoring of radio signals in Chinese mainland.
According to information obtained by the US National Security Agency using a radio signal monitoring system, as early as April and June 1950, it was discovered that the 40th and 39th armies of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) were moving north and south from north to south; in late June and early July, it was discovered that the 38th Army was traveling by train from northern Wuhan to northeast; and in early September, it was discovered that the headquarters of the 13th Corps had moved from Guangzhou to Andong on the Sino-Korean border between 19 and 26 August.
After that, it was discovered that the 118th Division of the 40th Army appeared in Andong on September 5, the 39th Army appeared in Liaoyang on September 6, and the 42nd Army appeared in Tonghua on September 28, and so on.
Not only that, but various intelligence sources also indicate:
"A new large-scale deployment is still in full swing. The Military Security Service on October 21... According to the report submitted, 20 columns transporting troops were heading to Manchuria from the Shanghai area, which was under the responsibility of the Third Field Army. ”
By September, the U.S. intelligence agencies had realized that "China had postponed its attack on Taiwan," and it was incomprehensible that although more and more intelligence showed that the Chinese military was carrying out large-scale deployment adjustments in order to enter the war in North Korea, the U.S. intelligence analysis was still wandering in illusion and wandering in blind spots.
The NSA's summary report after the incident reads:
The intelligence officers have all but forgotten their earlier warnings, ignored China's new pattern of military deployments along the border with North Korea, and sought alternative explanations for China's other military movements, or simply dismissed those movements as meaningless. While the CIA described the congestion on the East China Railway as a sign of a "massive military movement to the north," the Joint Intelligence Steering Committee attributed the congestion to the negative impact of dilapidated locomotives. ... The intelligence services are squabbling over China's strength.
At the same time, CIA intelligence analysts increasingly believe that communications intelligence involving Chinese military movements means that Chinese troops are merely exercise-style deployments, and military intelligence officers are beginning to wonder whether China's various military forces are stationed in Manchuria. The Joint Intelligence Committee stated on 1 October that communications intelligence did not provide conclusive evidence that "all the units of these armies were in Manchuria, not just some of them there".
The Pentagon's intelligence staff also concluded on October 4:
While we cannot "completely ignore" China's interference, the available evidence is insufficient to suggest that such a development is "either highly probable or imminent."
On October 5, the Intelligence Watch Committee boldly argued that even with a large number of Chinese troops deployed in the border areas, the possibility of interference is almost non-existent compared to before, given that Beijing's propaganda offensive in support of North Korea has waned and that the Chinese leadership is likely not to want to expose China to retaliatory U.S. air strikes.
On October 20, the CIA's Daily Digest published information from the U.S. military liaison officer in Hong Kong under the headline "CCP Intervention in North Korea," stating that "according to the information available, the CCP's 400,000-strong troops have been mobilized to the border area close to North Korea, and they have been ordered to cross the border on the night of October 18 or 'two days later.'"
For this fairly accurate piece of information, the CIA added this comment:
The CIA is confident that the best time for such action has passed. At this time, neither the Soviet Union nor China was willing to take the increasing risk that the CCP's direct involvement in North Korea would lead to the outbreak of World War III.
In response to a series of warnings issued by China to the United States in various ways during this period, the U.S. intelligence community and policymakers also believe that "this is just rhetorical intimidation." ”
3. Why is there a strategic miscalculation?
The reason why the United States made a strategic misjudgment about China's dispatch of troops to Korea is that they miscalculated the timing of China's military participation in the war and China's own war capability.
First, U.S. intelligence and policymakers generally believe that the Chinese have lost the best opportunity to intervene militarily when U.S. forces advance north of the 38th parallel.
This was first put forward by the US ambassador to the Soviet Union, John Kirk.
On September 30, the CIA quoted Kirk as saying in the Daily Summary:
"The influx of large Chinese ground troops would prove to be a decisive factor when the 'United Nations forces' were desperately defending a small area of South Korea, and that was when the moment would be logical for Communist armed intervention. ”
After the Inchon landing, the message of the Chinese's hard-line attitude was nothing more than "hoping to scare the United Nations on the 38th parallel."
Kirk's views resonated in the US military and political circles.
There is general agreement at the top that:
"When war once appeared in Dunkirk, the United States, the Chinese restrained themselves from intervening, and they would never be stupid enough to put their troops into battle at this stage." ”
The CIA's October 12 report also emphasized that "the threat posed by the CCP's full involvement in North Korea" also emphasized:
"From a military standpoint, the most favorable time to intervene in North Korea has passed. ”
Subsequent reports assert that:
"The Chinese intervention could have turned the military tide and eliminated the chance for a complete Communist victory in North Korea." The CCP's military deployment to participate in the war may be a deliberately designed maneuver. ”
On October 15, Truman and MacArthur met at Wake Island, and Truman asked, "How likely is it that the Chinese will intervene?" and MacArthur replied, "Very little." ”
His reasoning is that the Chinese side has lost the opportunity to intervene effectively.
In the view of US intelligence personnel and policymakers, if the Chinese military really wants to enter the Korean war, the timing should be chosen before the US forces reach the 38th parallel, especially when the US forces are compressed to a corner of the Nakdong River or launch the Inchon landing; it is meaningless and therefore will not happen for the Chinese troops to intervene until the US forces have crossed the 38th parallel and the overall situation of the war has been decided.
Obviously, this judgment completely misses the bottom line set by the Chinese leadership for sending troops to the war.
It is no secret that the US military cannot cross the 38th parallel, and it is regarded by the Chinese leaders as the bottom line for sending troops but not sending troops, and the Chinese side has already explained to the Americans through diplomatic channels in advance. But the Americans still go their own way, turning a deaf ear and coming to a judgment that is completely opposite to the actual situation.
Second, the United States also misestimated the ability of the Chinese to withstand and support the war, as well as the combat effectiveness of the Chinese army.
At that time, the United States viewed China and the Chinese with great arrogance and contempt.
In their eyes, poor and weak China simply has no strength to compete with the powerful United States on the battlefield, and if the Chinese army dares to enter Korea to fight the American army, it will inevitably suffer unbearable and disastrous consequences.
MacArthur assured Truman during his meeting with Truman on Wake Island:
The Chinese do not have an air force, while the United States has four air bases in North Korea, and if China attempts to attack Pyongyang, they will be devastated. Even if the Soviet air supported the Chinese ground forces, the coordination between them would be very loose, and the bombs dropped by Soviet air force planes would probably fall on the Chinese troops as many times as on the American troops, and their cooperation would have little practical effect.
Most of the high-ranking figures in the US military and political circles share MacArthur's views.
Bradley admitted in his memoirs that the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time also believed:
"The Chinese do not have the ability to intervene independently militarily" and "China's independent action does not make a decisive difference; in fact, it may bring shameful defeat to themselves".
In its assessment report, the CIA listed seven factors that would not have contributed to China's military presence in North Korea, including:
"The pressure and material losses suffered in the war with the United States will cause damage to the regime's entire domestic problems and economy", "anti-Soviet forces will certainly be encouraged and will endanger the stable existence of the regime", "the cost of intervention without the support of the Soviet Union by sea and air will be extremely great", and if the intervention fails, "Peiping will openly face the resentment of the Chinese", and so on.
Based on this, the CIA concluded:
"There is no way that the CCP is willing to risk an open conflict with the United States and its UN allies to aid North Koreans. The CCP knows very well that at least in the absence of a full-scale war between the East and the West, a war with the United States will be catastrophic, not only to the detriment of China's overall interests, but also to the destabilization of its domestic plans and the Beiping regime. As a result, they are likely to seek to avoid openly participating in military operations outside of China's traditional territory. ”
The assessment report was completed on 18 October.
The day after the CIA completed the report, the more than 200,000 troops of the Chinese People's Volunteers crossed the Yalu River and marched into North Korea.
The blind spots and misunderstandings of the Americans in intelligence and strategic judgment put the US military in an unfavorable and dangerous situation in the encounter that collided head-on with the Chinese army.
4. A busy day
When the Chinese People's Volunteers first entered Korea, they carried out and established campaign and operational arrangements in accordance with the strategy of the first phase of the defense plan.
According to the predetermined plan, the Volunteer Army will advance to the area north of the Pyongyang and Wonsan lines and south of the Tokucheon and Nyeongwon lines, build several positions to organize defense, and then discuss the issue of counteroffensive six months later.
However, because the "United Nations Army" led by the United States was attacking faster than the Volunteer Army, a situation arose in the predetermined defense area in which the "United Nations Army" arrived first before the Volunteer Army arrived.
In this way, the first phase of the defense concept could not be implemented.
However, in the eyes of the Chinese leadership, this change in the situation on the battlefield is not a bad thing. The "United Nations Army" marched forward separately, but on the contrary, it formed a situation that was easy to fight, and provided the volunteers with a favorable fighter plane for moving to annihilate the enemy.
Mao Zedong and Peng Dehuai keenly discovered this fighter, changed the predetermined plan in time, and redesigned the first battle of entering the DPRK, laying the foundation for winning the first battle.
At dusk on October 19, Peng Dehuai crossed the Yalu River Bridge from Andong into North Korea. Behind him were the various armies of volunteers who were marching towards the ferry.
On the 19th, Peng Dehuai's schedule was extremely tight.
On the first night, he was still in Beijing with Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and Gao Gang, repeatedly studying the battle plan of the Volunteers to enter North Korea, and he almost stayed awake all night.
Early in the morning of the 19th, accompanied by Gao Gang, he took a bus from the Beijing Hotel to the Western Suburbs Airport, and took a nap in the car on the way. At around 9 a.m., he landed at Shenyang Airport on a special plane. After getting off the plane, he immediately rushed to the headquarters of the Northeast Military Region with Gao Gang to arrange for the rear support work of the volunteers after entering the DPRK to Li Fuchun, He Jinnian, Li Jukui, and other party, government, and military leaders in the northeast region, who were already waiting here.
Peng Dehuai said:
From today, the mainland has begun to enter a state of war. The entry of the volunteers into the DPRK this time was much larger in scale and much more arduous than the Liaoshen Campaign. The Northeast is the rear base of the Volunteer Army, and you must urgently mobilize and go all out.
In the afternoon, Peng Dehuai and Gao Gang flew to Andong and arrived at Zhenjiangshan (now known as Jinjiangshan), where the headquarters of the 13th Corps was located.
Here, he didn't even enter the house, he stood in the courtyard to convey the battle plan to the leaders of the corps and explain the tasks.
In the evening of the same day, in the rain and fog, Peng Dehuai shook hands with Gao Gang, Deng Hua and others by the river, and sat on a Soviet-made "Gas 69" with his military secretary Yang Fengan and two guards and entered North Korea through the Yalu River Bridge. Cui Lun, director of the communications department, followed closely behind in another truck with a radio station, two interpreters and three telegraph operators. Due to the rush of walking, I didn't even bring a Korean translator.
The first thing Peng Dehuai did was to meet with North Korean leader Kim Il Sung.
Ten days ago, when Peng Dehuai took up his post in Northeast China, he planned to go to Korea to meet Kim Il Sung, learn about the battlefield situation in person, and discuss the specific matters of the Chinese Volunteers' entry into the DPRK to fight. On October 11, he took a train to Andong with the intention of crossing the river, but he was unable to make the trip because he received an urgent notice from the central authorities asking him to return to Beijing immediately.
On the 15th, Peng Dehuai returned to Anton from Beijing after attending a meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, and according to Mao Zedong's instructions, "he went to Tokugawa to meet with Kim Il-sung two or three days after the arrangement in Anton."
In order to arrange this meeting, Mao Zedong sent a telegram to Ambassador Ni Zhiliang in the name of Zhou Enlai and asked him to convey to Kim Il Sung: "Send a comrade familiar with the situation to Andong on October 16 to pick up Comrade Peng Dehuai." ”
However, the meeting was not scheduled. On the 17th, Mao Zedong called Peng Dehuai back to Beijing and canceled the meeting.
It was not until the 19th, the day of the dispatch of the Volunteer Army, that Peng Dehuai hurriedly entered Korea before the army was dispatched.
Kim Il Sung sent Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Pak Hyun-yong to Sinuiju opposite Andong to greet him.
However, when Peng Dehuai met Park Heon-yong in Sinuiju, Park Hyun-yong said that he only knew that Kim Il-sung had evacuated from Tokucheon before the fall of Pyongyang, but he did not know where he had moved now.
This sudden change deeply disturbed Peng Dehuai - even Park Hyun-yong, who arranged his meeting with Kim Il-sung, did not know where Kim Il-bin was, which shows the severity of the battlefield situation and the chaos within the North Korean leadership.
Peng Dehuai immediately asked Yang Fengan to spread out the map of North Korea with a scale of 1:50,000 on the ground, and took a candle to examine it carefully.
Based on the current situation of the Korean People's Army and the speed of the attack of the US and ROK troops, he estimated that after the volunteers crossed the river, it would be difficult for them to rush to the defensive area between Pyongyang and Wonsan as originally planned, and it was very likely that they would have to fight an encounter with the US and ROK troops north of the line between Tokugawa and Nyongwon.
That night, Peng Dehuai drove north along the banks of the Yalu River to the vicinity of the Shuifeng Dam to wait for news from Kim Il Sung.
(End of text)
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