A gas renovation construction with a total price of 40,000 yuan caused an explosion, resulting in 1 death, 16 injuries, and a direct economic loss of 3.6707 million yuan. Behind this tragedy, what are the details that have been overlooked? What happened to the scene one hour before the explosion?
At about 14:53 on October 9, 2023, a gas explosion occurred at No. 998 Jiukeshu Middle Road, Liyuan Town, Tongzhou District, Beijing. Recently, the official website of the Beijing Municipal Emergency Management Bureau announced the investigation report of the accident, and two people have been taken criminal compulsory measures by the public security organs on suspicion of the crime of major liability accidents.
Pre-accident
In June 2023, Gan Yupeng leased the first floor of Shang 21, No. 998 Jiukeshu Middle Road, Tongzhou District, Beijing, and registered Jingronghe Company at the address in August and began store decoration.
Due to the need to divert the gas main pipeline to the stove in the store, Gan Yupeng contacted Yang Jie, an indoor operator of the Liyuan Service Center of the Third Branch of Beijing Gas Group, through his friend's introduction, Yang Jie did not distribute work orders and transfer them to Beijing Gas User Service Co., Ltd. for construction in accordance with the requirements of the Municipal Gas Group's "Notice on the Overall Management of Demolition, Alteration and Relocation Business for Non-residential Users", but arranged for Zhang Mingchao (individual) to carry out gas renovation construction. Zhang Mingchao fraudulently used the name of Beijing Tianwei Gas Engineering Co., Ltd. (legal representative Shen Yudong, and Zhang Mingchao is a friend) to sign a natural gas engineering transformation contract with Jingronghe Company, with a total price of 40,000 yuan (Zhang Mingchao transferred 40,000 yuan in cash to Yang Jie, Yang Jie handed over 11,000 yuan to Zhang Mingchao, and kept 29,000 yuan for himself), which was officially completed on September 17.
On October 9, Yang Jie illegally arranged for Zhang Mingchao, who did not have the qualifications to engage in gas pipeline installation and removal of blind plates, to contact Gan Yupeng by phone for door-to-door ventilation.
1 hour before the explosion
13:52
Zhang Mingchao entered the shop where the incident occurred, removed the steel blind plate between the end of the ball valve and the emergency shut-off valve, and then tightened the flange bolts, and tried to ignite the stove without success. Subsequently, Zhang Mingchao discharged the air in the pipeline directly into the room from the exhaust port at the end of the natural gas pipeline, and the discharge time was about half an hour.
14:31, 32
The No. 01 and No. 02 sensors connected to the gas alarm of the adjacent Qiuguo Hotel underreported (the concentration reached 25% of the lower explosion limit) was activated one after another.
2:45 p.m
The gas alarm of the adjacent Jiahe Yipin Company underreported and overreported (the concentration reached 50% of the lower explosion limit) alarmed one after another, and the automatic shut-off valve cut off the gas supply, and the employees of Jiahe Yipin Company contacted Yang Jie to check the scene.
Around 2:51 p.m
Yang Jie arrived at Jingronghe Company and saw Zhang Mingchao unscrewing the flange bolts of the gas pipeline to replace the flange gasket, Yang Jie smelled the smell of natural gas and asked Zhang Mingchao to stop the construction, but Zhang Mingchao did not think it was the smell of natural gas. Later, Yang Jie went to the kitchen of Jiahe Yipin Company to check the alarm situation of the gas alarm.
14:53
The No. 01 sensor connected to the gas alarm of Qiuguo Hotel is activated.
14:53:40
There was an explosion in the building.
The cause of the accident
According to the investigation report, the direct cause of the accident was that after Zhang Mingchao removed the blind plate of the natural gas pipeline in the kitchen of Jingronghe Company, he illegally released the gas in the natural gas pipeline, causing the natural gas to continue to leak and spread to the kitchen of Jingronghe Company and the kitchens of adjacent stores, where it was mixed with air to reach the explosion limit concentration, and an electrical spark exploded in the kitchen of Jingronghe Company, resulting in an accident.
Relevant responsible units
and the main problems of the individual
(1) Enterprises and individuals related to the accident
1. Beijing Gas Group did not firmly establish the concept of safe development, implemented the national special rectification of urban gas safety, the city's safety production and fire hazard investigation and rectification work was not in place, and failed to urge the three branches to deeply absorb the "7.30" in Chaoyang District Lessons learned from major poisoning and suffocation accidents; failure to effectively supervise and urge the employees of the three branches to strictly implement the internal regulations of the enterprise, negligence and neglect of the phenomenon of long-term private contracting of gas facilities by employees of the enterprise, and serious problems in the management of the demolition, alteration and relocation of gas facilities for non-residential users; and the lack of strict management of internal training certificates, resulting in Zhang Mingchao pretending to be a qualified person for gas construction to carry out construction work.
2. The Third Branch of Beijing Gas Group failed to strictly implement the gas shutdown procedures for users, failed to issue the "Notice of Suspension of Gas Supply (Restriction of Gas Purchase)" to non-residential users, and directly took gas shutdown measures for users with potential safety hazards without the expiration of the rectification period of Hidden Danger Notice 11, and failed to report to the comprehensive law enforcement department of urban management; When the contract expires, the user will only be prompted that the contract has expired, but the user can still purchase gas normally, and the city gas group's requirements for gas installation and strict density test before the resumption of gas production by the city gas group have not been implemented.
3. Yang Jie violated the relevant regulations of Beijing Gas Group on the dismantling, alteration and relocation of gas facilities for non-residential users, and used his position to facilitate the introduction of individuals to privately contract the installation and renovation of gas facilities, and sought benefits from them;
4. Zhang Mingchao illegally undertook the installation and renovation of gas pipelines in the name of other companies without permission, used the internal employment certificate of the gas group to pretend to be a person with gas construction qualifications to carry out construction operations, and dismantled, modified and installed gas facilities in violation of regulations without having the operation qualifications and safety knowledge of the position.
(2) Industry regulatory departments and local governments
1. The Tongzhou District Urban Management Committee failed to perform the supervision and management duties of gas supply safety production, and failed to effectively supervise the three branches of the Municipal Gas Group to implement the responsibility of gas supply safety.
2. The Tongzhou District Urban Management Law Enforcement Bureau did not verify and inspect the obvious contradiction between the user details provided by the three branches of the Municipal Gas Group and the use of gas at the incident point, did not find the problem of the expiration of the gas supply contract at the incident point, and did not find that the third branch of the Municipal Gas Group did not perform their duties properly.
3. In 2022 and 2023, the government of Liyuan Town, Tongzhou District, did not carry out supervision and inspection of the gas point where the incident occurred as required, and did not find the problem of missing gas alarms and gas alarms not being energized;