After the United States further intervened in Myanmar's affairs, the internal situation in Myanmar has undergone subtle changes, and the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has once again assembled troops in the border area between China and Myanmar, organized live-fire exercises, prepared for various possible emergencies in the future, and sent a clear message to all parties.
[The People's Liberation Army once again organized a live-fire exercise in the border area between China and Myanmar]
According to the announcement of China's Ministry of National Defense and other departments, the Southern Theater mobilized army and air force units to organize this border military exercise, mainly to test the troops' reconnaissance and early warning, three-dimensional blockade and control, air defense strikes, and other capabilities. Compared with the border exercise in early April, the exercise placed more emphasis on air defense operations.
This is mainly due to the fact that after the Burmese army lost control of the border town of Reki and other places, the ground fighting between the Burmese army and the Mindi Armed Forces near the China-Myanmar border has decreased, and the Tatmadaw is now using air power to carry out air strikes against the civilian forces in the border areas.
The main security threat that the PLA needs to guard against has naturally become preventing Burmese military aircraft from crossing the border or mistakenly dropping bombs into Chinese territory.
This is also a situation that Myanmar's neighboring countries are guarding against recently, after the previous Myanmar-Thailand border town of Myawaddy changed hands, the Thai Air Force sent additional F-16 fighters to the border area to strengthen air defense.
[Thai Air Force F-16 fighter jets are cruising in the airspace along the Myanmar-Thailand border]
However, judging from the overall development of the situation in Myanmar recently, the PLA's build-up of troops on the border this time is definitely not simply to deter the junta, but to defend against possible dangerous air situations.
In mid-April, the "Government of National Unity," which is based on the former ruling Democratic League of Burma and mainly represents liberal forces, sent a delegation to meet with US State Department Counselor Derek Jowlet and Assistant Administrator Michael Schiffer of the US Agency for International Development.
During the meeting, Jolet and others underscored the US support for Myanmar's "democracy movement" and exerted external pressure on Min Aung Hlaing's junta to "end the violence" and release the detained opposition figures through a joint statement with the "National Unity Government".
[U.S. Department of State Counselor Derek Jolet (right) and others meet with representatives of the "Government of National Unity"]
A few days after the U.S. side went straight to the war, the Burmese junta took the opportunity of celebrating Songkran to announce an amnesty for more than 3,300 prisoners, including 28 foreigners who would be deported, but it was not clear whether any of the 3,300 were opposition figures in Myanmar.
At the same time, the junta transferred state counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi and President Win Myint, leaders of the NLD who were detained in 2021, from prison to house arrest.
Although it is not uncommon in Myanmar to grant amnesty to prisoners on major holidays and improve the conditions of some prisoners, the timing of the junta's action still makes the outside world speculate whether the junta was forced to take action under external pressure to send a signal of détente to the opposition and the West and create a certain opportunity for possible peace talks.
It should be noted that the junta is now signaling détente, not only because of external pressure from the United States, but also because of the internal war situation in Myanmar, which is becoming more and more unfavorable to the junta.
[The junta has improved Aung San Suu Kyi's detention conditions]
After the loss of Reki and Myawaddy, and the repulsion of related counterattacks, the Burmese military junta has largely lost control of all border areas.
At the same time, the opposition coalition forces are continuing to launch onslaught against the Tatmadaw in several directions. In particular, in the direction of Rakhine State in western Myanmar, the Arakan Army has largely cleared the obstacles on the periphery of Sittwe, the capital of the state, and the key port of Kyaukpyu, and is preparing to launch a formal offensive against these two places to seize control of Rakhine State.
Min Aung Hlaing's government now urgently needs to regroup its troops, stabilize the front, and accelerate compulsory conscription to address the shortage of soldiers.
On the one hand, many Burmese youths have fled the junta-controlled areas to avoid military service with the help of the opposition, and on the other hand, some enterprises with deep backgrounds and ties to the military government are now unwilling to allow conscription to affect the operation of enterprises, forcing the military government to make some concessions and no longer recruit personnel from these enterprises.
The junta's completion of conscription will inevitably be greatly delayed, and the subsequent reorganization of the army will naturally face problems. Therefore, the junta needs to alleviate internal and external pressures in a variety of ways.
[The Myanmar military junta is in trouble now]
The opposition coalition, which now looks to be in good shape, is gradually revealing its internal problems that have been overshadowed by the victory. The Chin National Front has recently stated that it will cooperate with the "Government of National Unity" until the fall of the junta, which means that it may not be subject to the leadership of the "Government of National Unity" after the fall of the junta.
In a recent online meeting, many people also asked the "government of national unity" to organize reforms, although the relevant announcements did not clearly state the content of the reforms, but it cannot be ruled out that it involved ethnic policy and other issues.
It is not surprising that the "National Unity Government" is deeply influenced by the ideas of the Burmese people, as well as the junta, and it would have been difficult for them to come together and cooperate with the militia from all walks of life if it were not for the common enemy of the junta.
[The people's armed forces and the "National Unity Government" belong to temporary cooperation]
Therefore, the domestic situation in Myanmar is likely to develop in three directions: one is that the military junta and the opposition coalition will not back down from each other, and the two sides will fight to the death, and gradually form a tug-of-war, which will lead to the further expansion of the scale of this civil war and the increased risk of crisis spillover.
One is for the junta and the opposition coalition to sit down and hold peace talks, but given the complexity of the situation in Myanmar and abroad, it is unlikely that the peace talks will make immediate progress, and the two sides will inevitably stop and stop.
The last is the complete collapse of the military junta, and the formation of a new government by the "Government of National Unity" and the various civilian forces, but also because of the different interests of all parties, the formation of a new government may not go smoothly, and may even lead to new conflicts.
[The situation in Myanmar is becoming more and more complicated, and the PLA needs to show its sword in a timely manner]
It is safe to say that the civil war in Myanmar has entered a new phase and the situation will become more and more complicated.
Under such circumstances, China naturally needs to act in advance to prepare for possible changes, and send a signal to all parties in Myanmar through military and diplomatic channels to remind these forces not to do things that endanger China's national security and legitimate rights and interests in Myanmar in future internal strife. In particular, we should not become a special pawn of some foreign forces targeting China and undermining China's layout in Southeast Asia.