If you liked this article, please click "Follow" in the top right. Thank you for your support and encouragement, and hope to bring you a comfortable reading experience.
On February 17, 1979, thousands of artillery pieces were fired on the Sino-Vietnamese border, and Vietnam, which dared to launch a provocation without authorization, ushered in a thunderous trial on this day.
But the whole world did not expect that China's thunderous operation ended quickly a month later, and Vietnam, which was hit head-on, did not pursue it.
The difference between the Vietnam War and the Vietnam War
There have been three Vietnam Wars in the world, one was the Franco-Vietnamese War just after the end of World War II, when France tried to return to its colonies in Southeast Asia, the second was the American-Vietnamese War launched by the United States to contain the development of communism in China and the entire East Asian region, and the last was the mainland's self-defense counterattack against Vietnam.
In fact, the three Vietnam Wars were all closely related to China.
During the Franco-Vietnamese War, Chairman Mao decided that if the colonial forces of the European powers were allowed to return to Southeast Asia, then China would inevitably face the dilemma of being surrounded by the great powers in the future.
At that time, China sent the famous General Chen Geng to the front line in Vietnam to guide the Vietnamese troops to learn to fight.
The Franco-Vietnamese War ended with the complete defeat of France, and the United States began to fear China's strength, so in 1961 it led a large army to directly invade Vietnam, initiating the first regional war led by the United States since World War II without acting in the name of the United Nations Forces.
Of course, China's support was also indispensable behind the US-Vietnam War, and because it involved a direct confrontation with the United States, the Soviet Union also participated in it, and worked with the mainland to contribute to Vietnam's anti-US war.
A lost war that lasted nearly 15 years was one of the few scars on the face of the United States at its peak after World War II.
In 1979, when the war of self-defense and counterattack against Vietnam began, the world once again focused its attention on East Asia, with the defeat experience of France and the United States.
Even Vietnam was full of self-confidence, and Le Duan openly shouted in his speech that "one Vietnamese soldier can defeat thirty Chinese soldiers."
Was the mainland's national strength really stronger than that of the United States and France at that time? No, but the mainland had an innate advantage that neither of them had -- knowing the roots.
As mentioned above, since the beginning of the Franco-Vietnamese War, China has been providing military support to Vietnam for a long time, and it can be said that more than half of Vietnam's elite troops were brought out by Chinese instructors.
After the war began, under the cover of the first round of artillery battles, our army launched a pincer offensive from the east and west, from Yunnan and Guangxi, and quickly launched a pincer attack on the Vietnamese side.
Our army, which is well aware of Vietnam's defense tactics of tunneling fortresses, did not easily let down its vigilance, let alone delay its advance, but through the coordination of infantry and artillery, concentrated superior forces, quickly outflanked and annihilated the small strongholds planted by Vietnamese troops on the border line one by one.
Unless Vietnam has the ability to dig the entire underground into a base, under the series of roundabout annihilation offends, the bunkers and secret tunnels they had relied on to deal with the US military will eventually become isolated islands that cannot be helped.
In the Battle of Gao Ping, the 43rd Army Tank Battalion outflanked the rear of the elite 346th Division of the Vietnamese Army in only three hours.
However, Vietnam's efforts were basically in vain, Lao Cai, Mong Kang, Gu Liu, the three important border towns were quickly conquered in less than three days, nine days later Cao Ping, Dong Deng, Zhi Ma, and Tang Tang were taken by our army one after another, and in just nine days, our army completed the first phase of the occupation goal of "controlling the Red River" and opened the door to penetrate deep into Vietnam.
In the following half a month, our army successively conquered three provincial capitals and 17 western counties and cities in northern Vietnam, inflicted heavy losses on 4 regular divisions and 10 elite regiments of the Vietnamese army, and killed 37,000 Vietnamese troops, allowing the world to witness the lightning speed of China.
But just after winning this huge victory, our army made another decision that the whole world did not expect - to retreat, only to send troops for a month, in the case of a good war, our army did not choose to continue to advance, but directly shrunk back to China, why is this?
A battle that can't be delayed
Many different versions have emerged over the years as to why the 1979 self-defense counterattack against Vietnam was quickly withdrawn after a month.
Some attribute the reason to the loss of troops, while others believe that China hastened the war and has weak logistics, and the Vietnamese side still believes that it won the PLA, while the most widely circulated theory is "economic problems".
What is the real reason? Actually, there is nothing to guess, but from the very beginning, the Central Military Commission ordered that the war of self-defense and counterattack against Vietnam must be resolved quickly.
According to the documents of the Vietnam War in the archives of the People's Liberation Army, this battle of our army was really fast to the extreme, and the Central Military Commission issued an order to mobilize troops in December, and in less than three months, all troops, including armored forces, were deployed in Yunnan and Guangxi.
Before the war, the command of the two major corps in the east and west that participated in the operation received instructions to "quickly annihilate and return quickly", and not long after the battle began, on March 1, the Central Military Commission issued an order to prepare for retreat, when the eastern front was still attacking Lang Son, and the western front had not yet launched an offensive against Sabah.
What kind of concept is this? That is, when the PLA troops had not even accomplished their basic strategic objectives, they had already received instructions to "quickly withdraw after victory." On the one hand, it can be seen that the Central Military Commission has long been sure of the outcome of the victory, and on the other hand, it also proves that the mainland has never thought of occupying Vietnam for a long time.
Similar to the 1962 war of self-defense and counterattack against India, the mainland adheres to the diplomatic principle of responsibility and independence of a major country, and has always been unwilling to infringe on the sovereignty of other countries.
In addition, the diplomatic environment is also a decisive factor in the need for a quick victory in this war.
In that year, after making it clear that it was necessary to fight back against Vietnam's provocative act of massacring overseas Chinese, the Central Military Commission issued another directive on the same day -- the troops of the Shenyang Military Region, the Beijing Military Region, the Lanzhou Military Region, and the Xinjiang Military Region were all put into first-class combat readiness in case of a possible attack by the Soviet Union in support of Vietnam.
The Soviet Union used to be the big brother that helped China develop its industry, but in the seventies and eighties it had become a hegemonic country that trampled on the sovereignty of other countries, and Vietnam had a friendship with China in the past, but after the death of Ho Chi Minh, the Le Duan clique that succeeded him became hostile to China.
Vietnam provoked China because it had embraced the thigh of the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union also had the idea of beating China, the second largest country in the communist camp, so it not only did not mediate, but even supported it.
On January 1, 1979, when the ice of Sino-US relations was officially broken and the two countries re-established diplomatic relations, Deng Xiaoping quickly visited the United States and met with then US President Jimmy Carter to exchange views on Vietnam and other issues.
The war of self-defense and counterattack against Vietnam was fought in an environment where the Soviet Union could not react and the United States was won to neutrality, so that a very short window could be fought.
But there is another question that cannot be explained, since the PLA chose to withdraw its troops when the situation is very good, why did the Vietnamese side not pursue and counterattack after that?
The Li Duan Group
Why didn't the Vietnamese army launch a full-scale counterattack when the PLA withdrew in 1979?
In fact, this problem is not called a problem at all, and the root cause is that the Vietnamese army is afraid, and the Le Duan regime is afraid.
Although Vietnam still claims to have won the victory after the war, many Vietnamese generals have also found reasons and excuses in interviews and memoirs, such as Nguyen Duc Huy, who has repeatedly said that he did not fight back not because he was afraid of the PLA, but because Le Duan ordered not to pursue.
In fact, Le Duan did give the order, but the army was also really afraid, and the entire Vietnamese regime fell into a "state of fear" at that time.
From the very beginning, the Le Duan regime did not really have the courage to turn against China, and its provocations on the border and its anti-Chinese actions were only his tentative petty fights.
Le Duan hoped that China, fearing Soviet involvement, would make limited concessions to Vietnam, so that he could cut sausages along the border.
It was only after seeing through Le Duan's attempt that the mainland made the decision to attack Vietnam and punish Vietnam, but Le Duan, the initiator, had no preparation for facing war.
Judging from some documents declassified by the Vietnamese side, after the official start of the self-defense counterattack war against Vietnam, Le Duan did not even have the least psychological expectations for the war, and he immediately sought the Soviet ambassador for help, and then for a considerable period of time, he did not even convey the minimum instructions to the troops.
Later, when the PLA troops fought on the eastern and western fronts, Li Duan had basically delegated power to the army, and he himself did not have any outstanding leadership skills, so he could only pin his hopes on the self-exertion of the generals of the troops.
However, the hard gap in combat effectiveness was in front of us, and although the Vietnamese army had been tempered for many years and had a tenacious will to fight, it was ultimately powerless to return to the sky, and after the Battle of Songshan Ridge, the vitality of the whole army was greatly damaged, and the generals within the army began to feel cowardly and self-preservation in order to keep a few remnants of the elite, and at this point, the entire Vietnam almost gave up resistance.
When our army thought about marching towards Hanoi, Le Duan was helpless to do anything about it, and could only barely boost morale by deceiving the Vietnamese people through speeches, and his greatest "effort" for this war was to stand up and deliver a so-called "victory speech" on March 5, when the mainland announced the victory of the counterattack and was ready to withdraw its troops.
On the contrary, the Le Duan regime promulgated a so-called "conscription order for the death of the country," which trumpeted that "all male citizens between the ages of 18 and 45 and female citizens between the ages of 18 and 35 must join the guerrillas in good health."
This huge conscription order is actually just a show, and according to Vietnam's own historical research, it may not have been implemented at all, at least not at all.
The Le Duan government announced the so-called conscription order only after the withdrawal of our troops, and apart from the clamour, there was basically no actual pursuit action.
Ruan Dehui's words should be changed, not the so-called "It's not that you don't dare to fight, it's just that Li Duan gave an order", but "I don't really dare to fight, just shout with Li Duan".
We are also well aware that after 1979, there were several years of border friction and rotational warfare between China and Vietnam, and what did the Le Duan regime do at that time? They recruited a large number of underage "child soldiers" and almost gave up with an attitude of sending them to the front line to fill the vacancies.
The clamoring for all-out war and national mobilization never appeared, which shows what a terrifying impression our army gave to Vietnam in the First World War in 1979.
This article was originally written by "On History and the Present", and has been opened for the whole network to protect rights, and may not be reproduced without authorization, and infringement must be investigated.