Author: Hu Xianda
Statement: Bing said that the original was first published, and the whole network has been opened to protect rights, and plagiarism and manuscript handling must be investigated
In the War of Resistance behind enemy lines in North China, the Battle of the Hundred Regiments commanded by Mr. Peng had a far-reaching impact. This battle not only justified the name of the Eighth Route Army and left those who accused the Eighth Route Army of "swimming but not attacking" speechless, but also shocked Okamura Ningji of the Japanese army in North China and Lao Chiang in the rear of the Southwest Army.
This war, because it changed Japan's strategy toward China and Chiang's anti-Japanese war policy, became a major event that will go down in history. It profoundly triggered the transformation of the relationship between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, and at the same time attracted the crazy retaliation of the Japanese army, so it also became a pain point that Mr. Peng was repeatedly criticized later and could not let go of throughout his life.
[In the Battle of the Hundred Regiments, Peng Dehuai commanded the battle at the field artillery position on the front line of Guanjiayuan, which was only 500 meters away from the enemy. Photo by Xu Xiaobing】
From the North China Work Symposium in 1943 to the Lushan Conference in 1959, and then to the criticism in 1966, the controversy and right and wrong surrounding the Battle of the Hundred Regiments have always made it difficult for Mr. Peng to argue. In "Peng Dehuai's Self-Statement", his review and thoughts are also recorded.
Clearing away the fog of history back then, what "mistakes" did Mr. Peng make that were accused by others?
Some people say that Mr. Peng launched the Battle of 100 Regiments, without asking Yan'an for instructions in advance, nor did he get the approval of the chairman. Others said that Mr. Peng launched the Battle of 100 Regiments without authorization, "maintaining the rule of Lao Jiang". During the special 10 years of criticism, some people even counted the "guilt" of the loss of more than 8,000 people of the New Fourth Army in the Southern Anhui Incident on General Peng's head, saying that "the Southern Anhui Incident was because the Hundred Regiments Battle exposed its strength and caused Lao Chiang's attack."
In fact, the initiation of the Hundred Regiments War has a complex background, and it cannot be generalized and generalized. So, what does Mr. Peng himself think of the Battle of the Hundred Regiments?
On the Eighth Route Army's operational policy and the War of Resistance Behind Enemy Lines, the Yan'an side gave guidance in two directions after some debate at the Luochuan Conference.
The first is to go deep behind enemy lines and carry out independent guerrilla warfare in the mountains, but not relax movement warfare under favorable conditions;
Second, it is necessary to unleash the masses, establish base areas behind enemy lines, and develop and strengthen the revolutionary forces.
To put it in layman's terms, it is "to win the hearts and minds of the people, occupy territory, build political power, and expand the army."
In the first stage of the Anti-Japanese War, the frontal battlefield was the main direction of the Japanese army's operations, and the Japanese army did not care about the anti-Japanese forces in Yan'an at that time. However, with the development and growth of the Eighth Route Army's anti-Japanese forces behind enemy lines in North China, the claws of the Japanese army's "North China Public Security War" also quietly extended to our base areas. The Japanese army repaired artillery towers, occupied villages and towns, and levied grain taxes in an attempt to increase the burden on the people in the base areas and cut off the ties between the base areas behind enemy lines.
By 1940, Peng Dehuai was increasingly worried about the Eighth Route Army's war behind enemy lines in North China. First, the Eighth Route Army's policy of independent guerrilla warfare in mountainous areas that it has been implementing for the past three years has been poured a lot of sewage on the Chongqing side, saying that the Eighth Route Army "does not listen to commands" and "swims but does not attack." Second, Nanjing's "curve theory of national salvation" became increasingly arrogant, and after the failure of the first friction, some of Chiang's troops changed their appearance, merged with Wang and puppet, and worked with the Japanese army to constantly "sweep" our base areas and expand their occupied areas.
[Japanese pseudo "sweeping" data map]
It can be said that Mr. Peng launched the Hundred Regiment War, and there were many elements that were forced to be helpless and had to be sent.
As the deputy commander-in-chief of the Eighth Route Army, Mr. Peng launched the Battle of the Hundred Regiments because of at least three considerations. These considerations confirm that the initiation of the Hundred Regiments War is both the trend of the times and the necessity.
The first is to refute the enemy's rumors and justify the Eighth Route Army's "guerrilla but not attack."
The Eighth Route Army played an important role in killing a large number of enemies in the War of Resistance behind enemy lines, but it was accused by Chiang's army with ulterior motives of "guerrilla but not attacking", and this rumor also confused some people who did not know the truth. The Eighth Route Army needed a hard-fought battle to refute the enemy's rumors, make a name for itself, and win the support of the masses.
Second, it is to stop the encroachment of Japanese puppets and reduce the burden on the people in the base areas.
After the loss of Wuhan, the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression entered a phase of stalemate, and the Japanese army's offensive on the frontal battlefield was suspended, and the direction of the operation quietly turned to the "strengthening of law and order" in the occupied areas in North China and other places, intending to plunder the economy, feed the war with war, and eliminate their worries about the frontal battlefield of Chiang.
Along several lines of communication, the Japanese puppet army constantly "swept up," divided, and blockaded our base areas behind enemy lines, built artillery towers, set up additional strongholds, strengthened public order, supported the Wang puppet organization, expanded the occupied areas, implemented the "three lights," and plundered property everywhere, causing "two-sided burdens" on the people in the base areas, and the common people were miserable.
From March to July 1940, after the Japanese army "strengthened public security" and divided and blockaded, a large area of the base areas behind enemy lines in North China became guerrilla areas, and a small number of people in the guerrilla areas were even shaken and surrendered to the enemy under the coercion and temptation of the enemy. Before the Hundred Regiments War launched the Great Raid Campaign, there were only two county towns left in the base area behind the enemy lines in North China, one was Pingshun in Taihang Mountain, and the other was the partial pass in the northwest of Shanxi. The masses who were originally "burdened on one side" have become "burdened on both sides". In Mr. Peng's words, it is to not only resist the burden of the Japanese government, but also burden the Japanese pseudo-burden. The masses were overwhelmed and urgently demanded that the Eighth Route Army deal a heavy blow to the Japanese puppets who were wedged into the base areas to "strengthen public order" in order to change this situation of "two-sided burdens" and unsustainable.
[Battle of 100 Regiments, Destruction of Japanese Railway Communication Lines]
Third, the enemy's lines of communication are empty and the garrison is weak.
The enemy looks down on guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines, and absolutely could never have imagined that our army would be able to concentrate its forces to fight a war of movement. This paralysis of the enemy is conducive to us taking advantage of the situation to break through the enemy's communications, display our skills, and expand our influence. Avoiding the real and attacking the false is the key point of the soldiers, which shows that the Hundred Regiments War broke the Japanese pseudo-traffic and their "cage policy" on the right road. In terms of the art of war, there is nothing wrong with it.
The reason why the enemy's lines of communication were weakly defended was, first, that during the stalemate stage of the War of Resistance Against Japan, the Japanese army's forces on the front of Chiang and on the battlefield behind enemy lines in North China were already in a state of overstretching, and the internal potential of its forces was also exhausted.
Second, the Japanese puppets penetrated deep into our base areas to expand the occupied areas, strengthened "local public order," extensively repaired pillboxes, and divided troops into garrisons, and the troops that had been stationed on the lines of communication were increasingly dispersed to the new occupied areas.
Third, the Japanese army's appetite for expansion in the base areas behind enemy lines in North China was too great, and it committed the taboo of dispersing and using troops, which also enabled the Eighth Route Army to calmly concentrate its forces to attack the lines of communication.
This kind of enemy and friend situation has also become an important reason for President Peng's determination to launch the Hundred Regiments War. After more than three years of small, scattered guerrilla attacks in the mountains, the Japanese underestimated the comprehensive strength of the Eighth Route Army, creating their delusion. Therefore, the initiation of the Battle of the Hundred Regiments achieved tactical suddenness on the one hand, and strategic suddenness on the other hand, which caused the Japanese puppet army to panic, paralyzed all communication lines, and a large number of strongholds in the occupied areas were occupied by our army, which the Japanese puppet army in North China never dreamed of.
When Mr. Peng was criticized at the North China Work Symposium and even later at the Lushan Conference, few people mentioned his above three considerations. Most of the people's criticism of him focused on "not asking for approval, making decisions on his own, exposing his strength, setting himself on fire, being retaliated against by the enemy, and leaning to the right." Such a target makes Peng Dehuai difficult to argue, even if he has a stomach full of grievances, it is difficult to explain.
In fact, people with a little common sense know that it is impossible for Mr. Peng not to report to Yan'an for instructions on a major decision like the Battle of the Hundred Regiments, and it is impossible for Mr. Zhu to make such a mistake when he was still with Mr. Peng at that time.
[Zhu and Peng are together]
The campaign plan of the Eighth Route Army Headquarters on the large-scale attack on Zhengtai Road and Pinghan Road was originally planned to be launched in early August when the Qingsha tent was in full swing. This plan was telegraphed to the raided areas on July 22 and reported to Yan'an. After receiving the plan from the headquarters, the districts took active action and entered the predetermined areas in advance. In order to prevent our troops from preparing early to be discovered by the enemy, the major attack was launched in late July, 10 days earlier than scheduled. This has become the "crime" of "criticizing Peng". As a matter of fact, front-line commanders should seize the opportunity to fight at the opportune moment, which is necessary and inevitable in war. Without considering these factors, it is contrary to common sense to label Peng Dehuai as "unapproved".
[Deeply cultivate the history of war and promote positive energy]