#对越反击战#
Author: Forgotten in the rivers and lakes
Statement: Bing said that the original was first published, and the whole network has been opened to protect rights, and plagiarism and manuscript handling must be investigated
In the self-defense counterattack against Vietnam, our army won a complete victory.
However, the 28-day operation also exposed many problems and deficiencies, including a lack of actual combat experience, backward weaponry and equipment, lagging logistical support, unsmooth coordination between infantry and artillery, and problems in front-line command.
One of the painful lessons is that the 150th Division of the 50th Army made a mistake similar to that of the 180th Division of the 60th Army in the Fifth Campaign to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea in the process of retreating, and the 448th Regiment under the command of the division suffered a tragic battle: due to the surprise attack and encirclement of the Vietnamese army, 542 people of the regiment were separated (219 were captured), of which the cadres of the 2nd Battalion and 8th Company surrendered on the battlefield, leaving a sad page.
[More than 300 people were missing when the 150th Regiment of the 448th Division retreated. Guangxi Longzhou Martyrs Cemetery has built a martyr's famous wall, so that the souls of the martyrs can return to their hometown]
This painful defeat also laid the groundwork for the later withdrawal of the 150th Division.
Why did the 50th Division of the 150th Army in 1979 make some of the same mistakes of the 180th Division of the 60th Army in 1951?
The defeat of the 50th Regiment of the 150th Division of the 448th Army on the way to retreat could have been avoided.
On March 5, 1979, our army began to retreat in an all-round way, and differences arose between Liu Tongsheng, commander of the 150th Division, Yang Zhendao, political commissar, and the deputy commander and deputy political commissar of the working group stationed in the 150th Division.
The first disagreement was the question of whether to return to China and take the main road or the small road.
Taking the main road means that you can immediately return to China with the main force of the 41st Army (the 150th Division is under the command of the 41st Army) and no longer be entangled in clearing out the remnants of the Vietnamese army, which is also the opinion of the 150th Division; by taking the small road, you can retreat while clearing out the remnants of the Vietnamese army in the mountainous areas, and further expand the results of the battle; this is the opinion of the army working group.
In the end, the views of the three deputy military chiefs of the Working Group prevailed.
The second disagreement was whether the 2nd Battalion of the 448th Regiment should immediately retreat or hold on to the spot.
After the 448th Regiment was attacked by the Vietnamese army, the 2nd Battalion fell into the encirclement of the Vietnamese army. At this time, Liu Tongsheng, commander of the 150th Division, asked the 2nd Battalion to break through immediately, and at the same time, the 1st Battalion and the 3rd Battalion of the 448th Regiment went all out to help. However, the Working Group rejected this view in the light of the hostilities. The Working Group also did not agree to the return of the 447th Regiment to the division, which led to the 448th Regiment further in a dangerous situation.
[The retreat route of the 448th regiment. On the morning of March 7, 1979, the 448th Infantry Regiment of the 150th Division of the 50th Army was ordered by the 41st Army to carry out the task of clearing and suppressing from Cao Binh Ban Anh in Vietnam to the north, and suffered heavy losses.
The third disagreement, after the 448th Battalion of the 2nd Regiment was dispersed, should it be reported immediately.
The 2nd Battalion of the 448th Regiment missed a good opportunity to break through the encirclement, and soon fell into a desperate situation under the encirclement of the Vietnamese army, and finally 542 people were separated. Upon learning of the news, division commander Liu Tongsheng's suggestion to report to the 41st Army, the 50th Army, and the Eastern Front was once again rejected by the working group.
The 50th Army in the counterattack against Vietnam had many similarities with the 60th Army to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea.
The first point is that there are many recruits from the 60th Army to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea and the 50th Army in the counterattack against Vietnam.
The 60th Army of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, under its command the 179th Division (the glorious Linfen Brigade), the 180th Division, and the 181st Division (Leather Brigade) were not formed for a long time.
Although the 50th Army was one of the units incorporated into Siye after the Changchun Uprising, it was reorganized many times after the founding of the People's Republic of China, and in fact only the "airborne" 149th Division had a solid foundation, and the rebuilt 148th Division and 150th Division had a much shallow historical background.
The shallow historical background and insufficient training for combat were one of the reasons for the defeat of the 180th and 150th Divisions.
The second point is that the 60th Army of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea and the 50th Army of the Counterattack War were both "split into three".
In the Fifth Campaign to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, the 179th Division of the 60th Army was attached to the 12th Army, the 181st Division was attached to the 15th Army, and there was actually only one 180th Division under the command of the 60th Army. Therefore, when it was alone behind the enemy, the 60th Army had no mobile forces to use.
In the counterattack against Vietnam, the three divisions of the 50th Army were also divided into three: the 148th Division was in the direction of Lang Son and Luping on the Eastern Front; the 149th Division was under the command of the 13th Army on the Western Front; and the 150th Division remained unchanged and served as a reserve, and when it was put into the battlefield in the later stage, it was assigned to the 41st Army on the Eastern Front. Therefore, the 50th Army did not have a single unit of its own in its hands during the battle, and commanded the 20th Division of the 58th Army of the Wuhan Military Region, which was later put into the battlefield.
The three divisions of an army were dismantled and used, and the unfamiliar cooperation with the brother units was also one of the reasons for the defeat.
[In the 1979 counterattack against Vietnam, Kang Zhenhu (seated), commander of the 149th Division of the 50th Army, and Xu Jintang (first from right), political commissar, were on the battlefield in Sabah on the Western Front. The 149th Division participated in the battle in the direction of Yunnan and was under the command of the 13th Army of the Chengdu Military Region, and after the 50th Army revoked its number, the 149th Division was incorporated into the 13th Army]
Third, there are problems with the command structure of the 180th Division to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea and the 150th Division to Counterattack Vietnam.
The main problem of the command structure of the 180 th Division to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea was that the command force of the division headquarters was relatively weak, and the division commander Zheng Qigui was born as a political worker, and Wu Chengde, acting political commissar and director of the political department, had only one deputy division commander, Duan Longzhang, and chief of staff Wang Zhenbang.
In addition to the division commander Liu Tongsheng and political commissar Yang Zhendao, there were also deputy division commanders and deputy political commissars (this was a relatively common phenomenon at that time), and the trouble was that the army working group sent by the 50th Army to the 180th Division actually became a "mother-in-law" with higher authority during the retreat. Giving orders to the long and unclear rights and responsibilities is an important reason for the loss.
[The volunteer prisoners of war who were exchanged and released were persecuted and lost their legs, and resolutely demanded to return to the motherland]
Fourth, there was a problem with the on-the-spot response of the 180th Division to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea and the 150th Division to Counterattack Vietnam.
In the Fifth Campaign to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, the 180th Division had at least two chances to get out of the crisis, but the troops received an order from their superiors to break through the encirclement, and the commander did not respond in time and missed the opportunity.
During the 150th Division of the counterattack against Vietnam, when the 448th Regiment was attacked and surrounded by the Vietnamese army, the division commander Liu Tongsheng made several correct suggestions, but they were not adopted. Not only that, the working group also directly gave instructions to the two deputy division commanders, regiment commanders, and political commissars of the 448 Regiment, making it difficult for front-line commanders to respond on the spot.
【Data map of the mountainous areas of northern Vietnam】
The 180th Division to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea and the 150th Division to counterattack Vietnam were later withdrawn.
Despite all the defeats, the loyalty, bravery and tenacity of the commanders and fighters of the troops were awe-inspiring.
In the fifth battle to resist US aggression and aid Korea, more than 10,000 people from the 180th Division of the 60th Army were scattered and broke through, due to the disparity in numbers, more than 3,000 people died (including Liu Yaohu, the head of the 540th Regiment), and more than 3,000 people were captured (including Wu Chengde, acting political commissar of the 180th Division).
However, more than 4,000 commanders and fighters who fought separately fought bloody battles to break through the encirclement and returned to the establishment one after another, including division commander Zheng Qigui, deputy division commander Duan Longzhang, chief of staff Wang Zhenbang, and 538 regiment and 539 regiment commanders Pang Kechang Wang Zhicheng and others.
In the 50th Battalion of the 448th Regiment of the 150th Division of the 2nd Army in the counterattack against Vietnam, 219 people were captured, accounting for 80% of the captured personnel of our army in the entire self-defense counterattack. Although some personnel surrendered, most of the commanders and fighters fought to the end and shed their last drop of blood for the motherland. Wang Xin, deputy company commander of the 8th Company, shot the traitor, fought to the end, pulled the grenade and died with the enemy, and posthumously recorded first-class merit. Xiao Jiaxi, a soldier of the 8th Company, climbed back to China for 9 days and was awarded the honorary title of "Iron Warrior".
【Iron Warrior Xiao Jiaxi】
On May 4, 1979, Zhang Zhili, commander of the 50th Army, and Zhang Lixun, political commissar of the 50th Army, held a summary meeting to summarize the problems that had arisen in the operation of the 448th Regiment of the 150th Division, and to reflect on and improve the problems of collective leadership, organization and command, and lax discipline that had arisen in the counterattack operation.
On August 21, the main members of the working group of the 50th Army stationed in the 150th Division were dismissed, warned, and transferred.
Resources:
1. "The Battle of the 180th Division", by Chen Zhonglong, Jiangsu People's Publishing House;
2. "Dream Casting Army", by Zheng Jiacai, China Literature and History Publishing House.
[Deeply cultivate the history of war and promote positive energy]