Due to knowledge, vision, habits, etc., everyone may have certain cognitive biases. In decision-making teams, it is often easy to fall into the trap of groupthinking due to the overemphasis on centralization and unity. In recent years, the U.S. military has begun to consciously correct the thinking of individual officers and collective decision-making, and the theories and methods used are collectively referred to as "Red Teaming". The U.S. military usually refers to its own side as the blue side and the blue army, while the enemy side is called the red side and the red army. In 2015, the "Critical Thinking: The U.S. Army Red Team Practical Handbook 7.0" was released, and in May 2016, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff issued the "Command Red Team Reserve Regulations", which elaborated on the status, role, organizational system, and basic functions of the red team. These documents all focus on two goals: First, to cultivate the critical spirit of officers and men and to correctly understand their own biases and the erroneous decisions and behaviors that may lead to them; second, to use various effective techniques, methods, concepts, and means to question existing facts and solutions, seek other alternatives, and resolve prejudices and mistakes that may arise in individual cognition and collective thinking.
1. The concept of the Red Team of the Headquarters
The Red Team is a full-time team that has been trained to understand, familiarize and master the relevant situation and operation mode of the Red Party, and they independently and comprehensively study and analyze the combat plan and combat operation alternatives from the perspective of the enemy or a third party, so as to stimulate reflective, critical and creative thinking, reduce risks, avoid surprises, increase opportunities, improve operational flexibility, expand analysis and enhance decision-making, etc.
The Red Team of the Headquarters is a force multiplier of combat effectiveness, which is applicable at all levels of warfare and at all stages of combat operations. The Red Team Doctrine stipulates that all joint forces and agencies, especially the Joint Command, the Joint Task Force, the constituent units of the Joint Forces, combat support organizations, and service intelligence centers, must use the Red Team in order to discover deficiencies in understanding and to "put themselves in the other place" to think about and deal with pressing issues in operational planning, combat operations, and intelligence information.
The Command Red Team has three unique features. First, it is organizationally independent, which is conducive to examining problems relatively independently; second, professional training is conducive to correcting deviations and stimulating questioning and creative thinking; third, it is not conformist, does not play cards according to common sense, and is accustomed to singing the opposite tone and doing things against each other.
2. The functions and main areas of activity of the Red Team of the Command
Typically, the focus of the Red Team in the Command is to help staff officers develop plans, conduct operations, and conduct intelligence analysis. For example, it assists in identifying weaknesses and opportunities for victory on both sides of the enemy, improves awareness of all aspects of the operational environment, and critically reviews strategic tactics, operational concepts, operational plans and operational orders, and intelligence products. The results of the red team's analysis can also include unknowns or low-probability, high-impact events, which can be used to predict unexpected events and reduce risk. In view of this, the main activities of the Red Team of the Headquarters cover four major areas, which are intertwined and mutually reinforcing. When dealing with a particular problem, there are often multiple areas involved.
The first area is assisted decision-making. Help staff organizations to get rid of the influence of organizational and human factors, and prevent bias caused by interference and constraints in analysis, planning and evaluation;
The second area is critical scrutiny. Independently re-evaluate problems, critically review judgment results, evaluate opinions and interpret information, explore hidden threats and opportunities, and assess the potential impact of unexpected events.
The third area is the simulation of opponents. Simulate the behavioral reactions of opponents, partners or other relevant parties, gain insight into the intentions, opinions and decision-making procedures of the participants, and explore the reactions and behaviors of the participants in specific factors and specific situations;
The fourth area is vulnerability detection. Discover the material and non-material weaknesses in the system or system integration, explore possible countermeasures and countermeasures, test the integrity of the system, and evaluate the possible "waterfall effect" of the system under pressure. Among them, it may act as a highly professional network "intruder" to assist information security agencies in finding physical defects and program vulnerabilities in command and control communication systems, discovering hidden threats and weaknesses, and studying the "waterfall effect" that adversary's behavior may bring to the system.
Ideally, the Red Team of the Headquarters should have the following core competencies: good at critical thinking, good at organizational procedures, professional knowledge, proficient in alternative analysis, familiar with changing situations, literate, good at simulating opponents, etc. These core competencies need to be integrated in order to be truly effective. At the same time, the effective play of these abilities is also inseparable from a good organizational mechanism and a humanistic atmosphere full of critical thinking.
3. Principles of operation of the Red Team of the Headquarters
Red teams are usually expected to follow a set of principles that work well. These principles define the powers, relationships, circumstances, and other conditions required for the Red Team of the Command to function effectively.
(1) The red team of the headquarters shall assist the commander. The Red Team should focus on improving the decision-making capacity of commanders at all levels, helping the staff to free itself from bureaucracy and human factors, and seeking to free action plans and evaluations from interference and constraints, and to abandon bias.
(ii) The support of the Red Team of the Headquarters should help to deal with all issues. Subtle changes and influences will constrain people's thinking and judgment, and make any individual and organization unintentionally fall victim. The red team needs to stimulate critical and creative thinking to help break free from such constraints.
(3) The red team of the headquarters should be integrated into the staff organization. The Red Team should be aware of the formal and informal structures and procedures of the staff and be able to identify and correct organizational and individual factors that hinder or hinder decision-making, and point out problems to the commander and the staff body.
(4) The Red Team of the Headquarters is an indispensable and independent component of the staff organization. The red team must remain organizationally and ideologically independent in order to minimize the impact of external factors. If the staff body is not receptive to the critical, alternative and supporting insights provided by the RED, it means that the RED team is not fully functioning.
(5) Although the Red Team of the Headquarters is independent, it needs to be supported by the commander and the staff body. No matter how difficult or critical the RED team's advice may be, it should play a constructive role in helping the organization achieve its goals. Without sustained support from commanders and staff bodies, the red team cannot function effectively.
(6) The red team of the headquarters should focus on improving combat efficiency, and raise different opinions. Military action tends to reinforce the herd mentality, which in turn leads to some cognitive errors. Resolutely contradicting helps sharpen the mind and prevents complacency and blind confidence.
(7) The support of the Red Team of the Headquarters should be coordinated with the daily staff work. The red team of the headquarters must be fully integrated with the staff organization receiving assistance, so that the best results of the red team of the headquarters can be brought into play. The views of the RED team at the right time and place should be taken into account in order to influence relevant assessments and decisions.
(8) The red team of the headquarters should be ready to be put into use at any time in advance. Before commissioning, the command red team should determine the topic, understand the characteristics and way of thinking of a potential enemy, and establish a working relationship with the staff body.
(9) The products of the red team of the headquarters shall be clearly labeled. When the Red Team of the Command decides to come up with a product that it has done independently, it is important to be careful not to mistake it for a general assessment or an authoritative policy. A reminder should be included in the product to indicate that the product does not represent the policy, position, opinion or evaluation of any official organization, and is solely the opinion of the Red Team and is only for the consideration of the relevant organization.
(10) The red team of the headquarters should cooperate with subject matter experts, but do not seek to take the same position. Subject matter experts should be consulted as required to ensure that factual information is used appropriately. Any conclusions based on the opinion of the subject matter experts do not require the consent of the subject matter experts.
Finally, it should be pointed out that with an insight into the so-called "red team mentality" that the US military has often emphasized in recent years, it is not difficult to see that its core target is China. The US military's "Command Red Team Reserve Order" points out that in the process of studying and making decisions on war issues, it is necessary to use the red team on a regular and institutionalized basis, and only in the presence of a strong imaginary enemy "agent" can it avoid wishful thinking and assumption of decision-making. "Improving Jonit Operational Concept Developement within the U.S. Department of" released by the Center for a New American Security, a U.S. think tank, in October 2021 Defense) report makes it clear that during the Cold War, the U.S. military had a good understanding of the Soviet Union's potential warfare methods, in part because the Soviet Union's theory of victory could be glimpsed from its World War II warfare practice. The US Department of Defense is facing a completely different situation when it comes to designing a future war with the Chinese military, mainly because there are no recent cases of the Chinese military to study, and its combat methods are still a "mystery," and the new combat methods that China is developing may not be known to the US military until the beginning of the conflict. This requires the US Department of Defense to attach importance to and strengthen operational simulation, scientifically predict and analyze threats, and lay a good foundation for the development of joint concepts.
The report also pointed out that at present, most of the "red teams" of the US Department of Defense are temporary, and the "red team thinking" as an important critical thinking has shrunk with the end of the Cold War. The "red team" is essential to prevent "inertial thinking" and "collective thinking" in concept development, and to promote the generation of creative ideas, and the development of joint operations concepts requires a comprehensive and hard-working "red team", as it is called, to "challenge all concepts with smart adversaries." Therefore, the U.S. Department of Defense must have the "red team" appear early and often in the concept development process, and be good and dare to put forward different opinions. Of course, the ideas produced by the "red team" should be adapted to the adjustment of the decision-making of senior leaders as much as possible, so as not to become empty "intellectual exercises".