Recently, the launch of the first domestic Type 054B frigate received widespread attention from the foreign media. In contrast to this, the Constellation-class frigates, which the United States is trying to mass-produce, are in an awkward situation. Because, both in quantity and quality, it is difficult to ensure superiority at the "constellation" level! In the next few years, the US top management is likely to face a very headache "shipbuilding contradiction."
The Constellation-class frigate is an ocean-going frigate built by the US Navy again many years after all the Perry-class frigates were decommissioned. Previously, the US military believed that there were no more opponents on the ocean, and the aircraft carrier formation only needed Aegis ships such as the Ticonderoga class and the Arleigh Burke class to meet the needs of ocean-going presence, "freedom of navigation" and aircraft carrier escort. The US Navy once focused on interfering in geopolitical hotspots, proposing a "sea to land" strategy, in which the ecological niche of frigates in the original surface ships was replaced by littoral combat ships.
(Both types of LCS developed by the US Navy proved to be failures)
The rapid rise of the PLA Navy and the poor performance of littoral combat ships made the US Navy realize that it still had to build a sufficient number of frigates to meet the scale needs of sea control operations. The end product is the Constellation-class frigate, which is also a key part of meeting the goal of "383 ships in the future". Therefore, in the context of the tight military budget of the US Navy and insufficient shipbuilding capacity, the "Constellation" class frigate should try to meet the requirements of "low cost" and "easy production", and the cost of a single ship was pressed at $900 million.
(The overall design of the Constellation-class frigate is much like the scaled-down version of the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer.)
The US Navy uses more off-the-shelf equipment and technology in the design of the "Constellation" class. To this end, although the "Constellation" class borrows the Italian version of the "Carlo Berga Mini" class frigate of the European multi-mission frigate, it cancels the complex and more expensive integrated mast and uses a single longitudinal mast inherited from the Arleigh Burke class, in order to facilitate the installation of mature American-made radar, electronic warfare and satellite and other antenna equipment.
(Italian Navy's "Carlo Berga Mini" class frigate)
In contrast, China's Type 054B, Japan's Mogami class, Britain's Type 26 frigate, and European multi-mission frigates each use different integrated integrated masts, which not only make the outer shape of the ship more concise, greatly reduce the radar reflected signal, but also reflect a more advanced level, phased array radar and ship electrical management level.
It can be seen that the unsimple design of the "Constellation" level not only affects stealth, but also indicates that the level of electronic system integration of the "Constellation" level may be worse than that of China, Japan and Europe. Of course, the hardware standard of the "Constellation" class frigate is actually not low, the "Constellation" class is equipped with the baseline-10 "Aegis" combat system, which follows the ready-made equipment of the Burke 3 class destroyer and is equipped with three fixed installation of the AN/SPY-6V2 radar, which is also a scaled-down version of the Burke 3 AN/SPY-6V1 radar.
(Constellation-class frigate rear view)
There is a mature "Aegis" system and Burke 3 to lay the foundation, which is the comparative advantage of the "Constellation" class, so the US military has also given the "Constellation" class quite good air defense combat capabilities, in addition to the common ESSM point defense missiles, it can also launch the standard-2 and standard-6 series of long-range air defense missiles. The farthest air defense engagement range of the "Constellation" class can reach more than 370 km, and the overall air defense capability has reached the level of many Aegis ships.
Simply put, the Constellation class is more like a scaled-down version of the Burke III, or a monkey version of a European multipurpose frigate. However, the "Constellation" class, with a more conservative configuration of radar electronics and a sky-high "Baseline-10" system, forcibly upgraded combat capabilities exceed the 054B, Mogami or European multi-purpose frigates, but the cost is much more expensive. Although the Baseline-10 gives the Constellation class powerful anti-missile capabilities, it has greatly increased the cost of the Constellation class, and although it is quite cheap compared to the Arleigh Burke 3 destroyer, the value of $900 million is definitely not low.
(The side lines of the constellation level can see the mixed design style of the United States and Europe)
The unit price of European multipurpose frigates in France and Italy is about 800 million US dollars, the unit price of Japan's "Mogami" class is about 400 million US dollars, and the "Constellation" class, as a low-end version of the Burke 3 type, the cost of the lead ship is as high as 1.6 billion US dollars, and the expected price of 900 million US dollars needs to be gradually reached after mass production. However, the unit price of $900 million is already a "very cheap" price for the US Navy, but it is doubtful whether this price target can be achieved. Almost none of the U.S. Navy's previous new warship programs have achieved the expected "price target", including Virginia-class nuclear submarines and littoral combat ships that have been aimed at low cost from the beginning.
(Virginia-class nuclear submarines are also overruns)
Therefore, the US Navy's "2045 Target Plan" claims to build 56 Constellation-class frigates, but from the cost point of view, the difficulty is really not small, and the construction speed is also a huge challenge. There are not many shipyards in the United States that can build Constellation-class frigates, and the U.S. Navy currently has more than a dozen Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, multiple American-class amphibious assault ships, Ford-class aircraft carriers, and future DDG(X) to build. Not only that, but the launch of 054B means that the "Constellation" class will most likely lose its meaning in construction.
First of all, the technical level of the 054B frigate is already not inferior to the "Constellation" class, although the latter uses the high-priced "Baseline-10" system and has advantages in software, but the hardware upgrade potential is very limited. As long as the 054B frigate is upgraded in terms of software, with more advanced radar, and standardized vertical launch system, it has the potential to surpass the combat capabilities of the "Constellation" class in the later stage.
(The lines of 054B are much more concise than constellation)
Secondly, the number of 054B frigates built, too, easily surpasses the "Constellation" class. The number of earlier 054A frigates easily exceeded 40 in more than a decade, and the pace of construction of 054B will not differ too much. The Constellation, on the other hand, is almost impossible to complete the construction plan of 56 ships by 2045, faced with the US shipbuilding capacity of "only one destroyer per year." Even the 20 Constellation-class ships ordered by the US Navy can be built faster than the 054B is doubtful.
It can be seen that if the United States hopes to use Constellation-class frigates to maintain its numerical superiority in warships, it is basically impossible. And in the face of a higher level of 054B, even the quality advantage may not exist. In the next 20 years, the two most important warships of the US surface fleet, the Constellation-class frigates and DDG(X) destroyers, are unlikely to surpass the 054B and 055 in terms of technology and construction speed. What is even more ridiculous is that one of the two future capital ships of the United States is still under construction and the other is still in the design stage, while 054B and 055 have already stepped into the sea.
(Many of the battleships massively built in the US Navy in the 80-90s will have to wait for decommissioning)
So why does the United States continue to build the "constellation" class? This very paradoxical question is likely to become a headache for the US top in the next few years.