“800,000 against 600,000, the advantage is mine,” said Chiang Kai-shek in the movie "The Great Battle of Huaihai."
While often used in jest nowadays, looking back to that year, the Battle of Huaihai was a significant chance for the Nationalists, given its prominent status among the Three Great Campaigns. The elite forces of the Central Army were gathered, and on paper, their strength was no less than that of the Communist forces.
Initially, even the People's Liberation Army (PLA) didn't hold absolute certainty of obliterating such a substantial number of Nationalist troops. Su Yu, at the outset, had only envisioned a "Small Huaihai," but what transpired was far beyond expectations as the Nationalist leadership's "cooperation" played a pivotal role, transforming it into a massive confrontation.
The actual commander of the Nationalist forces in this battle later reminisced that he had initially planned to strike at Xuzhou before Huaiyin. He believed that if he had followed this strategy, the course of the battle would have been altered, and the Nationalists might have even secured a victory. Nonetheless, Chiang Kai-shek ultimately rejected his tactical approach.
At first glance, this viewpoint may hold merit, yet the certainty of a Nationalist victory wasn't guaranteed by adhering to that plan. The Nationalists faced issues beyond just the battlefield; their internal chaos was evident from personnel appointments even before the campaign.
Initially, Chiang Kai-shek hoped for Bai Chongxi to lead as the commander-in-chief of the "Pacification Headquarters" in Xuzhou. He even held secretive talks with Bai Chongxi in Nanjing for this purpose. However, Bai Chongxi went back on his word the next day, despite initially agreeing.
In a dilemma, Chiang Kai-shek reviewed his subordinates. Chen Cheng? He had suffered a disastrous defeat in the northeast. Xue Yue? While he held an advantage earlier as the head of "Suibu" in the early days of the Liberation War, he had suffered consecutive defeats. Hu Lian? His Huangpu Fourth Term background lacked experience, particularly in commanding large units in combat.
After much contemplation, he could only turn to Du Yuming. Despite his earlier exchanges of blows with Lin Biao in the northeast, his credentials as a Huangpu First Term student fell slightly short, making it unlikely for others to follow his lead.
Consequently, Chiang Kai-shek appointed Liu Zhi as the commander-in-chief of the "Pacification Headquarters" in Xuzhou, and Du Yuming as the deputy commander-in-chief and director of the "Advanced Command Headquarters," with the real authority concentrated in Du Yuming's hands.
In September 1948, the East China Field Army launched the Battle of Jinan. Du Yuming analyzed the situation calmly, estimating that the total force of the Communist forces in the Huaiyin region was around 300,000, and the Nationalist forces in the Xuzhou area could mobilize more maneuverable units than this number.
By deploying forces to simultaneously pursue victory in Jining while defending against reinforcements, the Nationalists could amass a superior force. Du Yuming's plan aimed to seize the initiative rather than passively reacting. He swiftly formulated an "Attack Plan against the Shandong Communist Forces," intending to capitalize on the separation of the Central and East China Communist forces. While the Central "Pacification Headquarters" distracted the Central Communist forces, the Xuzhou "Pacification Headquarters" would engage the Jinan battle with the East China Communist forces.
Although Chiang Kai-shek and Chief of the General Staff Gu Zhutong approved of his strategy, the coordination within the Nationalist forces took an extended period. By the time the forces were nearly assembled, Jinan had already fallen to the Communist forces.
With Jinan lost, Du Yuming's plan to regain the initiative collapsed. Yet he believed that, given the shaky foothold of the Communist forces, there was still a chance for victory against them. He prepared to lead the 2nd, 16th, and 13th Corps to implement the plan. However, at that moment, the Battle of Jinzhou erupted.
The potential loss of Jinzhou would trap the Nationalist forces in the northeast, leaving Chiang Kai-shek deeply anxious. The commander of the Northeast "Pacification Headquarters," Wei Lihuang, was consistently passive and unreliable. In dire straits, Chiang Kai-shek had no choice but to entrust Du Yuming with the task. As for the relatively secure situation in East China, Chiang Kai-shek handed it over to Liu Zhi.
Before departing for the northeast, Du Yuming communicated with Liu Zhi, hoping that the Xuzhou forces would continue their offensive. However, as soon as Du Yuming left, Liu Zhi halted the plan. Given the high risk, Liu Zhi was reluctant to bear the responsibility of potential failure.
Upon learning of this in the northeast, Du Yuming was infuriated but powerless. Without Du Yuming's guidance, the strategy of the Xuzhou "Pacification Headquarters" shifted from an offensive to a defensive posture, with the primary decision-making power resting with Du Yuming as the deputy commander-in-chief.
In 1948, November, Du Yuming returned to Xuzhou. Liu Zhi promptly transferred all defense responsibilities to him and sought refuge in Bengbu.
Du Yuming, in handling this chaotic situation, remained composed. Despite claims from various corps commanders about encountering the Communist main force, his analysis led him to conclude that the primary target of the Communist forces was the Huang Baitao Corps, while other directions were diversionary attacks. Thus, he decided to "encircle Wei to rescue Zhao," concentrating forces to eliminate the Central Communist force.
From the outset, Du Yuming's aim was to prevent a combined assault by the Central and East China Communist forces. By concentrating forces to relieve the Huang Baitao Corps, the Central Communist force would potentially be forced to aid in defense, creating a chance for the Huang Baitao Corps to break through. If the Central Communist force did not intervene, the Nationalists could seize the opportunity to defeat them, thereby regaining the initiative.
Consequently, Du Yuming sequentially issued orders for the Huang Baitao Corps to hold out for about ten days, while the Li Mi 13th Corps was assigned to defend Xuzhou. Simultaneously, the 2nd, 16th, and Huang Wei 12th Corps, as well as the Huangzhong forces from Central China, were ordered to jointly attack the Central Communist force.
However, this command was never truly executed due to Chiang Kai-shek's veto.
At that time, everyone believed that the Huang Baitao Corps couldn't hold out for ten days. From Chiang Kai-shek's perspective, Du Yuming's plan seemed to sacrifice the Huang Baitao Corps, discarding so many soldiers at once—an outcome he was reluctant to accept. He hoped to extricate the corps and then defeat both the Central and East China Communist forces.
This dual-minded approach was far from practical, but Chiang Kai-shek had the final say. Thus, Du Yuming had no choice but to devise an alternative plan, leaving one corps in Xuzhou while focusing the rest of the forces on saving the Huang Baitao Corps. This time, Chiang Kai
Kai-shek agreed.
Unexpectedly, as the main forces were swiftly mobilizing, Chiang Kai-shek's orders arrived once again. Chiang Kai-shek embarked on a "small gain, big loss" scenario once more. Even Du Yuming, who had always obeyed orders, couldn't avoid this fate. As a result, the Nationalist elite forces were utterly annihilated.
However, could following Du Yuming's plan of attacking the Central Communist force first have truly turned the tide of battle? In reality, that would have been an extremely challenging task. Leaving aside the formidable strength of the PLA, even considering the internal dynamics within the Nationalist forces, the prospects of victory seemed bleak.
The Battle of Huaihai saw the involvement of seven corps from the Nationalist side, each harboring their own grudges and ambitions. Among these corps, the 2nd Corps led by Qiu Qingquan and the 12th Corps led by Huang Wei possessed the strongest combat capabilities. The 2nd Corps was founded upon the foundation of the 5th Army, while the 12th Corps was built around the 18th Division, both being part of the Nationalist's five major main forces and equipped with substantial American weaponry.
The 7th Corps under Huang Baitao and the 13th Corps under Li Mi also displayed commendable combat prowess. The 7th Corps managed to withstand the Communist forces for over ten days, causing Su Yu considerable anxiety. As for the 13th Corps, while it had the capacity to fight, Li Mi was prone to fleeing from combat.
The remaining three corps, led by Sun Yuanliang, Li Yannian, and Liu Ruming, were often overlooked and underestimated.
Among them, Qiu Qingquan had a close relationship with Li Mi, but he deeply disliked Huang Baitao. The source of this enmity stemmed from the Yudong Campaign, where Qiu Qingquan risked his life to save Huang Baitao. Many of his soldiers were lost in the process, yet when it came time to reward their efforts, Chiang Kai-shek awarded Huang Baitao medals and lavish praise, while Qiu Qingquan received nothing.
This led Qiu Qingquan to a state of perplexity. Unable to confront Chiang Kai-shek, he transferred his resentment onto Huang Baitao. So, when Qiu Qingquan received orders to rescue Huang Baitao during the Battle of Huaihai, he advanced at a leisurely pace. Li Mi, who had a strong friendship with him, combined with his fear of the Communist forces, cooperated by progressing slowly.
As for the remaining corps commanders, each had their own hidden motives. Sun Yuanliang was a master at escaping, making it nearly impossible to expect him to fight valiantly. Li Yannian and Liu Ruming were often dismissed and overlooked, which translated into their lack of effort during the campaign to rescue Huang Baitao.
Ironically, Huang Wei, arriving from Central China, put forth genuine effort, yet he encountered insufficient cooperation from his counterparts. Moreover, his extended absence from active combat preceding the Battle of Huaihai dulled his sensitivity to shifting battle dynamics.
In essence, the seven corps commanders were unable to coordinate effectively, rendering victory against the united front of the Communist forces—a force united from top to bottom—nearly impossible.