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Article|Henk's loneliness
Editor's | Henk's Loneliness
Sudanese independence is imperative
In October 1951, former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, who had been in opposition for six years, led the Conservative Party to win the election. Churchill was a loyal defender of the British Empire, but it was in him that the cracks in tradition began to unfold. Churchill followed the trend of history and actually endorsed the Labor Party's decolonization strategy to continue the process of Sudanese independence.
In November, the British Colonial Department reaffirmed Britain's commitment to help colonies achieve self-government and independence within the Commonwealth, expressing a desire to promote the establishment of self-government in the Commonwealth. This gave Sudanese officials great encouragement, and the people also had hopes to join the Commonwealth.
But this is really just a gesture, because the admission of Sudan will not only do little to consolidate the Commonwealth, but will also reinforce the centrifugal tendencies of South Africa, which holds extremely racist views, and lead to the intensification of contradictions inherent within the Commonwealth. In addition, economic assistance and political arrangements have become obstacles to Sudanese autonomy within the Commonwealth.
On 20 December, the Sudanese Civil Secretary, Robertson, sent a letter to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs proposing the procedure for promulgating the draft constitution of the Sudan, arguing that the Sudan would eventually establish a cabinet, but that difficulties remained on sovereignty issues. Since then, the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations have gradually reached a dead end. In mid-October 1951, Egypt once again raised the Sudan issue at the United Nations, demanding that Britain withdraw from Sudan and decide the future of Sudan in the form of a referendum.
In December, in an effort to conclude a mutual defense agreement with Egypt and safeguard its strategic interests in the Middle East, the United States began to shift its stance, arguing that Britain should recognize Egypt's "symbolic sovereignty" over Sudan. On December 28, the British government made it clear that it would never cede Sudanese sovereignty in exchange for Egypt's mutual defense agreement, and firmly opposed the Sudanese referendum on the grounds of educational backwardness, stating that the establishment of an autonomous government was the primary prerequisite for its implementation.
In January 1952, after negotiations with U.S. Secretary of State Acheson, Eden explicitly proposed to formulate a Sudanese constitution and achieve autonomy by the end of 1952.
The draft constitution prepared by the Government of the Sudan, which had been endorsed by the Prime Minister, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Colonial Ministry, had strengthened the Governor's confidence in speeding up the process of Sudanese autonomy and self-determination by 1953 and for determining the relationship between the Sudan and Egypt through the election of a new parliament. Eden also made this clear in his meetings with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Colonial Ministry, opposing the use of the title of "Sultan King" by King Farouk of Egypt. At the same time, the assessment of the south laid the groundwork for Sudan's move towards self-government.
It is not so much that Britain took the initiative to take measures to promote the reunification of the north and south of Sudan, but rather that it had to take measures. At a time when constitutional evolution was gradually stagnating and Egypt's call for "unity under the crown of Egypt" was growing, it became an inevitable choice for Britain to suppress the pro-Egyptian forces in northern Sudan with a "multi-ethnic federation" and try to weaken Egypt's influence in Sudan. At the same time, in the minds of Sudanese nationalists, the South must not be lost, and the North has even put on a posture at all costs to demand that the South must unite with the North.
On 2 March, the Governor sent a letter to the United Kingdom reporting on the political process, paying particular attention to the South and the attitude of British personnel. After a long call, Eden and Howe met on April 21-22 to reach an agreement on the attitudes of Egypt and Sudan and the Sudan autonomy bill. The Sudan Self-Government Statute was also enacted on April 22.
The law of autonomy basically establishes the political structure of the Sudan: the Council of Ministers holds executive power, and the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate are constituted; Most of the members of the Senate are indirectly elected, and the members of the House of Representatives are appointed by the Governor and elected by the provincial electoral colleges, and the Parliament holds legislative power; The Governor is the supreme constitutional authority and has veto power in matters such as foreign affairs, public service and southern affairs.
In addition, provisions were made for Southern Affairs and referendums. Egypt's approval was needed for the bill to be implemented, but the deadlock in the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations left the two sides with poor communication and communication.
On July 22, the Egyptian Free Officers Organization overthrew the Farouk dynasty, with General Muhammad Najib, who was half Sudanese and educated in Sudan, chairman of the Revolutionary Steering Committee and Prime Minister of Egypt.
As a result, Najib quickly renounced his previous intransigence (staunchly rejecting Sudan's self-determination; Only maintain close ties with the pro-Ethiopian faction), working to promote Sudanese independence. The shift in Egypt led to a change in the situation in Sudan, with the Khatamiya faction turning to support the elections and Abdul Rahman and the Umma Party hoping to break free from Egypt's shackles and achieve independence. On 12 September, Eden explicitly instructed Ambassador Stevenson to Egypt to consult with Egypt on specific arrangements for monitoring and elections in the Sudanese Parliament.
On September 22, Stevenson held talks with Major Salah Salam, Egypt's Minister of Sudanese Affairs. Major Salim said Egypt "will grant independence to Sudan," calling India a success story and consulting on election timing, referendum and the Nile Water Agreement.
Eventually, Najib announced that he would be in contact with his early close friend Abdul Rahman and hoped to reach an agreement, a principle that Eden also appreciated.
On 22 October, Rahman arrived in Cairo and was given a grand welcome. Subsequently, the Egyptian government met with Rahman without the participation of representatives of the Hatmiya sect, led by Mirjani, and Southern Sudan (which Rahman claimed to represent the south). At the beginning of the talks, Rahman said, "I am committed to fighting for Sudan's independence. For the stability of government and the promotion of democracy, I am willing to sacrifice health and all my wealth."
On 2 November, the parties issued a joint statement in which Egypt firmly believes in the right of the Sudanese to self-determination and to exercise it effectively at the appropriate time and with the necessary safeguards; A transitional period was established to ensure full autonomy for the Sudan and to provide an atmosphere of neutrality and peace. The shift in attitude of the Umma Party laid the groundwork for Egypt's push to sign a multiparty agreement. Since then, negotiations between the two sides have focused on minutiae such as the Governor's emergency powers, the establishment of an electoral advisory board and the South.
In December 1952, Salah Salim visited Sudan, but his words and actions aroused the displeasure of the British. Salim claimed that British rule had left the South backward and urged the South to secede from condominium, which sparked a public rally of southerners in Juba in protest.
Salim's talks with representatives of northern political parties were more successful than in the south. On 10 January 1953, Salim signed the Political Parties Agreement in Khartoum with representatives of the Sultan Umma Party, the National Coalition Party, the Socialist Republican Party, and the National Party.
The agreement covers five aspects: the South question, the Council of Governors, Sudanization, elections and the withdrawal of foreign troops, stipulates that the Sudan will achieve self-determination and Sudanization within three years, establish an international commission and an electoral commission, and conduct direct elections. Foreign forces will withdraw after Sudanese autonomy and the Sudanese Armed Forces will take over defence. Unfortunately, the south, which accounts for one third of the Sudanese population, was excluded and not allowed to send representatives to sign the agreement.
At the same time, there were discussions within the UK around the development and procedure of Sudan's constitution. On 13 November, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Colonialism convened a meeting on the constitution of the Sudan to discuss the possibility of making an Indian governor of the Sudan, the abolition of the Sudanization Council and the Sudan's accession to the Commonwealth.
At the same time, Robert and Allen also discussed the composition of the Sudanese Election Commission, which he believed could allow Indians or Pakistanis to join as neutral members.
Churchill was in Jamaica when Ethiopia reached the multi-party agreement, and upon learning the news, he said, "We must firmly implement this agreement until 1956 ... What happened here sets the tone for our affairs throughout Africa and the Middle East." In fact, Britain was skeptical and critical of the agreement, which Churchill noted appeared to be a failure of the Sudanese government, and that "Egypt was free to use its money [to gain the support of the Sudanese]."
The Sudan Political Intelligence Summary noted that Saleh "successfully signed documents through flattery, bribery and deception," that the Egyptian delegation "acted equally rude and regrettably" personally and officially, and that the delegation "painted a deeply irresponsible image" in the south.
After Salim returned to Cairo in early February with the Multiparty Agreement, Egypt and the United Kingdom had a full exchange of views on the new Anglo-Egyptian agreement. On 12 February, the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement on Sudanese autonomy and self-determination was formally signed in Cairo, and the Egyptian proposal was largely retained. The Anglo-Egyptian Agreement consists of 15 articles and provides for the self-determination and sovereignty of the Sudan, the distribution of powers between the Governor's Council, the Election Commission and the Sudanization Commission, and the withdrawal of foreign troops.
Eden believes that Britain's strategic position in Sudan is gradually declining, and its economic interests are insignificant, so Britain's main interest in Sudan is that the Sudanese people should be well managed and Sudan should not become "the center of communism or the center of subversion and turmoil."
Egypt preemptively made a preemptive strike in the Anglo-Egyptian agreement, abandoning the slogan of ruling Sudan, choosing the premise of reaching an agreement with the Sudanese people, and seized the initiative in negotiations. Britain was a well-deserved champion of Sudanese independence and self-determination in the eyes of the Sudanese, while Egypt "remained committed to the legitimate sovereignty and unity of the Nile Valley as an indisputable principle."
The deeper significance of the new Anglo-Egyptian agreement is that the political forces in northern Sudan have basically reached the political demand for autonomy. On February 20, 1953, in the Caliphate Square in Omdurman, the crowd cheered and celebrated the Anglo-Egyptian agreement, believing that this transcendent action (whether political or religious) reflected the close unity of the Sudanese.
Establishment of the Sudanese Autonomous Government
As soon as the goal of establishing an autonomous government in Sudan was set, it received an immediate positive response from the United Kingdom. In his reply to Foreign Secretary Eden, Governor Howe stated that the tone of Sudanese policy was "not to lose the British work in Sudan for 50 years, to establish the close ties and prestige between Britain and Sudan, and to ensure that Sudan never falls into Egyptian hands".
At the same time, he also analyzed the obstacles to the situation in Sudan, both the attitude of Sudanese political parties and the need for the Sudanese government to guarantee jobs for British employees for the next three years. This fully reflects the calm thinking of the Sudanese government about the future and the helplessness of Britain to withdraw according to the scheduled time.
Eden appreciated Howe's views and instructed Howe to take them seriously in Sudan. Britain's relationship with Egypt is also undergoing subtle changes around southern Sudan.
From 21 to 27 March 1953, British Deputy Foreign Secretary Lloyd visited Sudan, where he met with the leaders of political parties in northern Sudan, the Sudanese of the Juba Political Committee and British officials in Sudan, and discussed Egyptian propaganda in southern Sudan with Salim in Sudan.
On 25 and 26 March, Lloyd and Salim held press conferences in which Salim condemned Britain's attempt to maintain business-on control of southern Sudan.
On 28 March, Lloyd met with Najib in Cairo to discuss factors affecting the political situation in the Sudan.
During the talks, Najib made it clear that Egypt would not interfere in Sudan's electoral process, and Lloyd wrote it down and asked Najib to sign for confirmation. Lloyd sorted out the memorandum and forwarded it to Aiden, who submitted the memorandum to Parliament for discussion on April 7.
The memorandum begins with an analysis of Egypt's demands, pointing out that Egypt's quest for Sudan focuses on water resources and military control, using propaganda, inducing Sudanese to be pro-Egyptian, and vilifying Britain.
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[3] Samuel Huntington: Political Order in Changing Societies, Shanghai People's Publishing House, 2008.
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[6] [Japanese] Zhongxi Huizheng: A History of the Decline and Fall of the British Empire, Changsha: Hunan People's Publishing House, 2018.
[7] [Sudan] Meji Shibeka: An Independent Sultan, Shanghai: Shanghai People's Publishing House, 1973.
[8] [Soviet] Ryabinov: Sultan, Beijing: Commercial Press, 1959.