Source: Global Times
On July 4, the International Atomic Energy Agency (hereinafter referred to as the IAEA) released a comprehensive assessment report on the disposal of nuclear contaminated water in Fukushima, Japan, holding that Japan's plan for discharging contaminated water into the sea generally meets international safety standards. Although the Japanese government intends to use the IAEA assessment report as a "talisman" to prove the safety of the Fukushima's plan to discharge contaminated water into the sea and dispel public concerns, in the eyes of professionals, Japan's relevant operations are full of loopholes and simply cannot withstand scientific rigor. In a recent interview with the Global Times, a number of insiders and industry experts involved in the relevant work exposed the inside story of Japan's plan to create "rationality" for the Fukushima nuclear contaminated water discharge plan, in their view, although the Japanese side is trying to create a "harmless" image, but the harm of Fukushima nuclear contaminated water discharged into the sea is real. In the interests of all mankind, there should have been a better choice, but the Japanese side abandoned it and chose the most beneficial way for itself.
IAEA report cannot "stamp" security
As an independent intergovernmental international organization in the United Nations system, the conclusions reached by the IAEA are easily regarded as having natural authority, and the Japanese government also intends to use the IAEA report to "justify" the discharge of Fukushima's nuclear contaminated water, but as Foreign Ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin said, the agency report cannot be a "talisman" and "pass" for Japan to drain the sea. A number of industry insiders and experts also expressed the same view to the Global Times reporter, believing that the conclusions of the IAEA assessment report cannot "stamp" the safety of the Fukushima nuclear contaminated water discharge plan.
Regarding the report released by the IAEA, the China Atomic Energy Agency and the Ministry of Ecology and Environment have recently spoken out to question the content of the report, believing that Japan still has many problems in the legitimacy of sea drainage, the reliability of purification equipment, and the perfection of monitoring programs.
Deng Ge, secretary-general of the China Atomic Energy Agency, said the IAEA report pointed out that the ALPS used by Japan could not remove all radionuclides from the nuclear-contaminated water. From the past operation, ALPS has proved that it cannot effectively remove radionuclides such as tritium and carbon-14, and whether it can effectively remove other radionuclides also needs further tests and engineering verification. According to Japan's own data, more than 70% of the nuclear contaminated water treated by ALPS still does not meet the discharge standards and needs to be purified again. In the subsequent long-term operation, the performance, effectiveness and reliability of ALPS will further decline with the corrosion and aging of the equipment. The Japanese side has not proved the long-term effectiveness and reliability of the nuclear contaminated water purification device.
An insider familiar with Japan's sea drainage plan recently said in an interview with the Global Times that Japan's existing sea drainage plans and assessments are based on the assumption that the treated nuclear contaminated water can meet the standard. Unfortunately, according to data previously released by TEPCO, not only about 70% of the nuclear contaminated water treated by ALPS still does not meet the standard, but 18% of it even exceeds the standard by 10 times to 20,000 times. In addition, the occasional failures and component breakdowns of ALPS raise doubts about its ability to handle nuclear-contaminated water.
According to the Global Times reporter, in August 2021, when the Japanese staff transferred the sludge generated after ALPS treatment to other containers, the treatment system sounded an alarm. The investigation found that the filter used to adsorb nuclides had at least 10 breakages. In order to replace the filter, all ALPS equipment has been out of service since August 30 of that year. TEPCO later found that 24 of the 25 filters on the ALPS device had been damaged. In September 2021, TEPCO announced that five more filters had been found to be broken in ALPS, and radioactive contamination had been detected near some filters.
The insider further said that it is unclear whether the situation can be improved if the substandard water is treated with ALPS twice, and the sea discharge plan provided by TEPCO does not explain how to ensure that the contaminated water meets the discharge standards, nor does it include an analysis of the impact of the non-compliant discharges. According to previously published data, TEPCO only carried out secondary treatment of 0.25% of the contaminated water, did not disclose the time required for secondary treatment, and did not explain the secondary treatment plan for the contaminated water.
The true accuracy of the nuclear-contaminated water data released by Japan has also been questioned by many parties. Dungo said that TEPCO has repeatedly concealed and tampered with data on nuclear-contaminated water in recent years. The Japanese side approved the plan for draining the sea without authorization, stepped up preparations for the discharge of the sea, and used various means to put pressure on the IAEA to set limits on the review and assessment. The IAEA only conducts the review and assessment based on the data and information unilaterally provided by the Japanese side, and only conducts inter-laboratory comparison and analysis of a small number of nuclear contaminated water samples unilaterally collected by the Japanese side.
The above-mentioned insiders also believe that Japan's monitoring of nuclear contaminated water sources is not only incomplete and incomplete, but the authenticity of the measured data is also doubtful. The contaminated water from Fukushima, which comes into direct contact with the molten core, theoretically contains hundreds of nuclides, including fissile nuclides, uranium isotopes, and transuranic nuclides. However, TEPCO initially listed only 64 nuclides, such as H-3 and C-14, as the basis for monitoring and analysis, emission control, and environmental impact assessment. These 64 nuclides do not include uranium isotopes and other parts α nuclides, which have long half-lives and some are highly toxic. In terms of sampling monitoring, TEPCO initially only sampled and monitored 9 nuclides other than tritium in nuclear-contaminated water, and adjusted to 29 in 2023. But this is still not enough for Fukushima's nuclear-contaminated water, which has an extremely complex nuclear composition. "These operations of TEPCO have caused great uncertainty in the source information of nuclear contaminated water, which in turn greatly increases the difficulty of formulating follow-up monitoring plans and marine ecological environmental impact assessment." The insider said.
In fact, even if the IAEA's assessment report concludes that Japan's plan to discharge contaminated water into the sea generally meets international safety standards, there are still risks.
Wei Fangxin, a researcher at the Nuclear and Radiation Safety Center of the Ministry of Ecology and Environment, said in an interview with the Global Times on July 6 that the nuclear radiation safety standard set by the International Atomic Energy Agency is that the dose limit for the public is 1 millisievert per year, but even if it is lower than 1 millisievert, there is still a risk of being affected by radiation, "This is like a high-speed speed limit of 100 kilometers per hour, which does not mean that the speed of a car below 100 kilometers per hour must be absolutely safe." If Japan does not discharge the contaminated water into the sea, or chooses other better disposal methods, we will not have to bear these additional potential risks. The expert said.
Wei Fangxin also pointed out that Japan's Fukushima nuclear power plant nuclear contaminated water has a lot of nuclides, it is very difficult to deal with, each treatment technology it is limited, can only deal with specific types of nuclides, and other nuclides or impurities will affect this treatment equipment, Fukushima nuclear contaminated water composition is complex, such as its high salt content, more impurities, which will affect the performance of the nuclear contaminated water treatment system, in the long run the performance of the treatment system declines, Treated contaminated water may have excessive levels of radioactive activity.
"In the long run, people in Japan's neighboring countries and regions will definitely be adversely affected by the discharge of contaminated water into the sea. From the perspective of radiation protection, within the feasible range, measures should be taken as much as possible to reduce the harm to personnel, but as far as the radioactivity of nuclear contaminated water is concerned, no matter how small, it has a certain degree of harm, the reality is that in the case of radioactive pollution caused by the nuclear leakage of the Fukushima nuclear power plant in Japan is no longer avoidable, we can only ask Japan to reduce the amount of radionuclides emitted as much as possible. Wei Fangxin said.
The IAEA's impartiality has been widely questioned
On July 4, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin stated China's position on the IAEA's comprehensive assessment report on the disposal of Japan's Fukushima nuclear contaminated water. China regrets the agency's hasty issuance of the report.
"This report is issued in the name of Director-General Grossi, and although the IAEA Secretariat has sought expert advice from the Technical Working Group on the draft report prior to its release, the time window for experts is very limited, and the expert opinion is for information only, and it is up to the IAEA Secretariat to decide whether to adopt it. After receiving the feedback, the IAEA Secretariat also issued the report hastily without reaching consensus on the revision of the report and the adoption of the comments with experts from all over the world. I regret that. Liu Lin, a researcher at the China Institute of Atomic Energy (CAGE), a Chinese expert who participated in the IAEA's technical working group on the assessment of Fukushima's "Multi-Nuclide Treatment System (ALPS) treated water" into the sea, briefed the Global Times reporter on July 6. In his view, the IAEA's assessment report has great limitations, as it does not include the effectiveness and long-term reliability of the nuclear contaminated water purification device, does not address the concerns of the international community about the legitimacy of Japan's decision to discharge the sea, and does not fully discuss and make appropriate arrangements for the follow-up review and assessment mission and long-term monitoring arrangements.
Liu Lin believes that the IAEA's assessment is in the nature of international peer evaluation, mainly based on the data and information provided by the Japanese side to make assessments and put forward opinions. In the past two years of assessment tasks, experts from all parties of the technical working group have conducted extensive and in-depth discussions on technical issues such as government duties and functions, main principles and safety objectives, authorization procedures, source characterization, safety issues of discharge systems and processes, radiation environmental impact assessment, source monitoring and environmental monitoring plans, occupational radiation protection, public consultation and participation of relevant parties. "The release of this report by the IAEA does not mean that the IAEA recognizes the legitimacy of Japan's decision to drain the sea, nor does it mean that the IAEA endorses or approves Japan's discharge of nuclear-contaminated water into the ocean." Liu Lin emphasized.
Wei Fangxin also said that the IAEA plays an evaluator rather than a decision-maker in Japan's Fukushima nuclear contaminated water disposal problem, from the perspective of the IAEA, its comprehensive assessment report believes that Japan's nuclear contaminated water discharge plan "meets international safety standards" can only be understood as Japan's Fukushima nuclear contaminated water discharge plan is feasible, but feasibility does not mean that the plan is the optimal solution, on the contrary, there are many doubts that Japan has not given an answer.
The IAEA's unfair performance has also been questioned by many parties. Some Korean media quoted a person from the so-called Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs as saying, "The IAEA accepted a bribe of 1 million euros from the Japanese side to revise the final report." At a press conference on July 4 to release the comprehensive assessment report on the disposal of contaminated water in Fukushima, Japan, a South Korean journalist also asked IAEA Director-General Grossi about this issue, which Grossi denied.
For the IAEA's hasty report, an industry insider who did not want to be named told the Global Times reporter on July 6 that from the IAEA's assessment results, its position is obviously more biased towards the Japanese government, but he believes that there should be two reasons for this.
The person believes that the IAEA itself really wants to solve the problem of Fukushima's contaminated water as soon as possible. Because one of the purposes of the IAEA is to work for the peaceful use of nuclear energy and promote the development of nuclear energy on a global scale, and the issue of the disposal of Fukushima nuclear contaminated water has been unresolved, and the nuclear pollution remediation of the entire Fukushima nuclear power plant has not progressed, which will inevitably adversely affect the development of global nuclear energy. The person said.
In addition, the person also believes that Japan's greater influence in the IAEA cannot be ignored. "From what we know, there are more Japanese nationals working in the IAEA, and this trend has been the case for the past 10 years, and the Japanese government is more active on this issue, and they will send some experts or consultants to serve or provide services in the IAEA at their own expense." From the IAEA's point of view, the ability to enjoy free professional services is of course welcome, and from Japan's point of view, this way expands its influence and voice in the IAEA. The person said.
The relevant operations of the Japanese side are intended to muddle through
In implementing the Fukushima plan to discharge contaminated water, Japan has never been able to prove the legitimacy of its decision to discharge contaminated water. This is one of the reasons why it requested the IAEA to carry out a review and assessment, in which Japan's relevant operations have revealed that it will not deal with relevant issues responsibly for a long time, but is only eager to muddle through for a while.
The China Atomic Energy Agency said July 4 that Japan deliberately limited the authorization of the IAEA technical working group to limit the review and assessment to one option for draining the sea and exclude other possible disposal options. Even if the IAEA finds that discharge meets international safety standards, it cannot prove that discharge is the only or best option for disposing of nuclear-contaminated water.
Liu Lin told the Global Times reporter that the IAEA carried out a review and assessment at the request of the Japanese side after the Japanese government unilaterally made the decision to discharge the contaminated water into the sea. The IAEA's assessment is limited to Japan's plan to discharge the treated contaminated water, the Japanese government's regulatory procedures and activities, and whether TEPCO's implementation of the plan meets IAEA safety standards, and does not include possible disposal options other than the discharge into the sea, nor does it include the effectiveness and long-term reliability of the contaminated water purification device.
Wei Fangxin told the Global Times reporter that for the disposal of Fukushima nuclear contaminated water in Japan, there have been a variety of schemes, and the Japanese side finally narrowed the scope to five schemes: formation injection, marine emissions, steam emissions, hydrogen emissions and underground burial, of which marine emissions and steam emissions are the two main schemes promoted by Japan, but in 2020, Japan finally decided to adopt marine emissions in these two plans, and the main reason why Japan did this was because it was the most cost-effective way. The second is that the use of steam emissions may have a certain impact on its local ecological security, and now Japan chooses to discharge nuclear contaminated water into the high seas, which is the simplest and most trouble-saving way for it, reducing the economic burden and reducing the harm to the mainland, but it has caused potential harm to neighboring countries, which is equivalent to transferring its own risk to other countries.
Wei Fangxin also stressed that one point that needs to be clarified is that when Japan asks the IAEA to evaluate the disposal plan, it does not take all feasible options to the IAEA for evaluation, but takes the most favorable plan for its own sea discharge to the IAEA for evaluation, which is itself limited and one-sided. "It's like when we do the design plan, we must meet the standards, formulate several feasible solutions, compare and then select the best, and Japan's approach is to come up with the only plan that is most beneficial to itself to evaluate, it will not come up with an unfeasible plan, and after the IAEA assesses the feasibility of the plan, it will create a kind of information gap, so that the public has the illusion that this is the best plan that can be taken, so as to rest assured that Japan's Fukushima nuclear contaminated water is discharged into the sea." The expert said.
In order to suppress doubts about the Fukushima nuclear contaminated water discharge plan, Japan's Yomiuri Shimbun and other Japanese media concocted the topic that "China's nuclear power plant tritium emissions are 6.5 times that of Japan's Fukushima nuclear pollution water tritium emissions" in an attempt to confuse the public and reduce the pressure of public opinion for Japan's selfish sea drainage behavior.
As for the relevant statements of Japanese media, China's Ministry of Ecology and Environment responded on July 5 that in fact, Japan's Fukushima nuclear pollution water and the normal operation of nuclear power plants around the world liquid effluent are essentially different. First, the source is different, the second is the different types of radionuclides, and the third is the difficulty of treatment. Japan's Fukushima nuclear contaminated water comes from cooling water injected into the melt-damaged core after the accident, as well as groundwater and rainwater that seeps into the reactor, including various radionuclides present in the molten core, which is difficult to treat. In contrast, the wastewater produced by the normal operation of nuclear power plants mainly comes from process drainage, ground drainage, etc., contains a small amount of fissile nuclides, strictly abides by international standards, adopts the best available technology treatment, and is discharged in an organized manner after strict monitoring to meet the standards, and the discharge is far below the specified control value.
Wei Fangxin further introduced that Japan's Fukushima nuclear contaminated water and the radionuclides of the normal liquid effluent of nuclear power plants in various countries around the world are obviously different, and the most typical feature of Japan's Fukushima nuclear contaminated water is that it contains a certain amount of long-life nuclides with greater toxicity, such as I-129 and transuranic nuclides, which are more harmful.
"The Japanese media's repeated hype with tritium is obviously a manifestation of weakness, and its purpose is to cover up the issue of the discharge of Fukushima's nuclear-contaminated water and muddle through." Wei Fangxin said.