Scarecrow of Jiang Zuquan 2022-05-22
Born in Tokyo, Eri Hotta was educated in Japan, the United States and the United Kingdom, and taught at Oxford, Tokyo and Jerusalem, focusing on international relations.
Hotta Eri sorted out and analyzed the historical details of the eight months before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in World War II, the decision-making process of the entire plan, and the dilemma faced by the Japanese government in 1941, including the exhaustion of manpower and limited resources since Japan invaded China in 1937, the deterioration of the economy, the serious division of Japan's ruling class over whether to continue expansionism, and even among the top of the military, there were skeptics, and some within the military hardliners believed that if the United States went to war, Japan would definitely lose.
In this case, why should soldiers, civil servants, diplomats, and the emperor put their country and people in unnecessary danger, and so on.
Through an in-depth analysis of many hitherto unpublished first-hand accounts in Japanese, Hotta, in his book The Great Defeat of Japan, describes the motives and actions of those who doubts, schemers, and so-called patriots who led the country to disaster, shows the global dangers that can arise when the political system of a powerful country fails, and shows how reason is engulfed in the process of collective disaster.
The following article was originally published in Jiangxi Normal University's "Reading and Writing Monthly" magazine No. 1, 2020, by Jiang Zuquan. The article is briefly edited and reproduced below.
The defeat that caused the death Jiang Zuquan Wen |
On December 7, 1941, the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor.
Tactically, the Japanese achieved great success, but strategically they committed suicide. While being trapped in the Chinese war zone, they are also enemies of the United States, and their decisions are so irrational, are they all crazy?
On October 16, 1941, Prime Minister Fumihiro Konoe announced his resignation, and the next day, the emperor summoned Hideki Tojo and appointed him prime minister, much to Tojo's surprise.
In the Guards cabinet, Hideki Tojo, the prime minister, was a headache, and he advocated being tough on the United States. In decision-making circles, everyone knows that Tojo is lying nonsense, even if he fights the United States, it depends on the navy, has nothing to do with the army, and Japan cannot win.
It is estimated that at that time, the United States produced more than 500 times more oil than Japan, 20 times pig iron, 9 times copper, and 7 times aluminum, and the average industrial output of the United States was more than 74 times that of Japan. In the event of war, Japan would lose an average of 1.4 million tons of warships per year, far exceeding its replenishment capacity, and by the third year, all civilian ships would have disappeared.
Konoe Fumiki was from an aristocratic family, hesitant to do things, and always wanted to please all parties. But the army and navy are desperately torturing the guards in order to grab resources, and Hideki Tojo's trick is: frequently playing the "anti-American" card.
In the atmosphere of militarism, Japan is "anti-American" equal to "patriotic" and has natural moral legitimacy, which is more appealing than logic. The mid-ranking officers mostly supported Tojo, they came from humble beginnings, and before the ceiling of promotion, they felt that the Lord and the faction should all step down so that they could let go and do a big job.
At that time, everyone in Japan's decision-making circles was at risk, for fear of being misunderstood by angry youth, and no one dared to speak out against the war. Under the aggressive pressure of Hideki Tojo, Fumiki Konoe had to delay, but Tojo came up with a trick: set a final time point to solve the problem. In the countdown, Konoe Fumiki simply picked the pick and resigned.
Bringing Hideki Tojo to power actually contains malice: let him also taste the taste of Konoe Fumiki, and see if he really dares to go to war with the Americans?
Hideki Tojo, the 40th Prime Minister of Japan
After pushing Hideki Tojo to the foreground, Tojo also began to make trouble.
The trouble stemmed from the "July Seven Incident". The Japanese Army thought that it would win the war against China in a few months, but it did not expect to be trapped in it, resulting in a lack of material resources and human resources, and even the iron bars of the imperial palace were removed and sent to the steelmaking furnace.
The best way to evade blame was to take the initiative, and the Army had a radical idea: to attack Southeast Asia. Southeast Asia had rubber and tin that could threaten the Dutch East Indies with oil supplies while cutting off Chinese supplies and forcing Chiang Kai-shek to surrender.
But it was a colony of the great powers, and the United States could not sit idly by. Sure enough, as soon as the Japanese army took a step forward, the United States ordered an oil embargo, and Japan fell into panic, with only enough oil reserves for a year, and could only submit to the United States as soon as possible.
In fact, the United States also intends to make peace with Japan. At this time, Roosevelt was determined to go to war with Germany, he did not want to fight Japan at the same time, he was willing to give up practical profits and retain the moral high ground. But Hideki Tojo needs face more to ensure that his "anti-American" performance does not wear gangs. In the treaty, he set up too many complex wording and did not give in to the fur issue.
In fact, the United States proposed a plan of substantial concessions, but the Japanese did not understand them, and in the last days, the Japanese also proposed concessions, but the Americans could not understand them.
Until the moment the Japanese military plane took off, the United States and Japan still had the possibility of reaching peace, and if the countdown had not been set, Japanese diplomats could have played a role, and Roosevelt even told them that "there is always room for negotiation between friends", but the person in charge of the final mediation knew that there was no time.
If Japan can compromise a little on face, Japan will reap all the benefits, but how can it explain it to the patriots? I wanted "lizi" and "face" again, and they all turned out to be lost.
In the process of rushing to war, Japan has several forces to put on the brakes. Why is no one hitting the brakes?
The first was Emperor Hirohito, an anti-war faction who was assassinated for it. Faced with the war motion, his series of rhetorical questions left the generals stunned. However, since the Meiji Restoration, no emperor had vetoed the opinion of the cabinet, and he finally chose to back down.
The second is the navy, Yamamoto Isoroku is a resolute anti-war faction, but he did not have the courage to oppose his superiors, but he took the initiative to "fight first", and in opposing wrong decisions, he did far less effort than he did in preparing for war. At the cabinet meeting at which the war was decided, the Navy reduced the forecast of an estimated annual loss of 1.4 million tons of warships by 50%, which became the judgment that Japan's shipbuilding capacity would be sufficient to compensate for the losses. The explanation of the person in charge was: the emperor would veto it anyway.
The third is Hideki Tojo, who is "anti-American" for canvassing, not necessarily from the heart; But when the power is monopolized, all parties send good news, and the perfect and bold "attack on Pearl Harbor plan" is on the table, does he dare to deny it? Then he would lose his political base, he kidnapped Japan with slogans, but slogans also kidnapped him.
The fourth is Japanese diplomats, who have an excellent reputation in the international community, they understand the world and are resolute anti-war factions, but they are cautious and prefer the sinking of large ships, and as long as they do not drown themselves first, they will never take the initiative.
At that time, there were still liberals in Japan, resolutely opposed to the war, but they had no one in the DPRK and China, and few people should make peace. Japanese liberals became a decoration.
During the reign of Taisho (Emperor Hirohito's father), liberals once dominated the political situation, bringing an unprecedented atmosphere of freedom, but they encountered a sharp increase in anger. Japan's economy is growing rapidly, and all social strata are changing rapidly, but the upper class is relatively closed, which makes everyone feel that their interests are being deprived.
With internal grievances and a lack of space for political expression, xenophobia has become the best channel for venting anger, fueled by education and the media, and "patriotism" is the only one. Through this distorted mirror, in the face of all kinds of unsatisfactory reality, the Japanese people have shifted the responsibility to the "traitors", and liberals who advocate Western ideas have become the target of everyone.
Konoe Fumiki was plucked up by the liberal boss Nishienji Gongwang, but Saienji himself was almost killed in a coup d'état, and he and Konoe later had more and more different views, and even stopped interacting.
Both were anti-war, but Konoe believed that a war would be lost based on a strength analysis, while Saienji opposed the abandonment of moral principles for the benefit of his country, based on the value that "there are still human beings above all nations".
It turned out that Saienji was prescient, and in the decision-making process of the "attack on Pearl Harbor", not a single high-ranking figure disagreed from a moral standpoint, they were all thorough utilitarians, and without moral height, it was easy to form evil alliances by greed.
It is worth reflecting on why Nishienji's liberal ideas have no market in Japan. This is indeed the responsibility of ideological traditions and cultural traditions. Through the book "The Great Defeat of Japan", we can appreciate that such a tragedy is by no means an isolated case in the modern East.
Duke Nishienji, guardian of Japanese liberalism
Latecomer is both an advantage and a disadvantage
Latecomers learn from others to reduce the "cost of trial and error", which is for the "latecomer advantage". However, when entering the stalemate stage, there will be a "latecomer disadvantage":
On the one hand, without trial and error, society lacks the training to resolve the collective impetuosity brought about by rapid growth. On the other hand, the latecomer naturally has a sense of direction, just need to follow the strong country, but once it is equal or leading, there will be problems, because its development is not endogenous, it is imitated, it is obtained in "comparison with others", once the object of comparison disappears or is blocked, it may go blind.
Blind and impetuous, inevitably ignoring universality, intoxicated with the particularity of the self, is the most likely to lead to disaster.
Nationalism kidnaps society
The evolution of all things is a process of continuous differentiation, and so is human beings, the separation of politics and society is the trend of the times, and it is also the only way to enter modernization, and clinging to the chaotic state that does not distinguish each other will not only restrict overall progress, but also cause historical regression.
The reason why Japan went to war, middle-level officers were an important thrust, because of the system, they could not see the whole truth, and they were particularly easily deceived by myths and passions. However, the top management thinks that creating myths and sensationalism can unite the middle level and grasp more resources.
Although in the biological world it is often the cow wagging its tail, in the power field, it is often the tail wagging the cow.
There was no opposition before the incident
Although history cannot be assumed, if Ryusu and Nomura were desperate to make decisive concessions to the United States, would the outcome change?
In fact, it won't.
Because in the bad environment, the upper echelons are generally refined egoists, just as Yamamoto Fifty-Six opposed suicide submarines, but still used in real combat, expressing dissent, is the highest proof of human nature.
The lack of "loyal opponents" in a society will only increase the number of "disloyal apors".
If you start wrong, it's easy to get it wrong
Japan in World War II had enough opportunities to fix its mistakes, and since it was dragged down by the war of aggression against China, it was a retreat that was, although it did not get what it wanted, but at least it did not have to pay the price.
In other words, it was possible to replace Hideki Tojo within Japan at that time, but because the war situation deteriorated step by step, someone was always responsible for it in the end. Therefore, all parties within Japan decided to remain silent and let Hideki Tojo continue to work. After the war, Hideki Tojo and others were in charge of the International Court of Justice, and the other parties were responsible for rebuilding Japan.
Looking back at Japan's defeat in the past, it is not difficult to find that when culture and institutions deviate from the track of progress and development, the social crisis will become greater and greater with the pressure of development, and eventually develop to the point that no one can make up for it.
Even if there is no problem with Hideki Tojo's generation, there will be problems in the next generation. Even if they are all understanding people, they may still walk into disaster hand in hand, and they will still collectively abandon reason. (End of Jiang Zuquan's article)
John Adams, the second president of the United States, said:
"Despite the progress of mankind in all other areas of science, it is not much better in the way it is managed than it was three or four thousand years ago."
Looking at the vast history of human development, it can be seen that those in high positions are so often stupid and do things that are completely contrary to their own interests:
- The rulers of Trojan had every reason to suspect that the Trojan horse was a trick of the Greeks, but they pulled it into the city anyway.
- George III's successive cabinets have maintained a threatening attitude towards the American colonies, even though doing so would do more harm than good.
- Charles XII and Napoleon, and later Hitler, regardless of the catastrophe suffered by the pioneers, still insisted on invading Russia.
- and the introduction of stupid decisions such as the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor ... As described above, it will be covered below.
Why is the government's performance so unsatisfactory compared to all human activity? American historian Barbara Tuchman has profound insight into this problem that has plagued mankind for thousands of years.
American historian Barbara Tuchman
In her book "March of Foolishness", Ms. Tuchman not only deeply analyzes the mechanism that makes the government frequently make mistakes and even do evil, but also shows how mass blindness can infringe on the sanity of the entire society and make a normal person commit destructive behavior.
At that time, Japan's main obstacle in the way of progress was the United States, which consistently refused to accept Japan's step-by-step occupation of China and became increasingly reluctant to provide Japan with raw materials to avoid further risky actions.
How to achieve its goals without angering the United States was a question that plagued Japan from 1940 to 1941.
In January 1941, Japan began planning a super-daring devastating strike against the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor. Japanese Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto saw that he could not stop the plan, so he proposed:
Japan should "violently attack and destroy the main American fleet from the very beginning of the war, thereby severely demoralizing the US Navy and its people."
Proponents of this plan believe that the raid will make it impossible for the United States to interfere with Japan and never again dare to take further hostile actions against Japan.
The sound of warnings is always heard. Prime Minister Prince Konoe resigned at this time, commanders quarreled, advisers hesitated, and the emperor sullen—he asked his men whether a sneak attack could be as great a victory as the attack on Port Arthur in the Russo-Japanese War, to which the chief of naval staff replied that it was still doubtful whether Japan could win.
But it was in this atmosphere of doubt that the extreme adventure of attacking Pearl Harbor was approved. Why? In addition to the analysis above, Barbara Tuchman has a more convincing explanation in her writings.
Pearl Harbor site
Politics is made up of the smartest people, but always makes the stupidest decisions. The leaders of every world war before every world war, almost all of whom knew the art of statecraft and power games, fell into astonishing collective stupidity and confused self-confidence, and these brilliant professional politicians personally dragged human civilization into a catastrophe.
History has brains, but people often don't. Because of the lack of innovation in the way humanity has managed for thousands of years, the fatal problems that caused great disasters in the past have never disappeared and could return at any time.
Without Tuchman's persistent and profound revelation of the mechanisms of human catastrophe, the wisdom of many politicians and social elites would have been greatly diminished.
Kennedy had resolved to stay calm after reading her August Cannon Fire, thus avoiding a nuclear war that could destroy humanity. And today's Russian war in Ukraine reminds me of Tuchman, a wise female historian.
Tuchman's Stilwell and the American Experience in China, Tower of Pride: A Portrait of the Pre-War World, March of Foolishness, The Bible and the Sword, and August Cannon Fire, a collection of eight volumes and nine volumes, Chinese Simplified the world's most complete collection of Tuchman's works.
"The so-called excellent historical work is that the reader knows the ending for a long time, but still can't stop the suspenseful words." Tuchman's genius in organizing language ensures that all her work possesses this quality.